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In order to establish the correlation between interdisciplinary approach and cooperation, the authors devised a questionnaire and sent a copy to three educational organizations. Collaborative and cross-departmental behaviors are captured through the proportion of scientists whose methods came from scientific inquiries as opposed to those whose approaches came from the problem statement. Findings indicate that association is present with interdisciplinary study and co-authorship and cooperative manifestations. Although there are dilemmas in the identification of problems and the appropriate strategies to employ, these attempts result in the evaluation of research programs and in the resolution of field concerns. Also, the significance of an investigator's competence and knowledge, as well as that person's working relationship with others (not only participants, but also other researchers), is recognized.

The ‘we’ passages in 2 Cor 1‐9 (1:3‐14; 1:18‐22; 2:14‐7:2; 7:13‐8:7; 8:16‐24) reveal Timothy's contribution as co‐author. The alternating ‘I’ sections (1:15‐17; 1:23‐2:13; 7:3‐12; 8:8‐15; 9:1‐15) were dictated by Paul alone because they concern matters in which Timothy was not involved, viz. the Intermediate Visit and the Collection for the Poor of Jerusalem.

This chapter argues that Sosthenes (1:1) should be understood as the co‐author of with Paul of 1 Cor, and that his contribution is perceptible particularly in 1:18–31 and 2:6–16. The kagô in 2:1 and 3:1, and the abrupt shift from ‘we’ to ‘I’, show where Paul has taken over in some irritation.

This final chapter considers co-authorship and makes three principal claims. First, it states that Shakespeare’s involvement with co-authorship was largely or entirely confined to the first and the final phases of his development, i.e. those years when he was closest to his fellow playwrights and most distant from the actors who performed his plays. Second, it concludes that co-authorship, for practical reasons, militates against complex evolving relationship between characters. Third, it argues that Shakespeare, as a co-author, tends to respond creatively to the poetic effects created by his collaborator—a tendency that makes his literary craft simultaneously more self-advertising and more reducible to conventional literary norms. These claims are established and explored through a series of plays in which co-authorship is likely or certain, including Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII, and The Two Noble Kinsmen.

‘Imitation and Identity’ is the first of three chapters that deal with Shakespeare’s early career, covering the years 1592 to 1594. It looks at the close parallels between Shakespeare’s style in this period and that of his contemporaries. What has sometimes been seen as Shakespeare’s imitation of Marlowe in plays like 3 Henry VI and Titus Andronicus, it is suggested, should instead be understood as his deployment of conventional rhetoric. The writing we have come to call ‘Marlovian’ was in fact widely distributed. Indeed, Marlowe’s distinctive artistic identity is itself in some ways a function of modern editorial practice rather than being an absolute fact. In his early years, Shakespeare worked in a way that related closely to his poet-playwright contemporaries: through literary imitation, through deliberate allusion, and almost certainly also through co-authorship with fellow poets such as George Peele. Throughout these early years as a professional writer, it is argued, Shakespeare’s individual voice tends to blur with that of other literary voices—a tendency that was widespread amongst writers for the theatre at this time.

Most of the commutative entries in the book are not authored individually, but are produced jointly by a number of visitors (usually family members, classmates, etc.). The co-produced and co-written entries sometimes index these interactions and at other times conceal them. Following Goffman’s dramaturgical model, the chapter illustrates and adds to the social roles involved in producing visitors’ “faces” on the pages of the book as coherent and proficient utterances. The chapter proceeds to discuss playful utterances, suggesting the important ideological function of “light” or “playful” commemorative texts within the otherwise somber and serious environment. Finally, the chapter addresses visitors’ drawings—the visual grammar that they reveal and how they contribute to the retelling and amplification of ethnonational Zionist narrative.

Chapter 5 elaborates the view that dances are indicated structures of action-types, manifest in performance events. The nature of dance action-types and choreographic structuring principles are discussed. The chapter develops the idea that choreographic authorship is a form of artistic indication and explores debates about dancer co-authorship, arguing for the latter under certain conditions. The notion of a norm-type or kind is also considered, alongside the idea that choreography specifies norms for performance. The chapter considers how dance works often depend on underlying consensus about such norms rather than on scores or texts which articulate them explicitly. Contemporary scoring practices are examined in this regard, and it is argued that there is no sharp division between works and structured improvisations. The question of how a norm-type or kind can be manifest is addressed, the chapter arguing that works (qua norm-types or kinds) are only indirectly perceptible.

This commentary raises numerous questions for the communicative conception of law. Given that compliance with law has multiple motivations, how can it be effective in sending a message of equal respect? Why do we have to be co-authors of the message, as opposed to merely affirming it? Why does the message or its affirmation have to come from the collective, rather than from individuals? Supposing we must author the message, why must our roles in doing so be equal? Why does the communicative function of democratic law give us a reason for participating in a democratic system? These questions give rise to two general challenges. First, how can we reconcile the demand on individual citizens to convey a message of equal respect with the idea that it is the collective which conveys the message? Second, why couldn’t law have the role of communicating public commitments without those commitments being democratic?