Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217373
- eISBN:
- 9780191712470
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217373.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book describes and explains the basic tenets of just war theory and gives a precise, succinct, and highly critical account of its present status and of the most important and controversial ...
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This book describes and explains the basic tenets of just war theory and gives a precise, succinct, and highly critical account of its present status and of the most important and controversial current debates surrounding it. Rejecting certain traditional, in effect medieval assumptions of just war theory and advancing a liberal outlook, it argues that every single individual is a legitimate authority and has, under certain circumstances, the right to declare war on others or the state. It also argues that just cause cannot be established independently of the other criteria of ius ad bellum (the justification for entering into war), except for right intention, which the book interprets more leniently than is traditional. Turning to ius in bello (which governs the conduct of a war) the book criticizes the doctrine of double effect and concludes that insofar as wars kill innocents, albeit as ‘collateral damage’, they cannot be just, but at best justified as the lesser evil. The book gives particular attention to the question why soldiers, allegedly, are legitimate targets and civilians not. Discussing four approaches to the explanation of the difference, it is argued that the four principles underlying them should all be taken into account and outlines how their comparative weighting can proceed when applied to concrete cases. The resulting approach does not square the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets with that between soldiers and civilians: this has extremely important consequences for the conduct of war. Finally, the book analyses the concept of terrorism, arguing that some forms of ‘terrorism’ are not terrorism at all and that, under certain circumstances, even terrorism proper can be justified.Less
This book describes and explains the basic tenets of just war theory and gives a precise, succinct, and highly critical account of its present status and of the most important and controversial current debates surrounding it. Rejecting certain traditional, in effect medieval assumptions of just war theory and advancing a liberal outlook, it argues that every single individual is a legitimate authority and has, under certain circumstances, the right to declare war on others or the state. It also argues that just cause cannot be established independently of the other criteria of ius ad bellum (the justification for entering into war), except for right intention, which the book interprets more leniently than is traditional. Turning to ius in bello (which governs the conduct of a war) the book criticizes the doctrine of double effect and concludes that insofar as wars kill innocents, albeit as ‘collateral damage’, they cannot be just, but at best justified as the lesser evil. The book gives particular attention to the question why soldiers, allegedly, are legitimate targets and civilians not. Discussing four approaches to the explanation of the difference, it is argued that the four principles underlying them should all be taken into account and outlines how their comparative weighting can proceed when applied to concrete cases. The resulting approach does not square the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets with that between soldiers and civilians: this has extremely important consequences for the conduct of war. Finally, the book analyses the concept of terrorism, arguing that some forms of ‘terrorism’ are not terrorism at all and that, under certain circumstances, even terrorism proper can be justified.
Michael W. Foley and Dean R. Hoge
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195188707
- eISBN:
- 9780199785315
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195188707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This book assesses the role of local worship communities — churches, mosques, temples, and others — in promoting civic engagement among recent immigrants to the United States. The product of a ...
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This book assesses the role of local worship communities — churches, mosques, temples, and others — in promoting civic engagement among recent immigrants to the United States. The product of a three-year study of immigrant worship communities in the Washington, D.C. area, the study looked at churches, mosques, temples, and other communities of immigrants from Korea, China, India, West Africa, the Muslim world, and El Salvador. The researchers surveyed 200 of these communities and studied twenty in depth. Communities vary widely in how much they build social capital, provide social services to immigrants, develop the civic skills of members, and shape immigrants' identities. Local leadership and group characteristics much more than ethnic origin or religious tradition shape the level and kind of civic engagement that the communities foster. Particularly, where leaders are civically engaged, they provide personal and organizational links to the wider American society and promote civic engagement by members. Homeland causes and a strong sense of religious and ethnic identity, far from alienating immigrants from American society, promote higher levels of civic engagement in immigrant communities.Less
This book assesses the role of local worship communities — churches, mosques, temples, and others — in promoting civic engagement among recent immigrants to the United States. The product of a three-year study of immigrant worship communities in the Washington, D.C. area, the study looked at churches, mosques, temples, and other communities of immigrants from Korea, China, India, West Africa, the Muslim world, and El Salvador. The researchers surveyed 200 of these communities and studied twenty in depth. Communities vary widely in how much they build social capital, provide social services to immigrants, develop the civic skills of members, and shape immigrants' identities. Local leadership and group characteristics much more than ethnic origin or religious tradition shape the level and kind of civic engagement that the communities foster. Particularly, where leaders are civically engaged, they provide personal and organizational links to the wider American society and promote civic engagement by members. Homeland causes and a strong sense of religious and ethnic identity, far from alienating immigrants from American society, promote higher levels of civic engagement in immigrant communities.
C. B. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234103
- eISBN:
- 9780191715570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234103.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter begins with a discussion of the private world problem, and argues that with or without sensations, the spectre of the ‘private world’ arises equally, so sensations are not the problem if ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the private world problem, and argues that with or without sensations, the spectre of the ‘private world’ arises equally, so sensations are not the problem if there is a ‘private world problem’. It is also argued that the role of knowledge of behaviour (or what a sensation is ‘apt to cause’) and/or physical circumstances (or that by which the sensation is ‘apt to be caused’) needs better understanding. The rejection of analogical ways of thinking about the experiences of others and the complementary fixation on public, observable, shared behaviour and circumstances leads — when carried to its fair conclusion — to a second joke, which is explained in the chapter.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the private world problem, and argues that with or without sensations, the spectre of the ‘private world’ arises equally, so sensations are not the problem if there is a ‘private world problem’. It is also argued that the role of knowledge of behaviour (or what a sensation is ‘apt to cause’) and/or physical circumstances (or that by which the sensation is ‘apt to be caused’) needs better understanding. The rejection of analogical ways of thinking about the experiences of others and the complementary fixation on public, observable, shared behaviour and circumstances leads — when carried to its fair conclusion — to a second joke, which is explained in the chapter.
Thomas Holden
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579945
- eISBN:
- 9780191722776
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book presents an historical and critical interpretation of Hume's rejection of the existence of a deity with moral attributes. It argues that in Hume's view no first cause or designer ...
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This book presents an historical and critical interpretation of Hume's rejection of the existence of a deity with moral attributes. It argues that in Hume's view no first cause or designer responsible for the ordered universe could possibly have moral attributes; nor could the existence (or non-existence) of such a being have any real implications for human practice or conduct. Hume's case for this ‘moral atheism’ is a central plank of both his naturalistic agenda in metaphysics and his secularizing program in moral theory. It complements his wider critique of traditional theism, and threatens to rule out any religion that would make claims on moral practice. This book situates Hume's commitment to moral atheism in its historical and philosophical context, offers a systematic interpretation of his case for divine amorality, and shows how Hume can endorse moral atheism while maintaining his sceptical attitude toward traditional forms of cosmological and theological speculation.Less
This book presents an historical and critical interpretation of Hume's rejection of the existence of a deity with moral attributes. It argues that in Hume's view no first cause or designer responsible for the ordered universe could possibly have moral attributes; nor could the existence (or non-existence) of such a being have any real implications for human practice or conduct. Hume's case for this ‘moral atheism’ is a central plank of both his naturalistic agenda in metaphysics and his secularizing program in moral theory. It complements his wider critique of traditional theism, and threatens to rule out any religion that would make claims on moral practice. This book situates Hume's commitment to moral atheism in its historical and philosophical context, offers a systematic interpretation of his case for divine amorality, and shows how Hume can endorse moral atheism while maintaining his sceptical attitude toward traditional forms of cosmological and theological speculation.
Michael Biggs
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276998
- eISBN:
- 9780191707735
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276998.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter provides an overview of self-immolation in the last four decades, from an original database of over 500 individual acts. It is divided into five main sections. The first sketches the ...
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This chapter provides an overview of self-immolation in the last four decades, from an original database of over 500 individual acts. It is divided into five main sections. The first sketches the history of self-immolation. The second examines the prevalence of self-immolation among causes, across countries, and over time. The third section focuses on the orchestration of the individual action. The fourth section tackles the central question — why? — by elucidating the various motivations for self-immolation. The final section considers the effects of the action.Less
This chapter provides an overview of self-immolation in the last four decades, from an original database of over 500 individual acts. It is divided into five main sections. The first sketches the history of self-immolation. The second examines the prevalence of self-immolation among causes, across countries, and over time. The third section focuses on the orchestration of the individual action. The fourth section tackles the central question — why? — by elucidating the various motivations for self-immolation. The final section considers the effects of the action.
Hidemi Suganami
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273387
- eISBN:
- 9780191684043
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273387.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book analyses one of the fundamental questions of international relations: what causes war? Drawing on historical, statistical, and philosophical perspectives to produce an innovative theory, ...
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This book analyses one of the fundamental questions of international relations: what causes war? Drawing on historical, statistical, and philosophical perspectives to produce an innovative theory, the book rejects the simplistic notion that war can be explained by some straightforward formula, yet demonstrates that there are basic similarities among the diverse origins of wars. Such similarities, it argues, are rooted in the way the origins of wars, conventionally, are narrated. Comparing various narrative accounts of the origins of wars, the book shows that enquiry into the causes of war is inseparable from the question of responsibility.Less
This book analyses one of the fundamental questions of international relations: what causes war? Drawing on historical, statistical, and philosophical perspectives to produce an innovative theory, the book rejects the simplistic notion that war can be explained by some straightforward formula, yet demonstrates that there are basic similarities among the diverse origins of wars. Such similarities, it argues, are rooted in the way the origins of wars, conventionally, are narrated. Comparing various narrative accounts of the origins of wars, the book shows that enquiry into the causes of war is inseparable from the question of responsibility.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268559
- eISBN:
- 9780191601415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926855X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the ...
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Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.Less
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235125
- eISBN:
- 9780191598579
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235127.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book is about what it is for there to be a God, and what reason there is to suppose that God to be the traditional Christian God. Part 1 (Chs.1 to 5) analyses the metaphysical categories needed ...
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This book is about what it is for there to be a God, and what reason there is to suppose that God to be the traditional Christian God. Part 1 (Chs.1 to 5) analyses the metaphysical categories needed for this purpose – substance, cause, time, and necessity. Part 2 (Ch. 6 to 10) begins by setting out some of the different ways in which the doctrine that there is a divine individual (an individual with the traditional divine properties) can be developed. There can be more than one divine individual so long as a first such individual is necessarily the cause of the existence of the others. Given the supreme moral goodness of cooperating with one individual in sharing everything with a third individual, it follows that if there is one divine individual, there will be three and only three such individuals; hence the necessity of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – that there is one God consisting of three divine persons. One of these persons may choose to become incarnate, i.e. human, and there are reasons why he would do so.Less
This book is about what it is for there to be a God, and what reason there is to suppose that God to be the traditional Christian God. Part 1 (Chs.1 to 5) analyses the metaphysical categories needed for this purpose – substance, cause, time, and necessity. Part 2 (Ch. 6 to 10) begins by setting out some of the different ways in which the doctrine that there is a divine individual (an individual with the traditional divine properties) can be developed. There can be more than one divine individual so long as a first such individual is necessarily the cause of the existence of the others. Given the supreme moral goodness of cooperating with one individual in sharing everything with a third individual, it follows that if there is one divine individual, there will be three and only three such individuals; hence the necessity of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – that there is one God consisting of three divine persons. One of these persons may choose to become incarnate, i.e. human, and there are reasons why he would do so.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context ...
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Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.Less
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end ...
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There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end is inconsequential. On other occasions, he appears to hold not only that a remote end gives a species to a human action, but also that this species has greater formal influence than the species from a proximate end. The way to resolve this paradox is to realize that Aquinas addresses two different questions with respect to the specification of human action. Sometimes, he is exploring what is required to determine a particular species of human action. In this case, he thinks that willing a proximate end (such as ‘having intercourse with another’s spouse’) is sufficient to determine this action’s species (adultery), and that no further end would add something critical for making this determination. On other occasions, he is wondering what the species of an action would be in a case where a particular proximate end (such as theft) is already being willed by an agent for a particular remote end (such as murder or almsgiving). In this case, he believes that the human action in question has two moral species, one from each end; the species from the remote end has a kind of formal primacy, since the proximate end is being willed for the remote end’s sake.Less
There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end is inconsequential. On other occasions, he appears to hold not only that a remote end gives a species to a human action, but also that this species has greater formal influence than the species from a proximate end. The way to resolve this paradox is to realize that Aquinas addresses two different questions with respect to the specification of human action. Sometimes, he is exploring what is required to determine a particular species of human action. In this case, he thinks that willing a proximate end (such as ‘having intercourse with another’s spouse’) is sufficient to determine this action’s species (adultery), and that no further end would add something critical for making this determination. On other occasions, he is wondering what the species of an action would be in a case where a particular proximate end (such as theft) is already being willed by an agent for a particular remote end (such as murder or almsgiving). In this case, he believes that the human action in question has two moral species, one from each end; the species from the remote end has a kind of formal primacy, since the proximate end is being willed for the remote end’s sake.
J. R. LUCAS
- Published in print:
- 1970
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243434
- eISBN:
- 9780191680687
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243434.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
The concept of explanation is linked with that of cause, although not identical with it. Explanations are answers. They are answers to questions, asked or anticipated, and in particular to the ...
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The concept of explanation is linked with that of cause, although not identical with it. Explanations are answers. They are answers to questions, asked or anticipated, and in particular to the question ‘Why?’. They characteristically begin with the word ‘because’, although we also explain what we are doing, who our friends are, and how we can bring our plans to fruition. There cannot be any exact account of explanation. Although it is not true that any answer will do, it is often the case that more than one answer might do, and we cannot lay down in advance exactly what answers are admissible in any given case. We rely not on antecedent specification of the answer required but on subsequent elucidation, by further question and answer, until a satisfactory one has been elicited.Less
The concept of explanation is linked with that of cause, although not identical with it. Explanations are answers. They are answers to questions, asked or anticipated, and in particular to the question ‘Why?’. They characteristically begin with the word ‘because’, although we also explain what we are doing, who our friends are, and how we can bring our plans to fruition. There cannot be any exact account of explanation. Although it is not true that any answer will do, it is often the case that more than one answer might do, and we cannot lay down in advance exactly what answers are admissible in any given case. We rely not on antecedent specification of the answer required but on subsequent elucidation, by further question and answer, until a satisfactory one has been elicited.
Nicholas Morris*
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267217
- eISBN:
- 9780191601118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267219.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the ...
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Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.Less
Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.
Paul M. Pietroski
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252763
- eISBN:
- 9780191598234
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical ...
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When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical event. But this token identity thesis is not mandatory and it is implausible. We can instead adopt a non‐Cartesian form of dualism, according to which many mental events are causes distinct from any biochemical events, but persons are spatiotemporal things with physical and mental properties (that supervene on physical properties). Actions are themselves mental events (tryings) that typically cause bodily motions, which also have biochemical causes; and actions are typically caused by other mental events. This does not lead to an objectionable form of overdetermination, given the proposed sufficient condition for causation, which is stated in terms of explanation. An especially relevant form of explanation involves subsuming events under ceteris paribus laws. The overall account avoids objections to standard covering‐law (and regularity) conceptions of causation. An appendix addresses questions about mental content, and how such questions bear on the token identity thesis.Less
When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical event. But this token identity thesis is not mandatory and it is implausible. We can instead adopt a non‐Cartesian form of dualism, according to which many mental events are causes distinct from any biochemical events, but persons are spatiotemporal things with physical and mental properties (that supervene on physical properties). Actions are themselves mental events (tryings) that typically cause bodily motions, which also have biochemical causes; and actions are typically caused by other mental events. This does not lead to an objectionable form of overdetermination, given the proposed sufficient condition for causation, which is stated in terms of explanation. An especially relevant form of explanation involves subsuming events under ceteris paribus laws. The overall account avoids objections to standard covering‐law (and regularity) conceptions of causation. An appendix addresses questions about mental content, and how such questions bear on the token identity thesis.
Emma Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195323351
- eISBN:
- 9780199785575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195323351.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, World Religions
Chapter 8 considers the relevance of spirits to everyday life (e.g. healing, counseling, etc.). It offers a generalizable explanation for the widespread attribution of personal misfortune to ...
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Chapter 8 considers the relevance of spirits to everyday life (e.g. healing, counseling, etc.). It offers a generalizable explanation for the widespread attribution of personal misfortune to supernatural causes (e.g. divine retribution, sorcery, etc.). It is suggested that the widespread association between spirits (and other supernatural agents) and practices concerning healing and the betterment of life circumstances is supported by mechanisms of normal, human cognition that deal with social causation.Less
Chapter 8 considers the relevance of spirits to everyday life (e.g. healing, counseling, etc.). It offers a generalizable explanation for the widespread attribution of personal misfortune to supernatural causes (e.g. divine retribution, sorcery, etc.). It is suggested that the widespread association between spirits (and other supernatural agents) and practices concerning healing and the betterment of life circumstances is supported by mechanisms of normal, human cognition that deal with social causation.
Nancy Cartwright
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235071
- eISBN:
- 9780191597169
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235070.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts ...
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This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies from both econometrics and quantum mechanics.Less
This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies from both econometrics and quantum mechanics.
Paul Webb and Thomas Poguntke
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199252015
- eISBN:
- 9780191602375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252017.003.0015
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Draws together the empirical material presented in the book, and concludes that the weight of evidence lies in favour of the presidentialization thesis. Thus, many systems have manifested shifts in ...
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Draws together the empirical material presented in the book, and concludes that the weight of evidence lies in favour of the presidentialization thesis. Thus, many systems have manifested shifts in the direction of the typical presidential mode of operation—implying greater executive and party power resources and autonomy for leaders, and more personalized electoral processes. Note that this is not the same thing as presidentialism per se: Cabinets and parties can still be powerful countervailing forces in parliamentary systems, and the power and autonomy of apparently ‘presidential’ leaders can sometimes rest on unsustainable contingencies. Nevertheless, we believe that there is now indisputable evidence of a steady shift in various underlying structural factors that generate the 'presidentialized' working mode of politics.In conclusion, it is suggested that modern democracies are moving towards a fusion of elitist and plebiscitary models of democracy, which offer a highly imperfect form of democratic accountability. Yet, this ‘neo-elitist’ model of democracy is a double-edged sword: Deprived of their previously relatively stable power bases that were built on alliances within political parties, leaders are left stronger in victory, but weaker in defeat.Less
Draws together the empirical material presented in the book, and concludes that the weight of evidence lies in favour of the presidentialization thesis. Thus, many systems have manifested shifts in the direction of the typical presidential mode of operation—implying greater executive and party power resources and autonomy for leaders, and more personalized electoral processes. Note that this is not the same thing as presidentialism per se: Cabinets and parties can still be powerful countervailing forces in parliamentary systems, and the power and autonomy of apparently ‘presidential’ leaders can sometimes rest on unsustainable contingencies. Nevertheless, we believe that there is now indisputable evidence of a steady shift in various underlying structural factors that generate the 'presidentialized' working mode of politics.
In conclusion, it is suggested that modern democracies are moving towards a fusion of elitist and plebiscitary models of democracy, which offer a highly imperfect form of democratic accountability. Yet, this ‘neo-elitist’ model of democracy is a double-edged sword: Deprived of their previously relatively stable power bases that were built on alliances within political parties, leaders are left stronger in victory, but weaker in defeat.
Jennifer M. Welsh
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267217
- eISBN:
- 9780191601118
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267219.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This concluding chapter assesses the debate over humanitarian intervention in the light of the events of September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it can be argued that 9/11 has reversed the momentum ...
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This concluding chapter assesses the debate over humanitarian intervention in the light of the events of September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it can be argued that 9/11 has reversed the momentum behind the norm of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. In the course of waging the war on terrorism, the powers of sovereign states have been increased and the willingness of Western states to criticize the treatment of civilians within other sovereign jurisdictions appears to have weakened. On the other, there are three reasons why humanitarian intervention – and the issues associated with it – will continue to preoccupy scholars and statesmen in a post-September 11th world. First, the terrorist attacks of 2001 have reinforced the view that instability within or collapse of a state anywhere in the world can have implications that reach far wider than that particular region. Second, the debate about what constraints should be placed on the use of force – particularly those related to proper authority – are as relevant for the ‘war on terror’ as they are for humanitarian intervention. Finally, as the missions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 have shown, humanitarian rationale are all-important in justifying the use of force in international society, even when other motives are at work.Less
This concluding chapter assesses the debate over humanitarian intervention in the light of the events of September 11, 2001. On the one hand, it can be argued that 9/11 has reversed the momentum behind the norm of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. In the course of waging the war on terrorism, the powers of sovereign states have been increased and the willingness of Western states to criticize the treatment of civilians within other sovereign jurisdictions appears to have weakened. On the other, there are three reasons why humanitarian intervention – and the issues associated with it – will continue to preoccupy scholars and statesmen in a post-September 11th world. First, the terrorist attacks of 2001 have reinforced the view that instability within or collapse of a state anywhere in the world can have implications that reach far wider than that particular region. Second, the debate about what constraints should be placed on the use of force – particularly those related to proper authority – are as relevant for the ‘war on terror’ as they are for humanitarian intervention. Finally, as the missions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 have shown, humanitarian rationale are all-important in justifying the use of force in international society, even when other motives are at work.
Roger D. Spegele
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199265206
- eISBN:
- 9780191601866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199265208.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Part Two of the book begins with a discussion of realist and English School of International Relations approaches to writing international history, in which the author argues that the appreciation of ...
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Part Two of the book begins with a discussion of realist and English School of International Relations approaches to writing international history, in which the author argues that the appreciation of history that underpinned early English School thinking was reminiscent of that which also framed ‘traditional classical’ realist approaches to the subject. The author refutes D. C. Copeland's (2003) structuralist critique of the English School and argues that the School's early thinkers may provide a teleological account of agent‐led historical change that could enable traditional realists to regain ground lost to the structuralists in the past few decades. Focusing on the conceptions of history of two distinguished members of the English School, E. H. Carr and Herbert Butterfield (although their views are in some respects diametrically opposed), he argues that both implicitly accepted different renditions of a teleological view of history. He advances a case for treating human actions as directed to the agent's – both individual and collective – goals and purposes, an idea that scientific empiricism would be obliged to reject but which may unite the English School and traditional political realism. In addition, he suggests that the mix of English School and political realism provided by Carr and Butterfield offers an understanding of history that can challenge dominant neorealist and neoliberal accounts in two principal ways: first, in that it offers an account of history that focuses on the intentional actions of actors, and second, because it provides a convincing method for identifying the causes of historical change by focusing on the reasons for change.Less
Part Two of the book begins with a discussion of realist and English School of International Relations approaches to writing international history, in which the author argues that the appreciation of history that underpinned early English School thinking was reminiscent of that which also framed ‘traditional classical’ realist approaches to the subject. The author refutes D. C. Copeland's (2003) structuralist critique of the English School and argues that the School's early thinkers may provide a teleological account of agent‐led historical change that could enable traditional realists to regain ground lost to the structuralists in the past few decades. Focusing on the conceptions of history of two distinguished members of the English School, E. H. Carr and Herbert Butterfield (although their views are in some respects diametrically opposed), he argues that both implicitly accepted different renditions of a teleological view of history. He advances a case for treating human actions as directed to the agent's – both individual and collective – goals and purposes, an idea that scientific empiricism would be obliged to reject but which may unite the English School and traditional political realism. In addition, he suggests that the mix of English School and political realism provided by Carr and Butterfield offers an understanding of history that can challenge dominant neorealist and neoliberal accounts in two principal ways: first, in that it offers an account of history that focuses on the intentional actions of actors, and second, because it provides a convincing method for identifying the causes of historical change by focusing on the reasons for change.
Francesca Aran Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219285
- eISBN:
- 9780191711664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219285.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter first reiterates the argument of Chapter III under the form that proving God's existence via the distinction of essence and existence is ultimately experiential, coming down to a ...
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This chapter first reiterates the argument of Chapter III under the form that proving God's existence via the distinction of essence and existence is ultimately experiential, coming down to a psychological conviction that death, as endangering my existence, is poetically unjust. A better argument for God's existence would begin below the level of conceptual language, starting from animality and movement. It then describes Etienne Gilson's re-statement of Thomas' Five Ways (moves, causes, necessity/contingency, perfections, design), in order to give a satisfactory argument for God's existence, that is, Hans Urs von Balthasar's ‘four distinctions’. Based on the ‘Five Ways’ and building on their empirical character, the ‘four distinctions’ give an argument to God which is primarily objective and realistic, but which takes the subject and his experience into account, by beginning from the dialogue between mother and child which first ‘moves’ the child into reality.Less
This chapter first reiterates the argument of Chapter III under the form that proving God's existence via the distinction of essence and existence is ultimately experiential, coming down to a psychological conviction that death, as endangering my existence, is poetically unjust. A better argument for God's existence would begin below the level of conceptual language, starting from animality and movement. It then describes Etienne Gilson's re-statement of Thomas' Five Ways (moves, causes, necessity/contingency, perfections, design), in order to give a satisfactory argument for God's existence, that is, Hans Urs von Balthasar's ‘four distinctions’. Based on the ‘Five Ways’ and building on their empirical character, the ‘four distinctions’ give an argument to God which is primarily objective and realistic, but which takes the subject and his experience into account, by beginning from the dialogue between mother and child which first ‘moves’ the child into reality.
Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159066
- eISBN:
- 9780199786466
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159063.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter introduces the technical term “malady” as a genus term that includes as species: diseases, disorders, injuries, allergies, illnesses, etc., and can be taken as meaning that something is ...
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This chapter introduces the technical term “malady” as a genus term that includes as species: diseases, disorders, injuries, allergies, illnesses, etc., and can be taken as meaning that something is wrong with the person. It provides a definition of malady that includes the following features: it is a condition of the individual, it involves significantly increased risk of suffering nontrivial harms, and there is no distinct sustaining cause. The role of abnormality in the defining malady and some difficult cases such as pregnancy, short stature, old age, and various genetic conditions are discussed.Less
This chapter introduces the technical term “malady” as a genus term that includes as species: diseases, disorders, injuries, allergies, illnesses, etc., and can be taken as meaning that something is wrong with the person. It provides a definition of malady that includes the following features: it is a condition of the individual, it involves significantly increased risk of suffering nontrivial harms, and there is no distinct sustaining cause. The role of abnormality in the defining malady and some difficult cases such as pregnancy, short stature, old age, and various genetic conditions are discussed.
