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This chapter considers the role of polite language in the political negotiations that followed Caesar's assassination in 44 B.C. It examines in particular the correspondence of Mark Antony with the leaders of the conspirators, Marcus Brutus and Cassius Longinus, and the letters exchanged between Cicero and Munatius Plancus. In the former case, Brutus and Cassius appear to deploy a highly respectful and restrained manner in order to present themselves as solid, conservative types, an image necessary given their radical use of violence against Caesar. Antony, by contrast, seems to have adopted a harsher, more abusive style in his later public letters in order to define himself more starkly as a Caesarian staunchly opposed to the assassins. In the following year, Cicero and Munatius Plancus employed affiliative politeness with remarkable energy during their high-stake political negotiations. The latter's eventual defection to Antony highlights the duplicitous potential inherent in this type of language, even though both parties seem to have been well aware of the political game they were playing. In this connection, Cicero's correspondence with Octavian and Dolabella during this period is also examined.

This chapter examines in detail seven letters from Cicero's correspondence in order to establish some of the conventions of linguistic politeness typically used in more formal epistolary exchanges between Roman aristocrats. These seven letters include missives from Cicero to C. Matius, Marcus Crassus, Cassius Longinus, Scribonius Curio, Acilius Caninus, and L. Culleolus, as well as one from M. Marcellus to Cicero. These letters show the important role played by conventionalized polite language in aristocratic correspondence and in particular by the following linguistic strategies: expressions of thanks and appreciation, pledges of help and support, emphatic assertions of pleasure, assertions of goodwill and congratulations, compliments (often wittily phrased), and the commemoration of family ties and previous friendly services. Overall, these letters demonstrate the value placed on the politeness of respect in circles where personal dignitas received great emphasis, as well as the significance of conventionalized affiliative politeness and polite fictions for individuals attempting to forge cooperative political alliances.

This chapter discusses the evolution of a resolution passed by the Roman Senate, the SC Silanianum (10 CE) on the interrogation and execution of household slaves “under the same roof” as a prematurely dead master and therefore implicated in his death. It shows how its development through further senatorial court decisions, imperial judgements and juristic interpretation was influenced by elite social attitudes towards slavery, and that legal protections, not only of slaves (minimal) but also of freedmen were overridden by decisions based on fear rather than due legal process. A further source of confusion was the imprecision of definitions of familia (household) and other terms used in the lost decree. Particular attention is paid to the intervention of the jurist Cassius Longinus in the decision to execute the slaves of a murdered senator in 61 CE as recorded by Tacitus; and to Pliny’s recording of a senatorial debate on the fates of the slaves and freedmen of a mysteriously dead senator in 105 CE.

This chapter examines the aftermath of Marcus Crassus’ defeat in Parthia in 53. The Parthian threat was real, as was the defence response, but there was no move to avenge Crassus in these years. Instead, Rome disowned Crassus’ aggressive campaign while embracing principles of ethical governance long advocated by Pompey and Cato. The blow to Rome’s military supremacy, combined with endemic misgovernment, created the threat of rebellion within Roman provinces; we therefore find Cicero, Gaius Cassius, Marcus Bibulus, and others striving not only to defend against Parthian attack but also to secure the loyalty of the allies by means of fair and upright governance. In this way, Crassus’ defeat provided the catalyst for an ongoing programme of provincial reform. Another product was the senatus consultum of 53, passed probably with Cato’s backing, which became the lex Pompeia de provinciis of 52 (the subject of chapter 7).

Via Salaria was the oldest road leading out of Rome, proceeding northeast. Via Nomentana, terminating at Nomentum, is a more recent road, though its origins are nonetheless archaic. Via Flamiana was built by C. Flaminius and was intended to connect Rome with the Adriatic Sea and with the Ager Gallicus. The first stretch of the Cassia was named Via Clodia, and was probably built to connect Rome with the colonies of Nepi and Sutri. Via Cassia was probably laid out by C. Cassius Longinus, the censor of 156 bc, in order to reach central Etruria.

The chapter juxtaposes about thirty inscriptional and literary sources purportedly from Demades’s lifetime (although the book suggests dating some of the literary sources to later times) with almost 250 references in the literary texts of different genres from the mid-first century B.C. to the late Byzantine empire, revealing a gap of nearly 300 years between the death of Demades and the time in which most of the available literary evidence about his politics, character, looks, and oratory was produced. Contradictions between inscriptional and literary sources, and between references in literary texts, cast doubts on both the credibility of the literary evidence about Demades and the suggested criteria for establishing its authenticity. The chapter proposes to explain his contradictory image as an artificial rhetorical construct that served the educational and social needs of the Greek-speaking intellectual élite during Roman and Byzantine times, long after Demades’s death.