Timothy O'Connor and John Ross Churchill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583621
- eISBN:
- 9780191723483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non‐reductive physicalism regarding mental states, one that is explicitly directed at non‐reductive physicalists who adopt an ...
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The chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non‐reductive physicalism regarding mental states, one that is explicitly directed at non‐reductive physicalists who adopt an ontology of causal powers. It considers whether a satisfying reply to the argument can be fashioned on the basis of Sydney Shoemaker's novel account of the mental–physical realization relation, most recently in his book Physical Realization. It is argued that Shoemaker's strategy does not provide a plausible reply to the argument. Three broad alternatives to non‐reductive physicalism available to the causal powers metaphysician are then discussed: reduction, elimination, and ontological emergence. It is contended that while all of them are at present viable approaches to special science properties generally, there is special reason to affirm the irreducibility and efficacy of mental properties and so to conclude that mental properties are unrealized, ontologically emergent features of their subjects.Less
The chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non‐reductive physicalism regarding mental states, one that is explicitly directed at non‐reductive physicalists who adopt an ontology of causal powers. It considers whether a satisfying reply to the argument can be fashioned on the basis of Sydney Shoemaker's novel account of the mental–physical realization relation, most recently in his book Physical Realization. It is argued that Shoemaker's strategy does not provide a plausible reply to the argument. Three broad alternatives to non‐reductive physicalism available to the causal powers metaphysician are then discussed: reduction, elimination, and ontological emergence. It is contended that while all of them are at present viable approaches to special science properties generally, there is special reason to affirm the irreducibility and efficacy of mental properties and so to conclude that mental properties are unrealized, ontologically emergent features of their subjects.
Erasmus Mayr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606214
- eISBN:
- 9780191731631
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606214.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Our self‐understanding as human agents includes commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: That agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order, and that intentional ...
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Our self‐understanding as human agents includes commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: That agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order, and that intentional actions can be explained by the agent's reasons for acting. While all of these claims are indispensable elements of our view of ourselves as human agents, they are in continuous conflict and tension with one another. One of the central tasks of philosophy of action consists in showing how, despite appearances, these conflicts can be resolved and our self‐understanding as agents be vindicated. The mainstream of contemporary philosophy of action thinks that this task can be fulfilled by an event-causal reductive view of human agency, paradigmatically embodied in the so‐called standard‐model. This book, by contrast, develops a new agent‐causal solution to these conflicts and shows why this solution is superior both to event‐causalist accounts and to intentionalism about agency. It offers a comprehensive theory of substance-causation on the basis of a realist conception of powers, and a non-causal account of acting for reasons in terms of following a standard of success.Less
Our self‐understanding as human agents includes commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: That agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order, and that intentional actions can be explained by the agent's reasons for acting. While all of these claims are indispensable elements of our view of ourselves as human agents, they are in continuous conflict and tension with one another. One of the central tasks of philosophy of action consists in showing how, despite appearances, these conflicts can be resolved and our self‐understanding as agents be vindicated. The mainstream of contemporary philosophy of action thinks that this task can be fulfilled by an event-causal reductive view of human agency, paradigmatically embodied in the so‐called standard‐model. This book, by contrast, develops a new agent‐causal solution to these conflicts and shows why this solution is superior both to event‐causalist accounts and to intentionalism about agency. It offers a comprehensive theory of substance-causation on the basis of a realist conception of powers, and a non-causal account of acting for reasons in terms of following a standard of success.
Barbara Hannan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195378948
- eISBN:
- 9780199869589
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378948.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is an introduction to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The peculiar inconsistencies and tensions in Schopenhauer's thought are emphasized. A main theme of the book is that ...
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This book is an introduction to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The peculiar inconsistencies and tensions in Schopenhauer's thought are emphasized. A main theme of the book is that Schopenhauer was torn between realism and anti-realism, and between denial and affirmation of the individual will. A useful summary of Schopenhauer's main ideas is provided. In addition, the book connects Schopenhauer's thought with ongoing debates in philosophy. The book argues that Schopenhauer was struggling half-consciously to break altogether with Kant and transcendental idealism and that the anti-Kantian features of Schopenhauer's thought possess the most lasting value. Schopenhauer's panpsychist metaphysics of will is defended, and compared favorably with contemporary views according to which causal power is metaphysically basic. Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion is also defended against Kant's ethics of pure reason. Friendly amendments are offered to Schopenhauer's theories of art, music, and “salvation.” The book illuminates the deep connection between Schopenhauer and the early Wittgenstein, as well as Schopenhauer's influence on existentialism and psychoanalytic thought.Less
This book is an introduction to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The peculiar inconsistencies and tensions in Schopenhauer's thought are emphasized. A main theme of the book is that Schopenhauer was torn between realism and anti-realism, and between denial and affirmation of the individual will. A useful summary of Schopenhauer's main ideas is provided. In addition, the book connects Schopenhauer's thought with ongoing debates in philosophy. The book argues that Schopenhauer was struggling half-consciously to break altogether with Kant and transcendental idealism and that the anti-Kantian features of Schopenhauer's thought possess the most lasting value. Schopenhauer's panpsychist metaphysics of will is defended, and compared favorably with contemporary views according to which causal power is metaphysically basic. Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion is also defended against Kant's ethics of pure reason. Friendly amendments are offered to Schopenhauer's theories of art, music, and “salvation.” The book illuminates the deep connection between Schopenhauer and the early Wittgenstein, as well as Schopenhauer's influence on existentialism and psychoanalytic thought.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, ...
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The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.Less
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.
Timothy O'Connor and John Ross Churchill
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556182
- eISBN:
- 9780191721014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non-reductive physicalism, one that is explicitly directed at non-reductive physicalists who adopt an ontology of causal powers. ...
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This chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non-reductive physicalism, one that is explicitly directed at non-reductive physicalists who adopt an ontology of causal powers. After reviewing some considerations in favor of a causal powers metaphysic, it presents its exclusion argument and defends it against recent attempts by Shoemaker and Gillett to overcome exclusion without sacrificing causal powers or non-reductive physicalism. The lesson is that if irreducible mental properties are to be efficacious in a way that is consonant with a causal powers metaphysic, these properties cannot be the realized entities postulated by the non-reductive physicalist. The chapter ends with a sketch of an alternative to non-reductive physicalism that preserves both the causal powers ontology and the irreducibility and efficacy of mental properties. On this alternative, mental properties are unrealized, ontologically emergent features of their subjects.Less
This chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non-reductive physicalism, one that is explicitly directed at non-reductive physicalists who adopt an ontology of causal powers. After reviewing some considerations in favor of a causal powers metaphysic, it presents its exclusion argument and defends it against recent attempts by Shoemaker and Gillett to overcome exclusion without sacrificing causal powers or non-reductive physicalism. The lesson is that if irreducible mental properties are to be efficacious in a way that is consonant with a causal powers metaphysic, these properties cannot be the realized entities postulated by the non-reductive physicalist. The chapter ends with a sketch of an alternative to non-reductive physicalism that preserves both the causal powers ontology and the irreducibility and efficacy of mental properties. On this alternative, mental properties are unrealized, ontologically emergent features of their subjects.
Jaegwon Kim
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585878
- eISBN:
- 9780191595349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
“Two Concepts of Realization, Mental Causation, and Physicalism” compares and evaluates two accounts of realization, the standard second‐order account and Sydney Shoemaker's new “subset” account. ...
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“Two Concepts of Realization, Mental Causation, and Physicalism” compares and evaluates two accounts of realization, the standard second‐order account and Sydney Shoemaker's new “subset” account. According to the standard account, a property realizes another just in case it fills the causal role that defines the realized property. On the subset account, a property realizes another if and only if its causal powers include the causal powers of the realized property as a subset. In his recent book Physical Realization (2007), Shoemaker uses this subset account to vindicate mental causation within nonreductive physicalism. The essay argues that Shoemaker's attempt does not succeed, and that the physicalist framework he defends is best viewed as a form of type physicalism, not nonreductive physicalism.Less
“Two Concepts of Realization, Mental Causation, and Physicalism” compares and evaluates two accounts of realization, the standard second‐order account and Sydney Shoemaker's new “subset” account. According to the standard account, a property realizes another just in case it fills the causal role that defines the realized property. On the subset account, a property realizes another if and only if its causal powers include the causal powers of the realized property as a subset. In his recent book Physical Realization (2007), Shoemaker uses this subset account to vindicate mental causation within nonreductive physicalism. The essay argues that Shoemaker's attempt does not succeed, and that the physicalist framework he defends is best viewed as a form of type physicalism, not nonreductive physicalism.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological ...
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This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological issues and controversies that were of considerable interest and importance for Hume and his contemporaries. Not only does Hume present a skeptical challenge to the fundamental theological doctrines of omnipotence and Creation, he also suggests a comprehensive, integrated naturalism in respect of the causal relations governing matter and thought—doing away with the suggestion that spiritual agents are the only possible source of real activity in the world. In pursuing these various irreligious themes Hume is following a tradition and pattern of “atheistic” thought that was readily identified by his own contemporaries. These specific lines of argument are entirely consistent with the wider irreligious program that Hume pursues throughout the Treatise as a whole.Less
This chapter's particular concern is to identify and describe the way in which Hume's discussion of our idea of necessity (T,1.3.14) is intimately and intricately related to a number of theological issues and controversies that were of considerable interest and importance for Hume and his contemporaries. Not only does Hume present a skeptical challenge to the fundamental theological doctrines of omnipotence and Creation, he also suggests a comprehensive, integrated naturalism in respect of the causal relations governing matter and thought—doing away with the suggestion that spiritual agents are the only possible source of real activity in the world. In pursuing these various irreligious themes Hume is following a tradition and pattern of “atheistic” thought that was readily identified by his own contemporaries. These specific lines of argument are entirely consistent with the wider irreligious program that Hume pursues throughout the Treatise as a whole.
Kevin B. Korb, Erik P. Nyberg, and Lucas Hope
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199574131
- eISBN:
- 9780191728921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0030
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
The causal power of C over E is (roughly) the degree to which changes in C cause changes in E. A formal measure of causal power would be very useful, as an aid to understanding and modelling complex ...
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The causal power of C over E is (roughly) the degree to which changes in C cause changes in E. A formal measure of causal power would be very useful, as an aid to understanding and modelling complex stochastic systems. Previous attempts to measure causal power, such as those of Good (1961), Cheng (1997), and Glymour (2001), while useful, suffer from one fundamental flaw: they only give sensible results when applied to very restricted types of causal system, all of which exhibit causal transitivity. Causal Bayesian networks, however, are not in general transitive. The chapter develops an information‐theoretic alternative, causal information, which applies to any kind of causal Bayesian network. Causal information is based upon three ideas. First, the chapter assumes that the system can be represented causally as a Bayesian network. Second, the chapter uses hypothetical interventions to select the causal from the non‐causal paths connecting C to E. Third, we use a variation on the information‐theoretic measure mutual information to summarize the total causal influence of C on E. The chapter's measure gives sensible results for a much wider variety of complex stochastic systems than previous attempts and promises to simplify the interpretation and application of Bayesian networks.Less
The causal power of C over E is (roughly) the degree to which changes in C cause changes in E. A formal measure of causal power would be very useful, as an aid to understanding and modelling complex stochastic systems. Previous attempts to measure causal power, such as those of Good (1961), Cheng (1997), and Glymour (2001), while useful, suffer from one fundamental flaw: they only give sensible results when applied to very restricted types of causal system, all of which exhibit causal transitivity. Causal Bayesian networks, however, are not in general transitive. The chapter develops an information‐theoretic alternative, causal information, which applies to any kind of causal Bayesian network. Causal information is based upon three ideas. First, the chapter assumes that the system can be represented causally as a Bayesian network. Second, the chapter uses hypothetical interventions to select the causal from the non‐causal paths connecting C to E. Third, we use a variation on the information‐theoretic measure mutual information to summarize the total causal influence of C on E. The chapter's measure gives sensible results for a much wider variety of complex stochastic systems than previous attempts and promises to simplify the interpretation and application of Bayesian networks.
George Molnar
Stephen Mumford (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199204175
- eISBN:
- 9780191695537
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers ...
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This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. This book sets about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remain, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Hume's assumptions. This book shows both that the notion of a power is central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. This book's account of powers is as realistic as any that has appeared so far, and shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend on their manifestations for their existence; nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. The book thus appropriates the notion of intentionality from Brentano and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. It offers a persuasive case for the existence of some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, the book does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, the book's final position is dualistic.Less
This book sees that the solution to a number of the problems of contemporary philosophy lies in the development of an alternative to Hume's metaphysics. This alternative would have real causal powers at its centre. This book sets about developing a thorough account of powers that might persuade those who remain, perhaps unknowingly, in the grip of Hume's assumptions. This book shows both that the notion of a power is central and that it could serve to dispel a number of long-standing philosophical problems. This book's account of powers is as realistic as any that has appeared so far, and shows that dispositions are as real as any other properties. Specifically, they do not depend on their manifestations for their existence; nevertheless, they are directed towards such manifestations. The book thus appropriates the notion of intentionality from Brentano and argues that it is the essential characteristic of powers. It offers a persuasive case for the existence of some basic and ungrounded powers, thus ruling out the reducibility of the dispositional to the non-dispositional. However, the book does allow that there are non-power properties as well as power properties. In this respect, the book's final position is dualistic.
Nancy Cartwright
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235071
- eISBN:
- 9780191597169
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235070.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts ...
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This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies from both econometrics and quantum mechanics.Less
This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies from both econometrics and quantum mechanics.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199764037
- eISBN:
- 9780199895243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 7 sets out a robust conception of nonreductive physicalism in which mental entities, either type or token, are not identical with neural or microphysical entities, and mental causes are ...
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Chapter 7 sets out a robust conception of nonreductive physicalism in which mental entities, either type or token, are not identical with neural or microphysical entities, and mental causes are causally efficacious as mental. I then examine whether nonreductive physicalism can finesse the causal exclusion problem that Jaegwon Kim has pressed. I claim that it can, and that one way it to do so is by grounding the mental in the neural and the microphysical by a constitution relation. I then set out my version of this position and differentiate it from other nonreductive physicalist views. Subsequently I argue that there are significant differences between the controversial sort of emergentism and a plausible sort of nonreductive physicalism, and that nonreductive physicalist need not be emergentist in this sense.Less
Chapter 7 sets out a robust conception of nonreductive physicalism in which mental entities, either type or token, are not identical with neural or microphysical entities, and mental causes are causally efficacious as mental. I then examine whether nonreductive physicalism can finesse the causal exclusion problem that Jaegwon Kim has pressed. I claim that it can, and that one way it to do so is by grounding the mental in the neural and the microphysical by a constitution relation. I then set out my version of this position and differentiate it from other nonreductive physicalist views. Subsequently I argue that there are significant differences between the controversial sort of emergentism and a plausible sort of nonreductive physicalism, and that nonreductive physicalist need not be emergentist in this sense.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235125
- eISBN:
- 9780191598579
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235127.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Causation is a basic category, not reducible to anything else. Intentional causation is a species of causation of which we are aware when we try to move our limbs. Talk of ‘laws of nature’ is ...
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Causation is a basic category, not reducible to anything else. Intentional causation is a species of causation of which we are aware when we try to move our limbs. Talk of ‘laws of nature’ is reducible to talk of the causal powers and liabilities of substances. A perfectly free (and so rational) agent will inevitably do only (what he believes to be) good actions – the best action or one of a number of equal best actions, if there are such.Less
Causation is a basic category, not reducible to anything else. Intentional causation is a species of causation of which we are aware when we try to move our limbs. Talk of ‘laws of nature’ is reducible to talk of the causal powers and liabilities of substances. A perfectly free (and so rational) agent will inevitably do only (what he believes to be) good actions – the best action or one of a number of equal best actions, if there are such.
Barbara Hannan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195378948
- eISBN:
- 9780199869589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378948.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In this chapter, the following are explained in detail and evaluated: (1) Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism; (2) Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Will, which may be described as a kind of animism ...
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In this chapter, the following are explained in detail and evaluated: (1) Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism; (2) Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Will, which may be described as a kind of animism or panpsychism; and (3) Schopenhauer's views on freedom and determinism, which are probably best described as compatibilist. Realism, anti-realism, and idealism are discussed. It is argued that anti-realism about x always presupposes realism about y, and that to be real is to be mind independent. A novel interpretation of the ontological argument is defended, according to which the argument proves not the existence of God, but the existence of mind-independent reality. Panpsychism, characterized as neutral monism or the idea that the mental/physical dichotomy is not ontologically deep, is defended. Schopenhauer's doctrine of the “Platonic Forms” is interpreted as emergentism—novel causal powers appear at different ontological levels. The idea that properties are causal powers is defended, and it is argued that this is the main idea behind Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Will. The chapter also gives an account of quantum indeterminacy and argues that such indeterminism does not defeat Schopenhauer's views on freedom and responsibility because determinism still prevails above the quantum level.Less
In this chapter, the following are explained in detail and evaluated: (1) Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism; (2) Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Will, which may be described as a kind of animism or panpsychism; and (3) Schopenhauer's views on freedom and determinism, which are probably best described as compatibilist. Realism, anti-realism, and idealism are discussed. It is argued that anti-realism about x always presupposes realism about y, and that to be real is to be mind independent. A novel interpretation of the ontological argument is defended, according to which the argument proves not the existence of God, but the existence of mind-independent reality. Panpsychism, characterized as neutral monism or the idea that the mental/physical dichotomy is not ontologically deep, is defended. Schopenhauer's doctrine of the “Platonic Forms” is interpreted as emergentism—novel causal powers appear at different ontological levels. The idea that properties are causal powers is defended, and it is argued that this is the main idea behind Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Will. The chapter also gives an account of quantum indeterminacy and argues that such indeterminism does not defeat Schopenhauer's views on freedom and responsibility because determinism still prevails above the quantum level.
Walter Ott
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570430
- eISBN:
- 9780191722394
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens ...
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Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. This book follows the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. The book argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are “intrinsically directed” at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make this case, the book explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser‐known writers such as Pierre‐Sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle.Less
Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. This book follows the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. The book argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are “intrinsically directed” at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make this case, the book explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser‐known writers such as Pierre‐Sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle.
Michael R. Waldmann, Patricia W. Cheng, York Hagmayer, and Aaron P. Blaisdell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199216093
- eISBN:
- 9780191695971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216093.003.0020
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The authors bring together human and animal studies, with a particular focus on causal learning. Whereas the traditional associative approach to learning views learning contingencies as basic, and ...
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The authors bring together human and animal studies, with a particular focus on causal learning. Whereas the traditional associative approach to learning views learning contingencies as basic, and the learning of causality (if it is considered at all) to be secondary, they take the goal of the agent to infer the ‘causal powers’ of aspects of the world. Contingencies are primarily of interest to the degree that they provide evidence for such causal relationships. The degree to which the same rational model may be applied to learning, from rat to human, puts a new complexion on the behaviourist's project of building general principles of learning across species.Less
The authors bring together human and animal studies, with a particular focus on causal learning. Whereas the traditional associative approach to learning views learning contingencies as basic, and the learning of causality (if it is considered at all) to be secondary, they take the goal of the agent to infer the ‘causal powers’ of aspects of the world. Contingencies are primarily of interest to the degree that they provide evidence for such causal relationships. The degree to which the same rational model may be applied to learning, from rat to human, puts a new complexion on the behaviourist's project of building general principles of learning across species.
Timothy O'Connor
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153743
- eISBN:
- 9780199867080
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515374X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops the basic metaphysics of agent causation. The author analyzes causal notions generally in terms of the notion of ’causal power’ or ’causal capacity.’ The difference between ...
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This chapter develops the basic metaphysics of agent causation. The author analyzes causal notions generally in terms of the notion of ’causal power’ or ’causal capacity.’ The difference between event (or broadly mechanistic) causation and agent (or personal) causation concerns the way in which causal capacities are exercised. With event causation, the capacity to generate a particular effect (in some cases, from a range of possible effects) is exercised ’as a matter of course’: having the capacity in the right circumstances directly gives rise to what is either its unique characteristic effect or one of the effects within its characteristic range. By contrast, having the properties that subserve an agent‐causal capacity doesn’t produce an effect; rather, it enables the agent to freely determine an effect (within a circumscribed range).Less
This chapter develops the basic metaphysics of agent causation. The author analyzes causal notions generally in terms of the notion of ’causal power’ or ’causal capacity.’ The difference between event (or broadly mechanistic) causation and agent (or personal) causation concerns the way in which causal capacities are exercised. With event causation, the capacity to generate a particular effect (in some cases, from a range of possible effects) is exercised ’as a matter of course’: having the capacity in the right circumstances directly gives rise to what is either its unique characteristic effect or one of the effects within its characteristic range. By contrast, having the properties that subserve an agent‐causal capacity doesn’t produce an effect; rather, it enables the agent to freely determine an effect (within a circumscribed range).
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259455.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the ...
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Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.Less
Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.
Rae Langton
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243174
- eISBN:
- 9780191597909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243174.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In his early work (1747‐56), Kant is Leibnizian in his commitment to a distinction between things in themselves and phenomena, grounded on a contrast between intrinsic and relational properties. He ...
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In his early work (1747‐56), Kant is Leibnizian in his commitment to a distinction between things in themselves and phenomena, grounded on a contrast between intrinsic and relational properties. He is anti‐Leibnizian in his argument that there is Receptivity, since there is real causal influence; and anti‐Leibnizian in his argument that there is Irreducibility, since relations fail to supervene on intrinsic properties. The latter argument is of considerable interest, and open to interpretation: whether it moves illicitly from unilateral to bilateral reducibility; which notions of intrinsicness are appropriate; whether it concerns relations in general, or causal power (specifically attraction and impenetrability in a pioneering field theory). Irreducibility here yields a doctrine of superadded force: since ‘substance never has the power, through its own intrinsic properties, to determine others’, such power is added by God.Less
In his early work (1747‐56), Kant is Leibnizian in his commitment to a distinction between things in themselves and phenomena, grounded on a contrast between intrinsic and relational properties. He is anti‐Leibnizian in his argument that there is Receptivity, since there is real causal influence; and anti‐Leibnizian in his argument that there is Irreducibility, since relations fail to supervene on intrinsic properties. The latter argument is of considerable interest, and open to interpretation: whether it moves illicitly from unilateral to bilateral reducibility; which notions of intrinsicness are appropriate; whether it concerns relations in general, or causal power (specifically attraction and impenetrability in a pioneering field theory). Irreducibility here yields a doctrine of superadded force: since ‘substance never has the power, through its own intrinsic properties, to determine others’, such power is added by God.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199764037
- eISBN:
- 9780199895243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 8 develops a model of the mental that is not functional in the external-relations sense; that is, one in which the essences of types of mental properties do not consist in their causal ...
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Chapter 8 develops a model of the mental that is not functional in the external-relations sense; that is, one in which the essences of types of mental properties do not consist in their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. Instead mental properties — and this includes phenomenal properties — are identical to broadly physical compositional properties, properties things have solely by virtue of intrinsic features of their parts, either proper or improper, and relations these parts have to one another. This model would secure the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental in a way that the most common sort of functionalism cannot. It preserves nonreductivism, since multiple realizability arguments indicate that mental compositional properties would not be essentially neural or microphysical. At the same time, given the identities that it affirms, in a significant respect the position espoused amounts to a compromise with the type-type reductionist views. I close by considering several objections that have been raised against nonreductive views generally, arguing that in each case the model yields an adequate response.Less
Chapter 8 develops a model of the mental that is not functional in the external-relations sense; that is, one in which the essences of types of mental properties do not consist in their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. Instead mental properties — and this includes phenomenal properties — are identical to broadly physical compositional properties, properties things have solely by virtue of intrinsic features of their parts, either proper or improper, and relations these parts have to one another. This model would secure the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental in a way that the most common sort of functionalism cannot. It preserves nonreductivism, since multiple realizability arguments indicate that mental compositional properties would not be essentially neural or microphysical. At the same time, given the identities that it affirms, in a significant respect the position espoused amounts to a compromise with the type-type reductionist views. I close by considering several objections that have been raised against nonreductive views generally, arguing that in each case the model yields an adequate response.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246274
- eISBN:
- 9780191715198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246270.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This Essay defends the view that freedom to act is a causal power. Davidson believes that an agent is free to act if he can act intentionally, and he can so act in virtue of having beliefs and ...
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This Essay defends the view that freedom to act is a causal power. Davidson believes that an agent is free to act if he can act intentionally, and he can so act in virtue of having beliefs and desires that rationalize and cause his action; thus, freedom of act is a causal power necessarily defined in terms of intention, even though the agent could not have caused the causal conditions of so acting viz. his desires and beliefs. Davidson demotes the view that freedom to act requires that one ‘could have done otherwise’: choosing something to do and doing it suffices for the action to be free, no matter what would have happened if we hadn’t chosen (besides, if as Essay 1 argued there are no distinct acts of will, it follows that ‘could have done otherwise’ could not even be analysed as withholding such an act). After addressing various objections to analysing ‘can’ and ‘is free to’ in terms of causal conditionals, Davidson ends on a sceptical note: unless we can spell out the ‘right way’ in which attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalize them (for beliefs and desires may rationalize an action in one way and cause it in another; see Essay 5) our notions of rationalization and freedom to act must remain programmatic.Less
This Essay defends the view that freedom to act is a causal power. Davidson believes that an agent is free to act if he can act intentionally, and he can so act in virtue of having beliefs and desires that rationalize and cause his action; thus, freedom of act is a causal power necessarily defined in terms of intention, even though the agent could not have caused the causal conditions of so acting viz. his desires and beliefs. Davidson demotes the view that freedom to act requires that one ‘could have done otherwise’: choosing something to do and doing it suffices for the action to be free, no matter what would have happened if we hadn’t chosen (besides, if as Essay 1 argued there are no distinct acts of will, it follows that ‘could have done otherwise’ could not even be analysed as withholding such an act). After addressing various objections to analysing ‘can’ and ‘is free to’ in terms of causal conditionals, Davidson ends on a sceptical note: unless we can spell out the ‘right way’ in which attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalize them (for beliefs and desires may rationalize an action in one way and cause it in another; see Essay 5) our notions of rationalization and freedom to act must remain programmatic.
