Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and ...
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The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.Less
The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be ...
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This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be purely formal, by which he means that it does not direct us to act in order to achieve certain ends. Thus, any principle directed to the realization of certain ends must be merely hypothetical in character, and its motivational grounds subjective. It is shown that Kant overlooks a third possibility, namely, that there can be substantive categorical principles that objectively require us to realize certain ends regardless of our inclinations.Less
This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be purely formal, by which he means that it does not direct us to act in order to achieve certain ends. Thus, any principle directed to the realization of certain ends must be merely hypothetical in character, and its motivational grounds subjective. It is shown that Kant overlooks a third possibility, namely, that there can be substantive categorical principles that objectively require us to realize certain ends regardless of our inclinations.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, ...
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This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, the historical context in which it was written, and the views to which Kant was responding. It argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy and that its significance lies mainly in two closely related factors. The first is that it is here that Kant first articulates his revolutionary principle of the autonomy of the will, that is, the paradoxical thesis that moral requirements (duties) are self-imposed and that it is only in virtue of this that they can be unconditionally binding. The second is that for Kant all other moral theories are united by the assumption that the ground of moral requirements must be located in some object of the will (the good) rather than the will itself, which Kant terms heteronomy. Accordingly, what from the standpoint of previous moral theories was seen as a fundamental conflict between various views of the good is reconceived by Kant as a family quarrel between various forms of heteronomy, none of which are capable of accounting for the unconditionally binding nature of morality. Kant expresses the latter by claiming that they reduce the categorical to a merely hypothetical imperative.Less
This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, the historical context in which it was written, and the views to which Kant was responding. It argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy and that its significance lies mainly in two closely related factors. The first is that it is here that Kant first articulates his revolutionary principle of the autonomy of the will, that is, the paradoxical thesis that moral requirements (duties) are self-imposed and that it is only in virtue of this that they can be unconditionally binding. The second is that for Kant all other moral theories are united by the assumption that the ground of moral requirements must be located in some object of the will (the good) rather than the will itself, which Kant terms heteronomy. Accordingly, what from the standpoint of previous moral theories was seen as a fundamental conflict between various views of the good is reconceived by Kant as a family quarrel between various forms of heteronomy, none of which are capable of accounting for the unconditionally binding nature of morality. Kant expresses the latter by claiming that they reduce the categorical to a merely hypothetical imperative.
Steve Selvin
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195172805
- eISBN:
- 9780199865697
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172805.001.0001
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
Analytic procedures suitable for the study of human disease are scattered throughout the statistical and epidemiologic literature. Explanations of their properties are frequently presented in ...
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Analytic procedures suitable for the study of human disease are scattered throughout the statistical and epidemiologic literature. Explanations of their properties are frequently presented in mathematical and theoretical language. This text provides a clear understanding of the statistical methods that are widely used in epidemiologic research without depending on advanced mathematical or statistical theory. By applying these methods to actual data, this book reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each analytic approach. The book combines techniques from the fields of statistics, biostatistics, demography, and epidemiology to present an overview that does not require computational details of the statistical techniques described. Throughout, the text contains illuminating discussions with new elements for this edition, including the analysis of multi-level categorical data and simple, intuitive arguments that exponential survival times cause the hazard function to be constant. There are also new applied examples to illustrate such topics as the pitfalls of proportional mortality data, the analysis of matched pair categorical data, and the age-adjustment of mortality rates based on statistical models. The most important new feature is a chapter on Poisson regression analysis. This essential statistical tool permits the multivariable analysis of rates, probabilities, and counts.Less
Analytic procedures suitable for the study of human disease are scattered throughout the statistical and epidemiologic literature. Explanations of their properties are frequently presented in mathematical and theoretical language. This text provides a clear understanding of the statistical methods that are widely used in epidemiologic research without depending on advanced mathematical or statistical theory. By applying these methods to actual data, this book reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each analytic approach. The book combines techniques from the fields of statistics, biostatistics, demography, and epidemiology to present an overview that does not require computational details of the statistical techniques described. Throughout, the text contains illuminating discussions with new elements for this edition, including the analysis of multi-level categorical data and simple, intuitive arguments that exponential survival times cause the hazard function to be constant. There are also new applied examples to illustrate such topics as the pitfalls of proportional mortality data, the analysis of matched pair categorical data, and the age-adjustment of mortality rates based on statistical models. The most important new feature is a chapter on Poisson regression analysis. This essential statistical tool permits the multivariable analysis of rates, probabilities, and counts.
Michelle Kosch
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199289110
- eISBN:
- 9780191604003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199289115.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the ...
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This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.Less
This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores Russell’s idea that reflection on the nature of scientific inquiry prompts a version of the ignorance hypothesis, an idea much discussed in contemporary philosophy. As ...
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This chapter explores Russell’s idea that reflection on the nature of scientific inquiry prompts a version of the ignorance hypothesis, an idea much discussed in contemporary philosophy. As interpreted here, Russell’s idea is that empirical inquiry acquaints only with relational or dispositional features of physical objects, rather than their categorical or intrinsic features. A version of the epistemic view based on this idea is explicated.Less
This chapter explores Russell’s idea that reflection on the nature of scientific inquiry prompts a version of the ignorance hypothesis, an idea much discussed in contemporary philosophy. As interpreted here, Russell’s idea is that empirical inquiry acquaints only with relational or dispositional features of physical objects, rather than their categorical or intrinsic features. A version of the epistemic view based on this idea is explicated.
Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter outlines an explanation of how Kant grounds morality in reason. It argues that all rational choice is guided by normative considerations (reasons with normative force for the agent). In ...
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This chapter outlines an explanation of how Kant grounds morality in reason. It argues that all rational choice is guided by normative considerations (reasons with normative force for the agent). In moral choice, the reasons from which the agent acts are in fact sufficient to justify the action to anyone. Such a view underlies Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative, and offers the best understanding of the connection that he draws between moral principles and the nature of practical reason. The chapter offers a reconstruction of the derivation of the Formula of Universal Law in the first two sections of the Groundwork. Section II provides an overview of the argument of Groundwork, I, which explains how Kant thinks that the concept of morality implicit in ordinary thought leads to the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). Sections III through V explain, respectively, what leads Kant to undertake another derivation of the FUL in Groundwork, II — this time one that traces it to the nature of practical reason; his conception of practical reason; and how it is most fully expressed by the Categorical Imperative.Less
This chapter outlines an explanation of how Kant grounds morality in reason. It argues that all rational choice is guided by normative considerations (reasons with normative force for the agent). In moral choice, the reasons from which the agent acts are in fact sufficient to justify the action to anyone. Such a view underlies Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative, and offers the best understanding of the connection that he draws between moral principles and the nature of practical reason. The chapter offers a reconstruction of the derivation of the Formula of Universal Law in the first two sections of the Groundwork. Section II provides an overview of the argument of Groundwork, I, which explains how Kant thinks that the concept of morality implicit in ordinary thought leads to the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). Sections III through V explain, respectively, what leads Kant to undertake another derivation of the FUL in Groundwork, II — this time one that traces it to the nature of practical reason; his conception of practical reason; and how it is most fully expressed by the Categorical Imperative.
Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular ...
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This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular categorical imperatives or moral requirements. The Formula of Universal Law is a law that Kant derives from the nature of rational volition or rational choice. In this sense, it is a law that the rational will legislates or gives to itself. Roughly, the will is a law to itself since the nature of rational volition leads to a principle that governs its own exercise, namely the Categorical Imperative. To understand the sense in which rational agents legislate particular moral requirements, it is important to bear in mind that Kant is led to this idea by considering how such requirements get their normative authority. Kant appears to claim that the agents who are subject to moral law must be the ‘legislators’ from whom these requirements receive their authority, because only then can we explain their unconditional authority as categorical imperatives. The view ascribed to Kant is that the reasons to comply with moral requirements are given simply by the reasoning that establishes them as requirements, from which it follows that moral agents are bound to moral requirements in such a way that they model the source of their authority.Less
This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular categorical imperatives or moral requirements. The Formula of Universal Law is a law that Kant derives from the nature of rational volition or rational choice. In this sense, it is a law that the rational will legislates or gives to itself. Roughly, the will is a law to itself since the nature of rational volition leads to a principle that governs its own exercise, namely the Categorical Imperative. To understand the sense in which rational agents legislate particular moral requirements, it is important to bear in mind that Kant is led to this idea by considering how such requirements get their normative authority. Kant appears to claim that the agents who are subject to moral law must be the ‘legislators’ from whom these requirements receive their authority, because only then can we explain their unconditional authority as categorical imperatives. The view ascribed to Kant is that the reasons to comply with moral requirements are given simply by the reasoning that establishes them as requirements, from which it follows that moral agents are bound to moral requirements in such a way that they model the source of their authority.
David Cummiskey
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195094534
- eISBN:
- 9780199833146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195094530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or ...
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Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.Less
Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.
Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that reading ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation as good will provides the best fit between the humanity formulation and other major themes of Kant’s ethics. An analysis of ...
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This chapter argues that reading ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation as good will provides the best fit between the humanity formulation and other major themes of Kant’s ethics. An analysis of Kant’s most significant claims about value in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals shows that good will and humanity are equivalent. Since all of Kant’s claims about value must be read in light of his position that value is just a way to describe the choices that rational beings would make, it is especially significant to note that he often describes humanity as a moral ideal that must be pursued at all costs. Taking the end in itself to be good will also explains why the duty to aid others in pursuing their ends does not include their immoral ends, and allows for stronger connections between the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative.Less
This chapter argues that reading ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation as good will provides the best fit between the humanity formulation and other major themes of Kant’s ethics. An analysis of Kant’s most significant claims about value in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals shows that good will and humanity are equivalent. Since all of Kant’s claims about value must be read in light of his position that value is just a way to describe the choices that rational beings would make, it is especially significant to note that he often describes humanity as a moral ideal that must be pursued at all costs. Taking the end in itself to be good will also explains why the duty to aid others in pursuing their ends does not include their immoral ends, and allows for stronger connections between the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative.
Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is no easy task to decipher Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a fundamental principle of morality (often called his ‘derivation’ of the humanity formulation). The argument ...
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It is no easy task to decipher Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a fundamental principle of morality (often called his ‘derivation’ of the humanity formulation). The argument may be viewed as having two steps. The first step, establishing that each rational agent has reason to treat her own rational nature in certain ways, is justified because one’s own rational nature is the necessary condition of the value of any other ends one has. The second step, establishing that each rational agent also must treat others’ rational nature in certain ways, depends on Kant’s idea that any formulation of the Categorical Imperative must embody basic everyday assumptions about the nature of morality. A principle of morality must give people common ends to work toward, rather than spurring them toward inevitable conflict. Thus, a moral principle based on the importance of rational nature must emphasize the importance of everyone’s rational nature, instead of telling each person to care only about her own.Less
It is no easy task to decipher Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a fundamental principle of morality (often called his ‘derivation’ of the humanity formulation). The argument may be viewed as having two steps. The first step, establishing that each rational agent has reason to treat her own rational nature in certain ways, is justified because one’s own rational nature is the necessary condition of the value of any other ends one has. The second step, establishing that each rational agent also must treat others’ rational nature in certain ways, depends on Kant’s idea that any formulation of the Categorical Imperative must embody basic everyday assumptions about the nature of morality. A principle of morality must give people common ends to work toward, rather than spurring them toward inevitable conflict. Thus, a moral principle based on the importance of rational nature must emphasize the importance of everyone’s rational nature, instead of telling each person to care only about her own.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252862
- eISBN:
- 9780191597435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252866.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The author replies to Prof. William K. Frankena's article accusing her of an ‘attack on morality’. Her articles on ‘Morality and Art’ and ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ are ...
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The author replies to Prof. William K. Frankena's article accusing her of an ‘attack on morality’. Her articles on ‘Morality and Art’ and ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ are discussed, and her criticism of the doctrine of the categorical imperative is outlined.Less
The author replies to Prof. William K. Frankena's article accusing her of an ‘attack on morality’. Her articles on ‘Morality and Art’ and ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ are discussed, and her criticism of the doctrine of the categorical imperative is outlined.
David J. Pym and Eike Ritter
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198526339
- eISBN:
- 9780191712012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198526339.003.0005
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This chapter provides a systematic model-theoretic account of reductive logic. Here, the challenge is to provide semantic structures that are rich enough to account not only for the space of proofs, ...
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This chapter provides a systematic model-theoretic account of reductive logic. Here, the challenge is to provide semantic structures that are rich enough to account not only for the space of proofs, but also for the (larger) space to reductions — all proofs may be seen as successful reductions whereas many reductions fail to determine proofs. The techniques used are those of categorical model theory and categorical proof theory, and essential use is made of the interplay between the semantics of proofs given by algebraic realizers and the meaning of propositions given by Kripke's account of truth-functional semantics.Less
This chapter provides a systematic model-theoretic account of reductive logic. Here, the challenge is to provide semantic structures that are rich enough to account not only for the space of proofs, but also for the (larger) space to reductions — all proofs may be seen as successful reductions whereas many reductions fail to determine proofs. The techniques used are those of categorical model theory and categorical proof theory, and essential use is made of the interplay between the semantics of proofs given by algebraic realizers and the meaning of propositions given by Kripke's account of truth-functional semantics.
J. C. Gower and G. B. Dijksterhuis
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198510581
- eISBN:
- 9780191708961
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198510581.003.0011
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
All projection Procrustes methods may be treated as a generalized orthogonal rotation, part of which comprises the projection. It follows that after these types of Procrustes analyses, the embedded ...
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All projection Procrustes methods may be treated as a generalized orthogonal rotation, part of which comprises the projection. It follows that after these types of Procrustes analyses, the embedded reference systems as well as the configurations themselves, coexist in the same P-dimensional space. Then, the reference system can be approximated in any sub-space from which biplot representations may be derived for all the orthogonal and projection Procrustes methods. In two-set problems, the relevant sub-space will be that which contains X2 . In K-sets problems the exhibited space is the centre of interest. Within this basic framework, there are many possibilities, depending less on the particular Procrustes method used, than on the multivariate method of deriving Xk from Yk and on the types of variable — quantitative, nominal categorical, ordered categorical. It would be an impossible task to describe all the variants in detail but, fortunately, the same basic principles are valid in all cases. This chapter presents an overview of the more important special cases and illustrates methodology through an example.Less
All projection Procrustes methods may be treated as a generalized orthogonal rotation, part of which comprises the projection. It follows that after these types of Procrustes analyses, the embedded reference systems as well as the configurations themselves, coexist in the same P-dimensional space. Then, the reference system can be approximated in any sub-space from which biplot representations may be derived for all the orthogonal and projection Procrustes methods. In two-set problems, the relevant sub-space will be that which contains X2 . In K-sets problems the exhibited space is the centre of interest. Within this basic framework, there are many possibilities, depending less on the particular Procrustes method used, than on the multivariate method of deriving Xk from Yk and on the types of variable — quantitative, nominal categorical, ordered categorical. It would be an impossible task to describe all the variants in detail but, fortunately, the same basic principles are valid in all cases. This chapter presents an overview of the more important special cases and illustrates methodology through an example.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter reviews the calumnies that are commonly directed at moral naturalists. Philosophical rationalism is compared unfavorably with the empirical tradition by drawing attention to the ...
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This chapter reviews the calumnies that are commonly directed at moral naturalists. Philosophical rationalism is compared unfavorably with the empirical tradition by drawing attention to the inadequacies in the reasoning that supposedly leads to Kant's categorical imperative. Moral naturalism is defended on the same basis as biological naturalism. Moral relativism — the big no-no for metaphysical moralists — is defended against a variety of common criticisms; reductionism gets the same treatment. Finally, the life of David Hume is advanced as a counter-example to those who feel that naturalism is necessarily dehumanizing or dispiriting.Less
This chapter reviews the calumnies that are commonly directed at moral naturalists. Philosophical rationalism is compared unfavorably with the empirical tradition by drawing attention to the inadequacies in the reasoning that supposedly leads to Kant's categorical imperative. Moral naturalism is defended on the same basis as biological naturalism. Moral relativism — the big no-no for metaphysical moralists — is defended against a variety of common criticisms; reductionism gets the same treatment. Finally, the life of David Hume is advanced as a counter-example to those who feel that naturalism is necessarily dehumanizing or dispiriting.
Martin Wight
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273676
- eISBN:
- 9780191602771
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273677.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Kant was the greatest of modern philosophers. He held that we have knowledge of the phenomenal world alone; of the realm of the noumenal we have only moral experience. But he had moral passion in his ...
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Kant was the greatest of modern philosophers. He held that we have knowledge of the phenomenal world alone; of the realm of the noumenal we have only moral experience. But he had moral passion in his notion of the categorical imperative, or goodwill dedicated to duty. Kant’s revolutionism is seen in the idea of the homogeneity of states—a federation of ‘republics’; or alternatively in cosmopolitanism— a world of individuals and peoples rather than of governments and states. Kant’s belief in the harmony of interests underlies his doctrine of progress. There are categories of Kantians, although Kant himself was both comprehensive and universal as a philosopher.Less
Kant was the greatest of modern philosophers. He held that we have knowledge of the phenomenal world alone; of the realm of the noumenal we have only moral experience. But he had moral passion in his notion of the categorical imperative, or goodwill dedicated to duty. Kant’s revolutionism is seen in the idea of the homogeneity of states—a federation of ‘republics’; or alternatively in cosmopolitanism— a world of individuals and peoples rather than of governments and states. Kant’s belief in the harmony of interests underlies his doctrine of progress. There are categories of Kantians, although Kant himself was both comprehensive and universal as a philosopher.
Robert N. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599349
- eISBN:
- 9780191731556
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599349.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an ...
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Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation, and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him- or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, such as it being impossible to owe anything to yourself, or the belief that an obligation to improve oneself is overly ‘moralistic’. It argues against Kantian universalization arguments for a duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has, but defends arguments based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept a requirement of self-improvement, and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed.Less
Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation, and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him- or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, such as it being impossible to owe anything to yourself, or the belief that an obligation to improve oneself is overly ‘moralistic’. It argues against Kantian universalization arguments for a duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has, but defends arguments based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept a requirement of self-improvement, and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed.
Bernard Gert
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter compares two conceptions of morality, one championed by Aristotle, Ross, and Kant, the other championed by Hobbes and Mill. In The Good in the Right, Audi develops a version of the first ...
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This chapter compares two conceptions of morality, one championed by Aristotle, Ross, and Kant, the other championed by Hobbes and Mill. In The Good in the Right, Audi develops a version of the first tradition by using Kant as a foundation for Ross, and presents ten midlevel axioms that are intended as modifications of Ross's prima facie duties. In addition to being self‐evident, Audi claims that these middle axioms are supported by various versions of Kant's categorical imperative. This chapter compares these ten midlevel axioms with the ten moral rules that it claims are the universally known rules of common morality. The point of this comparison is to show the great difference between the two conceptions of morality mentioned above. Gert defends the Hobbes‐Mill conception.Less
This chapter compares two conceptions of morality, one championed by Aristotle, Ross, and Kant, the other championed by Hobbes and Mill. In The Good in the Right, Audi develops a version of the first tradition by using Kant as a foundation for Ross, and presents ten midlevel axioms that are intended as modifications of Ross's prima facie duties. In addition to being self‐evident, Audi claims that these middle axioms are supported by various versions of Kant's categorical imperative. This chapter compares these ten midlevel axioms with the ten moral rules that it claims are the universally known rules of common morality. The point of this comparison is to show the great difference between the two conceptions of morality mentioned above. Gert defends the Hobbes‐Mill conception.
Candace Vogler
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that Audi's ethical theory lacks the kind of grounding found in the theories of Ross and Kant, contrasting the “principles” of Audi's theory with Kant's categorical imperative and ...
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This chapter argues that Audi's ethical theory lacks the kind of grounding found in the theories of Ross and Kant, contrasting the “principles” of Audi's theory with Kant's categorical imperative and Ross's prima facie duties. The categorical imperative, it argues, is not a “principle” in Audi's sense. Instead, it is an abstract formula that expresses the common element of all duties and reveals the nature of the (human) will. Kant's imperatives are thus internal to humans in a way that Audi's principles are not. Likewise, Ross's prima facie duties are not like Audi's principles: they presuppose a social world of interpersonal claims, serving to summarize general aspects of prior practical knowledge, and are thus internal to us. This chapter concludes that Audi's reading of Ross and Kant leaves his theory unable to explain our interest in ethics and why it is not an accident.Less
This chapter argues that Audi's ethical theory lacks the kind of grounding found in the theories of Ross and Kant, contrasting the “principles” of Audi's theory with Kant's categorical imperative and Ross's prima facie duties. The categorical imperative, it argues, is not a “principle” in Audi's sense. Instead, it is an abstract formula that expresses the common element of all duties and reveals the nature of the (human) will. Kant's imperatives are thus internal to humans in a way that Audi's principles are not. Likewise, Ross's prima facie duties are not like Audi's principles: they presuppose a social world of interpersonal claims, serving to summarize general aspects of prior practical knowledge, and are thus internal to us. This chapter concludes that Audi's reading of Ross and Kant leaves his theory unable to explain our interest in ethics and why it is not an accident.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the ...
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This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the objections of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Chapter 2), Roger Crisp (Chapter 3), and Hugh McCann (Chapter 4), and he defends his integration of Rossian pluralism with a Kantian unification of morality under the categorical imperative against the challenges raised by Bernard Gert (Chapter 5), Thomas Hurka (Chapter 6), and Candace Vogler (Chapter 7).Less
This chapter comprises Audi's responses to the critical chapters that comprise Part I, “Problems and Prospects for Intuitionist Ethics.” Audi defends his version of ethical intuitionism against the objections of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Chapter 2), Roger Crisp (Chapter 3), and Hugh McCann (Chapter 4), and he defends his integration of Rossian pluralism with a Kantian unification of morality under the categorical imperative against the challenges raised by Bernard Gert (Chapter 5), Thomas Hurka (Chapter 6), and Candace Vogler (Chapter 7).
