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How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Berent Enç

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199256020
eISBN:
9780191602238
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256020.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states ... More


A Causal Model of Deliberation

Berent Enç

in How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199256020
eISBN:
9780191602238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256020.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Deals with the objection against causal theories that conceiving of an action as the result of a chain of events that are causally connected seems to remove the agent from picture altogether: since ... More


Basic Actions

Berent Enç

in How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199256020
eISBN:
9780191602238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256020.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Enç’s naturalistic foundationalism divides actions into two sub-categories, namely, basic acts and non-basic acts. This chapter develops this foundationalism into a causal theory of action, which has ... More


Deviance

Berent Enç

in How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199256020
eISBN:
9780191602238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256020.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Deals with the problem that a causal theory of action must be able to distinguish, in purely causal terms, between ‘deviant’ and ‘normal’ causal pathways. The objection goes as follows: there are ... More


Theories of Action and an Introduction to the Causal Theory of Action

Ruben David-Hillel

in Action and its Explanation

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198235880
eISBN:
9780191679155
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces the idea of a particular sort of philosophical naturalism — folk naturalism — and explains what this doctrine says about action. It describes its commitment to a ... More


More Theories

Ruben David-Hillel

in Action and its Explanation

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198235880
eISBN:
9780191679155
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces two versions of the agent causalist theory (ACT). One version is involved in a reification that is gratuitous; the other version is rejected on other grounds. It argues that ... More


An Integrated Agent‐Causal Account

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins an assessment of agent-causal libertarian accounts, which require causation by agents, where this is construed as causation by enduring substances and not reducible to event ... More


Action as Settling: Some Objections

Helen Steward

in A Metaphysics for Freedom

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199552054
eISBN:
9780191738838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552054.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores some possible objections to the idea that actions are agents’ settlings of hitherto unsettled questions—and considers the case for a deflationary compatibilist understanding of ... More


The Causal Theory of Action

Ruben David-Hillel

in Action and its Explanation

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198235880
eISBN:
9780191679155
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter addresses the causal theory of action. It clarifies the idea of belief and argues that there is no genuine sense of ‘belief’ in which there are sufficient beliefs to meet the ... More


Teleological Agency

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199794522
eISBN:
9780199919253
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This chapter applies the results of chapter 10 (i.e., the reconstruction of Hegel's theory of causal productivity) to the problem of chapter 9 (i.e., the doubts about the reality of free will ... More


The Causal Theory Revisited

Berent Enç

in How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199256020
eISBN:
9780191602238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256020.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Develops further the foundationalist causal theory of action introduced in Ch. 2. In particular, Enç develops an account of act individuation ingenious to his reductive view of action, which at the ... More


Reasons and Causes

Timothy O'Connor

in Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195153743
eISBN:
9780199867080
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515374X.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A theory of how reasons may explain agent‐causal actions is offered. Contrary to the causal theory of action, there can be an internal, non‐contrastive explanatory link between a prior motivational ... More


Hegel and Free Will

Christopher Yeomans

in Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199794522
eISBN:
9780199919253
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794522.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

In addition to setting out the problem of free will as a problem generated by our commitment to the explicability of the world or the principle of sufficient reason, this chapter accomplishes two ... More


Goal‐Directed Action

Alfred R. Mele

in Motivation and Agency

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195156171
eISBN:
9780199833467
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515617X.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that ... More


The Causal Theory of Action : Origins and Issues

Aguilar Jesús H. and Buckareff Andrei A.

in Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014564
eISBN:
9780262289139
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This introduction offers a brief historical examination of the three key stages of the development of the causal theory of action (CTA), namely, the ancient classical period represented by the work ... More


Decision and Free Will

Storrs McCall

in A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198236221
eISBN:
9780191679209
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236221.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter focuses on chance, deliberation, and decision. It explains various kinds of deliberation and examines what is involved in the familiar process of deliberation. Responsibility is another ... More


Active Control and Causation

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Noncausal libertarian accounts allow that a basic free action may be uncaused and have no internal causal structure. Views of this type advanced by Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann are evaluated here. ... More


Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation

Jaegwon Kim

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585878
eISBN:
9780191595349
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

“Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation” takes the ideas adumbrated in Essay 5 a step further and develops a first‐person normative account of action explanation. The paper ... More


Problems in the Explanation of Action

Donald Davidson

in Problems of Rationality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780198237549
eISBN:
9780191601378
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198237545.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Takes up a number of problems that arise by attempts to explain actions, and defends the author's causal theory of action. In particular, the author defends the claims that, first, if a person is ... More


The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

Randolph Clarke

in Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195159875
eISBN:
9780199835010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019515987X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily ... More


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