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Why have the climate negotiations failed? How might we do better? This chapter answers these questions by relying on three of Tom Schelling's greatest insights—the importance of, and difficulty in, making credible commitments; the value of framing negotiations in a way that suggests focal points; and the role that tipping can play in creating positive feedbacks for emission reductions and treaty participation. The climate regime developed so far has failed to provide a credible enforcement mechanism, was framed in a way that made agreement difficult, and has stimulated negative rather than positive feedbacks. This is why so little has been achieved, despite so much having been invested in the negotiations. To do better, our approach must change. Our focus should be on negotiating obligations that can be enforced, on framing the negotiations to facilitate agreement, and on identifying sources of leverage for positive feedbacks. The chapter suggests ways in which we can do all of these things, as well as expressing doubt as to whether we can do enough to avoid possible catastrophes. As in other areas that have attracted Professor Schelling's attention, even the best policy cannot be sure of averting danger. There are no guarantees, only better or worse choices.

This introductory chapter discusses how our current response to climate change has been inadequate and inequitable. During UN climate negotiations, nations still talk about climate inaction. Developed countries emphasize the importance of climate issues, but climate change is largely a product of their own unconstrained greenhouse gas emissions. Nations downplay their historical responsibilities for the problem, demanding instead that all nations take measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—an issue described here as climate injustice. In addition, power relations continue to shift in new ways, particularly as the world warms. The chapter explores these shifting power dynamics and considers their impact on our ability to take sustainable and equitable action, and how we can change course.

This chapter explains that while much of the world was still preoccupied with scenes of people arriving at Europe's external borders in 2015 and the search for solutions to the crisis of migration that these scenes were widely taken to represent, in a setting that could not contrast more with the rawness of life and refuge being depicted in the viral images beaming their way around the world, negotiators from around the globe gathered in Paris for the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The bureaucratic, meticulous, and technical world of climate change negotiations was, however, being explicitly connected to these emotional images, amid warnings that climate change would be the ‘Syria refugee crisis times 100’. The prominence of the topic of the large-scale displacement of people thus reportedly added ‘an ominous, politically sensitive undercurrent in the talks and side events’ in Paris. In a COP that was already being seen as highly relevant for the policy community on migration and climate change due to the large coordinated advocacy effort leading up to it, events playing out beyond the walls of the conference arguably brought even more relevance to this policy juncture. The chapter then considers mentions of human mobility within the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the Doha decision.

Climate change poses a serious challenge to the ability of international law to construct equitable global responses to shared problems. Emissions of greenhouse gases come disproportionately from industrialized countries. Some countries, again predominantly in the industrialized world, are better placed than others to pioneer the technologies, processes, and behavioural changes that will be necessary to mitigate their emissions. Furthermore, in international climate negotiations, the same countries are often the least able to make their voices heard, or to assess the implications of any proposed outcome in light of their own interests. A sustainable development law perspective in the area of climate change focuses on how climate change law is developed and implemented, with a focus on the needs of smaller economies, especially least-developed countries and new actors, including civil society and corporate citizens.

China’s energy challenges are shaping the way its leadership is approaching climate mitigation at the domestic level, which in turn is shaping its positioning in international climate negotiations. An increase in the scientific and technical understanding of its own energy and emissions situation—an understanding promoted in part by increased international engagement—has permitted China’s policy makers to legislate with more confidence domestically. Low carbon development is now positioned at the core of China’s overarching national five-year economic plans with carbon management programs existing alongside a low carbon development strategy. These significant domestic changes have permitted an equally striking shift in China’s approach to global environmental diplomacy, particularly in the context of the international climate change negotiations.

This chapter assesses the economic incentives of different countries to cooperate on international climate negotiations, particularly on greenhouse gas emission control. It first examines the indications that the noncooperative coalition theory provides for the analysis of climate negotiations. It then presents the FEEM-RICE model, a well-known integrated assessment tool for the study of climate change. This model is used to analyze the equilibrium coalition structure that could emerge out of climate negotiations.

This chapter examines climate change negotiations, which provide a very good way of characterizing the problem and of identifying why it is so hard for countries to agree. Specifically, climate change negotiations resemble a particular type of game called the prisoner's dilemma. The Kyoto Protocol tried to disaggregate the agreed overall target of reducing global emissions by 5.2 percent below the 1990 baseline by 2012. The European Commission, in its own assessment of the outcome, concluded that the sum of all the voluntary commitments in the so-called Copenhagen Accord, even if achieved, would not meet the 2°C target. In the way of summits and international conferences, those concerned with climate change have now started the foundation work for another round of negotiations and will focus on the final day of the prospective summit in around 2015.

The urgency of responding to global climate change is an inescapable feature of the global energy landscape. The international community has agreed to limit global temperature rise to 2 °C from preindustrial levels, and this cannot be done without major transformations in the energy sector. This chapter examines the impact of the international response to climate change, based on the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, on the energy sector to date. In particular, it describes and analyses the ‘ambition gap’, whereby the goal of 2 °C is not matched by corresponding emission targets, and explores other features of the climate change regime, including the CDM and methodological decisions, that are relevant to the energy field. Finally, it examines the likelihood of climate change emerging as the major driver of decision-making on energy, as the science would seem to require.

Although the European Union (EU) is often neglected in the great powers literature owing to its lack of military and security clout, we argue that the EU should nevertheless be considered a great power in global environmental politics (GEP). We develop this argument by highlighting the multiple nature and sources of power at the EU’s disposal, its ability to project power, and its recognition as a great power in GEP. By examining two distinctive cases of GEP—climate change and chemicals governance—we show that the EU relies on different sources of power and deploys its power in different ways in GEP, but that in both cases it can indeed be considered a great power. However, the EU’s negative power (responsibility) is diminishing as it becomes more successful in resolving environmental issues, which demonstrates the paradox of the EU’s role in GEP generally. Therefore, the EU relies increasingly on its positive power and its ability to persuade, incentivize, and assist others in its role as a green great power.

This final chapter assesses how the differences in lobbying behaviour and access to decision-makers stressed in the previous chapters shape interest groups' ability to influence political decisions in Europe's multilevel polity. It does so by looking at three major decision-making episodes: the ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the European Union's position with respect to the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and the European Fiscal Compact. The evidence shows that outsiders managed to derail ACTA by mobilizing the public, whereas insiders managed to defend their interests in the climate change and Fiscal Compact cases because outsiders were unable to draw the attention of the broader public to these issues. Both logics of lobbying thus can be effective under different circumstances.

A three-point brief from the Prime Minister to ensure transparency and accountability in the ministry’s working; balancing high growth with environmental protection. This chapter gives an overview of how the brief was translated into policy and the obstacles that arose therein. Transparency and accountability were brought in through speaking orders, public consultations and letters. It delineates the attempt to forge a compromise between the needs of growth and ecological security and the tension within the government on the critical issue of coal mining and preservation of forests. It is a bird’s eye view of efforts to make environment count in governance and economic decision making—to reclaim executive space, the creation of the National Green Tribunal, the greening of the Gross Domestic Product, reviving the scientific basis of the ministry. It also narrates the effort to give India an image makeover in the international community through proactive engagement in negotiations on climate change and environment.

There are many barriers—political, diplomatic, and economic—to the full participation and ambitious emissions reductions from all countries that are necessary for climate stabilization. In this non-ideal situation, the responsible path is to relinquish the insistence that climate negotiations should aim to establish only a single, legally binding, top-down treaty modelled after the Kyoto Protocol. This chapter proposes that an enhanced focus on mitigating short-lived climate pollutants—such as methane, black carbon, and HFCs—in a variety of multilateral forums can help overcome several barriers to adequate climate action and allow us to move toward a modern climate regime that includes meaningful mitigation from all of the world’s major emitters both inside and outside the UN climate negotiations.

This chapter examines the economics of climate change from the perspective of behavioural economics: as market data simply reflect the aggregate of human behaviour of participants, understanding this behaviour and its normative significance is relevant to thinking about discounting, just as it is relevant to the design of climate change policy. The chapter considers the choice of discount rates and the ethics of discounting in a world where people are not time-consistent expected-utility maximisers, along with self control and social discount rates. It also addresses the issue of human cooperation in general, and implications for climate negotiations in particular.

India is at an innovation crossroads in which it can choose between staying on its well-worn path of an incremental imitation of mature technologies developed elsewhere or becoming an innovator in the bio-digital energy paradigm. India has an incentive to do the latter because climate models suggest it and its region will be one of the most severely affected by climate change. India has launched the “Solar India” mission, but it has also opened its coal sector to private firms. India like China is undergoing a monumental urbanization. It could use its cities to urbanize innovation. India, with its successful high-tech experience in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and information technology, along with its large population of poor people, could combine high technology with the value of frugality.