Christopher Hood and David Heald (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263839
- eISBN:
- 9780191734915
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
‘Transparency’ is widely canvassed as a key to better governance, increasing trust in public-office holders. But it is more often preached than practised, more often referred to than defined, and ...
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‘Transparency’ is widely canvassed as a key to better governance, increasing trust in public-office holders. But it is more often preached than practised, more often referred to than defined, and more often advocated than critically analysed. This book exposes this doctrine to critical scrutiny from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including political science, philosophy, and economics. It traces the history of transparency as a doctrine of good governance and social organization, and identifies its different forms; assesses the benefits and drawbacks of measures to enhance various forms of transparency; and examines how institutions respond to measures intended to increase transparency, and with what consequences. Transparency is shown not to be a new doctrine. It can come into conflict with other doctrines of good governance, and there are some important exceptions to Jeremy Bentham's famous dictum that ‘the more closely we are watched, the better we behave’. Instead of heralding a new culture of openness in government, measures to improve transparency tend to lead to tighter and more centralized management of information.Less
‘Transparency’ is widely canvassed as a key to better governance, increasing trust in public-office holders. But it is more often preached than practised, more often referred to than defined, and more often advocated than critically analysed. This book exposes this doctrine to critical scrutiny from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including political science, philosophy, and economics. It traces the history of transparency as a doctrine of good governance and social organization, and identifies its different forms; assesses the benefits and drawbacks of measures to enhance various forms of transparency; and examines how institutions respond to measures intended to increase transparency, and with what consequences. Transparency is shown not to be a new doctrine. It can come into conflict with other doctrines of good governance, and there are some important exceptions to Jeremy Bentham's famous dictum that ‘the more closely we are watched, the better we behave’. Instead of heralding a new culture of openness in government, measures to improve transparency tend to lead to tighter and more centralized management of information.
Xu Yi-chong
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190279523
- eISBN:
- 9780190279554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190279523.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
Since its inception, SGCC has transformed into a large-scale corporation through its internal organisational centralisation and external mergers and acquisitions. This transformation altered SGCC’s ...
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Since its inception, SGCC has transformed into a large-scale corporation through its internal organisational centralisation and external mergers and acquisitions. This transformation altered SGCC’s internal managerial structures and system controls, and changed the basic relationships with its owner (SASAC), its regulators (NDRC and SERC), its own subsidiaries and employees, and other players, especially the provinces. This chapter explains how this expansion and transformation took place in the broad institutional context over several key controversial issues—its governing structure, expansion, centralisation, and relationship with local governments. It shows that the mandate of the electricity reform in 2002 not only created SGCC, but also bred a sense of identity, a set of interests, and a large degree of autonomy, with which SGCC expanded horizontally and vertically into a multilayered corporation that makes it extremely difficult for its ‘owner’ to monitor.Less
Since its inception, SGCC has transformed into a large-scale corporation through its internal organisational centralisation and external mergers and acquisitions. This transformation altered SGCC’s internal managerial structures and system controls, and changed the basic relationships with its owner (SASAC), its regulators (NDRC and SERC), its own subsidiaries and employees, and other players, especially the provinces. This chapter explains how this expansion and transformation took place in the broad institutional context over several key controversial issues—its governing structure, expansion, centralisation, and relationship with local governments. It shows that the mandate of the electricity reform in 2002 not only created SGCC, but also bred a sense of identity, a set of interests, and a large degree of autonomy, with which SGCC expanded horizontally and vertically into a multilayered corporation that makes it extremely difficult for its ‘owner’ to monitor.
Paul Craig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199296811
- eISBN:
- 9780191700811
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296811.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
The new Financial Regulation contains provisions dealing with shared management, as well as direct/centralized management. There are ...
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The new Financial Regulation contains provisions dealing with shared management, as well as direct/centralized management. There are nonetheless many issues posed by shared management that are not touched by the new reforms. This chapter explores these problems in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds. These problems cannot be ignored by anyone seriously interested in law and administration within the EU, both because expenditure in these areas consumes a large part of the Community budget, and because the regime of shared management poses unique problems and challenges.Less
The new Financial Regulation contains provisions dealing with shared management, as well as direct/centralized management. There are nonetheless many issues posed by shared management that are not touched by the new reforms. This chapter explores these problems in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds. These problems cannot be ignored by anyone seriously interested in law and administration within the EU, both because expenditure in these areas consumes a large part of the Community budget, and because the regime of shared management poses unique problems and challenges.
