Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-4 of 4 items

  • Keywords: categoricalism x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

Reacting to Dispositionalism

David M. Armstrong

in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199590612
eISBN:
9780191723391
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A view that is currently popular is to identify properties as being nothing but powers, a position that can be called ‘Dispositionalism’. Causation becomes manifestations of dispositions, and ... More


Categoricalism

Alexander Bird

in Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199227013
eISBN:
9780191711121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Categoricalism is the view that all fundamental natural properties are categorical — they have no nomic or causal essences. Categoricalism is explored as a conception of properties and as a basis for ... More


The Ontology of Powers

George Molnar

in Powers: A Study in Metaphysics

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199204175
eISBN:
9780191695537
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses the nature of the derivation of powers and the theories of the ontology of powers. It explains that a power is derivative if the presence of this power in the object depends on ... More


Goodbye, Humean Supervenience

Troy Cross

in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 7

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199659081
eISBN:
9780191745201
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Humean supervenience, at least in its familiar Lewisian guise, harbors an internal inconsistency. Suppose that: (1) fundamental properties are categorical; (2) fundamental properties endow objects ... More


View: