Aaron Rapport
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801453588
- eISBN:
- 9780801455643
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801453588.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the Bush administration's planning of Phase IV—noncombat operations—of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Those ultimately ...
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This chapter examines the Bush administration's planning of Phase IV—noncombat operations—of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Those ultimately responsible for the invasion of Iraq made many errors in judgment, errors which were reflected in the planning process for Phase IV. A focus on humanitarian issues, coupled with optimistic assumptions about political conditions in Iraq and the necessary length of military occupation, left soldiers unable to perform key tasks once the initial combat phase was complete. Instead of maintaining the flow of forces into the theater of operations to enhance coalition and civilian security, principals in the United States stopped troop deployments and undermined a military command whose postwar structure and responsibilities were already unclear.Less
This chapter examines the Bush administration's planning of Phase IV—noncombat operations—of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Those ultimately responsible for the invasion of Iraq made many errors in judgment, errors which were reflected in the planning process for Phase IV. A focus on humanitarian issues, coupled with optimistic assumptions about political conditions in Iraq and the necessary length of military occupation, left soldiers unable to perform key tasks once the initial combat phase was complete. Instead of maintaining the flow of forces into the theater of operations to enhance coalition and civilian security, principals in the United States stopped troop deployments and undermined a military command whose postwar structure and responsibilities were already unclear.
