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This chapter considers what can be learnt from the EMU negotiations and why an EMU agreement was possible. It looks at the nature and patterns of coalition building. It also examines the EMU negotiations in the context of European integration theories and outlines the theoretical implications of the study. Finally, it identifies the key problems in the Maastricht agreement, especially the risk of being locked into a politics of deflation in the context of imperfect legitimation.

With the failure to delay or block the EMU initiative, Major was left to bridge the unbridgeable, caught between a divided party and European credibility. Party divisions prevented any radical shift of policy. More constructive rhetoric did not disguise essential policy continuity. Major's instincts were for pragmatism, but any scope for building alternative coalitions (e.g. with the German–Dutch bloc) were not exploited, despite compatibilities in policy belief (on monetary policy and on free markets). Thus, the end game became dominated by the technical design of an opt‐out from EMU and a weakening stage 2. The ‘victory’ on the opt‐out was somewhat hollow: not least because Britain's partners had all but given up on her. The problems of reconciling Britain's interests were graphically portrayed by its exit from the ERM in September 1992. The irony of Major's leadership was that, despite him giving priority to party unity, the Conservative Party was left in almost terminable decline and he failed to ease the constraints on his successor.

This chapter concentrates on the reform opportunities that emerge when a government exploits its parliamentary majority. For example the privatizations and pension reforms carried out in the UK by the Thatcher government. When backed by a large parliamentary majority, the policy-makers' only constraint is the need to win a future election, which provides freedom of action in most cases. Yet, this strategy is not always valuable. The mix of successes and failures suggests that other institutional elements are crucial, such as the (lack of) internal cohesion in coalition governments or the existence of strong opposition. A strong parliamentary majority can thus be insufficient to generate sufficient coalition building.

This chapter examines how countries build multilateral military coalitions. Diplomatic networks provide critical underpinnings for multilateral coalition-building efforts. States that are most interested in seeing a given coalition deploy will develop operational plans of how the mission should look and instrumentalize existing bilateral and multilateral connections to recruit fitting coalition contributors. The trust, information, and facility to construct issue linkages and side payments embedded in these networks help these states in their coalition-building endeavor. Moreover, these states ask common institutional contacts to serve as cooperation brokers and use institutional venues as coalition negotiation fora. In short, diplomatic embeddedness serves as a resource, a strategic capability that states use to bargain third parties into joining a coalition.

India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has a Westminster type parliamentary system with single member plurality elections. In a seemingly major challenge to Duverger’s laws, India has developed a large multiparty system despite its SMP electoral system. Part of the answer is that the extreme multi-party system in the all-India parliament masks the nature of party competition in the electoral districts. Electoral competition can be thought of as a series of different regional level two-party contests.

This chapter assesses how New York City, Los Angeles, and Toronto have used the three governing strategies—institution building, coalition building, and capacity building—to support their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Each strategy reduces key sources of uncertainty that arise when taking up the new and challenging issue of climate change mitigation. The governing strategies facilitate action on climate change and channel resources to the effort. In this way, the strategies underpin and support governance for climate change mitigation regardless of the particular mode of governing or source of emissions being targeted. These strategies have manifested in different ways: while New York City and Toronto have focused on building stakeholder coalitions invested in and informing city government programs, Los Angeles has focused more on mobilizing voters willing to support ballot initiatives.

This chapter argues that Congress may be called the graveyard of major health reforms. It begins by examining the institutional setting of U.S. governance in which Congress is embedded and highlights the challenges this generally poses for large-scale policy making compared with of other countries. The chapter then examines the problem of coalition building in legislatures to illustrate the challenges and opportunities engendered by Congress in the twentieth century. It highlights the manner in which the system's institutional features and health-care politics have changed over time, creating different opportunities for coalition building, and then explains why those opportunities have been missed or ineffectively pursued. The chapter concludes with some ideas for enhancing future opportunities to enact universal coverage.

This concluding chapter discusses that most multilateral military coalitions—including those operating under the umbrella of an international organization—are purposefully constructed by states that are most interested in the deployment of a particular operation. These pivotal states thereby instrumentalize diplomatic embeddedness; they use their diplomatic networks as a resource, as a strategic capability to construct allied cooperation. Most pivotal states are politically powerful and wealthy. Yet asymmetrical power capabilities alone often cannot account for the coalition negotiation outcomes observed in this book. Relatively weak states in fact are often able to drive a hard bargain. They are aware of the pivotal states' desire for their coalition contribution and thus hold considerable power in coalition negotiations. The social-institutional theory of multilateral military coalition building developed in this book explains the theoretical underpinnings of these dynamics in detail. The chapter then considers this book's implications for how governments, international organizations, scholars, and informed citizens analyze multilateral military coalition building and make policies to deal with it.

This introductory chapter discusses the importance of studying the process of coalition building. The puzzle of collective mobilization lies at the root of all politics. Studying the construction of multilateral military coalitions trains this puzzle on the context of international security—the one area of international cooperation that has traditionally been perceived as the most difficult to sustain a cooperative equilibrium. Moreover, the specific techniques used to build multilateral military coalitions affect how wars are fought. On the battlefield, coalition operations are supposedly more successful than non-coalition endeavors. Multilateral coalition building also affects the prospect for peace. Most peacekeeping deployments today are coalition endeavors, and research suggests that the stronger their participants, particularly in terms of personnel numbers and equipment, the more effective the missions are likely to be. Finally, coalitions unleash important socialization dynamics among participating states. They create common battle experiences and shape threat perceptions, military doctrine, and strategy for years to come. Sometimes, participation in a coalition can radically change a country's political trajectory. Thus, this book uses a social-institutional theory and evidence from over eighty multilateral military coalitions to explain coalition-building practices.

This chapter discusses violence against women in the context of broader pro-Beijing and pro-democracy movements. In Hong Kong, the significance of the political transition is apparent in the development of oppositional politics, characterized by movements enabling the collective contestation of economic and political power relations, organizing to articulate oppositional and competing frames of democracy, human rights, and feminism, and maintaining freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press. The Hong Kong Women's Coalition on Equal Opportunities is the most prominent coalition of rights-based, grassroots-oriented women's groups, albeit diverse feminist organizational forms, rhetoric, and strategies. In contrast, the Hong Kong Federation of Women unites and propagates patriotic and nationalist passions among women's groups. Both coalitions have common concerns about local women's issues but they rely on different economic, political, and social networks and employ opposing rhetoric and strategies. Given the hierarchical, corporatist dimensions of the Hong Kong government and its complex interactions with the Beijing government, feminist engagement with state institutions and processes is always combined with efforts to maintain broader transformatory struggle and movement-oriented activism.

Chapter 8 considers the internal dynamics of diversity seeking organisations and the implications for their engagement in skilled immigration policy processes. Undertaking an audit of all major organisations in the field in Australia and Canada, this chapter demonstrates the importance of funding diversity, coalition building and a flat organisational structure for diversity-seeking group strength, itself a necessary precursor to venue shopping. The chapter concludes by considering the practical policy and theoretical implications of the gender analysis presented in the book.

Lowth's social networks at different periods in his life using his collected correspondence as a basis but also other documents, like his lists of presentation copies for Isaiah (1778). An important tool for this is Lowth's use of epistolary formulas, which can be employed as an index of politeness.

This chapter develops a framework for understanding and evaluating the tools available to, and deployed by, city governments for governing, foregrounding the “how” of urban climate change mitigation. The framework has three components. First, city governments make choices about the policies and governing modes they will use to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These choices represent each city's unique route to climate change mitigation and are shaped by the broader social, political, institutional, and physical context. Second, regardless of the specific route a city chooses, there are shared governing strategies city governments can and do use to mobilize participants and resources: institution building, coalition building, and capacity building. These strategies allow city governments to reduce key sources of uncertainty, mobilize the participants, and coordinate the resources needed for change. Third, evaluating urban climate change governance requires evaluating its impacts. These are both reductions in city-scale GHG emissions and broader changes in the city, and beyond, catalyzed by efforts to reduce urban GHG emissions.

This chapter focuses on the Korean War, which constituted the first instance of multilateral military coalition building in the post-World War II era. The U.S. government served as the pivotal state in this coalition-building effort. The chapter then looks at the deployment decisions of the three largest troop-contributing countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, and Turkey; the Philippines, a deeply embedded state with the United States in 1950; and South Africa, a weakly embedded state with the United States in 1950. The deployment decisions of the U.K. and Canada were the result of intense U.S. prodding involving a mixture of personal appeals, incentives, and threats. In this process, the U.S. government instrumentalized diplomatic networks to the greatest extent possible. Meanwhile, the Philippines was lured into the coalition via U.S. diplomatic embeddedness. Finally, in the case of South Africa, diplomatic embeddedness played no direct role. Rather, South Africa perceived the Korean War as an opportunity to gain from the U.S. long-desired military equipment, in particular military aircraft.

This chapter argues that even if we try to build coalition around what might seem to be our most obvious common concern — reducing racism — the black-white paradigm that dominates racial discourse in the United States inhibits our comprehension of the variety of racisms and racial identities and thus proves more of an obstacle to coalition building than an aid. It uses the situation of Latinos and Asian Americans to explore the black-white binary, what it is, how it operates, and how it is limiting. It then discusses the black-white paradigm.

The new NAFTA regime offers several instruments for capacity building, convergence, coalition building, and regulatory communication. These constitute improved mechanisms for dealing with environmental regulatory protectionism when certain conflicts arise between governments, firms, and environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs). Also, to reduce regulatory barriers, the NAFTA regime entails instruments that advocate proactive cooperation. As such, this regulatory regime not only utilizes international commerce in improving the competitiveness of firms, but also enhances and protects the natural environment. The North American automotive industry demonstrates the creation and implementation of some of these new cooperative instruments. In this chapter, we illustrate the automotive industry case in which vehicle emissions were being reduced, and in which maintenance and operational inspection also proved to be important elements.

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).