Juliet Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781501700224
- eISBN:
- 9781501703751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501700224.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter describes the coordination and evolution of the transnational central banking community's training and technical assistance programs and explores the transformation campaign's overall ...
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This chapter describes the coordination and evolution of the transnational central banking community's training and technical assistance programs and explores the transformation campaign's overall effects in postcommunist states. While the transnational central banking community encouraged postcommunist governments to adopt legislation granting independence to their central banks, it came into its own with the campaign to transform the beliefs and practices of postcommunist central bankers. Driven by a desire to preserve international financial stability and to draw new members into the community, established central bankers individually and collectively deployed their extensive organizational, human, and material resources to develop training and technical assistance programs for the postcommunist central banks. Postcommunist central bankers welcomed this assistance because of the community's international status and model, the challenge of managing the complex postcommunist economic environment, and the social and material incentives for joining the community.Less
This chapter describes the coordination and evolution of the transnational central banking community's training and technical assistance programs and explores the transformation campaign's overall effects in postcommunist states. While the transnational central banking community encouraged postcommunist governments to adopt legislation granting independence to their central banks, it came into its own with the campaign to transform the beliefs and practices of postcommunist central bankers. Driven by a desire to preserve international financial stability and to draw new members into the community, established central bankers individually and collectively deployed their extensive organizational, human, and material resources to develop training and technical assistance programs for the postcommunist central banks. Postcommunist central bankers welcomed this assistance because of the community's international status and model, the challenge of managing the complex postcommunist economic environment, and the social and material incentives for joining the community.
Juliet Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781501700224
- eISBN:
- 9781501703751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501700224.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter explains why and how central bankers in the advanced industrial democracies formed a cohesive community advocating price stability and political independence in the 1990s. This community ...
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This chapter explains why and how central bankers in the advanced industrial democracies formed a cohesive community advocating price stability and political independence in the 1990s. This community shared two key operational principles. Most fundamentally, central bankers came to agree that a central bank's primary task should be to maintain a low and stable inflation rate, which they referred to as price stability. Moreover, because policies aimed at achieving price stability could be politically contentious, central bankers further agreed that they needed significant independence from their governments in order to do their jobs properly. Ultimately, central bankers agreed that if independent central banks successfully pursued price stability, growth and employment would follow.Less
This chapter explains why and how central bankers in the advanced industrial democracies formed a cohesive community advocating price stability and political independence in the 1990s. This community shared two key operational principles. Most fundamentally, central bankers came to agree that a central bank's primary task should be to maintain a low and stable inflation rate, which they referred to as price stability. Moreover, because policies aimed at achieving price stability could be politically contentious, central bankers further agreed that they needed significant independence from their governments in order to do their jobs properly. Ultimately, central bankers agreed that if independent central banks successfully pursued price stability, growth and employment would follow.
Juliet Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781501700224
- eISBN:
- 9781501703751
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501700224.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This book explores the unsung revolutionary campaign to transform postcommunist central banks from command-economy cash cows into Western-style monetary guardians. The book argues that a powerful ...
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This book explores the unsung revolutionary campaign to transform postcommunist central banks from command-economy cash cows into Western-style monetary guardians. The book argues that a powerful transnational central banking community concentrated in Western Europe and North America integrated postcommunist central bankers into its network, shaped their ideas about the role of central banks, and helped them develop modern tools of central banking. The detailed comparative studies of central bank development in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan span from the birth of the campaign in the late 1980s to the challenges faced by central bankers after the global financial crisis. As the comfortable certainties of the past collapse around them, today's central bankers in the postcommunist world and beyond find themselves torn between allegiance to their transnational community and its principles on the one hand and their increasingly complex and politicized national roles on the other.Less
This book explores the unsung revolutionary campaign to transform postcommunist central banks from command-economy cash cows into Western-style monetary guardians. The book argues that a powerful transnational central banking community concentrated in Western Europe and North America integrated postcommunist central bankers into its network, shaped their ideas about the role of central banks, and helped them develop modern tools of central banking. The detailed comparative studies of central bank development in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan span from the birth of the campaign in the late 1980s to the challenges faced by central bankers after the global financial crisis. As the comfortable certainties of the past collapse around them, today's central bankers in the postcommunist world and beyond find themselves torn between allegiance to their transnational community and its principles on the one hand and their increasingly complex and politicized national roles on the other.
Charles Wyplosz (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199245314
- eISBN:
- 9780191697449
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245314.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Much has been written about European Monetary Union (EMU), mostly concerning its desirability and whether it will ever come to exist. Now it is here, and likely to stay. The ‘next generation’ of ...
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Much has been written about European Monetary Union (EMU), mostly concerning its desirability and whether it will ever come to exist. Now it is here, and likely to stay. The ‘next generation’ of research on EMU is already under way, and this volume presents a significant sample of that research. The authors explore questions such as: How do central bankers who used to run their own banks now melt into a single pot? Are labour markets going to shape up? Is the euro becoming a world currency? The book examines the impact of EMU on the rest of the world – the developing and transition countries – and the likely evolution of trade patterns inside and outside Europe.Less
Much has been written about European Monetary Union (EMU), mostly concerning its desirability and whether it will ever come to exist. Now it is here, and likely to stay. The ‘next generation’ of research on EMU is already under way, and this volume presents a significant sample of that research. The authors explore questions such as: How do central bankers who used to run their own banks now melt into a single pot? Are labour markets going to shape up? Is the euro becoming a world currency? The book examines the impact of EMU on the rest of the world – the developing and transition countries – and the likely evolution of trade patterns inside and outside Europe.
Mikael Wendschlag
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198782797
- eISBN:
- 9780191825941
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198782797.003.0009
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business
This chapter studies the professional, political, and academic ‘human capital endowment’ of the central bank governors in office between 1950 and 2000 in twelve OECD countries. Although many national ...
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This chapter studies the professional, political, and academic ‘human capital endowment’ of the central bank governors in office between 1950 and 2000 in twelve OECD countries. Although many national differences are observed, four more general shifts in central bank governor ‘types’ have been identified: (1) the civil servant central banker of the economic ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s; (2), the central bank politicians of the 1970s; (3) the market-oriented governors of the 1980s; and (4), the academic central banker from the 1990s onward. During the period studied, it is also possible to track the development of an international elite of central bankers, sharing similar backgrounds (academically and professionally) and views on monetary policy. A key observation is that ‘what makes for a credible central banker’ has changed over time, and especially following events such as economic recessions or financial crises.Less
This chapter studies the professional, political, and academic ‘human capital endowment’ of the central bank governors in office between 1950 and 2000 in twelve OECD countries. Although many national differences are observed, four more general shifts in central bank governor ‘types’ have been identified: (1) the civil servant central banker of the economic ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s; (2), the central bank politicians of the 1970s; (3) the market-oriented governors of the 1980s; and (4), the academic central banker from the 1990s onward. During the period studied, it is also possible to track the development of an international elite of central bankers, sharing similar backgrounds (academically and professionally) and views on monetary policy. A key observation is that ‘what makes for a credible central banker’ has changed over time, and especially following events such as economic recessions or financial crises.
Alan Blinder
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300100877
- eISBN:
- 9780300127508
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300100877.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
This book argues that, although little noticed, the face of central banking has changed significantly over the past ten to fifteen years. The author, a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve ...
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This book argues that, although little noticed, the face of central banking has changed significantly over the past ten to fifteen years. The author, a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve System and member of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, shows that the changes, although quiet, have been sufficiently profound to constitute a revolution in central banking, and considers three of the most significant aspects of the revolution. The first is the shift toward transparency: whereas central bankers once believed in secrecy and even mystery, greater openness is now considered a virtue. The second is the transition from monetary policy decisions made by single individuals to decisions made by committees. The third change is a profoundly different attitude toward the markets, from that of stern schoolmarm to one of listener. The author examines the origins of these changes, and their pros and cons.Less
This book argues that, although little noticed, the face of central banking has changed significantly over the past ten to fifteen years. The author, a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve System and member of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, shows that the changes, although quiet, have been sufficiently profound to constitute a revolution in central banking, and considers three of the most significant aspects of the revolution. The first is the shift toward transparency: whereas central bankers once believed in secrecy and even mystery, greater openness is now considered a virtue. The second is the transition from monetary policy decisions made by single individuals to decisions made by committees. The third change is a profoundly different attitude toward the markets, from that of stern schoolmarm to one of listener. The author examines the origins of these changes, and their pros and cons.
Simon James Bytheway and Mark Metzler
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781501704949
- eISBN:
- 9781501705953
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501704949.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Economic History
In recent decades, Tokyo, London, and New York have been the sites of credit bubbles of historically unprecedented magnitude. Central bankers have enjoyed almost unparalleled power and autonomy. They ...
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In recent decades, Tokyo, London, and New York have been the sites of credit bubbles of historically unprecedented magnitude. Central bankers have enjoyed almost unparalleled power and autonomy. They have cooperated to construct and preserve towering structures of debt, reshaping relations of power and ownership around the world. This book explores how this financialized form of globalism took shape a century ago, when Tokyo joined London and New York as a major financial center. This book shows that close cooperation between central banks began along an unexpected axis, between London and Tokyo, around the year 1900, with the Bank of England's secret use of large Bank of Japan funds to intervene in the London markets. Central-bank cooperation became multilateral during World War I—the moment when Japan first emerged as a creditor country. In 1919 and 1920, as Japan, Great Britain, and the United States adopted deflation policies, the results of cooperation were realized in the world's first globally coordinated program of monetary policy. It was also in 1920 that Wall Street bankers moved to establish closer ties with Tokyo. The text tells the story of how the first age of central-bank power and pride ended in the disaster of the Great Depression, when a rush for gold brought the system crashing down. In all of this, we see also the quiet but surprisingly central place of Japan. We see it again today, in the way that Japan has unwillingly led the world into a new age of post-bubble economics.Less
In recent decades, Tokyo, London, and New York have been the sites of credit bubbles of historically unprecedented magnitude. Central bankers have enjoyed almost unparalleled power and autonomy. They have cooperated to construct and preserve towering structures of debt, reshaping relations of power and ownership around the world. This book explores how this financialized form of globalism took shape a century ago, when Tokyo joined London and New York as a major financial center. This book shows that close cooperation between central banks began along an unexpected axis, between London and Tokyo, around the year 1900, with the Bank of England's secret use of large Bank of Japan funds to intervene in the London markets. Central-bank cooperation became multilateral during World War I—the moment when Japan first emerged as a creditor country. In 1919 and 1920, as Japan, Great Britain, and the United States adopted deflation policies, the results of cooperation were realized in the world's first globally coordinated program of monetary policy. It was also in 1920 that Wall Street bankers moved to establish closer ties with Tokyo. The text tells the story of how the first age of central-bank power and pride ended in the disaster of the Great Depression, when a rush for gold brought the system crashing down. In all of this, we see also the quiet but surprisingly central place of Japan. We see it again today, in the way that Japan has unwillingly led the world into a new age of post-bubble economics.
Gene Park, Saori N. Katada, Giacomo Chiozza, and Yoshiko Kojo
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781501728174
- eISBN:
- 9781501728181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501728174.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter assesses central bankers' attitudes toward inflation and deflation. Specifically, it presents a statistical test to demonstrate whether, and to what extent, the ideas held by the central ...
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This chapter assesses central bankers' attitudes toward inflation and deflation. Specifically, it presents a statistical test to demonstrate whether, and to what extent, the ideas held by the central bankers at the Bank of Japan (BOJ) influenced Japan's monetary policy. The results show a systematic effect of central bankers' ideas on how they determine what should be Japan's monetary base, while controlling for the status of the economy and the political environment. Concerns about inflation are a better predictor of policy than objective economic indicators. The results also reveal an Abe effect, a systematic impact of the policy ideas championed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō after he came to power in 2012. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that the political business cycle or political partisanship influenced the BOJ policy choices.Less
This chapter assesses central bankers' attitudes toward inflation and deflation. Specifically, it presents a statistical test to demonstrate whether, and to what extent, the ideas held by the central bankers at the Bank of Japan (BOJ) influenced Japan's monetary policy. The results show a systematic effect of central bankers' ideas on how they determine what should be Japan's monetary base, while controlling for the status of the economy and the political environment. Concerns about inflation are a better predictor of policy than objective economic indicators. The results also reveal an Abe effect, a systematic impact of the policy ideas championed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō after he came to power in 2012. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that the political business cycle or political partisanship influenced the BOJ policy choices.
Glenn D. Rudebusch and John C. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226092119
- eISBN:
- 9780226092126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226092126.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
This chapter examines the unresolved debate among central bankers and researchers about the value of the direct signaling of policy intentions. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 ...
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This chapter examines the unresolved debate among central bankers and researchers about the value of the direct signaling of policy intentions. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the real-world direct signaling of policy inclinations by central banks and outlines some of the arguments for and against such transparency. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 examine the macroeconomic effects of direct revelation of a central bank's expectations about the future path of the policy rate in a small theoretical model, in which private agents have imperfect information about the determination of monetary policy. In particular, it focuses on the desirability of central bank transparency about the expected path of policy when the public is uncertain about the central bank's preferences and, therefore, the future path of policy. It is shown that publication of interest rate projections better aligns the expectations of the public and the central bank. Under reasonable conditions, improving the alignment of expectations helps the central bank better meet its goals, providing support for full central bank transparency.Less
This chapter examines the unresolved debate among central bankers and researchers about the value of the direct signaling of policy intentions. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the real-world direct signaling of policy inclinations by central banks and outlines some of the arguments for and against such transparency. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 examine the macroeconomic effects of direct revelation of a central bank's expectations about the future path of the policy rate in a small theoretical model, in which private agents have imperfect information about the determination of monetary policy. In particular, it focuses on the desirability of central bank transparency about the expected path of policy when the public is uncertain about the central bank's preferences and, therefore, the future path of policy. It is shown that publication of interest rate projections better aligns the expectations of the public and the central bank. Under reasonable conditions, improving the alignment of expectations helps the central bank better meet its goals, providing support for full central bank transparency.
John Y. Campbell (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226092119
- eISBN:
- 9780226092126
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226092126.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Economic growth, low inflation, and financial stability are among the most important goals of policy makers, and central banks such as the Federal Reserve are key institutions for achieving these ...
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Economic growth, low inflation, and financial stability are among the most important goals of policy makers, and central banks such as the Federal Reserve are key institutions for achieving these goals. In this book, scholars and practitioners probe the interaction of central banks, asset markets, and the general economy to forge a new understanding of the challenges facing policy makers as they manage an increasingly complex economic system. The contributors examine how central bankers determine their policy prescriptions with reference to the fluctuating housing market, the balance of debt and credit, changing beliefs of investors, the level of commodity prices, and other factors.Less
Economic growth, low inflation, and financial stability are among the most important goals of policy makers, and central banks such as the Federal Reserve are key institutions for achieving these goals. In this book, scholars and practitioners probe the interaction of central banks, asset markets, and the general economy to forge a new understanding of the challenges facing policy makers as they manage an increasingly complex economic system. The contributors examine how central bankers determine their policy prescriptions with reference to the fluctuating housing market, the balance of debt and credit, changing beliefs of investors, the level of commodity prices, and other factors.
Simon James Bytheway and Mark Metzler
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781501704949
- eISBN:
- 9781501705953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501704949.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Economic History
This chapter discusses the international surge of Japanese credit creation during the war, when Japan emerged, briefly and “prematurely,” as one of the world's top three creditor countries. Tokyo ...
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This chapter discusses the international surge of Japanese credit creation during the war, when Japan emerged, briefly and “prematurely,” as one of the world's top three creditor countries. Tokyo financial groups lent to Britain and France, as well as to Russia and China. Simultaneously, Japanese central bankers began to build the institutional infrastructure of an international credit center. This initiative was relatively unsuccessful. It did, however, herald the beginning of a structural shift. The chapter also looks at two parastatal banks—the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan—which functioned as a designated foreign exchange bank and a long-term industrial-investment bank, and their key roles in the administration of Japan's capital imports and exports. They were established to realize national policy goals, to mobilize domestic funds, and to build Japan's standing in international finance.Less
This chapter discusses the international surge of Japanese credit creation during the war, when Japan emerged, briefly and “prematurely,” as one of the world's top three creditor countries. Tokyo financial groups lent to Britain and France, as well as to Russia and China. Simultaneously, Japanese central bankers began to build the institutional infrastructure of an international credit center. This initiative was relatively unsuccessful. It did, however, herald the beginning of a structural shift. The chapter also looks at two parastatal banks—the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan—which functioned as a designated foreign exchange bank and a long-term industrial-investment bank, and their key roles in the administration of Japan's capital imports and exports. They were established to realize national policy goals, to mobilize domestic funds, and to build Japan's standing in international finance.