Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops an application of contextualism in the specific case of moral knowledge. The overall aim is the final vindication of a contextualist account of moral justification that supports ...
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This chapter develops an application of contextualism in the specific case of moral knowledge. The overall aim is the final vindication of a contextualist account of moral justification that supports a cognitivist interpretation of morality. It explains how contextualism compares and contrasts with the dominant coherentist model of moral epistemology in contemporary ethics, namely, an understanding of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as a coherence theory of justification. It argues that contextualism can be seen as arising from Rawls’s methodological assumptions, if one retains the assumption that considered moral judgements retain a direct source of moral justification even when they derive further warrant from their embedding in a context of justification.Less
This chapter develops an application of contextualism in the specific case of moral knowledge. The overall aim is the final vindication of a contextualist account of moral justification that supports a cognitivist interpretation of morality. It explains how contextualism compares and contrasts with the dominant coherentist model of moral epistemology in contemporary ethics, namely, an understanding of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as a coherence theory of justification. It argues that contextualism can be seen as arising from Rawls’s methodological assumptions, if one retains the assumption that considered moral judgements retain a direct source of moral justification even when they derive further warrant from their embedding in a context of justification.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for ...
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One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.Less
One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.
Janet Broughton
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is ...
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This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.Less
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.
Raimo Tuomela
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313390
- eISBN:
- 9780199870929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter focuses on I-mode we-attitudes and develops several varieties of them. Basically, e.g. a we-goal is a goal that an agent has because the others in the group have it, under conditions of ...
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This chapter focuses on I-mode we-attitudes and develops several varieties of them. Basically, e.g. a we-goal is a goal that an agent has because the others in the group have it, under conditions of mutual social awareness. There is also a discussion of a circularity problem that arises in some contexts involving coordination of attitudes and actions when communication is not possible.Less
This chapter focuses on I-mode we-attitudes and develops several varieties of them. Basically, e.g. a we-goal is a goal that an agent has because the others in the group have it, under conditions of mutual social awareness. There is also a discussion of a circularity problem that arises in some contexts involving coordination of attitudes and actions when communication is not possible.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is often claimed (e.g., by Swinburne, Armstrong, and Lowe) that the view that all natural properties are potencies leads to a vicious regress or circularity. The possible interpretations of this ...
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It is often claimed (e.g., by Swinburne, Armstrong, and Lowe) that the view that all natural properties are potencies leads to a vicious regress or circularity. The possible interpretations of this argument are examined, and the most pressing is that the regress leaves the identity of potencies indeterminate. This argument is equivalent to the claim that when the network of properties is represented as a graph, that graph has non-trivial automorphisms. It is shown that a graph can suitably represent the network of essentially dispositional properties while having no non-trivial automorphisms; and so the identity of each member of a set of potencies can supervene solely on the structure of relations among those potencies.Less
It is often claimed (e.g., by Swinburne, Armstrong, and Lowe) that the view that all natural properties are potencies leads to a vicious regress or circularity. The possible interpretations of this argument are examined, and the most pressing is that the regress leaves the identity of potencies indeterminate. This argument is equivalent to the claim that when the network of properties is represented as a graph, that graph has non-trivial automorphisms. It is shown that a graph can suitably represent the network of essentially dispositional properties while having no non-trivial automorphisms; and so the identity of each member of a set of potencies can supervene solely on the structure of relations among those potencies.
KEITH CULVER and MICHAEL GIUDICE
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195370751
- eISBN:
- 9780199775903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370751.003.001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter analyzes the limits to Hart's account of an official-operated rule of recognition as an account of the existence and borders of legal systems. The argument is developed via assessment of ...
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This chapter analyzes the limits to Hart's account of an official-operated rule of recognition as an account of the existence and borders of legal systems. The argument is developed via assessment of the success of the account's solutions to problems of circularity and indeterminacy in the identification of a distinct class of legal officials whose practices constitute the rule of recognition. It is shown that while the problem of circularity may have been adequately addressed in explanation of state legal systems, its solutions leave intact the problem of indeterminacy and reveal a strong presumption of hierarchy which threatens to run past rather than solve issues at the borders of legality. This is true in explanation of state legal systems, but the difficulties are particularly troubling in explanation of international law, as analysis of Hart's view of international law makes plain.Less
This chapter analyzes the limits to Hart's account of an official-operated rule of recognition as an account of the existence and borders of legal systems. The argument is developed via assessment of the success of the account's solutions to problems of circularity and indeterminacy in the identification of a distinct class of legal officials whose practices constitute the rule of recognition. It is shown that while the problem of circularity may have been adequately addressed in explanation of state legal systems, its solutions leave intact the problem of indeterminacy and reveal a strong presumption of hierarchy which threatens to run past rather than solve issues at the borders of legality. This is true in explanation of state legal systems, but the difficulties are particularly troubling in explanation of international law, as analysis of Hart's view of international law makes plain.
Caroline Jenkins
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231577
- eISBN:
- 9780191716102
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include ...
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This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include some objections that might be generated by a broadly Quinean outlook, a circularity worry (which are related here to the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘deep nonsense’), and a number of issues concerning the epistemic step from possession of concepts to belief in conceptually true propositions. The chapter also discusses in some detail the objection that, by definition, arithmetical knowledge cannot be a priori if it is empirical.Less
This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include some objections that might be generated by a broadly Quinean outlook, a circularity worry (which are related here to the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘deep nonsense’), and a number of issues concerning the epistemic step from possession of concepts to belief in conceptually true propositions. The chapter also discusses in some detail the objection that, by definition, arithmetical knowledge cannot be a priori if it is empirical.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original ...
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When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original experience/representation. This chapter investigates how the notion of personal identity is related to the notion of memory. It starts out by discussing the circularity objection to the psychological continuity theory of personal identity. Shoemaker and Parfit suggest solving the circularity objection by substituting the concept of quasi‐memory for the concept of memory. For the concept of quasi‐memory to provide a solution to the circularity objection quasi‐memory must be conceptually independent both from genuine memory and ostensible memory. The conceptual independence of quasi‐memory has come under attack: there are objections from constitutive holism, from the causal theory of memory, and from the immunity to error through misidentification. This chapter argues that the notion of quasi‐memory is indeed coherent and is not a derivative from the concept of memory. The dependence of memory on personal identity of a contingent rather than a logical nature. This chapter also discusses Wollheim's and Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view of personal identity.Less
When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original experience/representation. This chapter investigates how the notion of personal identity is related to the notion of memory. It starts out by discussing the circularity objection to the psychological continuity theory of personal identity. Shoemaker and Parfit suggest solving the circularity objection by substituting the concept of quasi‐memory for the concept of memory. For the concept of quasi‐memory to provide a solution to the circularity objection quasi‐memory must be conceptually independent both from genuine memory and ostensible memory. The conceptual independence of quasi‐memory has come under attack: there are objections from constitutive holism, from the causal theory of memory, and from the immunity to error through misidentification. This chapter argues that the notion of quasi‐memory is indeed coherent and is not a derivative from the concept of memory. The dependence of memory on personal identity of a contingent rather than a logical nature. This chapter also discusses Wollheim's and Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view of personal identity.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter responds to the two main arguments of Quine's paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. It argues that Chapter 2's rejection of the language myth makes it easier to understand what is good or ...
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This chapter responds to the two main arguments of Quine's paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. It argues that Chapter 2's rejection of the language myth makes it easier to understand what is good or plausible in the infamous argument from circularity, but that it ultimately also allows us to reject the conclusion of that argument. Similarly, the argument from confirmation holism is presented and rejected.Less
This chapter responds to the two main arguments of Quine's paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. It argues that Chapter 2's rejection of the language myth makes it easier to understand what is good or plausible in the infamous argument from circularity, but that it ultimately also allows us to reject the conclusion of that argument. Similarly, the argument from confirmation holism is presented and rejected.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230747
- eISBN:
- 9780191710933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter gives an initial discussion of the relation between validity and necessary truth-preservation. It argues that the so-called ‘soundness theorems’ of first order logic are misnamed, and ...
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This chapter gives an initial discussion of the relation between validity and necessary truth-preservation. It argues that the so-called ‘soundness theorems’ of first order logic are misnamed, and that the soundness of first order logic is not provable (even ‘rule-circularly’) in standard set theory.Less
This chapter gives an initial discussion of the relation between validity and necessary truth-preservation. It argues that the so-called ‘soundness theorems’ of first order logic are misnamed, and that the soundness of first order logic is not provable (even ‘rule-circularly’) in standard set theory.
Sam Rohdie
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781784992637
- eISBN:
- 9781526104151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781784992637.003.0016
- Subject:
- Film, Television and Radio, Film
The multiple narratives are duplicates of each other that proceed in parallel and are simultaneous in time. There is no linear thread, but rather circularities and reversals that mirror each other.
The multiple narratives are duplicates of each other that proceed in parallel and are simultaneous in time. There is no linear thread, but rather circularities and reversals that mirror each other.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends the epistemic circularity involved in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. It begins by explaining two forms of bootstrapping: the inference from ...
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This chapter defends the epistemic circularity involved in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. It begins by explaining two forms of bootstrapping: the inference from the perceptual belief that a seen surface is red to the conclusion that in so believing we are not misled by a white surface in bad light, and the inductive inference from the track record of a gauge to the conclusion that it is a reliable gauge. Each is formally valid, yet neither could possibly provide adequate justification for its conclusion. The chapter offers an explanation for why this is so, before moving on to the reliability of a competence that is not reason-involving. Finally, this chapter advances an argument in defense of trust in our epistemic faculties, one that involves circularity of a sort, and how such circularity can be considered virtuous.Less
This chapter defends the epistemic circularity involved in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. It begins by explaining two forms of bootstrapping: the inference from the perceptual belief that a seen surface is red to the conclusion that in so believing we are not misled by a white surface in bad light, and the inductive inference from the track record of a gauge to the conclusion that it is a reliable gauge. Each is formally valid, yet neither could possibly provide adequate justification for its conclusion. The chapter offers an explanation for why this is so, before moving on to the reliability of a competence that is not reason-involving. Finally, this chapter advances an argument in defense of trust in our epistemic faculties, one that involves circularity of a sort, and how such circularity can be considered virtuous.
Sam Rohdie
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781784992637
- eISBN:
- 9781526104151
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781784992637.003.0033
- Subject:
- Film, Television and Radio, Film
Griffith’s editing spatialised time and Griffith established a tension between the temporal linearity of the narrative and the spatial simultaneity of his parallel alternating editing. One of the ...
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Griffith’s editing spatialised time and Griffith established a tension between the temporal linearity of the narrative and the spatial simultaneity of his parallel alternating editing. One of the interesting aspects of F for Fake is the circularity and overlapping of the editing as if the film was a spatial surface upon which various temporalities were edited together, the case with Griffith.Less
Griffith’s editing spatialised time and Griffith established a tension between the temporal linearity of the narrative and the spatial simultaneity of his parallel alternating editing. One of the interesting aspects of F for Fake is the circularity and overlapping of the editing as if the film was a spatial surface upon which various temporalities were edited together, the case with Griffith.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161006
- eISBN:
- 9781400851843
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter examines the charge of circularity or question-begging that has been leveled against John Locke's notion of personal identity. It first considers Locke's assumption, in raising the ...
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This chapter examines the charge of circularity or question-begging that has been leveled against John Locke's notion of personal identity. It first considers Locke's assumption, in raising the question of personal identity, that there exists a diachronically continuous subject of experience that qualifies as a person by virtue of possessing the capacities characteristic of personhood. It then discusses the concept of a person (Person), described as something that has a certain personality or moral-characteral coherence in addition to being a cognitively sophisticated “sensible creature.” It also suggests that Locke never endorsed the radical theory of personal identity and concludes by interpreting the claim that “consciousness makes personal identity” as simply the claim that “the actions that you'll be responsible for on the Day of Judgment, as a human subject of experience, will be all.”Less
This chapter examines the charge of circularity or question-begging that has been leveled against John Locke's notion of personal identity. It first considers Locke's assumption, in raising the question of personal identity, that there exists a diachronically continuous subject of experience that qualifies as a person by virtue of possessing the capacities characteristic of personhood. It then discusses the concept of a person (Person), described as something that has a certain personality or moral-characteral coherence in addition to being a cognitively sophisticated “sensible creature.” It also suggests that Locke never endorsed the radical theory of personal identity and concludes by interpreting the claim that “consciousness makes personal identity” as simply the claim that “the actions that you'll be responsible for on the Day of Judgment, as a human subject of experience, will be all.”
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161006
- eISBN:
- 9781400851843
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. ...
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This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.Less
This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.
José L. Zalabardo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199656073
- eISBN:
- 9780191742132
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter addresses the following question: assuming that E provides adequate support for H, as explicated in Chapter 4, how would a subject have to be related to E and to the relationship between ...
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This chapter addresses the following question: assuming that E provides adequate support for H, as explicated in Chapter 4, how would a subject have to be related to E and to the relationship between E and H, in order to have inferential knowledge of H based on the evidence provided by E? The preliminary answer to the question provided here is that the subject needs to know E and that E supports H. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to dealing with two problems arising from treating these as sufficient conditions for knowledge. The first is a version of the Gettier problem. The second is the fact that this view would force us to treat Moorean inferences and bootstrapping arguments as cases of inferential knowledge. The chapter introduces two additional conditions on inferential knowledge to deal with these issues.Less
This chapter addresses the following question: assuming that E provides adequate support for H, as explicated in Chapter 4, how would a subject have to be related to E and to the relationship between E and H, in order to have inferential knowledge of H based on the evidence provided by E? The preliminary answer to the question provided here is that the subject needs to know E and that E supports H. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to dealing with two problems arising from treating these as sufficient conditions for knowledge. The first is a version of the Gettier problem. The second is the fact that this view would force us to treat Moorean inferences and bootstrapping arguments as cases of inferential knowledge. The chapter introduces two additional conditions on inferential knowledge to deal with these issues.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766864
- eISBN:
- 9780199932184
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter aims to provide an account of Descartes's project in the Meditations that will fit various passages in the text that are incompatible with earlier interpretations. It emerges that ...
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This chapter aims to provide an account of Descartes's project in the Meditations that will fit various passages in the text that are incompatible with earlier interpretations. It emerges that Descartes upholds in all of its parts an epistemology that has come to be knows on the contemporary scene as “virtue epistemology.” This is the robust virtue epistemology that takes epistemic normativity to be the AAA performance normativity of accuracy, adroitness, and aptness, that distinguishes between animal and reflective knowledge, and that embraces epistemic circularity.Less
This chapter aims to provide an account of Descartes's project in the Meditations that will fit various passages in the text that are incompatible with earlier interpretations. It emerges that Descartes upholds in all of its parts an epistemology that has come to be knows on the contemporary scene as “virtue epistemology.” This is the robust virtue epistemology that takes epistemic normativity to be the AAA performance normativity of accuracy, adroitness, and aptness, that distinguishes between animal and reflective knowledge, and that embraces epistemic circularity.
Ronald Rubin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804758161
- eISBN:
- 9780804779661
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804758161.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book attempts to explain The Meditations (1641), a classic of Western philosophy in which Descartes tries to reach a predetermined end (“perfect certainty”) by means of a definite method (“the ...
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This book attempts to explain The Meditations (1641), a classic of Western philosophy in which Descartes tries to reach a predetermined end (“perfect certainty”) by means of a definite method (“the method of doubt”). The author argues that many problems of interpretation—including notorious problems of circularity—arise from a failure to recognize that Descartes' strategy for attaining certainty is not to add support for his beliefs, but to subtract grounds for doubt. To explain this strategy, he views Descartes as playing the role of a fictional character—The Demon's Advocate—whose beliefs are, in some respects, mirror images of Descartes' own. The purpose of The Meditations, the author contends, is to silence The Demon's Advocate.Less
This book attempts to explain The Meditations (1641), a classic of Western philosophy in which Descartes tries to reach a predetermined end (“perfect certainty”) by means of a definite method (“the method of doubt”). The author argues that many problems of interpretation—including notorious problems of circularity—arise from a failure to recognize that Descartes' strategy for attaining certainty is not to add support for his beliefs, but to subtract grounds for doubt. To explain this strategy, he views Descartes as playing the role of a fictional character—The Demon's Advocate—whose beliefs are, in some respects, mirror images of Descartes' own. The purpose of The Meditations, the author contends, is to silence The Demon's Advocate.
George Bealer
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556182
- eISBN:
- 9780191721014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter targets functionalism as the most cogent form of contemporary materialism. In particular, it takes aim at ‘ontic’ or reductive functionalism: a theory that attempts to specify the ...
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This chapter targets functionalism as the most cogent form of contemporary materialism. In particular, it takes aim at ‘ontic’ or reductive functionalism: a theory that attempts to specify the essences of mental states, in a non-circular fashion, by means of physicalistic functional definitions (i.e., by means of the Ramsification of causal theories of the mind). The chapter points out that functionalism must account for thoughts that have psychological attitudes embedded within them. It effectively sets asides worries that the intensionality of the context of thought renders the argument invalid. It also draws attention to the devastating consequences of the other strategies for avoiding the dilemma. including language-of-thought functionalism. When the language-of-thought theorists attempt to define the content-of relation, they face a dilemma concerning the content of psychological predicates in the language. The language-of-thought theorist must either accept a definitional circularity incompatible with materialism, or resort again to Ramsified definitions that misdescribe the contents of self-conscious thoughts. In addition, such language-of-thought functionalism readily leads to epiphenomenalism. Finally, attempts to avoid the definitional circularity by means of something like a Tarskian hierarchy of distinct psychological attitudes founder on the type-free nature of introspection. The chapter concludes that the only viable functionalism is a non-reductive one that accepts mental properties as ontologically primary, on a par with physical properties.Less
This chapter targets functionalism as the most cogent form of contemporary materialism. In particular, it takes aim at ‘ontic’ or reductive functionalism: a theory that attempts to specify the essences of mental states, in a non-circular fashion, by means of physicalistic functional definitions (i.e., by means of the Ramsification of causal theories of the mind). The chapter points out that functionalism must account for thoughts that have psychological attitudes embedded within them. It effectively sets asides worries that the intensionality of the context of thought renders the argument invalid. It also draws attention to the devastating consequences of the other strategies for avoiding the dilemma. including language-of-thought functionalism. When the language-of-thought theorists attempt to define the content-of relation, they face a dilemma concerning the content of psychological predicates in the language. The language-of-thought theorist must either accept a definitional circularity incompatible with materialism, or resort again to Ramsified definitions that misdescribe the contents of self-conscious thoughts. In addition, such language-of-thought functionalism readily leads to epiphenomenalism. Finally, attempts to avoid the definitional circularity by means of something like a Tarskian hierarchy of distinct psychological attitudes founder on the type-free nature of introspection. The chapter concludes that the only viable functionalism is a non-reductive one that accepts mental properties as ontologically primary, on a par with physical properties.
