Alasdair Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195374988
- eISBN:
- 9780199776849
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374988.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a ...
More
The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a globalized economy. Central banking, fiscal control, tax collection, regulation, port and airport management, infrastructure development—in all of these areas, radical reforms were made to the architecture of government. A common philosophy shaped all of these reforms: the logic of discipline. It was premised on deep skepticism about the ability of democratic processes to make sensible policy choices. It sought to impose constraints on elected officials and citizens, often by shifting power to technocrat-guardians who were shielded from political influence. It placed great faith in the power of legal changes—new laws, treaties, and contracts—to produce significant alterations in the performance of governmental systems. Even before the global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the logic of discipline was under assault. Faced with many failed reform projects, advocates of discipline realized that they had underestimated the complexity of governmental change. Opponents of discipline emphasized the damage to democratic values that followed from the empowerment of new groups of technocrat-guardians. The financial crisis did further damage to the logic of discipline, as governments modified their attitudes about central bank independence and fiscal control, and global financial and trade flows declined. It was the market that now appeared to behave myopically and erratically, and which now insisted that governments should abandon precepts about the role of government that it had once insisted were inviolable. An account of neoliberal governmental restructuring across the world, The Logic of Discipline offers an analysis of how this undemocratic model is unravelling in the face of a monumental and ongoing failure of the market.Less
The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a globalized economy. Central banking, fiscal control, tax collection, regulation, port and airport management, infrastructure development—in all of these areas, radical reforms were made to the architecture of government. A common philosophy shaped all of these reforms: the logic of discipline. It was premised on deep skepticism about the ability of democratic processes to make sensible policy choices. It sought to impose constraints on elected officials and citizens, often by shifting power to technocrat-guardians who were shielded from political influence. It placed great faith in the power of legal changes—new laws, treaties, and contracts—to produce significant alterations in the performance of governmental systems. Even before the global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the logic of discipline was under assault. Faced with many failed reform projects, advocates of discipline realized that they had underestimated the complexity of governmental change. Opponents of discipline emphasized the damage to democratic values that followed from the empowerment of new groups of technocrat-guardians. The financial crisis did further damage to the logic of discipline, as governments modified their attitudes about central bank independence and fiscal control, and global financial and trade flows declined. It was the market that now appeared to behave myopically and erratically, and which now insisted that governments should abandon precepts about the role of government that it had once insisted were inviolable. An account of neoliberal governmental restructuring across the world, The Logic of Discipline offers an analysis of how this undemocratic model is unravelling in the face of a monumental and ongoing failure of the market.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199270569
- eISBN:
- 9780191602542
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270562.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank ...
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This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank licensing principles. Essay three explores the changing attitude towards banking competition. Essay four discusses self-regulation by financial institutions. Essay five explores the increasing links between banking and securities activities. Essay six examines the organisational structure of financial regulatory and supervisory functions. Essays seven and eight discuss the abandonment of the coincidence between the jurisdiction of monetary policy and the jurisdiction of banking supervision, and the important role of central banks in financial stability, respectively.Less
This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank licensing principles. Essay three explores the changing attitude towards banking competition. Essay four discusses self-regulation by financial institutions. Essay five explores the increasing links between banking and securities activities. Essay six examines the organisational structure of financial regulatory and supervisory functions. Essays seven and eight discuss the abandonment of the coincidence between the jurisdiction of monetary policy and the jurisdiction of banking supervision, and the important role of central banks in financial stability, respectively.
Miriam L. Campanella
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297574
- eISBN:
- 9780191598982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297572.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter examines the conflict between the European Central Bank (ECB) and Council of Ministers and the Economic and Finance Ministers of the eleven countries taking part in the common currency ...
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This chapter examines the conflict between the European Central Bank (ECB) and Council of Ministers and the Economic and Finance Ministers of the eleven countries taking part in the common currency (ECOFIN-11). The theoretical game of chicken is used to highlight the preferences of the two parties and ensuing dynamics. It is shown that the ECB’s commitment to its institutional objective counters political authorities’ attempts to gain fiscal dominance over monetary policy.Less
This chapter examines the conflict between the European Central Bank (ECB) and Council of Ministers and the Economic and Finance Ministers of the eleven countries taking part in the common currency (ECOFIN-11). The theoretical game of chicken is used to highlight the preferences of the two parties and ensuing dynamics. It is shown that the ECB’s commitment to its institutional objective counters political authorities’ attempts to gain fiscal dominance over monetary policy.
Alasdair Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195374988
- eISBN:
- 9780199776849
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374988.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter discusses central bank independence and why it should be regarded as an application of the logic of discipline. The argument for central bank independence mutated substantially over ...
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This chapter discusses central bank independence and why it should be regarded as an application of the logic of discipline. The argument for central bank independence mutated substantially over thirty years. It began as a simple application of the logic of discipline: legal reforms were necessary to establish the independence of central banks so that they could make difficult decisions about monetary policy. Formal-legal reforms empowered a new guardian class of central bankers and scholarly economists. Over time the argument for independence was refined to include the claim that de jure independence would be an effective means of reassuring foreign investors about the commitment to price stability. By 2009, however, this now-conventional argument for central bank independence had been discredited in several ways. The most obvious difficulty was the failure of leading central bankers to anticipate and avoid the crisis of 2007-2009.Less
This chapter discusses central bank independence and why it should be regarded as an application of the logic of discipline. The argument for central bank independence mutated substantially over thirty years. It began as a simple application of the logic of discipline: legal reforms were necessary to establish the independence of central banks so that they could make difficult decisions about monetary policy. Formal-legal reforms empowered a new guardian class of central bankers and scholarly economists. Over time the argument for independence was refined to include the claim that de jure independence would be an effective means of reassuring foreign investors about the commitment to price stability. By 2009, however, this now-conventional argument for central bank independence had been discredited in several ways. The most obvious difficulty was the failure of leading central bankers to anticipate and avoid the crisis of 2007-2009.
J. C. R. Dow and I. D. Saville
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283195
- eISBN:
- 9780191596186
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283199.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
This book has been written to work on two levels. On the one hand, it provides a theory of monetary policy, focusing on the role of the central bank in determining and effecting policy. It also ...
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This book has been written to work on two levels. On the one hand, it provides a theory of monetary policy, focusing on the role of the central bank in determining and effecting policy. It also examines the relationship of the central banks to the public and private sectors. Both authors have extensive experience working in the Bank of England, and so are attempting to transfer this experience to the area of economic theory. The theoretical analysis is complemented by an examination of the successes and failures of monetary policy in the UK from the mid‐1960s. As such, the book acts as an important work for students of economics and economic theory, but is also accessible to those involved in policy‐making, journalism, and other interested parties.Less
This book has been written to work on two levels. On the one hand, it provides a theory of monetary policy, focusing on the role of the central bank in determining and effecting policy. It also examines the relationship of the central banks to the public and private sectors. Both authors have extensive experience working in the Bank of England, and so are attempting to transfer this experience to the area of economic theory. The theoretical analysis is complemented by an examination of the successes and failures of monetary policy in the UK from the mid‐1960s. As such, the book acts as an important work for students of economics and economic theory, but is also accessible to those involved in policy‐making, journalism, and other interested parties.
Christopher Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296393
- eISBN:
- 9780191599002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296398.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Starting from concerns at the lack of legitimacy and accountability of European monetary institutions, the author develops proposals for improving the accountability of the European Central Bank and ...
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Starting from concerns at the lack of legitimacy and accountability of European monetary institutions, the author develops proposals for improving the accountability of the European Central Bank and embedding it in a democratic institutional context resembling that of individual member states.Less
Starting from concerns at the lack of legitimacy and accountability of European monetary institutions, the author develops proposals for improving the accountability of the European Central Bank and embedding it in a democratic institutional context resembling that of individual member states.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199270569
- eISBN:
- 9780191602542
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270562.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This essay discusses the importance of central bank involvement in financial stability. The function of central banks occupies a place somewhere between monetary policy and supervision. Central bank ...
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This essay discusses the importance of central bank involvement in financial stability. The function of central banks occupies a place somewhere between monetary policy and supervision. Central bank involvement is distinct from, and complementary to, supervisory functions. Close cooperation and information exchange are essential for the successful execution of supervisory and central bank functions. Central banks should also continue to give advice on supervisory rules and policies.Less
This essay discusses the importance of central bank involvement in financial stability. The function of central banks occupies a place somewhere between monetary policy and supervision. Central bank involvement is distinct from, and complementary to, supervisory functions. Close cooperation and information exchange are essential for the successful execution of supervisory and central bank functions. Central banks should also continue to give advice on supervisory rules and policies.
Laurence Whitehead
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253289
- eISBN:
- 9780191600326
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253285.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Explores the relationship between processes of democratization and the establishment and/or reinforcement of trustworthy and credible systems of monetary authority, with particular emphasis on ...
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Explores the relationship between processes of democratization and the establishment and/or reinforcement of trustworthy and credible systems of monetary authority, with particular emphasis on central banks. The theoretical issues it considers include the ‘delicate balance’ between monetary authority and democratic legitimacy, the underlying rationale for central bank independence, and the scope and limits of ‘consent’ in monetary affairs. But this chapter is equally concerned with the feedback from experience to theory, focusing in particular on the way that unanticipated financial crises may inflict heavy redistributive costs on society, and may even weaken the legitimacy of fledgling democratic institutions.Less
Explores the relationship between processes of democratization and the establishment and/or reinforcement of trustworthy and credible systems of monetary authority, with particular emphasis on central banks. The theoretical issues it considers include the ‘delicate balance’ between monetary authority and democratic legitimacy, the underlying rationale for central bank independence, and the scope and limits of ‘consent’ in monetary affairs. But this chapter is equally concerned with the feedback from experience to theory, focusing in particular on the way that unanticipated financial crises may inflict heavy redistributive costs on society, and may even weaken the legitimacy of fledgling democratic institutions.
Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296386
- eISBN:
- 9780191599125
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829638X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Structuralist explanations have dominated attempts to explain the process of European integration. However, as the negotiation of Economic and Monetary Union shows, policy leadership has been ...
More
Structuralist explanations have dominated attempts to explain the process of European integration. However, as the negotiation of Economic and Monetary Union shows, policy leadership has been critical in launching, shaping, and sustaining this process. This leadership goes beyond policy entrepreneurship in setting the agenda to include the management of institutional venues in the pursuit of particular objectives.The Franco–German relationship emerges as a key venue that defines the scope and limitations of policy leadership and that was crucial in binding in the Bundesbank and EU central bankers to the process. At the domestic level, the political drive from Kohl and Mitterrand was decisive. Delors was a key driving force, at certain stages, both within the European Commission and as chair of the Delors Committee. Together, they acted as animateurs and ingénieurs of Economic and Monetary Union. The strategic aspect of leadership in the cases of Britain and Italy was altogether different. The Thatcher and Major governments repeatedly misjudged the commitment of their partners to proceed, and the inflexibility of their positions prevented them from building countervailing coalitions. For Italy, EMU was a test of external credibility: domestic weakness limited her overall influence on the progress of the initiative, whilst EMU was seized upon by a small leadership group as a new vincolo esterno (external constraint) to secure otherwise difficult domestic reforms. This latter strategy was replicated more widely as member states endeavored to meet the entry criteria for participation in the single currency.The outcome of the Maastricht Treaty was an imperfect agreement that generates serious future challenges for policy leadership. These challenges include cognitive gaps in EMU, institutional innovation, and imperfect legitimation.Less
Structuralist explanations have dominated attempts to explain the process of European integration. However, as the negotiation of Economic and Monetary Union shows, policy leadership has been critical in launching, shaping, and sustaining this process. This leadership goes beyond policy entrepreneurship in setting the agenda to include the management of institutional venues in the pursuit of particular objectives.
The Franco–German relationship emerges as a key venue that defines the scope and limitations of policy leadership and that was crucial in binding in the Bundesbank and EU central bankers to the process. At the domestic level, the political drive from Kohl and Mitterrand was decisive. Delors was a key driving force, at certain stages, both within the European Commission and as chair of the Delors Committee. Together, they acted as animateurs and ingénieurs of Economic and Monetary Union. The strategic aspect of leadership in the cases of Britain and Italy was altogether different. The Thatcher and Major governments repeatedly misjudged the commitment of their partners to proceed, and the inflexibility of their positions prevented them from building countervailing coalitions. For Italy, EMU was a test of external credibility: domestic weakness limited her overall influence on the progress of the initiative, whilst EMU was seized upon by a small leadership group as a new vincolo esterno (external constraint) to secure otherwise difficult domestic reforms. This latter strategy was replicated more widely as member states endeavored to meet the entry criteria for participation in the single currency.
The outcome of the Maastricht Treaty was an imperfect agreement that generates serious future challenges for policy leadership. These challenges include cognitive gaps in EMU, institutional innovation, and imperfect legitimation.
U. Bindseil
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199557523
- eISBN:
- 9780191725005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557523.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, International
This chapter provides an introduction to the theory of monetary policy implementation, i.e. how to control, in normal times, through central bank market operations a short-term interbank interest ...
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This chapter provides an introduction to the theory of monetary policy implementation, i.e. how to control, in normal times, through central bank market operations a short-term interbank interest rate. A financial accounts representation is provided to clarify the impact of central bank financial transactions on the balance sheets of other economic agents as well as the impact of other agents' transactions on the central bank balance sheet. The role of standing facilities, open market operations, reserve requirements, and collateral is explained in this context. The chapter also has a normative part, discussing desirable properties and tools of efficient implementation frameworks. The second half of the chapter deals with monetary policy implementation in crisis times — explaining the mechanisms of a financial turmoil, and how central banks can, through a number of measures, support the funding liquidity of banks and try to break the vicious circle inherent in a liquidity crisis.Less
This chapter provides an introduction to the theory of monetary policy implementation, i.e. how to control, in normal times, through central bank market operations a short-term interbank interest rate. A financial accounts representation is provided to clarify the impact of central bank financial transactions on the balance sheets of other economic agents as well as the impact of other agents' transactions on the central bank balance sheet. The role of standing facilities, open market operations, reserve requirements, and collateral is explained in this context. The chapter also has a normative part, discussing desirable properties and tools of efficient implementation frameworks. The second half of the chapter deals with monetary policy implementation in crisis times — explaining the mechanisms of a financial turmoil, and how central banks can, through a number of measures, support the funding liquidity of banks and try to break the vicious circle inherent in a liquidity crisis.
M. Galvenius and P. Mercier
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199557523
- eISBN:
- 9780191725005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557523.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, International
This chapter describes the history of the implementation technology for the Eurosystem's monetary policy. The monetary policy operational framework was developed by the European Monetary Institute ...
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This chapter describes the history of the implementation technology for the Eurosystem's monetary policy. The monetary policy operational framework was developed by the European Monetary Institute and then by the European Central Bank. The development of the framework included the specification of the ECB's open market operations, the standing facilities, the reserve requirement system, the collateral policy, the counterparty policy, and the liquidity forecasting procedures. The work also comprised a discussion on the appropriate operational target for the Eurosystem's monetary policy as well as the development of the supporting IT systems and other infrastructure. The chapter gives insights into the debates and practical challenges involved in agreeing a framework on the basis of the different traditions and interests of the participating EU national central banks. The chapter gives a view into the complex elaboration of proposals and the decision-making processes in the European Monetary Institute and the European Central Bank. Moreover, the chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the design of the original Eurosystem framework at the time of the launch of the euro.Less
This chapter describes the history of the implementation technology for the Eurosystem's monetary policy. The monetary policy operational framework was developed by the European Monetary Institute and then by the European Central Bank. The development of the framework included the specification of the ECB's open market operations, the standing facilities, the reserve requirement system, the collateral policy, the counterparty policy, and the liquidity forecasting procedures. The work also comprised a discussion on the appropriate operational target for the Eurosystem's monetary policy as well as the development of the supporting IT systems and other infrastructure. The chapter gives insights into the debates and practical challenges involved in agreeing a framework on the basis of the different traditions and interests of the participating EU national central banks. The chapter gives a view into the complex elaboration of proposals and the decision-making processes in the European Monetary Institute and the European Central Bank. Moreover, the chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the design of the original Eurosystem framework at the time of the launch of the euro.
Colin Crouch (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296393
- eISBN:
- 9780191599002
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296398.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The introduction of the single European currency, the euro, draws attention to the institutional deficit of the European Union: the organizational structures and forms of governance within which ...
More
The introduction of the single European currency, the euro, draws attention to the institutional deficit of the European Union: the organizational structures and forms of governance within which central banks and other monetary authorities are embedded within individual states, are lacking at the European level. This gives unusual prominence to financial structures. While the contributors to this collection do not agree in their evaluation of this phenomenon, they agree on its importance, and analyse different aspects of it in depth.Less
The introduction of the single European currency, the euro, draws attention to the institutional deficit of the European Union: the organizational structures and forms of governance within which central banks and other monetary authorities are embedded within individual states, are lacking at the European level. This gives unusual prominence to financial structures. While the contributors to this collection do not agree in their evaluation of this phenomenon, they agree on its importance, and analyse different aspects of it in depth.
Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296386
- eISBN:
- 9780191599125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829638X.003.0017
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Delors policy beliefs and strategy for EMU are analysed, in particular his role as animateur and ingénieur of the negotiations. His leadership before and during the Delors Committee is seen as ...
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Delors policy beliefs and strategy for EMU are analysed, in particular his role as animateur and ingénieur of the negotiations. His leadership before and during the Delors Committee is seen as central, especially in producing a unanimous report that bound in the EU central bank governors. Thereafter, his role is less significant. His role is considered in the context of his larger vision of European unification and his past experience as French Finance Minister. Within the European Commission, EMU is a case of informal presidentialization.Less
Delors policy beliefs and strategy for EMU are analysed, in particular his role as animateur and ingénieur of the negotiations. His leadership before and during the Delors Committee is seen as central, especially in producing a unanimous report that bound in the EU central bank governors. Thereafter, his role is less significant. His role is considered in the context of his larger vision of European unification and his past experience as French Finance Minister. Within the European Commission, EMU is a case of informal presidentialization.
Kathleen R. Mcnamara
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199247967
- eISBN:
- 9780191601088
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924796X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
An analysis is presented of the creation and development of rules governing the organizational form and the policy content of the European Central Bank (ECB). The establishment of the ECB and the ...
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An analysis is presented of the creation and development of rules governing the organizational form and the policy content of the European Central Bank (ECB). The establishment of the ECB and the launching of the Euro constitute an extraordinary innovation, one that opens and organizes a new institutional space in Europe. The ECB system is assessed in the light of three broad theoretical approaches emphasizing, respectively, power politics, institutions as rational solutions to collective problems, and pre-existing normative (social) structures. Power politics and functional rationality approaches are found to fail to account for important aspects of the ECB’s rules and policy mandates, while, in contrast, a sociological emphasis on institutional context is useful in explaining the continuities linking the ECB to the normative structure that had previously developed – largely within the network of central-bank governors – and diffused throughout the organizational field in which monetary policy-making was embedded. It was the need to legitimize the new ECB in terms of these broader norms that shaped the ECB’s organizational structure and governing rules: in particular, pre-existing norms influenced three key aspects of the ECB – its political independence, its criteria for membership, and its rules for price stability.Less
An analysis is presented of the creation and development of rules governing the organizational form and the policy content of the European Central Bank (ECB). The establishment of the ECB and the launching of the Euro constitute an extraordinary innovation, one that opens and organizes a new institutional space in Europe. The ECB system is assessed in the light of three broad theoretical approaches emphasizing, respectively, power politics, institutions as rational solutions to collective problems, and pre-existing normative (social) structures. Power politics and functional rationality approaches are found to fail to account for important aspects of the ECB’s rules and policy mandates, while, in contrast, a sociological emphasis on institutional context is useful in explaining the continuities linking the ECB to the normative structure that had previously developed – largely within the network of central-bank governors – and diffused throughout the organizational field in which monetary policy-making was embedded. It was the need to legitimize the new ECB in terms of these broader norms that shaped the ECB’s organizational structure and governing rules: in particular, pre-existing norms influenced three key aspects of the ECB – its political independence, its criteria for membership, and its rules for price stability.
Philip Turner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199578801
- eISBN:
- 9780191723285
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578801.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, Financial Economics
Turner examines the principles underlying central bank liquidity actions taken during the financial crisis. The toolkit of central banks has expanded dramatically. A bigger toolkit seems always ...
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Turner examines the principles underlying central bank liquidity actions taken during the financial crisis. The toolkit of central banks has expanded dramatically. A bigger toolkit seems always better, provided those using its potentially dangerous tools are fully cognizant of the attendant risks. Only central banks can provide the assurances of liquidity often needed in a financial crisis. In the extreme conditions prevailing in autumn 2008, it was natural that fighting the crisis received priority. Before this crisis, nobody expected the scale of operations central banks would be drawn into—and many of these operations will at some point have to be unwound. A lot of these measures, however, will probably be permanent. Turner suggests three areas where the changes decided on during this crisis are likely to endure: increased term financing, wider deposit arrangements at the central bank, and better cross border provision of liquidity.Less
Turner examines the principles underlying central bank liquidity actions taken during the financial crisis. The toolkit of central banks has expanded dramatically. A bigger toolkit seems always better, provided those using its potentially dangerous tools are fully cognizant of the attendant risks. Only central banks can provide the assurances of liquidity often needed in a financial crisis. In the extreme conditions prevailing in autumn 2008, it was natural that fighting the crisis received priority. Before this crisis, nobody expected the scale of operations central banks would be drawn into—and many of these operations will at some point have to be unwound. A lot of these measures, however, will probably be permanent. Turner suggests three areas where the changes decided on during this crisis are likely to endure: increased term financing, wider deposit arrangements at the central bank, and better cross border provision of liquidity.
Robert Boyer
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296393
- eISBN:
- 9780191599002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296398.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The institutional deficits surrounding the single European currency are formally analysed, and a number of possible future scenarios is outlined.
The institutional deficits surrounding the single European currency are formally analysed, and a number of possible future scenarios is outlined.
J. C. R. Dow and I. D. Saville
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283195
- eISBN:
- 9780191596186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283199.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
The use of bank rates acting as a source of control is the focus of this chapter. It examines the imposition of the Minimum Lending Rate in 1972. The role of the central bank in setting rates and ...
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The use of bank rates acting as a source of control is the focus of this chapter. It examines the imposition of the Minimum Lending Rate in 1972. The role of the central bank in setting rates and their ability to force up rates is examined. There is a discussion on the role of central bank reserves. The limitations of central bank's powers are also studied. The chapter concludes with an analysis of monetary aggregates.Less
The use of bank rates acting as a source of control is the focus of this chapter. It examines the imposition of the Minimum Lending Rate in 1972. The role of the central bank in setting rates and their ability to force up rates is examined. There is a discussion on the role of central bank reserves. The limitations of central bank's powers are also studied. The chapter concludes with an analysis of monetary aggregates.
Colin Crouch
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296393
- eISBN:
- 9780191599002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296398.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The introduction of the single European currency, the euro, draws attention to the institutional deficit of the European Union: the organizational structures and forms of governance within which ...
More
The introduction of the single European currency, the euro, draws attention to the institutional deficit of the European Union: the organizational structures and forms of governance within which central banks and other monetary authorities are embedded within individual states, are lacking at the European level. This gives unusual prominence to financial structures.Less
The introduction of the single European currency, the euro, draws attention to the institutional deficit of the European Union: the organizational structures and forms of governance within which central banks and other monetary authorities are embedded within individual states, are lacking at the European level. This gives unusual prominence to financial structures.
Matthew Flinders
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199271597
- eISBN:
- 9780191709234
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271597.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, UK Politics
Throughout the twentieth century the view was taken by consecutive governments that the United Kingdom's constitution was incompatible with the concept of central bank independence. New Labour ...
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Throughout the twentieth century the view was taken by consecutive governments that the United Kingdom's constitution was incompatible with the concept of central bank independence. New Labour departed from this position and instead sought to square the circle by granting independence but within the contours of the Westminster Model.Less
Throughout the twentieth century the view was taken by consecutive governments that the United Kingdom's constitution was incompatible with the concept of central bank independence. New Labour departed from this position and instead sought to square the circle by granting independence but within the contours of the Westminster Model.
David R. Cameron
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294641
- eISBN:
- 9780191601071
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294646.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Seeks to understand why some member‐states of the European Community attempted, with eventual success, to extend supranational authority in the domain of monetary and exchange‐rate policy and to ...
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Seeks to understand why some member‐states of the European Community attempted, with eventual success, to extend supranational authority in the domain of monetary and exchange‐rate policy and to anticipate some of the probable consequences of such extension. It begins by analysing the beliefs that originally underpinned the attempt, concerning the perceived need to resolve the community tensions inherent in independent economic policy‐making. It then considers the economic, political and institutional dilemmas, and uncertainties likely to confront member‐states as economic integration proceeds. Concentrating on the issues of low growth and high unemployment, it assesses how far European Monetary Union is likely to provide a remedy, and whether it will be necessary or desirable to create a counterweight to the authority of the European Central Bank, and to create new supranational organizations in the domain of European macroeconomic governance.Less
Seeks to understand why some member‐states of the European Community attempted, with eventual success, to extend supranational authority in the domain of monetary and exchange‐rate policy and to anticipate some of the probable consequences of such extension. It begins by analysing the beliefs that originally underpinned the attempt, concerning the perceived need to resolve the community tensions inherent in independent economic policy‐making. It then considers the economic, political and institutional dilemmas, and uncertainties likely to confront member‐states as economic integration proceeds. Concentrating on the issues of low growth and high unemployment, it assesses how far European Monetary Union is likely to provide a remedy, and whether it will be necessary or desirable to create a counterweight to the authority of the European Central Bank, and to create new supranational organizations in the domain of European macroeconomic governance.
