Berent Enç
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256020
- eISBN:
- 9780191602238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256020.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states ...
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Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states of affairs, or whether an adequate ontology requires sui generis acts that are essentially voluntary, such as volitions or agent-causation. Berent Enç defends the possibility of naturalizing agency via a causal theory of action (CTA). In doing that, he develops his key notion of basic action (Chs 2 and 3); he offers a ‘general and original’ solution to the problem of causal deviance (Ch. 4); and, he attempts to answer the objection that CTA removes the agent from the picture altogether by offering a purely causal model for the deliberative process that underlies practical reasoning (Ch. 5). Furthermore, the book discusses objections to volitional theories (Ch. 1), intentions and intentional action (Ch. 6), and the compatibility of Enç’s CTA with attractive accounts of autonomy and freedom (Ch. 7).Less
Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states of affairs, or whether an adequate ontology requires sui generis acts that are essentially voluntary, such as volitions or agent-causation. Berent Enç defends the possibility of naturalizing agency via a causal theory of action (CTA). In doing that, he develops his key notion of basic action (Chs 2 and 3); he offers a ‘general and original’ solution to the problem of causal deviance (Ch. 4); and, he attempts to answer the objection that CTA removes the agent from the picture altogether by offering a purely causal model for the deliberative process that underlies practical reasoning (Ch. 5). Furthermore, the book discusses objections to volitional theories (Ch. 1), intentions and intentional action (Ch. 6), and the compatibility of Enç’s CTA with attractive accounts of autonomy and freedom (Ch. 7).
Rory Fox
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285754
- eISBN:
- 9780191603563
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285756.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter focuses on the other two temporal relations: temporally before (temporal priority) and temporally after (temporal posteriority), examining the notions in themselves before turning to the ...
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This chapter focuses on the other two temporal relations: temporally before (temporal priority) and temporally after (temporal posteriority), examining the notions in themselves before turning to the related question of 13th century attitudes to the causal theory of time. Thirteenth-century accounts of simultaneous causation undermine the possibility that 13th century thinkers would have accepted that temporal relations could be reduced to more fundamental causal relations, since the existence of simultaneous causation implies that causal orderings and temporal orderings could be uncoupled. The notion of backwards causation is also explored as part of the general investigation of causation and causal sequences.Less
This chapter focuses on the other two temporal relations: temporally before (temporal priority) and temporally after (temporal posteriority), examining the notions in themselves before turning to the related question of 13th century attitudes to the causal theory of time. Thirteenth-century accounts of simultaneous causation undermine the possibility that 13th century thinkers would have accepted that temporal relations could be reduced to more fundamental causal relations, since the existence of simultaneous causation implies that causal orderings and temporal orderings could be uncoupled. The notion of backwards causation is also explored as part of the general investigation of causation and causal sequences.
William Child
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236252
- eISBN:
- 9780191597206
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236255.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by ...
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Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.Less
Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The interpretations of the memory connection proposed in the literature fall into three categories: the evidential retention theory, the simple retention theory, and the causal retention theory. This ...
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The interpretations of the memory connection proposed in the literature fall into three categories: the evidential retention theory, the simple retention theory, and the causal retention theory. This chapter weighs up these three accounts and argues for the causal retention theory. The main problem with the evidentialist approach is its commitment to the epistemic theory of memory. The main problem with the simple retention theory is that it appears informative only as long as one refrains from asking what is involved in the process of retaining of a representation. When this question is raised, proponents of this approach must concede that they don't have a positive story to tell. The causal theory of memory states that for a present representation to qualify as a memory it must be suitably causally connected to a corresponding past representation. The causal theory of memory is defended against three objections: the argument from the contingency of causation, the argument from the nomologicality of causation, and the argument from temporal forgetting. There are two things that speak in favor of the causal theory of memory. First, unlike the causal theory, the evidential retention theory and the simple retention theory are afflicted with serious problems. Second, the causal theory of memory can best explain the truth of commonsensical counterfactual statements of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a particular proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it now.Less
The interpretations of the memory connection proposed in the literature fall into three categories: the evidential retention theory, the simple retention theory, and the causal retention theory. This chapter weighs up these three accounts and argues for the causal retention theory. The main problem with the evidentialist approach is its commitment to the epistemic theory of memory. The main problem with the simple retention theory is that it appears informative only as long as one refrains from asking what is involved in the process of retaining of a representation. When this question is raised, proponents of this approach must concede that they don't have a positive story to tell. The causal theory of memory states that for a present representation to qualify as a memory it must be suitably causally connected to a corresponding past representation. The causal theory of memory is defended against three objections: the argument from the contingency of causation, the argument from the nomologicality of causation, and the argument from temporal forgetting. There are two things that speak in favor of the causal theory of memory. First, unlike the causal theory, the evidential retention theory and the simple retention theory are afflicted with serious problems. Second, the causal theory of memory can best explain the truth of commonsensical counterfactual statements of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a particular proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it now.
Steven French and Décio Krause
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278244
- eISBN:
- 9780191603952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278245.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins with a broad discussion of the use of names in science and their role in physical theories. The philosophy of names is outlined, covering the ‘Descriptivist’, ‘Non-descriptivist’, ...
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This chapter begins with a broad discussion of the use of names in science and their role in physical theories. The philosophy of names is outlined, covering the ‘Descriptivist’, ‘Non-descriptivist’, and ‘Hybrid’ accounts. The claim that Kripke’s theory of rigidly designating names is tied to classical statistics is critically assessed, and it is argued that a form of the ‘Hybrid’ account can accommodate quantum particles understood as named individuals for which distinguishing descriptions cannot be given. Toraldo di Francia and Dalla Chiara’s theory of quasets is presented as the formal counterpart to this view. This is compared with Krause’s theory of quasi-sets in Chapter 7.Less
This chapter begins with a broad discussion of the use of names in science and their role in physical theories. The philosophy of names is outlined, covering the ‘Descriptivist’, ‘Non-descriptivist’, and ‘Hybrid’ accounts. The claim that Kripke’s theory of rigidly designating names is tied to classical statistics is critically assessed, and it is argued that a form of the ‘Hybrid’ account can accommodate quantum particles understood as named individuals for which distinguishing descriptions cannot be given. Toraldo di Francia and Dalla Chiara’s theory of quasets is presented as the formal counterpart to this view. This is compared with Krause’s theory of quasi-sets in Chapter 7.
Lance J. Rips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195183054
- eISBN:
- 9780199865109
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183054.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Traditional psychological approaches to causality assume that we acquire causal information by extracting it from our experience of events. One possibility is that we can directly perceive causality ...
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Traditional psychological approaches to causality assume that we acquire causal information by extracting it from our experience of events. One possibility is that we can directly perceive causality (or can use a specialized perceptual module) to detect causal interactions. Another possibility is that we infer causality from correlational evidence—the co-occurrence of particular causes and effects. This chapter argues that these purely bottom-up solutions are unlikely to succeed. It considers a new approach to causal cognition that may alleviate these difficulties which comes from research on Bayes nets in computer science.Less
Traditional psychological approaches to causality assume that we acquire causal information by extracting it from our experience of events. One possibility is that we can directly perceive causality (or can use a specialized perceptual module) to detect causal interactions. Another possibility is that we infer causality from correlational evidence—the co-occurrence of particular causes and effects. This chapter argues that these purely bottom-up solutions are unlikely to succeed. It considers a new approach to causal cognition that may alleviate these difficulties which comes from research on Bayes nets in computer science.
David-Hillel Ruben
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ...
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This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.Less
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.
Gregg Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168143
- eISBN:
- 9780199850075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter is a basic introduction to the Theory of Causal Significance. It intends to motivate the general approach the theory represents as well as explain its basic concepts. The chapter begins ...
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This chapter is a basic introduction to the Theory of Causal Significance. It intends to motivate the general approach the theory represents as well as explain its basic concepts. The chapter begins by defining the problem of causation and then explicates the importance and necessity of a theory. It also provides a categorization of conventional approaches to causations and argues why the Theory of Causal Significance falls outside such traditional taxonomy. An introduction to the ideas of effective and receptive properties and how they are conceptually and empirically distinct aspects of causation is also illustrated. Also in this chapter is an analysis of the causal nexus through the definitions, examples and fundamental principles presented by the author.Less
This chapter is a basic introduction to the Theory of Causal Significance. It intends to motivate the general approach the theory represents as well as explain its basic concepts. The chapter begins by defining the problem of causation and then explicates the importance and necessity of a theory. It also provides a categorization of conventional approaches to causations and argues why the Theory of Causal Significance falls outside such traditional taxonomy. An introduction to the ideas of effective and receptive properties and how they are conceptually and empirically distinct aspects of causation is also illustrated. Also in this chapter is an analysis of the causal nexus through the definitions, examples and fundamental principles presented by the author.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ...
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What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.Less
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.
David Archard and David Benatar (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590704
- eISBN:
- 9780191595547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590704.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book offers new and original chapters on the ethics of procreation and parenthood. The introduction provides an overview of the current debates in this area. In his chapter, Tim Bayne evaluates ...
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The book offers new and original chapters on the ethics of procreation and parenthood. The introduction provides an overview of the current debates in this area. In his chapter, Tim Bayne evaluates current thinking about the ethics of bringing people into existence. David Benatar argues that the right of reproductive freedom, although important, must be limited. Michael Parker responds to the argument for ‘procreative beneficence’—the view that procreators are duty‐bound to produce children with the best possible quality of life. He argues that we need only aim at producing children that have ‘a reasonable chance of a good life’. Colin Macleod considers the extent to which the existence of parental prerogatives conflicts with the demands of justice. David Archard argues that the causal theory of parenthood is consistent with the view that those who did not cause the child to exist may still take on the responsibilities of acting as parents. Elizabeth Brake defends a version of the intentional account of parental duties, arguing that these duties can only arise from voluntary acceptance of the socially constituted parental role.Less
The book offers new and original chapters on the ethics of procreation and parenthood. The introduction provides an overview of the current debates in this area. In his chapter, Tim Bayne evaluates current thinking about the ethics of bringing people into existence. David Benatar argues that the right of reproductive freedom, although important, must be limited. Michael Parker responds to the argument for ‘procreative beneficence’—the view that procreators are duty‐bound to produce children with the best possible quality of life. He argues that we need only aim at producing children that have ‘a reasonable chance of a good life’. Colin Macleod considers the extent to which the existence of parental prerogatives conflicts with the demands of justice. David Archard argues that the causal theory of parenthood is consistent with the view that those who did not cause the child to exist may still take on the responsibilities of acting as parents. Elizabeth Brake defends a version of the intentional account of parental duties, arguing that these duties can only arise from voluntary acceptance of the socially constituted parental role.
Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199692040
- eISBN:
- 9780191729713
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is ...
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Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience and its relation to perceived objects, or any particular view of the way perception yields knowledge? Second, what explains the apparent intuitive appeal of commonsense realism? Should we think of it as a kind of folk theory held by most human adults or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to it — in virtue of the experience we enjoy or in virtue of the concepts we use or in virtue of the explanations we give? Third, is commonsense realism defensible, in the face of formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics and cognitive science? The project of the present volume is to advance our understanding of these issues and thus to shed light on the commitments and credentials of commonsense realism. As you may have guessed from the title, the volume also aims to highlight the key role the concept of causation plays in these debates. Central issues to be addressed include the status and nature of causal requirements on perception, the causal role of perceptual experience, and the relation between objective perception and causal thinking — issues that, as many chapters in the volume bring out, are inseparable from concerns with the very nature of causation.Less
Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience and its relation to perceived objects, or any particular view of the way perception yields knowledge? Second, what explains the apparent intuitive appeal of commonsense realism? Should we think of it as a kind of folk theory held by most human adults or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to it — in virtue of the experience we enjoy or in virtue of the concepts we use or in virtue of the explanations we give? Third, is commonsense realism defensible, in the face of formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics and cognitive science? The project of the present volume is to advance our understanding of these issues and thus to shed light on the commitments and credentials of commonsense realism. As you may have guessed from the title, the volume also aims to highlight the key role the concept of causation plays in these debates. Central issues to be addressed include the status and nature of causal requirements on perception, the causal role of perceptual experience, and the relation between objective perception and causal thinking — issues that, as many chapters in the volume bring out, are inseparable from concerns with the very nature of causation.
Maria Alvarez
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199550005
- eISBN:
- 9780191720239
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of ...
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The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of Davidson's paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, namely, whether reasons are causes and whether reason explanations are causal explanations. It is suggested that the questions have often been debated in terms which are muddled due to the lack of nuance in understanding reasons. It is suggested that it would, therefore, be interesting to reassess the questions Davidson put on the table with a clearer grasp of what our reasons for acting are, and a clearer picture of the reasons that explain action and the variety of forms that explanations of action take.Less
The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of Davidson's paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, namely, whether reasons are causes and whether reason explanations are causal explanations. It is suggested that the questions have often been debated in terms which are muddled due to the lack of nuance in understanding reasons. It is suggested that it would, therefore, be interesting to reassess the questions Davidson put on the table with a clearer grasp of what our reasons for acting are, and a clearer picture of the reasons that explain action and the variety of forms that explanations of action take.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends the idea that there are analytic entailments among our sentences against two sorts of prominent objections. In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic ...
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This chapter defends the idea that there are analytic entailments among our sentences against two sorts of prominent objections. In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, it suggests that analytic interrelations may be understood as grounded in (tacit, collective) legislations of the rules of use for our terms. Against objections based on a Kripkean approach to reference, it argues that those inclined to causal theories should accept a hybrid theory of reference in order to overcome both the qua problem and the problem of singular nonexistence claims. This hybrid theory acknowledges that our general and singular nominative terms have determinate reference only to the extent that they are associated with frame-level conceptual content, in the form of application and coapplication conditions that fix the category of entity to be referred to. This minimal conceptual content can underpin the analytic entailments discussed in Chapter 1.Less
This chapter defends the idea that there are analytic entailments among our sentences against two sorts of prominent objections. In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, it suggests that analytic interrelations may be understood as grounded in (tacit, collective) legislations of the rules of use for our terms. Against objections based on a Kripkean approach to reference, it argues that those inclined to causal theories should accept a hybrid theory of reference in order to overcome both the qua problem and the problem of singular nonexistence claims. This hybrid theory acknowledges that our general and singular nominative terms have determinate reference only to the extent that they are associated with frame-level conceptual content, in the form of application and coapplication conditions that fix the category of entity to be referred to. This minimal conceptual content can underpin the analytic entailments discussed in Chapter 1.
Paul Noordhof
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583621
- eISBN:
- 9780191723483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The chapter defends the application, and verdicts of a counterfactual theory of causation, to the question of property causation. In particular, the challenges that non‐reductive physicalism and ...
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The chapter defends the application, and verdicts of a counterfactual theory of causation, to the question of property causation. In particular, the challenges that non‐reductive physicalism and emergent dualism place upon such an account are evaluated. This involves providing a particular characterization of the difference between non‐reductive physicalism and emergent dualism, considering whether this characterization is defensible under various views about the nature of properties, and distinguishing two types of emergent causation only one type of which involves emergent properties.Less
The chapter defends the application, and verdicts of a counterfactual theory of causation, to the question of property causation. In particular, the challenges that non‐reductive physicalism and emergent dualism place upon such an account are evaluated. This involves providing a particular characterization of the difference between non‐reductive physicalism and emergent dualism, considering whether this characterization is defensible under various views about the nature of properties, and distinguishing two types of emergent causation only one type of which involves emergent properties.
Ruben David-Hillel
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some ...
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This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Stephen P. Stich
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126662
- eISBN:
- 9780199868322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126661.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Though many arguments have been offered for eliminativism, they all have a common structure. They begin with the premise that beliefs, desires, and other commonsense mental states are the posits of a ...
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Though many arguments have been offered for eliminativism, they all have a common structure. They begin with the premise that beliefs, desires, and other commonsense mental states are the posits of a widely shared, largely tacit psychological theory – “folk psychology.” The second premise of the argument, defended in many different ways, is that folk psychology is a seriously mistaken theory. From these premises, eliminativists draw the conclusion that commonsense mental states do not exist. However, the premises do not entail the conclusion, so some additional premise is necessary. One way to fill the gap is to appeal to a description theory of reference. But the description theory of reference has been challenged by the causal‐historical theory of reference. So in order to determine whether the eliminativist argument is sound, it appears we must determine which theory of reference is the correct one, and to do this, we must say what a theory of reference is supposed to do – what facts it is supposed to capture. Various accounts of what a theory of reference is supposed to do are considered, but none of them, it is argued, will help determine whether the eliminativist conclusion follows from the premises. Other ways of filling the gap are also considered and rejected; the most promising of these invokes the normative naturalism strategy.Less
Though many arguments have been offered for eliminativism, they all have a common structure. They begin with the premise that beliefs, desires, and other commonsense mental states are the posits of a widely shared, largely tacit psychological theory – “folk psychology.” The second premise of the argument, defended in many different ways, is that folk psychology is a seriously mistaken theory. From these premises, eliminativists draw the conclusion that commonsense mental states do not exist. However, the premises do not entail the conclusion, so some additional premise is necessary. One way to fill the gap is to appeal to a description theory of reference. But the description theory of reference has been challenged by the causal‐historical theory of reference. So in order to determine whether the eliminativist argument is sound, it appears we must determine which theory of reference is the correct one, and to do this, we must say what a theory of reference is supposed to do – what facts it is supposed to capture. Various accounts of what a theory of reference is supposed to do are considered, but none of them, it is argued, will help determine whether the eliminativist conclusion follows from the premises. Other ways of filling the gap are also considered and rejected; the most promising of these invokes the normative naturalism strategy.
John L. Pollock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195304817
- eISBN:
- 9780199850907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304817.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses the familiar difficulties originating from Newcomb's problem. Those problems gave rise to “causal decision theory”, which differs from classical decision theory in the manner ...
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This chapter discusses the familiar difficulties originating from Newcomb's problem. Those problems gave rise to “causal decision theory”, which differs from classical decision theory in the manner in which probabilities enter into the definition of expected value. This chapter proposes that one can replace the appeal to causal dependence by appeal to temporal relations and statistical relevance between mixed physical/epistemic probabilities. The basic idea is simply that causes propagate through the world in temporal order. The resulting analysis handles the known counterexamples to classical decision theory in essentially the same way Skymis' theory does, but without appealing to vaguely understood concepts like causal dependence.Less
This chapter discusses the familiar difficulties originating from Newcomb's problem. Those problems gave rise to “causal decision theory”, which differs from classical decision theory in the manner in which probabilities enter into the definition of expected value. This chapter proposes that one can replace the appeal to causal dependence by appeal to temporal relations and statistical relevance between mixed physical/epistemic probabilities. The basic idea is simply that causes propagate through the world in temporal order. The resulting analysis handles the known counterexamples to classical decision theory in essentially the same way Skymis' theory does, but without appealing to vaguely understood concepts like causal dependence.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195036466
- eISBN:
- 9780199833399
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195036468.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
When confronted with Newcomb problems, decision theory yields the wrong answer. This paper argues for an improved decision theory that is sensitive to causal distinctions. The causal theories of ...
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When confronted with Newcomb problems, decision theory yields the wrong answer. This paper argues for an improved decision theory that is sensitive to causal distinctions. The causal theories of Skyrms, Sobel, and others are surveyed, and an objection against causal decision theories in general is deflected. The paper includes a postscript dealing with two criticisms by Rabinowicz.Less
When confronted with Newcomb problems, decision theory yields the wrong answer. This paper argues for an improved decision theory that is sensitive to causal distinctions. The causal theories of Skyrms, Sobel, and others are surveyed, and an objection against causal decision theories in general is deflected. The paper includes a postscript dealing with two criticisms by Rabinowicz.
Wayne A. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199261659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603099
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261652.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter shows that the intentionalist definition of reference presented in chapter 7 is superior to alternative analyses. It defends the implication that speakers can refer to non-existent ...
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This chapter shows that the intentionalist definition of reference presented in chapter 7 is superior to alternative analyses. It defends the implication that speakers can refer to non-existent objects, arguing for the intentionality of speaker reference and against the wide-spread assumption that it is a relation. It enumerates many defects in the theory that reference is a species of causal relation, and defends the thesis that speaker reference is determined by intention against twin earth arguments.Less
This chapter shows that the intentionalist definition of reference presented in chapter 7 is superior to alternative analyses. It defends the implication that speakers can refer to non-existent objects, arguing for the intentionality of speaker reference and against the wide-spread assumption that it is a relation. It enumerates many defects in the theory that reference is a species of causal relation, and defends the thesis that speaker reference is determined by intention against twin earth arguments.
William Child
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236252
- eISBN:
- 9780191597206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236255.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Defends the causal theory of vision and the disjunctive conception of visual experience and argues that they can be coherently combined. Reasons are given for accepting the causal theory of vision ...
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Defends the causal theory of vision and the disjunctive conception of visual experience and argues that they can be coherently combined. Reasons are given for accepting the causal theory of vision and the disjunctive conception of experience. Then, an objection (due to Paul Snowdon) is set out, according to which the disjunctive conception undermines the causal theory, either (1) because the disjunctive conception is incompatible with the idea that visual experiences are caused by the objects we see or (2) because the disjunctive conception removes the main motivation for accepting a causal theory. Against this objection, it is shown how a disjunctive conception of experience can be combined with the causal theory. And it is argued that, even if we accept the disjunctive conception, the causal theory is still needed in order to understand two features of experiences: why they occur and how they have the objective content they do.Less
Defends the causal theory of vision and the disjunctive conception of visual experience and argues that they can be coherently combined. Reasons are given for accepting the causal theory of vision and the disjunctive conception of experience. Then, an objection (due to Paul Snowdon) is set out, according to which the disjunctive conception undermines the causal theory, either (1) because the disjunctive conception is incompatible with the idea that visual experiences are caused by the objects we see or (2) because the disjunctive conception removes the main motivation for accepting a causal theory. Against this objection, it is shown how a disjunctive conception of experience can be combined with the causal theory. And it is argued that, even if we accept the disjunctive conception, the causal theory is still needed in order to understand two features of experiences: why they occur and how they have the objective content they do.
