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The ground forces had high expectations of the IAF. Elazar remained vague about the IAF's role in the defensive campaign, but he made it clear that the regulars would have to hang on singlehandedly for a “few hours” until the IAF attained air superiority (ninety-six hours, according to the IAF commander). No one checked the calculations or asked whether the small regular army could hold the line alone for such a long time. Ground support was third on the IAF's list of priorities, after defense of the skies and air superiority. The IAF had little interest in the ground forces’ targets, regarding them as “a pain in the ass” and usually missing them. The IAF's accomplishments in the war were minimal, and its assistance to the ground forces negligible.

This chapter examines Almond’s final assignment as Commandant, US Army War College, where he left an indelible impression. This final assignment proved especially rewarding. Subsequent commandants have maintained and expanded many of his curriculum ideas, including a broader focus on international affairs and a joint perspective. He also used the time to study the use of l close air support in Korea, with an eye toward improving interoperability with the Air Force.

This chapter is the second of two chapters that analyse the role of military lawyers in the contemporary US kill chain. It focuses on dynamic (unplanned) targeting and shows how its ontology of violence necessitates rapid forms of decision making that affects both the possibility of legal advice and its content. An examination of close air support (CAS) and troops in contact (TIC) targeting operations reveals the rapid legal and operational interpretations that military actors form as they attempt to make sense of highly mobile targets and fast-moving events. These involve issues of self-defence, imminence of threats, and proportionality. It is argued that dynamic and time-sensitive targeting create their own unique military ‘necessities’ and governing legalities. The chapter shows that the latitude given to interpretational work has real-world consequences for both troops on the ground and civilians: dynamic targeting accounts for a high proportion of fratricides and civilian casualties.

Chapter 4 examines the development of new aircraft. It also details how new technologies were incorporated into training exercises. As the training revolution was beginning, the air force was procuring new aircraft and systems with special new technologies. The new technologies forced the training exercises to become even more realistic and to increase threat levels to keep pace with advancements in the aircraft. One of the most contentious issues that arose from the Vietnam experience was the air force’s perceived lack of interest in performing close air support (CAS). This spurred the creation of the A-10. The A-10 quickly found a place in specifically designed Red Flag and other exercises that focused exclusively on the CAS mission. The post–Vietnam era also saw the procurement of “advanced fighters.” The F-15 and F-16 became complementary systems that functioned in tandem at Red Flag exercises and blended advanced technologies (radar and missiles) with advanced training techniques to produce a combat air force prepared to face either the Soviets or their proxies. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the stealth technology also altered more traditional uses of air power and provided the TAC with a powerful weapon that could destroy Soviet air defense systems.

Classical deterrence concepts were developed to prevent nuclear war, for obvious reasons, and thus tend to focus on high-stakes crisis bargaining, or “chicken” games, to both threaten and avoid Armageddon. Yet deterrence may operate in many different settings (i.e., different games) and with repeated interactions by the players. Indeed, deterrence is prevalent, if underappreciated, at the operational level of war, even when a state is attacking at the strategic level. Drawing on a number of historical examples, this chapter argues that command of the air over the battlefield is operationally valuable because it deters ground forces from massing and maneuvering, which can benefit either offensive and defensive operations. The degree to which an air force can deter in war depends on various operational factors, including the degree of air superiority achieved over the battlefield, the capability of the air force to locate and target enemy ground forces, the composition of enemy forces, the presence of friendly ground forces, and permissive environmental conditions.

The Indian Army defeated the Italians in Abyssinia and played a crucial role in containing Erwin Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika in Egypt–Libya in 1941–2. The Indian troops proved themselves masters of mountain warfare in the rolling hills of Abyssinia, in Tunisia, and also in Italy (1944). The pre-1939 Indian Army had a template of war which was geared for conducting Small War along the mountainous tracts of the North-West Frontier. Some of its elements were useful for the Indian units while fighting in the mountainous regions of Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Italy. However, in the course of the various campaigns, the Indian Army also absorbed certain new elements (such as cooperation with aircraft, anti-tank guns and tanks, use of concentrated artillery fire in fluid battlefield scenarios, etc.) for conducting conventional warfare. For instance, use of superior artillery and close air support in a quick and efficient manner at Second Alamein, Tunisia, and in Italy were some of the tactical techniques which functioned as force multipliers.