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What distinguishes a crime against humanity from an ordinary crime (or from other international crimes) is the requirement that it must have been committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. This requirement, which constitutes the chapeau or general requirements of crimes against humanity, must be seen as a whole and sets out the necessary context in which the acts of the accused must be inscribed. For the purpose of discussion, it may be divided, however, into five sub-elements: an attack; a link or nexus exists between the acts of the accused and the attack; the attack is directed against any civilian population; the attack is widespread or systematic; and the perpetrator has the appropriate state of mind or mens rea.

This is the second of three chapters on the three traditions of war, and introduces the Groatian tradition, which is viewed as the most dominant and powerful of the traditions presented, and had as its primary source the Dutch diplomat, lawyer, poet, mathematician, theologian, and historian, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). The objective of the chapter is to analyse this ideology, and show how its principles came to underpin the later Grotian rationale for the legal distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. The chapter begins by evoking the inherently enigmatic qualities of Grotius and the numerous (and often conflicting) traditions that he inspired; next the distinct properties of the Grotian tradition of war are set out and seen to consist of a singular legal discourse, a pluralist method, and a strong attachment to order and power. The core components of this ideology are then examined with reference to Grotian conceptions of human nature, government, and liberty; these elements are shown to provide the necessary foundations of Grotius’ conception of war, and in particular to inform the priority accorded to the rights of states and armies over those of civilian populations. The final section of the chapter examines how this ideology informed the practices and beliefs of the founders of the modern laws of war; these ideological changes highlight the adaptability of this tradition as it developed at the end of the nineteenth century, and defined the dominant paradigm of the laws of war.

Genocide is often viewed as the ultimate crime against humanity, but they are in fact legally distinct. First, crimes against humanity and genocide have a different mens rea. Second, the range of underlying offences which may qualify as genocidal is more restricted in scope than those that may qualify as crimes against humanity. Third, crimes against humanity must be committed in the context of an armed conflict, whereas genocide may be committed in time of peace as well as in time of war. Fourth, the definition of genocide unlike that of crimes against humanity does not require that the acts of the accused occur in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Fifth, whereas a crime against humanity may only be committed against civilians, genocide can be committed against any member of the targeted group, whether combatants or civilians. This chapter also discusses the distinction between genocide and persecution and between genocide and extermination.

Four elements distinguish war crimes from crimes against humanity. War crimes may only be committed during an armed conflict, whereas crimes against humanity can be committed both in times of war and of peace. Furthermore, a crime against humanity may be committed against nationals of any state, including that state’s own nationals, if the state takes part in the attack. Whereas crimes against humanity may only be committed against civilians, most war crimes may be committed against both civilians and enemy combatants. A crime against humanity must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population; there is no such requirement for a war crime. An isolated act could qualify as a war crime, but not as a crime against humanity. Nearly all of the underlying offences which could qualify as crimes against humanity would also amount, all other conditions being met, to war crimes, but the converse is not necessarily true.

This chapter describes the controversial acquittal of General Ante Gotovina. The events giving rise to this case occurred between July and September 1995. During that time, Croatia initiated a military action called “Operation Storm” for the purpose of taking control of territory in the Krajina region of Croatia. Gotovina was a colonel-general in the HV (Croatian Army) during the Indictment period and was the operational commander of Operation Storm in the southern part of the Krajina region. The Trial Chamber found that Gotovina contributed to the joint criminal enterprise (JCE), the common purpose of which was to permanently remove the Serb civilian population from the Krajina region. The Trial Chamber consequently found Gotovina guilty under the first form of JCE of both persecution and deportation as crimes against humanity. It also found him guilty under the third form of JCE of murder and inhuman acts as crimes against humanity, plunder of public and private property and violations of the laws or customs of war. He was sentenced to a single term of 24 years’ imprisonment.

The essence of multiculturalism is the acceptance and accommodation of practices and conduct that violate laws of the host country. This chapter asks whether an embrace of all aspects of all cultures comes at a cost. It examines the effects of multiculturalism; the state's role and responsibility in protecting both vulnerable members of the internal community and the larger civilian population; and responding to the harm produced at the intersection of multiculturalism and religious and secular extremism.

This chapter examines the change in halakha and morality in Zionism after the Six-Day War. It suggests that the most conspicuous change in the moral outlook of religious Zionism after the Six-Day War was on the question of causing harm to the civilian population of the enemy. It also explains that religious Zionism did not take a distinct stand in any of the great political or moral controversies that wracked the Yishuv and the newborn state until the Six-Day War and that the founding fathers of Zionism had reservations about the use of force in the struggle for redemption.

This chapter presents the salient traits of the crimes against humanity and genocide, and deepens some more controversial issues, such as the definition of the civilian population. It focuses on the origin of the crimes, their constitutive elements and their interpretation, and the practice of international criminal tribunals. Cet article a pour but de présenter généralement les traits saillants des crimes contre l’humanité et du crime de génocide et d’approfondir un peu quelques aspects plus controversés, tels que la définition de la population civile. Il fait le point sur l’origine de ces crimes, leurs éléments ainsi que leur interprétation et sur la pratique des tribunaux pénaux internationaux.