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This chapter seeks to clarify the concept of circumstances precluding wrongfulness in international law which, according to Ian Brownlie, is a concept that ‘had never been properly worked out’ by the ILC during its work on the Articles on State Responsibility. Indeed, it is not infrequent to find in the case law and the literature diverse, and often contradicting, explanations of this concept and its effects. Two misunderstandings which are recurrent in international law are especially troubling: (i) the notion that justified conduct is nevertheless a ‘breach’ of international law; and (ii) the qualification of justified conduct as ‘non-wrongful’ or ‘unlawful with precluded wrongfulness’, and variations thereof. The chapter first elucidates the concept of circumstances precluding wrongfulness and its relation with the notions of breach, internationally wrongful act, and excuse. It then considers the operation of these circumstances by means of two different models for the representation of reasoning with justifications: one based on deductive reasoning and the other on dialogic reasoning. The chapter concludes that justified conduct does not constitute a breach of international law and that it must be qualified as lawful.

Chapter 5 analyses the implementation of State responsibility for international terrorism through the adoption of non-military measures aimed at securing a wrongdoing State’s compliance with its secondary obligations of cessation and reparation, in particular the adoption of retorsive measures and countermeasures. It assesses potential problems with the adoption of countermeasures in the terrorism context, including the potential for misevaluating the wrongfulness of a target State’s conduct and continued uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of collective countermeasures. Finally, Chapter 5 explores the extent to which sub-systems of international law, including diplomatic law and the WTO, affect the right to adopt countermeasures in response to breaches of international terrorism obligations, including the extent to which such sub-system exclude the application of the secondary rules of State responsibility or restrict the scope of their wrongfulness preclusion.

Ongoing discussions among international lawyers on defences in state responsibility have close analogies with debates in two other fields: debates in general legal theory on defeasibility in law, and debates in criminal law theory (and philosophy) on the elements of criminal responsibility. The similarities are not surprising. But it is striking how little cross-fertilization there seems to have been. For jurisprudence and criminal law scholars have developed a number of points and distinctions that international law theorists working on defences should find helpful. This chapter illustrates these claims. Section 2 looks at defences from the point of view of general legal theory, and section 3 does the same from the point of view of criminal law theory, recommending specific solutions to particular problems. Section 4 then shows how these contributions can help to answer some persistent questions surrounding defences in the law of state responsibility.

In this chapter, the problematic of exceptions to peremptory norms is investigated in view of the defining feature of jus cogens rules as not admitting of derogation. This problematic appears singularly concerned with exceptions to the prohibition of the use of armed force, since that prohibition is regularly claimed to constitute a peremptory norm but admits of exceptions. Different legal constructions have been proposed to explain why exceptions would not amount to derogation. One construction, logically coherent but not (fully) borne out by positive law, is to see exceptions as limiting and lying outside of the substantive scope of a general rule and thus not amounting to derogation. Another construction concerns the claim that the prohibition of the use of armed force is not a jus cogens rule but rather the prohibition of aggression. As such, exceptions such as self-defence, force pursuant to a Security Council authorization, and consent would not amount to derogation, since they would not entail the commission of aggression. This construction would allow for the conclusion that peremptory prohibitions are absolute in character and not subject to exception or justification. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness, as general exceptions, appear to qualify as derogation, since Article 26 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States bars their invocation when conduct would be contrary to a peremptory norm. Finally, a narrow interpretation of the word derogation, as being involved only when states attempt to legalize or justify conduct in relation to already existing, concrete circumstances, could also explain why exceptions to peremptory prohibitions may be considered admissible.

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to identify seven legal techniques through which certain situations that could otherwise fall within the scope of a rule or a set of rules are excluded from it (scope clauses, carve-outs, flexibilities, derogations, exceptions stricto sensu, excuses, and circumstances precluding wrongfulness) and, secondly, to clarify the implications (technical and practical) of using such techniques and the terminology that comes with them. Using the term ‘exception’ rather than other terms such as ‘carve-out’ or ‘exemption’ may have significant legal implications as regards matters such as (i) the burden of proof, (ii) the interpretative approach, (iii) the degree of deference accorded to a respondent under a provision, or (iv) the interplay with certain referral clauses.

The second part validates the stipulative definition of Part I by identifying those norm conflicts which contemporary international law cannot satisfactorily resolve. In doing so, this part answers the second research question—whether legal dilemmas could exist in international law—in the affirmative and demarcates the doctrinal space that legal dilemmas occupy. The argument develops in three sections. The first section identifies the inherent limitations of norm conflict resolution devices. Norm conflict resolution devices deal with a norm conflict by establishing a hierarchy or a compromise between norms. They thereby identify a course of action that avoids impairing either norm unduly. The second section considers the limitation of norm conflict accommodation devices. The third section explains why measures of last resort do not preclude the possibility of the existence of legal dilemmas.

This chapter explores the defence tools that a host state can use against conflict-related investment claims. The first part analyses security exceptions which have been introduced to investment protection law after the Second World War. While it is widely believed that such exceptions provide for the most persuasive safeguard of the state’s security interests, it is argued that their effectiveness will depend on the wording of the provision, determining their scope, the degree of autonomy given to a state in responding to a security threat, and their relationship with other treaty provisions. The chapter addresses these aspects. The second part focuses on the defences in the general law of state responsibility (necessity, force majeure, and countermeasures), explaining why their potential as a defence is limited.

This chapter is the first ever comprehensive examination of how fact and law relate to each other in international law. After the critique of doctrinal approaches, the analysis examines how facts aspire producing legal regulation and to what extent they can do so. The analysis covers the relationship between title and effectivites in the law of territory, and the impact of treaties on factual situation. It also examines how rules can make facts relevant, at the example of certain rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and nationality of claims. Separate attention is paid to the notion of ‘effective control’ that has been frequently used in jurisprudence both of ICJ and European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the systemic relevance of facts in the law of treaties and law of State responsibility is examined. The chapter covers the jurisprudence of all major international tribunals, notably ICJ, arbitral tribunals, ECtHR, and WTO dispute settlement bodies.

Personal inviolability is one of the oldest rights of diplomatic agents and is often considered to be at the root of diplomatic immunity. The wording it received in the Vienna Convention does not allow for any exceptions. But the absolute nature of the right can lead to difficulties—especially in situations in which diplomats themselves cause a danger to the general public or particular individuals. This chapter explores potential inroads under international law into the concept of inviolability and thus discusses the applicability of self-defence, necessity, and distress in situations of emergency. It also raises the question whether the human right to life imposes certain obligations on the receiving State which are capable of limiting diplomatic inviolability. In a concluding section, the chapter reflects on the justifications which are particularly likely to carry validity in situations marked by a need to deal with dangers arising from diplomatic actions.