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The Libertarian, Fictionalist, and Compatibilist Responses to Hard Determinism

Michael S. Moore

in Mechanical Choices: The Responsibility of the Human Machine

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
June 2020
ISBN:
9780190863999
eISBN:
9780190864026
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863999.003.0008
Subject:
Law, Medical Law

This chapter surveys the various responses to hard determinism, all of which seek to salvage responsibility in the face of the thought that all of our actions and choices are caused by factors over ... More


Concepts of Free Will

Bernard Berofsky

in Nature's Challenge to Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199640010
eISBN:
9780191738197
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

The origins in Ancient Greece of the problem of free will and determinism are briefly described. A preliminary discussion of determinism that includes a discussion of the problems pertaining to its ... More


Contemporary Neuroscience’s Epiphenomenal Challenge to Responsibility

Michael S. Moore

in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198845539
eISBN:
9780191880711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845539.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This paper examines a particular challenge to responsible agency thought to be mounted by contemporary neuroscience. The challenge stems from the alleged experimental demonstration that human ... More


The Limited Compatibilism of Epiphenomenalism with Responsibility

Michael S. Moore

in Mechanical Choices: The Responsibility of the Human Machine

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
June 2020
ISBN:
9780190863999
eISBN:
9780190864026
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863999.003.0011
Subject:
Law, Medical Law

The second response to the epiphenomenal challenge is to deny that epiphenomenalism has any implications that are skeptical of responsibility. Such a compatibilist response is seemingly ruled out by ... More


Rescuing the Volitional Excuses from Compatibilism (the “Overshoot” Problem for Compatibilism)

Michael S. Moore

in Mechanical Choices: The Responsibility of the Human Machine

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
June 2020
ISBN:
9780190863999
eISBN:
9780190864026
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863999.003.0009
Subject:
Law, Medical Law

Chapter 9 explores the nature of the volitional excuses and whether such nature can be reconciled with the classical compatibilism explored in the last chapter. The volitional excuses are those ... More


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