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This chapter discusses some of the useful theoretical contributions that inform the study of civil–military relations and democratization in different political environments. The course of democratic transition and consolidation is unique to the country that is experiencing it. There are many different political, economic, and social tasks to accomplish, and how they are approached is inevitably affected by country-specific factors. As such, three things ought to be kept in mind. First, democratization in general and the democratization of civil–military relations, in particular, are always gradual processes. Second, the conception of the ideal democracy and that of the ideal civil–military relations change as societies change. Third, democracy is not some ultimate and clearly defined end result but an elusive goal that can only be approximated, constantly pondered, debated, and enhanced.

Strategy is the art of the possible, as Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) insisted, and what is possible is revealed by net tactical performance. And the whole military (and other) endeavour must serve not itself, but political purposes which typically will evolve under the pressure of events. Although strategy is possible, it is always difficult. Among the major sources of difficulty, which tend to manifest themselves synergistically, one must recognize the challenge that is strategy itself, the problem many people have understanding its nature and demands; that lies in the inconvenient, but for strategy essential, fact of an enemy with an independent will; of converting military effect into strategic effect, and then into political effect—which is the whole point of the project; of devising and running a strategy‐making process that is fit for purpose; of peopling the process with competent players; of sheer complexity; of friction, of the things, typically unforeseeable in detail, that go wrong; of productive civil–military relations. Remarkably, strategy is feasible, despite its myriad difficulties. Complexity of subject can translate as alternative options, while the self‐willed enemy must face a generically like large basket of challenges to his strategic effectiveness.

This chapter examines three East European states: Slovenia, a small country that has enjoyed a smooth transition to democracy and market economy; Russia, the world's largest state, which has failed to establish democratic rule; and Romania, a medium-sized Balkan country that, following some early stumbling, found its way into NATO and the European Union. The three postcommunist states suggest very different experiences of building democratic armies. No postcommunist country had fewer major problems in establishing democratic civil–military relations than Slovenia, even though it had to create a new army on the rather flimsy foundations of the Territorial Defense Force. Meanwhile, the specific shortcomings of Russian military politics reflect the power relations that have doomed Russia's democratization prospects. Romania's postcommunist record of building civil–military relations falls between the two others in terms of democratic performance, though it is much closer to Slovenia than to Russia.

This chapter focuses on the cases of Spain and Portugal. After decades of authoritarianism, placing the Spanish military under civilian control proved to be a relatively straightforward and brief process. The transformation of Portuguese civil–military relations, on the other hand, was more contentious, took far longer, and did not succeed as completely as Spain's. Greece, the secondary case in this chapter, had a much shorter but more intense experience with praetorianism; its return to democracy and democratic civil–military relations was quick albeit not without some shortcomings. The chapter then assesses the influence of international organizations, particularly NATO, on the democratization of the three states and their defense establishments.

This chapter explores India's nuclear posture. Like China's, India's nuclear posture is classified as one of assured retaliation. There have been various dramatic moments in India's nuclear weapons history that were often driven by domestic political considerations, most notably its nuclear tests in May of 1974 and 1998. Nonetheless, the capabilities, envisioned use, and command-and-control apparatus that Delhi has erected for its nuclear forces have been persistent and consistent with an assured retaliation posture since 1974. The reason for this, as illustrated by optimization theory, is that India is in a relatively secure position but with highly assertive civil–military relations, driving it toward an assured retaliation nuclear posture that emphasizes firm civilian control over the arsenal.

This chapter assesses China's civil–military relations, focusing on the post-1989 evolution of the military elite; the impact of the military suppression in Beijing on June 4, 1989; and the broader impact of, and lessons learned from, the roles played by militaries in the collapse of other Communist Party-states. These events affected the civilian and military elite in China profoundly and triggered considerable factional struggle, purges, and courts-martial, as well as promotions of many new officers. During the 1990s, virtually the entire People's Liberation Army High Command was replaced. Toward the end of the decade, some interesting legal developments suggested that interactions among the military, the Communist Party, and the state (or government) were changing and possibly evolving in a direction similar to that taken in other East Asian and developing nations.

This chapter looks at two pivotal states of South Asia: India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan gained their independence in 1947. India succeeded in placing its armed forces under firm and virtually unchallenged state control right from the beginning of independence. However, civil–military relations in Pakistan have been far more “eventful.” The chapter makes three arguments. First and most important, by the end of the first postcolonial decade, the patterns for the drastically different military politics of India and Pakistan were already set. Second, of the numerous reasons for the evolution of different civil–military relations in the two countries, several lie in the circumstances of the 1947 Partition and in the immediate post-Partition period. Third, the British colonial period left behind profound legacies, most of which have positively influenced military affairs in the Subcontinent. The chapter also addresses Bangladesh—from its independence in 1971 to the military take-over in 2007—and what sets its military politics apart from Pakistan's.

This chapter explains the book’s theoretical underpinnings. It begins by discussing the contrasting views of Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen on the preferred role and “balance” of civil–military relations. Next, it examines patterns of democratic civil–military relations to argue that they are shaped largely by three factors—the struggle over military autonomy, the issue of civilian expertise, and institutional design, specifically the manner in which the Ministry of Defence interacts with the services. The next section discusses the concept of military effectiveness as adopted in this book. Drawing inspiration from previous works, it examines five processes associated with effective militaries. These variables, analyzed subsequently in separate chapters, are weapons procurement, jointness, professional military education, officer promotion policies, and defense planning. The chapter then discusses the study of the Indian military and its effectiveness and concludes by describing the analytical framework adopted in the rest of the book.

This chapter investigates how variation in the political-military balance of power in a state influences its military activities and effectiveness. It compares two cases of autocratic states that show characteristics of shared power and political dominance, respectively: Egypt in the mid-1960s and Egypt in the 1970s. It is believed that the balance of power between military and political leaders profoundly affected military effectiveness through its influences on structures and processes important to organizing military activity and preparing for war. In 1973, Egypt has been able to obtain significant political, strategic, operational, and tactical integration in its military activity. Its performance made the most of its resources in men and equipment to attain its political objectives. The Egypt case generally indicates that special attention must be paid to the specific dynamics of civil-military relations: power relations between political and military leaders are fundamental in predicting the state's military effectiveness.

This chapter relies on the best available English language sources to detail Chinese nuclear posture over time. China, like India, has persistently adopted an assured retaliation posture against its potential adversaries. Though Chinese strategists have long debated the merits of shifting from what they term a “minimum deterrence” doctrine to a more aggressive “limited deterrence” doctrine that fields theater nuclear capabilities for possible first use, there has in fact been remarkable continuity in China's nuclear posture. China's posture enables its nuclear weapons to survive a first strike and effectively retaliate with nuclear weapons. As in India, China faces no existential land threats and also displays highly assertive civil–military relations, or more accurately, party–military relationship that privileges tight centralized control over China's nuclear assets. These variables have thus pushed China toward an assured retaliation nuclear posture.

This chapter examines the democratization of civil–military relations in two former fascist dictatorships, postwar Germany and Japan, whose armies had destroyed and terrorized large swathes of the surrounding territory. The creation of lasting democratic regimes on the ashes of these dictatorships stands as the signal achievement of democracy promotion. An important part of this process was the building of the new West German and Japanese armed forces. On the other hand, Hungary after World War II illustrates the trajectory of military politics in numerous European states where domestic political forces were defeated by the Soviet Union and its native communist puppets. The chapter then considers the evolution of Hungarian civil–military relations from the end of the war until the March 1953 death of Joseph Stalin, which is a suitable point to mark the consolidation of the Soviet-controlled communist regime and the completion of the armed forces' transformation.

American civil-military relations are rooted in constitutional foundations that distribute and check political power, such as civilian control over the military. Preserving American democracy requires adherence to these foundational democratic principles. This chapter argues that American policymakers, the military, and civilian society lack a shared understanding of the democratic norms that underpin US civil-military relations. Furthermore, poor understanding of democratic norms in general, and of civil-military relations norms in particular, puts American democracy at risk. Consequently, a review of the constitutional foundations of American civil-military relations and an assessment of the normative state of such relations is in order. This chapter defines civil-military relations; reviews the constitutional origins of American civil-military relations; presents the essential civil-military norms for democratic states; and highlights the responsibilities of political leaders, military actors, and civilian society to uphold them. Such a review contributes to improving the shared understanding of democratic civil-military relations norms that is essential to their preservation.

The introduction launches the arguments presented and outlines the intentions of the chapters in this book. The chapters ask a number of questions about the study and practice of contemporary American civil-military relations. First, they examine the military’s role in civil-military relations, focusing specifically on prevailing norms of professionalism and those that limit the military’s political activity. Second, the chapters explore the civilian side of the civil-military equation. Third, they investigate the relationship between society and the military, examining societal attitudes toward the military by focusing on how trends in partisanship and polarization are challenging civil-military relations. The fourth and final theme of this volume examines similar challenges in civil-military relations arising from the changing character of war and armed conflict.

Despite the high regard for the US military by the American public, a number of tensions continue to grow in civil-military relations in the United States. These are exacerbated by a lack of clarity, and thus productive debate, in the various relationships inherent in civil and military interaction. By trisecting civil military relations into the relations between the people and the military, the military and the government, and the people and the government on military issues, this chapter examines the potential for crisis in coming years. Doing so allows for greater theoretical and popular understanding and thus action in addressing the tensions, for there is cause for concern and action in each of the legs of this interconnected triangle.

This chapter argues that adaptation of emerging technology—artificial intelligence (AI), among other forms—will introduce new stresses and tensions in civil-military relations across a variety of domains and contexts. Specifically, the analysis highlights four areas of potential stress. The first area is the organizational implications of technological change and innovation for military institutions and civilian actors. The second is the opportunities and obstacles emerging technology poses for civilian oversight of the military. A third area includes how the introduction of technology in advisory processes at the senior level may affect tensions in strategic assessment and the provision of military advice in those processes. A final issue is the evolving character of the profession of arms and the diminution of the military’s exclusive domain of expertise relative to civilian actors.

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

This concluding chapter compares the Venezuelan experience against better-understood cases of democratic civil-military relations: Chile (1989 and after), Argentina (1983 and after), and Spain (1975 and after). These comparative cases illustrate the impact of regime leverage and the process by which political leadership can provide the institutional resources and civilian sources of defense expertise.

The concluding chapter revisits some of the main arguments in this book. It begins by examining the relevance of the absent dialogue framework in describing India's civil–military relations. It thereafter examines whether this framework is unique to India or if resonates with larger debates sorrouding democratic civilian control. Thereafter, relying on insights from India, it revisits the theoretical debates and the problems associated with democratic control and military effectiveness. In terms of theoretical implications, the chapter rejects the Huntingtonian notion of “objective control” and instead argues in favor of what Eliot Cohen calls the “unequal dialogue.” The penultimate section discusses avenues for further research, and the chapter concludes by discussing the prospects for change in India’s pattern of civil–military relations.