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Energy resources available for human use can be characterized as solar and carbon-based, solar and non-carbon-based (including wind), and planetary. Much of the developing world relies on biomass. Energy resources are divided as a practical matter into renewable and nonrenewable sources. But many nonrenewable resources behave as if they were renewable because supplies are far from depletion, such as oil. The immediate problem of fossil fuels is primarily a problem of reliance on coal. Nuclear energy is fraught with political, perceptual, and technical issues; fusion may yet be viable in the future. “Soft energy paths” include sustainable, low-impact energy sources applied to an energy regime characterized by conservation and local sourcing: solar, wind, renewable biofuels. Carbon capture and sequestration is a technology already proven on a small scale that is being scaled up to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions from large sources. If mitigation efforts fail, climate engineering on a planetary may be the only alternative.

The present energy economy, heavily dependent on fossil fuels, is not sustainable over the medium to long term. This book aims to explain how law can assist in, impede, or cope with the shift to a world energy picture in 2030 that is significantly different from the one that exists today. It examines the factors that create the problems of the present carbon economy and the environmental concerns about the carbon fuels, the impacts of the carbon economy on development goals, and whether more and more energy inputs are necessary to meet our economic and social aspirations given the potential for energy efficiency to move us beyond the carbon economy. The book also looks at several sectoral perspectives and technology-based approaches in moving to a new energy economy. These include the variety of renewable energy sources, new carbon fuels, nuclear power, carbon sequestration techniques, demand controls, and the creation of new markets for tradeable emissions certificates.

The decline in supplies of carbon fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas), the increased worldwide demand for modern energy, political instability because of the geographic location of carbon fuels, the needs of the least developed parts of the world, and the contribution of carbon fuels to climate change combine to compel a change in the current world energy picture with its heavy reliance on these fuels. Nuclear power addresses some of the carbon fuel concerns. However, the dark sides of nuclear power (accidental radiation release, risk of improper diversions, high costs) make it unattractive, and to some energy planners and thinkers, unacceptable. This chapter draws on statistics and commentary from some of the significant international organisations involved with nuclear power. The United States, despite its nuclear ambivalence, remains the nation with the most nuclear power plants and one of the major players in many aspects of nuclear energy. It has also been a pioneer in many aspects of nuclear law.

In the last several upswings of the world economy, core innovations paired new engines with new fuels: steam engines with coal, internal combustion engines with petroleum, and numerous electricity-driven applications with fossil fuels. In each instance, the new fuels initially were inexpensive, abundant, and incredibly powerful but also damaging to the climate and environment. Now we need to develop engines that can run using decarbonized fuels to minimize CO₂ emissions. In this chapter we shift our focus to the implications of carbon-based energy sources, system leadership, and climate change. We first review the evidence for a strong relationship between global warming and fossil fuels and then consider what might be done to forestall the consequences of such a relationship.We then relate macro-level fluctuations in world economic growth to policy responses focusing largely on electricity and transportation.

No two system leaders were identical in their claims to being the most innovative states in their respective zones, eras, and periods of leadership. Nonetheless, three general categories emerge: maritime commercial leadership, a pushing of agrarian boundaries, and sustained industrial economic growth. Those that made breakthroughs in the latter category, of course, redefined the modern world. Frontiers were critically important in all four cases of system leadership (China, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States), but not exactly in the same way. Major improvements in transportation/communication facilitated economic growth by making interactions more feasible and less expensive, although the importance of trade varied considerably. Expanding populations were a hallmark of all four cases, even if the scale of increase varied. Population growth and urbanization forced agriculture to become more efficient and provided labor for nonagricultural pursuits. Urban demands stimulated regional specialization, technological innovation, and energy intensification, expanding the size of domestic markets and contributing to scalar increases in production. Just how large those scalar increases were depended on the interactions among technological innovation, power-driven machinery, and energy transition. Yet no single change led automatically to technological leadership. While lead status was never gained by default, it helped to have few rivals. As more serious rivals emerged, technological leaderships became harder to maintain.