Helen Steward
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250647
- eISBN:
- 9780191681318
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of ...
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This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.Less
This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.
Gregg H. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168143
- eISBN:
- 9780199850075
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there even be a credible alternative? In this book, the author addresses the causal role of consciousness in ...
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What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there even be a credible alternative? In this book, the author addresses the causal role of consciousness in the world from an anti-physicalist perspective. Introducing a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism, he offers a profound framework that proposes a deep link between consciousness and causation. Using this framework, he undercuts the logic of the historical debate and deflates the question of causality that physicalists have long been posing to anti-physicalists. Ultimately, he gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical.Less
What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there even be a credible alternative? In this book, the author addresses the causal role of consciousness in the world from an anti-physicalist perspective. Introducing a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism, he offers a profound framework that proposes a deep link between consciousness and causation. Using this framework, he undercuts the logic of the historical debate and deflates the question of causality that physicalists have long been posing to anti-physicalists. Ultimately, he gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time ...
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The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.Less
The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.
Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199259823
- eISBN:
- 9780191698637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter considers property monism. It considers the requirements for the defeat of property dualism and advances an argument for the identity of dispositional and categorical property tokens ...
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This chapter considers property monism. It considers the requirements for the defeat of property dualism and advances an argument for the identity of dispositional and categorical property tokens which is an adaptation from a similar argument in the philosophy of the mind. The second section clarifies the nature of the monist claim. The third and fourth sections justify the claim that the argument from identity of causal role is a sound argument. The fifth section considers epistemic counterparts and the world-relative ascriptions. The sixth section examines the variable realization argument and instantiations of properties. The seventh section discusses identity conditions derived from the argument for the identity of the causal role. The eighth section presents the supplementary claims of property monism. The last two sections discuss two special cases of problematic dispositions: abstract dispositions and ungrounded dispositions.Less
This chapter considers property monism. It considers the requirements for the defeat of property dualism and advances an argument for the identity of dispositional and categorical property tokens which is an adaptation from a similar argument in the philosophy of the mind. The second section clarifies the nature of the monist claim. The third and fourth sections justify the claim that the argument from identity of causal role is a sound argument. The fifth section considers epistemic counterparts and the world-relative ascriptions. The sixth section examines the variable realization argument and instantiations of properties. The seventh section discusses identity conditions derived from the argument for the identity of the causal role. The eighth section presents the supplementary claims of property monism. The last two sections discuss two special cases of problematic dispositions: abstract dispositions and ungrounded dispositions.
Joseph Levine
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195132359
- eISBN:
- 9780199833375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195132351.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The doctrine of materialism, or physicalism, is articulated and defended, based on the causal role of conscious states. Three objections are dealt with: epiphenomenalism, the explanatory exclusion ...
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The doctrine of materialism, or physicalism, is articulated and defended, based on the causal role of conscious states. Three objections are dealt with: epiphenomenalism, the explanatory exclusion argument, and an argument to the effect that naturalization is not required to secure the causal role of the mental.Less
The doctrine of materialism, or physicalism, is articulated and defended, based on the causal role of conscious states. Three objections are dealt with: epiphenomenalism, the explanatory exclusion argument, and an argument to the effect that naturalization is not required to secure the causal role of the mental.
Michael V. Wedin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253081
- eISBN:
- 9780191598647
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253080.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle claims in Metaphysics Z.17 that form is both a cause and principle of c‐substances. In this chapter, Wedin argues that the explanatory, or causal, role of form is in the background of the ...
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Aristotle claims in Metaphysics Z.17 that form is both a cause and principle of c‐substances. In this chapter, Wedin argues that the explanatory, or causal, role of form is in the background of the entire discussion, and indeed directs much of the argumentation of Metaphysics Zeta. Form is the cause of some matter being a unity and not a heap, because form alone explains how the material parts of a thing are united in a single whole. Wedin draws together the main results of the preceding investigation of Zeta—that form is essence, that form must not contain matter or actual parts, and that form must not be a certain kind of universal—and he argues that these constraints on form are designed to serve the explanatory role that Aristotle explicitly gives to form in Z.17. Wedin emphasizes that the notions isolated in the examination of the earlier chapters, such as the purity of form, weak proscription, and dual complexity, each contribute to the account of form as the explanatory principle of c‐substance.Less
Aristotle claims in Metaphysics Z.17 that form is both a cause and principle of c‐substances. In this chapter, Wedin argues that the explanatory, or causal, role of form is in the background of the entire discussion, and indeed directs much of the argumentation of Metaphysics Zeta. Form is the cause of some matter being a unity and not a heap, because form alone explains how the material parts of a thing are united in a single whole. Wedin draws together the main results of the preceding investigation of Zeta—that form is essence, that form must not contain matter or actual parts, and that form must not be a certain kind of universal—and he argues that these constraints on form are designed to serve the explanatory role that Aristotle explicitly gives to form in Z.17. Wedin emphasizes that the notions isolated in the examination of the earlier chapters, such as the purity of form, weak proscription, and dual complexity, each contribute to the account of form as the explanatory principle of c‐substance.
Jennifer Radden (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195149531
- eISBN:
- 9780199870943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149531.003.0028
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses cognitive-behavioral models for therapy. It illustrates a field that is deeply divided over fundamental questions such as the causal role of cognitions and the effectiveness of ...
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This chapter discusses cognitive-behavioral models for therapy. It illustrates a field that is deeply divided over fundamental questions such as the causal role of cognitions and the effectiveness of the cognitive therapies. Disagreements also persist about a wide range of less immediately practical questions, including postulating unobservables, the goals of science, epiphenomenalism, and the nature of truth, logic, explanation, and causation.Less
This chapter discusses cognitive-behavioral models for therapy. It illustrates a field that is deeply divided over fundamental questions such as the causal role of cognitions and the effectiveness of the cognitive therapies. Disagreements also persist about a wide range of less immediately practical questions, including postulating unobservables, the goals of science, epiphenomenalism, and the nature of truth, logic, explanation, and causation.
Anya Plutynski
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780199967452
- eISBN:
- 9780190878474
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199967452.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
It is typical to refer to cancer as a “genetic” or “genomic” disease. This claim is ambiguous; one of the central goals of this chapter is to disambiguate this claim. I first distinguish different ...
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It is typical to refer to cancer as a “genetic” or “genomic” disease. This claim is ambiguous; one of the central goals of this chapter is to disambiguate this claim. I first distinguish different types of causal claims: claims about causal relevance, causal role, and causal specificity. As a backdrop to this discussion, I introduce what I call the “mechanistic research program” in cancer, according to which progression to cancer involves breakdowns in regulatory controls on gene expression in ways that affect cell birth and death. While this research program has been successful, it has downplayed the role of context in cancer progression, and the fact that disorderly cellular growth is affected by many pathways. I conclude by considering several philosophers’ accounts of “causal selection” and argue that ultimately the causal selection problem is not one but several different problems, requiring different, context-specific solutions.Less
It is typical to refer to cancer as a “genetic” or “genomic” disease. This claim is ambiguous; one of the central goals of this chapter is to disambiguate this claim. I first distinguish different types of causal claims: claims about causal relevance, causal role, and causal specificity. As a backdrop to this discussion, I introduce what I call the “mechanistic research program” in cancer, according to which progression to cancer involves breakdowns in regulatory controls on gene expression in ways that affect cell birth and death. While this research program has been successful, it has downplayed the role of context in cancer progression, and the fact that disorderly cellular growth is affected by many pathways. I conclude by considering several philosophers’ accounts of “causal selection” and argue that ultimately the causal selection problem is not one but several different problems, requiring different, context-specific solutions.
Michael V. Wedin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253081
- eISBN:
- 9780191598647
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253080.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an ...
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Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal.Less
Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal.
Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199841608
- eISBN:
- 9780190252618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199841608.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter presents a theoretical discussion of how predicting policy outcomes is really betting that the policy can play the right causal role in a given situation and that the given situation ...
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This chapter presents a theoretical discussion of how predicting policy outcomes is really betting that the policy can play the right causal role in a given situation and that the given situation will have the right support factors to allow it to do so. It provides an abstract, high-level framework to justify the conclusion that we should look for causal roles and support factors.Less
This chapter presents a theoretical discussion of how predicting policy outcomes is really betting that the policy can play the right causal role in a given situation and that the given situation will have the right support factors to allow it to do so. It provides an abstract, high-level framework to justify the conclusion that we should look for causal roles and support factors.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381641
- eISBN:
- 9780199864911
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to ...
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We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility, and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research—including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John–Dylan Haynes—that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, this book discusses whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other.Less
We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility, and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research—including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John–Dylan Haynes—that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, this book discusses whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other.
Gerald Vision
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015844
- eISBN:
- 9780262298599
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015844.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses the most glaring problems faced by emergentism, specifically those that challenge the alleged causal role of conscious properties and the causation by the mental in general. ...
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This chapter discusses the most glaring problems faced by emergentism, specifically those that challenge the alleged causal role of conscious properties and the causation by the mental in general. The Causal Exclusion Argument (CEA) is a prominent topic in this discussion because it is the most prevalent argument presented in opposition to mental causation. Consequently, the Redundancy Argument (RA) is considered next, as it shares some steps with CEA. Each are treated as separate arguments, however, since they are fundamentally different in the sense that CEA rejects mental causation on the grounds that it leads to massive overdetermination, whereas RA prescribes mental causation as superfluous. After expositions on each argument, their critical examination follows.Less
This chapter discusses the most glaring problems faced by emergentism, specifically those that challenge the alleged causal role of conscious properties and the causation by the mental in general. The Causal Exclusion Argument (CEA) is a prominent topic in this discussion because it is the most prevalent argument presented in opposition to mental causation. Consequently, the Redundancy Argument (RA) is considered next, as it shares some steps with CEA. Each are treated as separate arguments, however, since they are fundamentally different in the sense that CEA rejects mental causation on the grounds that it leads to massive overdetermination, whereas RA prescribes mental causation as superfluous. After expositions on each argument, their critical examination follows.
Sartorio Carolina
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014564
- eISBN:
- 9780262289139
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0083
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter focuses on arguments for intentional omissions as presented by Randolph Clarke, which has two main claims, the first of which states that, in order for an agent’s omitting to A to be ...
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This chapter focuses on arguments for intentional omissions as presented by Randolph Clarke, which has two main claims, the first of which states that, in order for an agent’s omitting to A to be intentional, some intention with the appropriate content must play a causal role in the situation. The second claim presents the notion that the relevant intention’s causal role in each case is causing the agent’s subsequent thought and action. This is followed by a few remarks regarding both claims individually. The first presented claim made by Clarke is, however, the main source of dissent here. The chapter argues that the agent’s omitting to intend to A causes his omitting to A, and that this is enough to explain why the agent’s omitting to A is intentional. It is not required to state that the agent’s formation of a certain intention also plays a causal role.Less
This chapter focuses on arguments for intentional omissions as presented by Randolph Clarke, which has two main claims, the first of which states that, in order for an agent’s omitting to A to be intentional, some intention with the appropriate content must play a causal role in the situation. The second claim presents the notion that the relevant intention’s causal role in each case is causing the agent’s subsequent thought and action. This is followed by a few remarks regarding both claims individually. The first presented claim made by Clarke is, however, the main source of dissent here. The chapter argues that the agent’s omitting to intend to A causes his omitting to A, and that this is enough to explain why the agent’s omitting to A is intentional. It is not required to state that the agent’s formation of a certain intention also plays a causal role.
Gregory J. Cooper, Charbel N. El-Hani, and Nei F. Nunes-Neto
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226426051
- eISBN:
- 9780226426198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226426198.003.0008
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Ecosystem function is the central use of function in ecology. In this work we examine the light that can be shed on ecosystem functions by three philosophical analyses of the concept of function: the ...
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Ecosystem function is the central use of function in ecology. In this work we examine the light that can be shed on ecosystem functions by three philosophical analyses of the concept of function: the causal role theory, the teleological theory, and the organizational theory. While the causal role theory provides a natural explication of many of the uses of ecosystem function, it does not underwrite either the teleological or normative aspects of functional discourse. The etiological approach has the potential to account for the teleology and normativity of ecosystem function but presupposes that ecosystem properties are, in some sense, shaped by natural selection. It is not obvious that this presupposition can be satisfied. The organizational approach has much in common with the causal role approach and also offers an alternative strategy for grounding teleology and normativity. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the organizational approach stems from the necessity to reach a historical account of how functional systems come into existence in the first place that is in sufficient agreement with a Darwinian understanding of evolution. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches, we suggest that a pluralistic approach might have some attraction.Less
Ecosystem function is the central use of function in ecology. In this work we examine the light that can be shed on ecosystem functions by three philosophical analyses of the concept of function: the causal role theory, the teleological theory, and the organizational theory. While the causal role theory provides a natural explication of many of the uses of ecosystem function, it does not underwrite either the teleological or normative aspects of functional discourse. The etiological approach has the potential to account for the teleology and normativity of ecosystem function but presupposes that ecosystem properties are, in some sense, shaped by natural selection. It is not obvious that this presupposition can be satisfied. The organizational approach has much in common with the causal role approach and also offers an alternative strategy for grounding teleology and normativity. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the organizational approach stems from the necessity to reach a historical account of how functional systems come into existence in the first place that is in sufficient agreement with a Darwinian understanding of evolution. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches, we suggest that a pluralistic approach might have some attraction.
Susan James
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250135
- eISBN:
- 9780191597794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250134.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The rejection of certain Scholastic doctrines nevertheless enabled seventeenth‐century writers to reconsider the interpretations of activity and passivity that they had inherited, and to generate new ...
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The rejection of certain Scholastic doctrines nevertheless enabled seventeenth‐century writers to reconsider the interpretations of activity and passivity that they had inherited, and to generate new conceptions of the passions. This chapter introduces the kinds of innovations they introduced, and the arguments they offered for them. It focuses on general claims about the causal role of the passions, their relation to the soul's other powers, and their connection with the body.Less
The rejection of certain Scholastic doctrines nevertheless enabled seventeenth‐century writers to reconsider the interpretations of activity and passivity that they had inherited, and to generate new conceptions of the passions. This chapter introduces the kinds of innovations they introduced, and the arguments they offered for them. It focuses on general claims about the causal role of the passions, their relation to the soul's other powers, and their connection with the body.
Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- February 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199841608
- eISBN:
- 9780190252618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199841608.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses causal roles, especially finding the right causal roles, ones that will travel from there to here, in order to make failures like those of the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition ...
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This chapter discusses causal roles, especially finding the right causal roles, ones that will travel from there to here, in order to make failures like those of the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Program less likely. It describes what a vertical search is and explains its importance.Less
This chapter discusses causal roles, especially finding the right causal roles, ones that will travel from there to here, in order to make failures like those of the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Program less likely. It describes what a vertical search is and explains its importance.
Hornsby Jennifer
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014564
- eISBN:
- 9780262289139
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0033
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter is a response to the arguments presented in the previous one. The previous chapter’s criticisms were directed against philosophers who argue that deficiencies in the standard story of ...
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This chapter is a response to the arguments presented in the previous one. The previous chapter’s criticisms were directed against philosophers who argue that deficiencies in the standard story of action are to be addressed through the addition of states of different sorts from beliefs and desires to the causes of bodily movements. These philosophers fail to address the question of whether their story contains the causal notions that belong in an account of human agency or not. According to Michael Smith, this argument charges the standard story with incompleteness, which is a misleading notion. It was never suggested that the story required completion, even if it was posited that the causal role of agents ceases to exist in an events-based conception of the causal order. This chapter aims to show that the standard story stops making sense once it is accepted that a person’s acting is a matter of exercising a capacity he or she possesses as agent.Less
This chapter is a response to the arguments presented in the previous one. The previous chapter’s criticisms were directed against philosophers who argue that deficiencies in the standard story of action are to be addressed through the addition of states of different sorts from beliefs and desires to the causes of bodily movements. These philosophers fail to address the question of whether their story contains the causal notions that belong in an account of human agency or not. According to Michael Smith, this argument charges the standard story with incompleteness, which is a misleading notion. It was never suggested that the story required completion, even if it was posited that the causal role of agents ceases to exist in an events-based conception of the causal order. This chapter aims to show that the standard story stops making sense once it is accepted that a person’s acting is a matter of exercising a capacity he or she possesses as agent.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199277360
- eISBN:
- 9780191602597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199277362.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Argues that all of the behaviours that we share with non-human animals can, and should, be explained in terms of the first-order, non-phenomenal, contents of our experiences. So, although we do have ...
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Argues that all of the behaviours that we share with non-human animals can, and should, be explained in terms of the first-order, non-phenomenal, contents of our experiences. So, although we do have phenomenally conscious experiences when we act, most of the time it is not by virtue of their being phenomenally conscious that they have their role in causing our actions. In consequence, the fact that my dispositional higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness might withhold such consciousness from most non-human animals should have a minimal impact on comparative psychology. The explanations for the behaviours that we have in common with animals can remain shared also, despite the differences in phenomenally conscious status.Less
Argues that all of the behaviours that we share with non-human animals can, and should, be explained in terms of the first-order, non-phenomenal, contents of our experiences. So, although we do have phenomenally conscious experiences when we act, most of the time it is not by virtue of their being phenomenally conscious that they have their role in causing our actions. In consequence, the fact that my dispositional higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness might withhold such consciousness from most non-human animals should have a minimal impact on comparative psychology. The explanations for the behaviours that we have in common with animals can remain shared also, despite the differences in phenomenally conscious status.
Bence Nanay
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015936
- eISBN:
- 9780262298780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins by presenting the three main principles of essentialism. The first principle is that all and only members of a natural kind have some essential properties. The second is that ...
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This chapter begins by presenting the three main principles of essentialism. The first principle is that all and only members of a natural kind have some essential properties. The second is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third and final principle is that they are explanatorily relevant. Questions that arise regarding these principles are examined and it is argued here that arguing against the first and the second principles of kind-essentialism would involve taking part in some of the grand debates of philosophy. However, if the scope of discussion is restricted to the biological realm, the third principle can be questioned more successfully. Essentialism about natural kinds can have different meanings; for one, it can refer to being essentialist about individuals and kinds. There are also a variety of possible definitions for essentialism about kinds, the most general of which is utilized in this chapter.Less
This chapter begins by presenting the three main principles of essentialism. The first principle is that all and only members of a natural kind have some essential properties. The second is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third and final principle is that they are explanatorily relevant. Questions that arise regarding these principles are examined and it is argued here that arguing against the first and the second principles of kind-essentialism would involve taking part in some of the grand debates of philosophy. However, if the scope of discussion is restricted to the biological realm, the third principle can be questioned more successfully. Essentialism about natural kinds can have different meanings; for one, it can refer to being essentialist about individuals and kinds. There are also a variety of possible definitions for essentialism about kinds, the most general of which is utilized in this chapter.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Lewis defends an account of the role of theoretical terms in scientific theories. Drawing on the work of Ramsey and Carnap, Lewis advocates the view that theoretical terms are implicitly defined by ...
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Lewis defends an account of the role of theoretical terms in scientific theories. Drawing on the work of Ramsey and Carnap, Lewis advocates the view that theoretical terms are implicitly defined by the scientific theories in which they figure; their meanings are to be characterized in functional terms, by reference to causal roles. According to Lewis, this understanding of theoretical terms (which would become influential in the development of functionalist theories of the mind) enables us to understand how one scientific theory may be reduced to another.Less
Lewis defends an account of the role of theoretical terms in scientific theories. Drawing on the work of Ramsey and Carnap, Lewis advocates the view that theoretical terms are implicitly defined by the scientific theories in which they figure; their meanings are to be characterized in functional terms, by reference to causal roles. According to Lewis, this understanding of theoretical terms (which would become influential in the development of functionalist theories of the mind) enables us to understand how one scientific theory may be reduced to another.
