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This chapter explores India's nuclear posture. Like China's, India's nuclear posture is classified as one of assured retaliation. There have been various dramatic moments in India's nuclear weapons history that were often driven by domestic political considerations, most notably its nuclear tests in May of 1974 and 1998. Nonetheless, the capabilities, envisioned use, and command-and-control apparatus that Delhi has erected for its nuclear forces have been persistent and consistent with an assured retaliation posture since 1974. The reason for this, as illustrated by optimization theory, is that India is in a relatively secure position but with highly assertive civil–military relations, driving it toward an assured retaliation nuclear posture that emphasizes firm civilian control over the arsenal.

This chapter focuses on the cases of Spain and Portugal. After decades of authoritarianism, placing the Spanish military under civilian control proved to be a relatively straightforward and brief process. The transformation of Portuguese civil–military relations, on the other hand, was more contentious, took far longer, and did not succeed as completely as Spain's. Greece, the secondary case in this chapter, had a much shorter but more intense experience with praetorianism; its return to democracy and democratic civil–military relations was quick albeit not without some shortcomings. The chapter then assesses the influence of international organizations, particularly NATO, on the democratization of the three states and their defense establishments.

This chapter focuses on Ghana, Tanzania, and Botswana. During the periods under study here, Ghana experienced intermittent military rule while Tanzania was a socialist state; their armed forces were not committed to democracy and, in Ghana's case, not even to civilian rule. Unlike Ghana, Tanzania was successful in establishing civilian control over the armed forces. Civilian control must not be confused with democratic control, however. In Tanzania, civilian control was unitary, the party-state's domination of the armed forces hardly surprising considering there was no independent legislature, judiciary, or any other political organization free of TANU/CCM control. Tanzania's example demonstrates that civilian control can be successful while incorporating the armed forces into the general political arena. Botswana's situation is similar to Tanzania's insofar as one party has ruled the country since independence, but with the major difference that in Botswana, during the same time period, free elections have been held at regular intervals.

When Venezuelans learned how to institutionalize civilian control, democracy prospered and consolidated during the 1960s and 1970s. Civilian control is consolidated when elected officials are able to shift the balance of power away from the military in favor of government authority. This chapter examines the process by which civilians achieve control of the armed forces and the process by which this control can be dismantled. It illustrates the paths and outcomes in civil-military relations following a transition to democracy and examines the long-term impact of institutionalized civilian control on democratic consolidation.

This chapter considers the governance of the army in the 19th century. In law the army was the king's, or queen's. Politically it had for long been controlled by ministers whose responsibilities had come to be owed to Parliament, and Parliament had come to control its finance, but the extent of those controls, the remaining role of the monarch, and the autonomy of the army high command, together formed a persistent if minor theme in Victorian and Edwardian constitutionalism. The army's prerogative status was used rhetorically from time to time by army high command as a justification for autonomy from politicians, and right to the end of the 19th century it was possible for army officers, in times of stress, to seek solace that the unpalatable orders they anticipated receiving had the king's personal approval and were not merely the implementation of government policy. Like the Church, the army had its own internal system of law. The common law judges accorded it a high degree of autonomy, in part as a reflection and reiteration of its prerogative status, but predominantly because they thought external adjudication would prejudice good discipline. Though this attitude was tested in the common law courts from time to time, it remained essentially unchanged throughout our period.

In 1958, Venezuela was given a second opportunity to democratize. Unlike the initial failed attempt in 1945–1958, democratization become successful and consolidated after Venezuelans had endured ten years of military authoritarian rule. Focusing on the 1958 transition to democracy in Venezuela, this chapter describes the rise and fall of Venezuelan democracy, the decline of military autonomy under Pérez Jiménez, and the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1958. It describes the strategies employed by democratizers in pursuing civilian control, which include appeasement, monitoring, and indoctrination to weaken the opposition of armed forces.

This chapter describes the eruption of military rebellion in Venezuela in 1992 due to the decline of institutionalized civilian control over the armed forces. It examines the changes that occurred in the democratic regime and its armed forces which led to attempts by military officers to displace civilian rule, including the reasons why the coup attempts failed. The chapter also illuminates the dysfunctional aspects of Venezuela's political system, such as political decline, economic austerity, and breakdown of consensual politics.

The first democratically elected president following the 1958 transition was Rómulo Betancourt. Betancourt was immensely unpopular among military officers at the start of his administration and was threatened by insurgents in the armed forces and civilian opponents. This chapter discusses how President Betancourt designed strategies that focused on civilian control of the armed forces. Aside from developing a personal network that monitored military threats, he was able to institutionalize the “divide and conquer” strategy to maximize regime leverage over the military.

The development of the Internet involved the transformation of a computer network that was initially established in the late 1960s by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense, to enable defense industry and university contractors to communicate with each other and with ARPA more effectively. Realization of this objective was demonstrated at the First International Conference on Computer Communication in October 1972. Important advances in hardware, software, and application were required not only to enable communication among individual computers, but to facilitate communication between different computer networks. It was not until the early 1980s, however, that cooperation between ARPA and the National Science Foundation opened up access to the Internet to the wider non-profit and university communities. Although the network was transferred to civilian control in 1983, full privatization of the Internet was not achieved until the early 1990s.

This chapter explores how the two naval elites strove to position themselves as the organizing center of a warfare state and to minimize their subjection to civilian control in maritime matters, underwritten in the United States by a full-fledged adulation of the German military state. Before World War I, both German and U.S. naval elites combined their call for large battle fleets with far-reaching demands for influence in the domestic area. The specifics of navalists' quest for institutional power and policy control were structured by the difference between the makeup of civil-military relations in the German imperial polity and the American civilian republic. This chapter considers the quest for a naval general staff with sweeping powers that was embodied the naval elite's interest in institutional control and independence from politics. It also examines important differences in the makeup of warfare states and civil-military relations between Germany and the United States.

There is a unanimous agreement that the principle of civilian control takes precedence over the armed forces. However, its implications are not well understood by politicians and bureaucrats. This is evident in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. Eight years earlier, Menon asked whether the soldiers can decide when to begin fighting. His desire to suborn a demoralised army into blind compliance had tragic consequences. The issue of civilian control was addressed in a report of the Study Team on Defence Matters established by the Administrative Reforms Commission on 15 November 1966 under the chairmanship of Ali Yavar Jung. The true meaning of 'civilian control': accountability under the law to the government and Parliament, and accountability to the law enacted by Parliament.

Many former Republican hands returned to positions of influence with the election of George W. Bush. These individuals had been involved in previous Intelligence Community reform efforts and returned to power with the intent of furthering these efforts. Believing the Clinton administration had reduced intelligence funding too far, the Bush team looked for ways to increase spending and rebuild the Intelligence Community. Within months of taking office, the administration initiated reviews to identify where to rebuild. The necessities of war would soon influence these reviews and the direction of the DoD/CIA relationship.

Because the revolution in Egypt was directed at the state, it is important to properly conceptualize the state apparatus and the regime that ruled it. Thus, chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on authoritarian regimes and explains why it is important to distinguish between states and regimes. Hosni Mubarak’s powerful presidency did not preclude the development of a diverse and unruly civil society, including tens of thousands of nongovernmental organizations. A new framework is employed in order to understand which parts of the state apparatus are most crucial during a period of revolutionary upheaval. It is important to distinguish between tools of the regime and pillars of support for the regime; the latter have the ability to either prop up or potentially withdraw their support. Mubarak relied on four pillars of regime support: the military, the business elite, the United States, and the acquiescence of the people. The chapter then turns to an overview of the literature on revolutions and military coups, which have usually been studied separately, as well as the literature on how establishing civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation.

This chapter examines the forced removal and incarceration of the Nikkei. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. With a stroke of his pen, and without regard for the U.S. Constitution, the president set in motion the process of forced removal and incarceration of an entire people charged with no crime. This episode was “a historical moment when the cultural, racial, and national Otherness of the Asian was most lucidly articulated, most undisputed, and most resolutely dealt with by the American citizenry and state.” The executive order gave the Western Defense Commander, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the power to exclude from designated “military areas” “any or all persons.” As such, Nikkei living within DeWitt's exclusion zone were then herded into temporary detention centers, officially called “Assembly Centers,” managed by the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (WCCA), an agency of the army's Western Defense Command (WDC).