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External realism has failed. Since the external realist’s Credo involved three Principles, it is necessary to determine which of these three Principles is responsible for the problems of part A. This chapter shows that the Independence and Correspondence Principles are innocent bystanders. Indeed, it takes a perverse act of will to understand them as making philosophical—let alone metaphysical—claims. The guilty party must therefore be the Cartesianism Principle. The task becomes, then, to overcome the Cartesianism Principle. This chapter closes with a discussion of Putnam’s Perspective Question (‘from whose point of view is the story being told?’). This might seem to provide a quick refutation of the Cartesianism Principle; however, the Question must be handled with care, given that Moorean Contradictions cannot be narrated as known fact but can nevertheless be true.

This chapter details the faith held by external realists (also known as metaphysical realists). External realists employ the picture of reasoning from a ‘God’s Eye point of view’. Putnam presents us with three principles that flow naturally from this picture. The Independence Principle states that the world is (largely) made up of objects that are mind-, language- and theory-independent. The Correspondence Principle tells us that truth involves a correspondence relation between words and the world. The Cartesianism Principle tells us that even an ideal theory might be radically false. Together, these principles enshrine the Credo of external realism. Following post-Quinean orthodoxy in metaphysics, this Credo can and should be treated model-theoretically.

Chapter 5 raised problems for external realists who accepted a bracketed empiricist theory of empirical content. Many external realists do, indeed, accept such a theory of empirical content. But in fact, no matter how the external realist explains her Cartesianism Principle, similar problems arise. In addition to the veil of sensations, it is possible to consider: a veil of Fregean senses that prevents access to ordinary objects; a veil of phenomena that prevents access to the noumena; a veil of observables that prevents access to unobservables; and a veil of flux that prevents access to the Forms. All external realists must accept that, by their own lights, any statement with empirical content is just more theory and so fails to constrain reference.

This chapter briefly characterises the spirit of the book and the scope of its ambition. The aim of the book is to sketch various limits: limits to realism, limits to ‘anti’-realism, and limits to what we can show at all. That aim is realised by considering the relevance of semantics and scepticism to the realism debate. This draws upon Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments against external realism. More generally, this book is constructed around Putnam’s contributions to the realism debate. Part A will show that the model-theoretic arguments should erode one’s faith in external realism; parts B–D consist in asking how we should reconcile ourselves to this loss.