Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the ...
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This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the period between World War II and the Iraq War. The U.S. military initially resisted the idea of biological warfare and assigned it to the Chemical Warfare Service despite all of the differences between chemical weapons and biological weapons. Moreover, inaccuracies inherent to the stereotype of “chemical and biological weapons” caused problems for offense as well as defense, and these ideas even influenced President Richard Nixon's decision to end the offensive biological weapons program in 1969. U.S. investment in biodefense soon hit record lows, which helps explain why General Schwarzkopf was unprepared for biological weapons during the Gulf War.Less
This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the period between World War II and the Iraq War. The U.S. military initially resisted the idea of biological warfare and assigned it to the Chemical Warfare Service despite all of the differences between chemical weapons and biological weapons. Moreover, inaccuracies inherent to the stereotype of “chemical and biological weapons” caused problems for offense as well as defense, and these ideas even influenced President Richard Nixon's decision to end the offensive biological weapons program in 1969. U.S. investment in biodefense soon hit record lows, which helps explain why General Schwarzkopf was unprepared for biological weapons during the Gulf War.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter examines the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) efforts to improve its public image and its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. It shows that while the National ...
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This chapter examines the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) efforts to improve its public image and its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. It shows that while the National Defense Act preserved the CWS as an organization within the military, it was surrounded by army officers who still had doubts about chemical weapons. It highlights the tenuous relationship between the CWS and the rest of the military that was exacerbated by the financial constraints of the postwar period. It considers the ways that Amos A. Fries and his fellow CWS officers continued to build on the foundations they had laid during the U.S. Army's reorganization crisis and tried to change public opinion with respect to chemical weapons, mainly by cultivating relationships within the military and with civilians in the chemical industry, as the organization struggled to consolidate its gains and carry out its mission in the postwar world.Less
This chapter examines the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) efforts to improve its public image and its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. It shows that while the National Defense Act preserved the CWS as an organization within the military, it was surrounded by army officers who still had doubts about chemical weapons. It highlights the tenuous relationship between the CWS and the rest of the military that was exacerbated by the financial constraints of the postwar period. It considers the ways that Amos A. Fries and his fellow CWS officers continued to build on the foundations they had laid during the U.S. Army's reorganization crisis and tried to change public opinion with respect to chemical weapons, mainly by cultivating relationships within the military and with civilians in the chemical industry, as the organization struggled to consolidate its gains and carry out its mission in the postwar world.
Scott Christianson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520255623
- eISBN:
- 9780520945616
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520255623.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The Great War that began in August 1914 ushered in deadly new weapons, including modern artillery, tanks, airplanes, and machine guns. The terror of modern chemical warfare was unleashed on the world ...
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The Great War that began in August 1914 ushered in deadly new weapons, including modern artillery, tanks, airplanes, and machine guns. The terror of modern chemical warfare was unleashed on the world when German troops clandestinely buried thousands of canisters containing the poisonous chlorine gas along the lines at Ypres. As a result of Germany's actions at Ypres, previous agreements had gone out the window, and the resulting arms race to devise more and deadlier gases would transform the nature of war itself and have many profound implications for the development of the gas chamber. Germany's first use of poison gas in World War I reflected its global dominance in the field of chemistry. Not to be outdone by the Germans, Britain set up a massive chemical warfare center at Porton Down. The Allies also established gas schools in France to train every soldier in chemical warfare tactics. In the United States, plants were built to manufacture poison gases for its troops or its allies.Less
The Great War that began in August 1914 ushered in deadly new weapons, including modern artillery, tanks, airplanes, and machine guns. The terror of modern chemical warfare was unleashed on the world when German troops clandestinely buried thousands of canisters containing the poisonous chlorine gas along the lines at Ypres. As a result of Germany's actions at Ypres, previous agreements had gone out the window, and the resulting arms race to devise more and deadlier gases would transform the nature of war itself and have many profound implications for the development of the gas chamber. Germany's first use of poison gas in World War I reflected its global dominance in the field of chemistry. Not to be outdone by the Germans, Britain set up a massive chemical warfare center at Porton Down. The Allies also established gas schools in France to train every soldier in chemical warfare tactics. In the United States, plants were built to manufacture poison gases for its troops or its allies.
Scott Christianson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520255623
- eISBN:
- 9780520945616
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520255623.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
When World War I ended, the United States shut down its poison gas plants for a time. But General Amos Fries and the chemical industry vowed to fight the dismantling of the precious apparatus they ...
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When World War I ended, the United States shut down its poison gas plants for a time. But General Amos Fries and the chemical industry vowed to fight the dismantling of the precious apparatus they had worked so hard to build. Due to their efforts, despite overwhelming public opinion against gas warfare and strong political opposition from his own commanders, Fries and his allies somehow succeeded in gaining passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, which not only saved the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) from extinction, but also turned it into a permanent part of the army. Under Fries's leadership, the CWS publicly turned its attention to undertaking cooperative enterprises with various government departments to harness the fruits of wartime gas research in constructive, peaceful ways. A fierce industrial and political battle ensued over one of the world's deadliest and more useful poisons: cyanide. The mining industry relied on cyanide's ability to separate silver, gold, copper, lead, and other ores. Fries and his allies lobbied against America's support for the Geneva Protocol, which sought to outlaw chemical warfare.Less
When World War I ended, the United States shut down its poison gas plants for a time. But General Amos Fries and the chemical industry vowed to fight the dismantling of the precious apparatus they had worked so hard to build. Due to their efforts, despite overwhelming public opinion against gas warfare and strong political opposition from his own commanders, Fries and his allies somehow succeeded in gaining passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, which not only saved the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) from extinction, but also turned it into a permanent part of the army. Under Fries's leadership, the CWS publicly turned its attention to undertaking cooperative enterprises with various government departments to harness the fruits of wartime gas research in constructive, peaceful ways. A fierce industrial and political battle ensued over one of the world's deadliest and more useful poisons: cyanide. The mining industry relied on cyanide's ability to separate silver, gold, copper, lead, and other ores. Fries and his allies lobbied against America's support for the Geneva Protocol, which sought to outlaw chemical warfare.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter discusses the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) struggle to continue chemical weapons work in the face of a hostile political environment as the U.S. Army sought to digest the lessons ...
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This chapter discusses the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) struggle to continue chemical weapons work in the face of a hostile political environment as the U.S. Army sought to digest the lessons learned from World War I under the budget constraints of the postwar period. It considers the uncertain future of the CWS and chemical weapons after the war as the American public reacted against modern weapons in general and poison gas in particular because of the battlefield suffering it had caused. It also discusses the attempts of policymakers in the Department of War and the U.S. Army to limit all chemical warfare activities in the armed forces after the armistice. Finally, it examines how the CWS, primarily under the leadership of Amos A. Fries, tried to counter anti-gas sentiment and promote chemical weapons and manage to lay a foundation that would allow them to continue improve their reputation through the 1920s.Less
This chapter discusses the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) struggle to continue chemical weapons work in the face of a hostile political environment as the U.S. Army sought to digest the lessons learned from World War I under the budget constraints of the postwar period. It considers the uncertain future of the CWS and chemical weapons after the war as the American public reacted against modern weapons in general and poison gas in particular because of the battlefield suffering it had caused. It also discusses the attempts of policymakers in the Department of War and the U.S. Army to limit all chemical warfare activities in the armed forces after the armistice. Finally, it examines how the CWS, primarily under the leadership of Amos A. Fries, tried to counter anti-gas sentiment and promote chemical weapons and manage to lay a foundation that would allow them to continue improve their reputation through the 1920s.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter focuses on the American Expeditionary Force's (AEF) experiences with poison gas on the Western Front and the logistical effort made by the United States to support chemical warfare ...
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This chapter focuses on the American Expeditionary Force's (AEF) experiences with poison gas on the Western Front and the logistical effort made by the United States to support chemical warfare during World War I. The nascent Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) had to support battlefield operations in 1918 as the AEF faced poison gas in Europe. On the whole, the CWS found itself seriously challenged by conditions on the Western Front and dependent on U.S. allies for information and equipment. This chapter examines the CWS's efforts to train the AEF, manufacture chemical weapons, and use poison gas on the battlefield throughout 1918. It discusses the comparatively heavy gas casualties suffered by the AEF in the fighting due to the inadequacy of the gas-mask training that its soldiers were given. It also considers the AEF's limited use of chemical weapons against the Germans and the U.S. Army's inability to organize for chemical warfare jeopardized the gas warfare program's status after World War I ended.Less
This chapter focuses on the American Expeditionary Force's (AEF) experiences with poison gas on the Western Front and the logistical effort made by the United States to support chemical warfare during World War I. The nascent Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) had to support battlefield operations in 1918 as the AEF faced poison gas in Europe. On the whole, the CWS found itself seriously challenged by conditions on the Western Front and dependent on U.S. allies for information and equipment. This chapter examines the CWS's efforts to train the AEF, manufacture chemical weapons, and use poison gas on the battlefield throughout 1918. It discusses the comparatively heavy gas casualties suffered by the AEF in the fighting due to the inadequacy of the gas-mask training that its soldiers were given. It also considers the AEF's limited use of chemical weapons against the Germans and the U.S. Army's inability to organize for chemical warfare jeopardized the gas warfare program's status after World War I ended.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This book offers an institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the department tasked with improving the Army's ability to use and defend against chemical weapons during and after ...
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This book offers an institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the department tasked with improving the Army's ability to use and defend against chemical weapons during and after World War I. Taking the CWS's story from the trenches to peacetime, the book explores how the CWS's work on chemical warfare continued through the 1920s despite deep opposition to the weapons in both military and civilian circles. As the book shows, the advocates for chemical weapons within the CWS allied with supporters in the military, government, and private industry to lobby to add chemical warfare to the country's permanent arsenal. Their argument: poison gas represented an advanced and even humane tool in modern war, while its applications for pest control and crowd control made a chemical capacity relevant in peacetime. But conflict with those aligned against chemical warfare forced the CWS to fight for its institutional life—and ultimately led to the U.S. military's rejection of battlefield chemical weapons.Less
This book offers an institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the department tasked with improving the Army's ability to use and defend against chemical weapons during and after World War I. Taking the CWS's story from the trenches to peacetime, the book explores how the CWS's work on chemical warfare continued through the 1920s despite deep opposition to the weapons in both military and civilian circles. As the book shows, the advocates for chemical weapons within the CWS allied with supporters in the military, government, and private industry to lobby to add chemical warfare to the country's permanent arsenal. Their argument: poison gas represented an advanced and even humane tool in modern war, while its applications for pest control and crowd control made a chemical capacity relevant in peacetime. But conflict with those aligned against chemical warfare forced the CWS to fight for its institutional life—and ultimately led to the U.S. military's rejection of battlefield chemical weapons.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter examines the United States' chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I. In 1917, the United States was ...
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This chapter examines the United States' chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I. In 1917, the United States was rapidly and haphazardly putting together a chemical warfare organization capable of a variety of responsibilities that included performing research, manufacturing war gases and gas masks, training the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to defend themselves against enemy gas, and deploying gas on the battlefield. While the members of the chemical warfare program performed well under the circumstances, more advanced preparation would have improved readiness and mitigated the need for emergency measures. This chapter discusses the use of poison gas and gas masks and the United States' chemical weapons manufacturing operations during World War I.Less
This chapter examines the United States' chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I. In 1917, the United States was rapidly and haphazardly putting together a chemical warfare organization capable of a variety of responsibilities that included performing research, manufacturing war gases and gas masks, training the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to defend themselves against enemy gas, and deploying gas on the battlefield. While the members of the chemical warfare program performed well under the circumstances, more advanced preparation would have improved readiness and mitigated the need for emergency measures. This chapter discusses the use of poison gas and gas masks and the United States' chemical weapons manufacturing operations during World War I.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign ...
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This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.Less
This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.
Thomas I. Faith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252038686
- eISBN:
- 9780252096624
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252038686.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This book documents the institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the U.S. Army organization responsible for chemical warfare, from its origins in 1917 through Amos A. Fries's ...
More
This book documents the institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the U.S. Army organization responsible for chemical warfare, from its origins in 1917 through Amos A. Fries's departure as CWS chief in 1929. It examines the U.S. chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I; the American Expeditionary Force's experiences with poison gas on the Western Front; the CWS's struggle to continue its chemical weapons program in a hostile political environment after the war; and CWS efforts to improve its public image as well as its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. The book concludes with an assessment of the CWS's successes and failures in the second half of the 1920s. Through the story of the CWS, the book shows how the autonomy of the military-industrial complex can be limited when policymakers are confronted with pervasive, hostile public opinion.Less
This book documents the institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), the U.S. Army organization responsible for chemical warfare, from its origins in 1917 through Amos A. Fries's departure as CWS chief in 1929. It examines the U.S. chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I; the American Expeditionary Force's experiences with poison gas on the Western Front; the CWS's struggle to continue its chemical weapons program in a hostile political environment after the war; and CWS efforts to improve its public image as well as its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. The book concludes with an assessment of the CWS's successes and failures in the second half of the 1920s. Through the story of the CWS, the book shows how the autonomy of the military-industrial complex can be limited when policymakers are confronted with pervasive, hostile public opinion.
Douglas Holdstock
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780192631985
- eISBN:
- 9780191723582
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192631985.003.0007
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter examines the impact of war on health. It begins by considering the health impact and response to specific types of weapons, and the role of the arms trade. It then discusses the broader ...
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This chapter examines the impact of war on health. It begins by considering the health impact and response to specific types of weapons, and the role of the arms trade. It then discusses the broader political changes need for a war-free — that is, stable — global society.Less
This chapter examines the impact of war on health. It begins by considering the health impact and response to specific types of weapons, and the role of the arms trade. It then discusses the broader political changes need for a war-free — that is, stable — global society.
Asher Orkaby
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190618445
- eISBN:
- 9780190618476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190618445.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History, World Modern History
Nasser’s “long-breath strategy” from 1966 through the end of 1967 was focused on maintaining the security of the strategic triangle while using fewer troops. Instead, an intensive bombing campaign ...
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Nasser’s “long-breath strategy” from 1966 through the end of 1967 was focused on maintaining the security of the strategic triangle while using fewer troops. Instead, an intensive bombing campaign that included poison gas was used to target the vast royalist cave network in North Yemen. Despite Egypt’s violation of the Geneva Protocols of 1925, the international community failed to condemn the use of chemical weapons, demonstrating the tenacity of the poison gas taboo. Saudi Ambassador Jamil Baroody’s fierce campaign against UN Secretary General U Thant’s inaction failed to persuade the UN to act. The ICRC, NATO, United States, and UK refused to openly criticize Egypt, as they did not want to fall out of favor with Nasser and suffer economic or political repercussions.Less
Nasser’s “long-breath strategy” from 1966 through the end of 1967 was focused on maintaining the security of the strategic triangle while using fewer troops. Instead, an intensive bombing campaign that included poison gas was used to target the vast royalist cave network in North Yemen. Despite Egypt’s violation of the Geneva Protocols of 1925, the international community failed to condemn the use of chemical weapons, demonstrating the tenacity of the poison gas taboo. Saudi Ambassador Jamil Baroody’s fierce campaign against UN Secretary General U Thant’s inaction failed to persuade the UN to act. The ICRC, NATO, United States, and UK refused to openly criticize Egypt, as they did not want to fall out of favor with Nasser and suffer economic or political repercussions.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804782753
- eISBN:
- 9780804786157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804782753.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other ...
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This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.Less
This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.
Emma Newlands
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780719088049
- eISBN:
- 9781781707869
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719088049.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter explores the medical and scientific experiments that were conducted on army personnel between 1939 and 1945. These included trials of therapeutic drugs, synthetic stimulants and exposure ...
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This chapter explores the medical and scientific experiments that were conducted on army personnel between 1939 and 1945. These included trials of therapeutic drugs, synthetic stimulants and exposure to chemical agents. It examines the aims and objectives of agencies like the Medical Research Council and the Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment at Porton Down, which conducted wartime research. These provide glimpses into the mind-set and decisions made by experimenters regarding the types of bodies that were considered most useful and the levels of risk to which they were to be exposed. The chapter then explores how servicemen encountered medical and scientific experiments. It shows that while some men were forced to take part in human trials by military superiors, many others willingly volunteered. They did so for extra money, time off or to enjoy an enhanced sense of status. Participants also had clear ethical expectations for their bodies, such as being informed about the nature of tests, providing voluntary consent and receiving safeguards to protect their health. This chapter therefore highlights the active role that soldiers played in shaping wartime research as they engaged, and indeed withdrew, their bodies in the demands of experimental science.Less
This chapter explores the medical and scientific experiments that were conducted on army personnel between 1939 and 1945. These included trials of therapeutic drugs, synthetic stimulants and exposure to chemical agents. It examines the aims and objectives of agencies like the Medical Research Council and the Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment at Porton Down, which conducted wartime research. These provide glimpses into the mind-set and decisions made by experimenters regarding the types of bodies that were considered most useful and the levels of risk to which they were to be exposed. The chapter then explores how servicemen encountered medical and scientific experiments. It shows that while some men were forced to take part in human trials by military superiors, many others willingly volunteered. They did so for extra money, time off or to enjoy an enhanced sense of status. Participants also had clear ethical expectations for their bodies, such as being informed about the nature of tests, providing voluntary consent and receiving safeguards to protect their health. This chapter therefore highlights the active role that soldiers played in shaping wartime research as they engaged, and indeed withdrew, their bodies in the demands of experimental science.
Nick Fischer
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252040023
- eISBN:
- 9780252098222
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252040023.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines how the anticommunist movement created the so-called Spider Web Chart that articulated its narrative of a vast and deadly conspiracy against America mounted from within by ...
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This chapter examines how the anticommunist movement created the so-called Spider Web Chart that articulated its narrative of a vast and deadly conspiracy against America mounted from within by Bolshevik spies, agents, and dupes. Representatives of government, big business, high finance, and the military were linked ever tightly by the rallying cause of anticommunism. The anticommunist movement sought to coherently define their cause and promote it in the wider community. Soon enough, the movement produced its ideal propaganda in an image that satisfied its members' political and psychological needs: the Spider Web Chart. Produced by the Chemical Warfare Service of the US Army, the chart proved to be a scheme of unique power, ideal for spreading the message of anticommunism. This chapter first considers how the Spider Web Chart was conceptualized before discussing its enduring effects. It shows that the Spider Web Chart encouraged anticommunists to develop an extensive and highly connected network of kindred associations and a monolithic ideology.Less
This chapter examines how the anticommunist movement created the so-called Spider Web Chart that articulated its narrative of a vast and deadly conspiracy against America mounted from within by Bolshevik spies, agents, and dupes. Representatives of government, big business, high finance, and the military were linked ever tightly by the rallying cause of anticommunism. The anticommunist movement sought to coherently define their cause and promote it in the wider community. Soon enough, the movement produced its ideal propaganda in an image that satisfied its members' political and psychological needs: the Spider Web Chart. Produced by the Chemical Warfare Service of the US Army, the chart proved to be a scheme of unique power, ideal for spreading the message of anticommunism. This chapter first considers how the Spider Web Chart was conceptualized before discussing its enduring effects. It shows that the Spider Web Chart encouraged anticommunists to develop an extensive and highly connected network of kindred associations and a monolithic ideology.
Peter Hough
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190270513
- eISBN:
- 9780190271909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190270513.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
Military ecocide—the wanton destruction of the environment in the course of warfare—emerged as a term in the early 1970s in the wake of the United States’ infamous jungle defoliation campaign ...
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Military ecocide—the wanton destruction of the environment in the course of warfare—emerged as a term in the early 1970s in the wake of the United States’ infamous jungle defoliation campaign Operation Ranch Hand. International moral outrage at the campaign allied to the general rise of ecological consciousness soon prompted the codification of international laws criminalizing such strategies. Implementation of these provisions, though, has been very limited owing to their ambiguity, which still permits military necessity to be cited in defence of environmental damage. However, in spite of this, the moral tide has turned against ecocide and there is reason to believe that assaults on the environment as brazen as Operation Ranch Hand are unlikely to be seen again with the emergence of a clearer global consensus on the immorality of such acts and greater governmental awareness of the reputational costs of ignoring this.Less
Military ecocide—the wanton destruction of the environment in the course of warfare—emerged as a term in the early 1970s in the wake of the United States’ infamous jungle defoliation campaign Operation Ranch Hand. International moral outrage at the campaign allied to the general rise of ecological consciousness soon prompted the codification of international laws criminalizing such strategies. Implementation of these provisions, though, has been very limited owing to their ambiguity, which still permits military necessity to be cited in defence of environmental damage. However, in spite of this, the moral tide has turned against ecocide and there is reason to believe that assaults on the environment as brazen as Operation Ranch Hand are unlikely to be seen again with the emergence of a clearer global consensus on the immorality of such acts and greater governmental awareness of the reputational costs of ignoring this.
Ioanna Iordanou
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- November 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198791317
- eISBN:
- 9780191833823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198791317.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History, Cultural History
This chapter’s aim is twofold. Firstly, it discusses the extraordinary measures that those in charge of Venice’s secret service employed in their ongoing effort to maintain the security of the ...
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This chapter’s aim is twofold. Firstly, it discusses the extraordinary measures that those in charge of Venice’s secret service employed in their ongoing effort to maintain the security of the Venetian state throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These measures included interrogations, tortures, assassinations, chemical warfare, as well as tricks such as letter interceptions and bribes. Such dealings were devised to complement the Republic’s intelligence operations and state surveillance activities. Secondly, it shows how such extraordinary measures, some abhorrent, others more benign, yet equally cunning, were routinely normalized and commonly accepted without dispute or dissent. Instead, with unstinting panache and little consideration for public censure, the Ten routinely legitimized morally reprehensible acts in the name of state security. Their most brute force was revealed on one crucial occasion: the need to prevent enemies from obtaining intelligence on Venetian affairs.Less
This chapter’s aim is twofold. Firstly, it discusses the extraordinary measures that those in charge of Venice’s secret service employed in their ongoing effort to maintain the security of the Venetian state throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These measures included interrogations, tortures, assassinations, chemical warfare, as well as tricks such as letter interceptions and bribes. Such dealings were devised to complement the Republic’s intelligence operations and state surveillance activities. Secondly, it shows how such extraordinary measures, some abhorrent, others more benign, yet equally cunning, were routinely normalized and commonly accepted without dispute or dissent. Instead, with unstinting panache and little consideration for public censure, the Ten routinely legitimized morally reprehensible acts in the name of state security. Their most brute force was revealed on one crucial occasion: the need to prevent enemies from obtaining intelligence on Venetian affairs.
Asher Orkaby
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190618445
- eISBN:
- 9780190618476
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190618445.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History, World Modern History
Beyond the Arab Cold War brings the Yemen Civil War (1962–68) to the forefront of modern Middle East history, in a comprehensive account that features multilingual and multinational archives and oral ...
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Beyond the Arab Cold War brings the Yemen Civil War (1962–68) to the forefront of modern Middle East history, in a comprehensive account that features multilingual and multinational archives and oral histories. Throughout six years of major conflict Yemen sat at the crossroads of regional and international conflict as dozens of countries, international organizations, and individuals intervened in the local South Arabian civil war. Yemen was a showcase for a new era of UN and Red Cross peacekeeping, clandestine activity, Egypt’s counterinsurgency, and one of the first large-scale uses of poison gas since World War I. Events in Yemen were not dominated by a single power, nor were they sole products of US-Soviet or Saudi-Egyptian Arab Cold War rivalry. Rather, during the 1960s Yemen was transformed into an arena of global conflict whose ensuing chaos tore down the walls of centuries of religious rule and isolation and laid the groundwork for the next half century of Yemeni history. The end of the Yemen Civil War marked the end of both Egyptian President Nasser’s Arab nationalist colonial expansion and the British Empire in the Middle East, two of the most dominant regional forces. The legacy of the eventual northern tribal defeat and the compromised establishment of a weak and decentralized republic are at the core of modern-day conflicts in South Arabia.Less
Beyond the Arab Cold War brings the Yemen Civil War (1962–68) to the forefront of modern Middle East history, in a comprehensive account that features multilingual and multinational archives and oral histories. Throughout six years of major conflict Yemen sat at the crossroads of regional and international conflict as dozens of countries, international organizations, and individuals intervened in the local South Arabian civil war. Yemen was a showcase for a new era of UN and Red Cross peacekeeping, clandestine activity, Egypt’s counterinsurgency, and one of the first large-scale uses of poison gas since World War I. Events in Yemen were not dominated by a single power, nor were they sole products of US-Soviet or Saudi-Egyptian Arab Cold War rivalry. Rather, during the 1960s Yemen was transformed into an arena of global conflict whose ensuing chaos tore down the walls of centuries of religious rule and isolation and laid the groundwork for the next half century of Yemeni history. The end of the Yemen Civil War marked the end of both Egyptian President Nasser’s Arab nationalist colonial expansion and the British Empire in the Middle East, two of the most dominant regional forces. The legacy of the eventual northern tribal defeat and the compromised establishment of a weak and decentralized republic are at the core of modern-day conflicts in South Arabia.