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Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199217144
eISBN:
9780191712418
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Looking at a wide range of causal closure principles of differing strengths, this chapter argues that the stronger principles are less plausible than the weaker while the weaker are less capable of ... More


Why There Are No Laws in the Special Sciences: Three Arguments

Jaegwon Kim

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585878
eISBN:
9780191595349
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

“Why There Are No Laws in the Special Sciences: Three Arguments” offers three arguments explaining why there are no laws, or “strict” laws, in the special sciences. The first of the arguments begins ... More


Mental Causation and Ontology

S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson (eds)

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199603770
eISBN:
9780191747670
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, ... More


The Exclusion Problem, the Determination Relation, and Contrastive Causation *

Peter Menzies

in Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199211531
eISBN:
9780191705977
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter critically examines the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. It argues that a contrastive account of causation falsifies the exclusion principle when it is ... More


Self, Agency, and Mental Causation

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199217144
eISBN:
9780191712418
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter shows how, consistently with accepting a fairly strong principle of physical causal closure, a dualistic theory of mental causation can be made plausible by emphasizing the explanatory ... More


The Case for Materialism

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243822
eISBN:
9780191598166
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243824.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The basic causal argument for materialism is that since physics is causally complete, conscious states must either be physical, or they must be epiphenomenal “danglers” with no causal influence on ... More


The Elegant Solution

Philip Goff

in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780190677015
eISBN:
9780190677046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces and precisely defines the view that will be explored and defended in the second half of the book: Russellian monism. Various categories of Russellian monism are ... More


Could Mental Causation be Invisible?

David Robb

in Ontology, Modality, and Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
November 2018
ISBN:
9780198796299
eISBN:
9780191866807
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198796299.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

E. J. Lowe proposed a model of mental causation on which mental events are emergent, thus exerting a novel, downward causal influence on physical events. Yet on Lowe’s model, mental causation is at ... More


Reduction and Emergence

Pascal Ludwig

in The Philosophy of Science: A Companion

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780190690649
eISBN:
9780190690670
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? ... More


Basic Features of Emergence

Paul Humphreys

in Emergence: A Philosophical Account

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780190620325
eISBN:
9780190620356
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190620325.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General

A common metaphysical approach, generative atomism, is discussed together with generalizations such as Humean supervenience, and its merits and deficiencies are evaluated. Atomism requires that the ... More


A Conscious Universe

Philip Goff

in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
August 2017
ISBN:
9780190677015
eISBN:
9780190677046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190677015.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores and defends a form of cosmopsychism: the combination of panpsychism and priority monism (the latter being the view that there is only one fundamental individual). The crucial ... More


The Necessity of Idealism

Aaron Segal and Tyron Goldschmidt

in Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780198746973
eISBN:
9780191863622
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198746973.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter formulates a version of idealism and argues for it. Sections 2 and 3 explicate this version of idealism: the world is mental through-and-through. Section 2 spells this out precisely and ... More


The Necessity of Sufficiency: The Argument from the Incompleteness of Nature

Bruce L. Gordon

in Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780190842215
eISBN:
9780190874445
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0026
Subject:
Religion, Theology

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of ... More


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