Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780823276073
- eISBN:
- 9780823277100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823276073.003.0002
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, History of Neuroscience
The first chapter proposes to trace the distant roots of the cerebral subject to the late seventeenth century, and particularly to debates about the seat of the soul, the corpuscularian theory of ...
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The first chapter proposes to trace the distant roots of the cerebral subject to the late seventeenth century, and particularly to debates about the seat of the soul, the corpuscularian theory of matter, and John Locke’s philosophy of personal identity. In the wake of Locke, eighteenth century authors began to assert that the brain is the only part of the body we need to be ourselves. In the nineteenth century, this form of deterministic essentialism contributed to motivate research into brain structure and function, and in turn confirmed the brain-personhood nexus. Since then, from phrenology to functional neuroimaging, neuroscientific knowledge and representations have constituted a powerful support for prescriptive outlooks on the individual and society. “Neuroascesis,” as we call the business that sells programs of cerebral self-discipline, is a case in point, which this chapter also examines. It appeals to the brain and neuroscience as bases for its self-help recipes to enhance memory and reasoning, fight depression, anxiety and compulsions, improve sexual performance, achieve happiness, and even establish a direct contact with God. Yet underneath the neuro surface lie beliefs and even concrete instructions that can be traced to nineteenth-century hygiene manuals.Less
The first chapter proposes to trace the distant roots of the cerebral subject to the late seventeenth century, and particularly to debates about the seat of the soul, the corpuscularian theory of matter, and John Locke’s philosophy of personal identity. In the wake of Locke, eighteenth century authors began to assert that the brain is the only part of the body we need to be ourselves. In the nineteenth century, this form of deterministic essentialism contributed to motivate research into brain structure and function, and in turn confirmed the brain-personhood nexus. Since then, from phrenology to functional neuroimaging, neuroscientific knowledge and representations have constituted a powerful support for prescriptive outlooks on the individual and society. “Neuroascesis,” as we call the business that sells programs of cerebral self-discipline, is a case in point, which this chapter also examines. It appeals to the brain and neuroscience as bases for its self-help recipes to enhance memory and reasoning, fight depression, anxiety and compulsions, improve sexual performance, achieve happiness, and even establish a direct contact with God. Yet underneath the neuro surface lie beliefs and even concrete instructions that can be traced to nineteenth-century hygiene manuals.
Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780823276073
- eISBN:
- 9780823277100
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823276073.001.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, History of Neuroscience
This book offers a critical exploration of the influential and pervasive belief that “we are our brains” (and that therefore he neurosciences will provide the key to all human phenomena). Since the ...
More
This book offers a critical exploration of the influential and pervasive belief that “we are our brains” (and that therefore he neurosciences will provide the key to all human phenomena). Since the 1990s, “neurocentrism” has become widespread in most Western and many non-Western societies. Advances, especially in neuroimaging, decisively bolstered it and helped justify increased funding for the brain sciences. Such a belief permeates many other contexts beyond basic research. Major national health agencies consider that “mental” illnesses are “brain disorders.” People diagnosed with some of those disorders advocate “neurodiversity” rights. In the human sciences, subspecialties such as neuroanthropology, neuroaesthetics, neuroeducation, neurohistory, neurolaw, neurosociology or neurotheology quickly professionalized. Dubious businesses, aimed for example at building neuroimaging lie detectors, selling (“neuromarketing”), or promoting wellbeing thanks to regimens said to target the brain (“neurobics”), became successful. The media has showered attention on all things “neuro,” and novels and films rehearsed the challenges of seeing persons as “cerebral subjects.” Skeptics have reacted to the “neurohype,” and spoken of neuromythology, neurotrash, neuromania or neuromadness. The neurocentric view of the human is not hegemonic or monolithic, but embodies a powerful ideology that is at the heart of some of today’s most important philosophical, ethical, scientific and political debates. Why We Are Our Brains critically explores the internal logic of such ideology, its genealogy, and its main contemporary incarnations.Less
This book offers a critical exploration of the influential and pervasive belief that “we are our brains” (and that therefore he neurosciences will provide the key to all human phenomena). Since the 1990s, “neurocentrism” has become widespread in most Western and many non-Western societies. Advances, especially in neuroimaging, decisively bolstered it and helped justify increased funding for the brain sciences. Such a belief permeates many other contexts beyond basic research. Major national health agencies consider that “mental” illnesses are “brain disorders.” People diagnosed with some of those disorders advocate “neurodiversity” rights. In the human sciences, subspecialties such as neuroanthropology, neuroaesthetics, neuroeducation, neurohistory, neurolaw, neurosociology or neurotheology quickly professionalized. Dubious businesses, aimed for example at building neuroimaging lie detectors, selling (“neuromarketing”), or promoting wellbeing thanks to regimens said to target the brain (“neurobics”), became successful. The media has showered attention on all things “neuro,” and novels and films rehearsed the challenges of seeing persons as “cerebral subjects.” Skeptics have reacted to the “neurohype,” and spoken of neuromythology, neurotrash, neuromania or neuromadness. The neurocentric view of the human is not hegemonic or monolithic, but embodies a powerful ideology that is at the heart of some of today’s most important philosophical, ethical, scientific and political debates. Why We Are Our Brains critically explores the internal logic of such ideology, its genealogy, and its main contemporary incarnations.
Jason Tougaw
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300221176
- eISBN:
- 9780300235609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300221176.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
The introduction examines contemporary debates in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, demonstrating the conceptual impasses inevitable when writers adopt extreme rhetorical positions about the ...
More
The introduction examines contemporary debates in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, demonstrating the conceptual impasses inevitable when writers adopt extreme rhetorical positions about the so-called “cerebral subject”—for example, “you are your brain” or “you are not your brain.” Literary works, literary criticism, and the neurohumanities respond to such debates by eschewing reductive rhetorical positions in favor of representing the complex questions that arise when they ask what philosophers call “the hard problem” of identifying roles the brain plays in the making of identity, consciousness, and self. Less
The introduction examines contemporary debates in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, demonstrating the conceptual impasses inevitable when writers adopt extreme rhetorical positions about the so-called “cerebral subject”—for example, “you are your brain” or “you are not your brain.” Literary works, literary criticism, and the neurohumanities respond to such debates by eschewing reductive rhetorical positions in favor of representing the complex questions that arise when they ask what philosophers call “the hard problem” of identifying roles the brain plays in the making of identity, consciousness, and self.
