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Working capital management is one of the most important topics in corporate finance: it relates to the operating investment of a firm and the way managers choose to finance it. This topic, mostly ignored by academics for years, is now gaining importance as we realize that financial markets are not as efficient as they were assumed to be, especially as firms expand outside the developed economies. This book provides a general framework that helps to understand working capital in a comprehensive approach, linking operating decisions to their financial implications and to the overall business strategy.

This book, which is part of the distinguished Clarendon Lectures in Economics series, puts forward a unique and authoritative set of detailed proposals for establishing new markets for the management of the biggest economic risks facing governments and society. Robert Shiller argues that we have largely the wrong financial markets, and that establishing new ones may fundamentally alter and diminish international economic fluctuations (and thus enable better risk management) and reduce the inequality of incomes. Shiller argues that although some risks, such as natural disaster or temporary unemployment, are shared by society, most risks are borne by the individual, and standards of living are determined by luck. He investigates whether a new technology of markets could make risk sharing possible and shows how new contracts could be designed to hedge all manner of risks to the individual's living standards. He proposes new international markets for perpetual claims on national incomes, and on components and aggregates of national incomes, concluding that these markets may well dwarf our stock markets in their activity and significance. He also argues for new liquid international markets for residential and commercial property. Establishing such unprecedented new markets presents some important technical problems that Shiller attempts to solve with proposals for implementing futures markets on perpetual claims on incomes, and for the construction of index numbers for cash settlement of risk management contracts. These new markets could fundamentally alter and diminish international economic fluctuations, and reduce the inequality of incomes around the world. Much of the book is technical, and it is intended mostly for economists, contract designers at futures and options exchanges, originators of swaps and other financial deals, and designers of retail products associated with risk management (such as insurance, pension plans, and mortgages). However, the material within the book is mostly arranged so that a non‐technical reader can follow the broad themes, and until Ch. 6, most of the technical material is relegated to appendices.

The market for U.S. Treasury securities is a marvel of modern finance. In 2009 the Treasury auctioned $8.2 trillion of new securities, ranging from four-day bills to thirty-year bonds, in 283 offerings on 171 different days. By contrast, in the decade before World War I, there was only about $1 billion of interest-bearing Treasury debt outstanding, spread out over just six issues. New offerings were rare, and the debt was narrowly held, most of it owned by national banks. This book traces the development of the Treasury market from a financial backwater in the years before World War I to a multibillion dollar market on the eve of World War II. It focuses on Treasury debt management policies, describing the origins of several pillars of modern Treasury practice, including “regular and predictable” auction offerings and the integration of debt and cash management. The book recounts the actions of Secretaries of the Treasury, from William McAdoo in the Wilson administration to Henry Morgenthau in the Roosevelt administration, and their responses to economic conditions. His account covers the Treasury market in the two decades before World War I, how the Treasury financed the Great War, how it managed the postwar refinancing and paydowns, and how it financed the chronic deficits of the Great Depression. It concludes with an examination of aspects of modern Treasury debt management that grew out of developments from 1917 to 1939.