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The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.

Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book’s most important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality itself — that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those who violate the principles. Because blame has not received much sustained attention, the book works its way toward its conclusions by first raising, and then seeking to resolve, a series of conceptual and normative questions. These questions include: How are blameworthy acts related to the characters of the agents who perform them? Can agents deserve blame for their bad traits as well as their bad acts? Is blame best understood as a kind of action, a kind of belief, a kind of feeling, a combination of these elements, or something entirely different? What sort of moral concept is blameworthiness? How do blame and blameworthiness — correlative concepts — fit together? Although the book draws both on Hume’s treatment of the relation between character and blame and Strawson’s landmark discussion of the “reactive attitudes”, the theory that emerges is neither Humean nor Strawsonian. It is a new theory that seeks to do more justice than its predecessors to the indispensable role that blame plays in our moral lives.

The argument of this book is that a primary goal in the work of C. S. Lewis is to articulate a Christian worldview. Lewis based this project on his positive view of culture, nature, and human relations. He addresses deficiencies in modern culture and the largely distorted relations of modernity to nature in order to restore culture as a supportive base for a Christian worldview. The book offers discussions of seven interests in Lewis's work: retrieval, reenchantment, houses, culture, character, pleasure, and celebration. The topics provide not only an analysis of Lewis's work but also a basis upon which readers who want to construct a worldview here and now can draw inspiration and direction from him.

What happens when we engage with fictional characters? What sort of cognitive activity and affective response does reading about imaginary figures involve? How do our imaginative engagements bear on our actions in the wider world? Moving between literary and philosophical analysis, this book considers the ways in which readers feel when they read, and how they understand ideas of feeling. By using poetic rewritings of The Tempest as its focus, this book broaches questions about fictional belief, morality, and the dynamics between readers, writers, and fictional characters. The book challenges conventionally accepted ideas of literary identification. It questions whether this activity is necessarily central to our reading practices, and scrutinises why identification has been seen as so important to some liberal humanist theories of literary engagement. Individual chapters on Robert Browning, W. H. Auden, and Samuel Beckett, who all drew on Shakespeare's late play, offer new readings of some major works, while the book's epilogue tackles questions of contemporary sympathy.

Literature is a source of understanding and insight into the human condition. Yet ever since Aristotle, philosophers have struggled to provide a plausible account of how this can be the case. For surely the fictionality, the sheer invented character, of the literary work means that literature concerns itself not with the real world but with other worlds — what are commonly called fictional worlds. How is it, then, that fictions can tell us something of consequence about reality? This book offers a novel and intriguing account of the relationship between literature and life, and shows that literature's great cultural and cognitive value is inseparable from its fictionality and inventiveness.

The Necessity of Theater examines the whole art of theater, which teaches us how best to watch and be watched, and is as necessary to human life as language. We practice the art of theater on the formal stage, but also in sports events, weddings, and ceremonies of all kinds. The book begins by defining the art in a broad way, so as to include as many kinds of theater as possible across world cultures. After defining theater, The Necessity of Theater examines in turn each of the main elements of its two main components: the art of watching and that of being watched. Performers practice the art of making their actions worth watching. This means that they should pay attention to such elements as action, choice, plot, character, mimesis, and the sacredness of performance space. All of these are covered in the book. Audiences practice the art of paying attention to the actions before them. To do that they need to know how to find events worth watching. A good audience is emotionally engaged through one of the many forms of empathy that are distinguished in this book, one of which leads to human wisdom. Plato's ancient attack on theater is right in that theater cannot teach us transcendent truths, but theater does each us about ourselves.

Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive a category for much more to be said about it than this; we should focus attention instead on the vaguely defined but interesting category of things rich in narrative structure. Such devices offer significant possibilities, not merely for the representation of stories, but for the expression of point of view; they have also played an important role in the evolution of reliable channels of information, an issue pursued in three chapter appendices. This book argues that much of the pleasure of narrative depends on early developing tendencies in human beings to imitation and to joint attention, and imitation turns out to be the key to understanding such important literary techniques as free indirect discourse and character‐focused narration. The book also examines irony in narrative, with an emphasis on the idea of the expression of ironic points of view; a case study of this phenomenon is offered. Finally, the book examines the idea of Character, as evidenced in robust, situation‐independent ways of acting and thinking, and its important role in many narratives. It is asked whether scepticism about the notion of Character should have us reassess the dramatic and literary tradition which places such emphasis on Character.

Campaign organizers and the media appear to agree that voters' perceptions of party leaders have an important impact in elections: considerable effort is made to ensure that leaders look good, speak well, and that they are up in the polls. In contrast, the academic literature is much more divided. Some suggest that leaders play an important role in the vote calculus, while others argue that in comparison to other factors, perceptions of leaders have only a minimal impact. This study incorporates data from thirty-five election studies across seven countries with varying institutional environments, and takes both a broad and in-depth look at the role of leaders. A few noteworthy conclusions emerge. First, voters evaluate leaders' traits in terms of two main dimensions: character and competence. Second, voters perceive leaders within the framework of a partisan stereotype in which the party label of the leader imbues meaning; more specifically, leaders of Conservative parties are seen to be more competent while Left leaders are seen to have more character. Third, and most importantly, leaders matter: they affect voters' decisions and have a discernible effect on the distribution of votes in an election. Fourth, there are consistent differences in the perception of party leaders according to voters' level of political sophistication. While all voters evaluate party leaders and consider leaders in their vote calculus, the more sophisticated do so the most. This book argues that personality plays an important role in elections, and that in a healthy democracy, so it should.

Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? This book offers an answer. It attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the feature that all and only conscious mental events have. According to the theory, conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. The book fleshed out this idea and argues for it.

What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw support for domestic violence prosecutions? This book defends the claim that (within the realm of justified/permissible action) prosecutors should respond effectively; which is to say that ceteris paribus domestic-violence prosecutors should respond as feminists. This claim is intended as a provocative formulation of the proposition that domestic violence prosecutors should act for reasons generated by the value of reconstituting their states (and communities) as less patriarchal. In defending this claim, the book first sets out a general theory of prosecutorial practical reasoning and then considers the prosecution of domestic-violence offences in particular. Along the way, it provides an original account of the nature of prosecutorial action, the values that can be realized through such action, and the relationship between these values and the practical reasoning of criminal prosecutors. Moreover, it provides analyses of two key concepts — domestic violence and patriarchy — and explains the relevance of the latter to a proper understanding of the former. Putting these insights to work in answering the question stated above, this book provides an account of what prosecutors would be justified in doing in such cases and what prosecutors should do in order to be effective as domestic violence prosecutors. Later chapters apply this general framework in addressing the rights and duties of domestic violence victims to participate in criminal prosecutions and responding to some general objections that might be raised against envisioning the role of domestic-violence-prosecutor-as-feminist.

The theory of action underlying Immanuel Kant's moral theory is the subject of this book. What “maxims” are, and how we act on maxims, are explained here in light of both the historical context of Kant's thought, and his classroom lectures on psychology and ethics. Arguing against the current of much recent scholarship, a strong case is made for interpreting Kant as having embraced psychological determinism, a version of the “belief-desire model” of human motivation, and a literal, “two-worlds” metaphysics. On this interpretation, actions in the familiar, sensible world are always effects of prior psychological causes. Their explaining causal laws are the maxims of agents' characters. And agents act freely if, acting in an intelligible world, what they do there results in their having the characters they have here, in the sensible world. In this way Kant's theory of action coordinates thoroughgoing causal determinism in the natural world with human freedom and moral responsibility. This line of interpretation is fruitful also for addressing some familiar problems in Kant's moral psychology. It allows explaining actions caused by admirable inclinations as “virtuous”, without requiring the motive of duty behind every morally praiseworthy action.

Providing an interdisciplinary and global perspective on immigration to the United States, this book represents an important step forward in the development of immigration studies. The book aims to help redirect thinking on the subject of immigration by giving a summary of the current state of immigration studies and a coherent new perspective that emphasizes the international dimensions of the immigrant experience from the time of the slave trade to present-day movements of Asian and Latin American peoples. This book challenges ethnocentric American or European perspectives on immigration, disputes the classical assimilation model of a linear progression of immigrant cultures toward a dominant American national character, questions human capital theory as an explanation of ethnic group achievement, reveals conflicting ethnic and racial attitudes toward immigration restriction, and examines the revival of interest in oral history, immigrant autobiographies, and other subjective documents.

Drawing on the role morality developed in previous applications of virtue ethics to professional practice, The Virtuous Psychiatrist shows that the ethical practice of psychiatry depends on the character of the practitioner. The book is built upon three key tenets: ethics is important to any professional practice, including psychiatry; the settings within which psychiatry is practiced impose ethical demands on its practitioners that are distinctive enough to warrant a separate analysis; and an emphasis on character and moral psychology in a virtue theory significantly augments our understanding of the ethical demands of psychiatric practice. In addition to the ethical guidelines imposed on every biomedical practice, the ethical practitioner should cultivate additional traits of character or virtues. These include gender sensitive virtues. Implicated in the normative presuppositions of psychiatric practice and lore, gender stands in for other such categories including race, class and ethnicity; it is also a factor at once unremittingly controversial, and inescapably tied to the self identity often at the heart of the therapeutic project. Virtues can and should be taught – that is, instilled, deepened and augmented. The setting where trainees are learning the ideals and responses of their particular professional role, it is emphasized, is where such virtues can be habituated, using pedagogical techniques associated with moral education, such as training in empathic emotions. Psychiatric training should address trainee's character alongside practice skills.

Homology—a similar trait shared by different species and derived from common ancestry, such as a seal's fin and a bird's wing—is one of the most fundamental yet challenging concepts in evolutionary biology. This book provides the first mechanistically based theory of what homology is and how it arises in evolution. The book argues that homology, or character identity, can be explained through the historical continuity of character identity networks—that is, the gene regulatory networks that enable differential gene expression. It shows how character identity is independent of the form and function of the character itself because the same network can activate different effector genes and thus control the development of different shapes, sizes, and qualities of the character. Demonstrating how this theoretical model can provide a foundation for understanding the evolutionary origin of novel characters, the book applies it to the origin and evolution of specific systems, such as cell types; skin, hair, and feathers; limbs and digits; and flowers. The first major synthesis of homology to be published in decades, this book reveals how a mechanistically based theory can serve as a unifying concept for any branch of science concerned with the structure and development of organisms, and how it can help explain major transitions in evolution and broad patterns of biological diversity.

This book states that we live our lives through our emotions, and that it is our emotions which give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us; all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. This book illuminates the rich life of the emotions: why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. The book provides a guide to cutting-edge scientific research, as well as to what philosophers and psychologists have said on the subject, but it also emphasizes the personal and ethical character of our emotions. The book shows that emotions are not something that happen to us, nor are they irrational in the literal sense; rather, they are judgments we make about the world, and they are strategies for living in it. Fear, anger, love, guilt, jealousy, compassion—they are all essential to our values, to living happily, healthily, and well.