Roger Guesnerie and Henry Tulkens (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262073028
- eISBN:
- 9780262274500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262073028.001.0001
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Climate
Debates over post-Kyoto Protocol climate change policy often take note of two issues: the feasibility and desirability of international cooperation on climate change policies, given the failure of ...
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Debates over post-Kyoto Protocol climate change policy often take note of two issues: the feasibility and desirability of international cooperation on climate change policies, given the failure of the United States to ratify Kyoto, and the very limited involvement of developing countries; and the optimal timing of climate policies. This book offers insights into both of these concerns. It first considers the appropriate institutions for effective international cooperation on climate change, proposing an alternative to the Kyoto arrangement and a theoretical framework for such a scheme. The discussions then turn to the stability of international environmental agreements, emphasizing the logic of coalition forming (including the applicability of game-theoretical analysis). Finally, chapters address both practical and quantitative aspects of policy design, offering theoretical analyses of such specific policy issues as intertemporal aspects of carbon trade and the optimal implementation of a sequestration policy and then using formal mathematical models to examine policies related to the rate of climate change, international trade and carbon leakage, and the shortcomings of the standard Global Warming Potential index.Less
Debates over post-Kyoto Protocol climate change policy often take note of two issues: the feasibility and desirability of international cooperation on climate change policies, given the failure of the United States to ratify Kyoto, and the very limited involvement of developing countries; and the optimal timing of climate policies. This book offers insights into both of these concerns. It first considers the appropriate institutions for effective international cooperation on climate change, proposing an alternative to the Kyoto arrangement and a theoretical framework for such a scheme. The discussions then turn to the stability of international environmental agreements, emphasizing the logic of coalition forming (including the applicability of game-theoretical analysis). Finally, chapters address both practical and quantitative aspects of policy design, offering theoretical analyses of such specific policy issues as intertemporal aspects of carbon trade and the optimal implementation of a sequestration policy and then using formal mathematical models to examine policies related to the rate of climate change, international trade and carbon leakage, and the shortcomings of the standard Global Warming Potential index.
