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This chapter deepens the discussion of the nature of disadvantage by asking: what categories of functionings exhaust those necessary to construct a full philosophical theory of disadvantage? Beginning with a list offered by Martha Nussbaum, and Sen's capability approach, the concepts of capability and functionings are further analysed, using the method of ‘dynamic public reflective equilibrium’. This involves a dialogue between the philosopher and the public, in this case a series of interviews with disadvantaged people and with professionals who take care of disadvantaged people in a variety of fields. The result is that while basically Nussbaum's list is shown to be intuitive, four additional categories are suggested. Thus, a new list of functionings is devised as part of the task of setting out a particular pluralist account of disadvantage.

Section 1 of this chapter outlines the concept of basic justice and argues that it is worthwhile to confine attention to it for the remainder of the book. Section 2 introduces in some detail the concept of habilitation and argues that it is a particularly illuminating tool for examining basic justice. Section 3 examines two types of normative theory that appear to have especially close conceptual connections to habilitation (capability theories; dependency and care theories). The habilitation framework proposed here is then distinguished from them. Section 4 suggests that habilitation into a robust form of health is a project central to the human condition itself rather than to a particular normative theory, and that the habilitation framework could in principle provide a theory-independent framework for normative theories of basic justice generally.

An analysis is made of a firm's evolutionary capabilities using the car industry in general, and Toyota in particular, as an example. The resource view of the firm is extended to look in detail at how capabilities change over time, and attempt to explain inter‐regional and inter‐firm differences. However, instead of applying the concepts of resource‐based theories or capability theories on the firm as a unit, the analysis is applied at the operational level. In the process, the author makes an argument for not only interpreting capabilities as something directly affecting the level of competitive performance and the improvements of performance but also as the accumulation of these static and improvement capabilities; in other words, successful firms are not only competitive and know how to improve to stay competitive, they also know how to sustain these skills over time. The chapter goes on to explore, in some depth, this novel interpretation of evolutionary capability as a firm‐specific ability to acquire both static and improvement capabilities, and includes a table summarizing the evolution of selected production–development capabilities at Toyota, to accompany the discussion in the text.

This chapter attempts to derive some key normative principles inherent in a Kantian scheme of distributive justice. To do so, this chapter looks at Kant's conception of external freedom and social welfare, relating them to a cosmopolitan concern for global justice. It argues that Kant's freedom of autonomy (co-legislation) demands a robust theory of distributive justice in order to provide a political environment that supports the effective autonomy of individuals in a hypothetical kingdom of ends. The chapter further explores a possible relationship with Martha Nussbaum's capability theory, suggesting that Kant's distributive principles might be best expressed through a form of the capability approach. Lastly, the chapter draws connections between contemporary cosmopolitan arguments for global justice and Kant's overall cosmopolitan concerns.

A central idea within free speech arguments is that the most appropriate response to speech with which one disagrees, or which one finds intolerable, is to speak back. Some scholars have argued there may even be a basis for governmental or state support to assist some in speaking. This chapter develops this argument in relation to hate speech, arguing that because and to the extent to which hate speech may prevent its targets from speaking back, institutional, educational, and material support ought to be provided to enable the targets of hate speech to ‘speak back’. This would enable them both to contradict the messages contained within the hate speech and to counteract the effects of that speech on their ability to respond. The policy thus aims to ameliorate the potential effects of hate speech, and also to preserve and enhance speech opportunities. This chapter discusses the likely fortunes of a ‘speaking back’ policy in the United States and Australia; two jurisdictions with widely variant institutional mechanisms for the protection of free speech. It concludes that the speaking back policy is conceptually and practically useful in combating hate speech, and also potentially robust in differing constitutional environments.

Chapter 2 defends the general collective right to territory from the perspective of natural law theory. A general right to territory is a claim to be self-determining over some territory, even if the particular territory is not yet identified. Natural law theory is well suited for the task of explaining and justifying territorial rights because it establishes a universal method for the appropriation of exclusive rights over goods. However, modern natural law theorists did not carry out a sustained investigation of territorial rights. Consequently, this chapter utilizes capability theory to develop a naturalistic perspective from which we can derive a general principle regarding the acquisition of territorial rights. This principle tells us that exclusive territorial rights are justified if they are essential for the provision of individual basic needs.

The late 20th Century project of transitional justice was a deferral/transcendence of two centuries of struggle for historical redress. In this humanitarian alternative, the beneficiaries of past injustice got to keep their gains without defending or condoning the atrocities of perpetrators, thereby allowing victims moral victory and an opportunity to heal. The ongoing presence of the past is here reduced to an affective disability that matters when, and only when, it impedes good choices among future options in the way that psychic trauma does. This chapter focuses on the fundamental differences between trauma and historical injustice as two paradigms of intertemporal truth. A trauma indexes present to past feelings in ways that block future choice. Even if trauma arises from injustice, its harm befalls regardless of culpability and is transmitted through largely unconscious mechanisms of identification. In contrast, historical injustice is transmitted through accretion—do the unjust gains resulting from the past continue to accumulate? A claim of historical injustice thus defines the present relevance of the past so as to compel a future choice. The chapter concludes by relating trauma and injustice to the messianic and prophetic traditions in monotheistic thought and the Weberian and Marxian views of capitalism.

This chapter starts by challenging the view of independence in legal theory. It goes on to assess social contract theory, in particular Rawls’s Theory of Justice, as well as criticisms of this theory put forward regarding disability. The aim is not only to expose the vacuum in political theory as well as the failure to offer disabled people equal moral consideration but also to examine what are the possible ways forward. The chapter therefore explores how theories of justice other than the social contract theory can be used in order to determine what is needed for including disabled people. It discusses two such theories, namely capabilities and recognition theories, and investigates both their limits and their potential in making them of benefit to all disabled people. It also proposes a combination of those theories so as to gear them towards the objectives of the CRPD.

The chapter argues how the capability approach, taken essentially as a normative theory, can contribute towards providing a new and updated foundation for labour law. The conditions on the basis of which a political theory may be relevant to labour law are first discussed, while acknowledging that a unique theory cannot provide a justification for all labour law but, rather, for specific laws. As regards the discipline’s classical core, which is aimed at compensating the inequality of power inherent to the employment relationship, that is, at reducing (although never eliminating) the level of the employer’s domination over the employee in Pettit’s perspective, it is argued that these norms can also be interpreted in terms of the capability theory, provided that the latter goes beyond its methodological individualism and deals with the dimension of power inside social relationships. However, the theoretical gains provided by this interpretation do not seem decisive. Instead, it is argued that the latest generation of labour laws has proposed new regulatory perspectives that can be seen as aimed at promoting the workers’ capabilities. Several examples are made with regard to European labour law, which are characterized by a new philosophy of protection that goes beyond a merely paternalistic approach and aims at enhancing the worker’s autonomy and responsibility. In conclusion, the chapter suggests that the capability view could give a remarkable contribution to the renewal of the fundamentally social-democratic background of labour law in a perspective of advanced social liberalism.

This chapter provides a general overview of the central problems in environmental policy that the book addresses. Key limitations of economic analysis and deliberative decision-making are contextualized and highlighted. “Capabilities theory” is introduced and its relevance to addressing these limitations is discussed. The chapter brings out two primary themes. The first theme concerns the importance of non-economic ideals, such as social justice and equality as political goals and social commitments. The second theme concerns the role of distributional assessment in environmental policy, and particularly its importance for evaluating and designing contemporary environmental policies. The chapter closes with a synopsis of the chapters to come, focusing on how the ideas in them are linked together and the specific areas of environmental policy to which the ideas will be applied.

This chapter starts to move towards a political theory that, by taking multispecies context seriously, considers communitarianism as the most reasonable starting point over utilitarian or other alternative approaches. Drawing on Martha Nussbaum, the author develops and refines her political theory of justice through her communitarian approach in a way that attempts to take into account interaction and entanglements with other species. Nussbaum’s approach, which draws on capabilities in community, is more inclusive and holistic compared with procedural theories of justice such as that of John Rawls, but it still lacks a robust means to integrate love and compassion with justice. Classic theological approaches provide such an ontological basis, but remain vulnerable in the face of ethical naturalism. Yet an evolutionary naturalistic ethic also flounders given the ambiguity of human history with other animals. The work of Paul Riceour is discussed as his theories contribute to the overall thesis of this book, namely, that the goal of a multispecies ethics needs to include the idea of living well in and for others in just institutions, but broaden out his view so that it is inclusive of other animal kinds.

This chapter engages two issues as they bear on genomic editing and the effects of biotechnology on human well-being: (1) how technology influences a reductionistic and manipulative understanding of biopower and biopolitics, fundamentally at odds with the worldview of bioethical humanism; and (2) how the reconceptualization of human flourishing in capability theories of justice bears on the ethics of biotechnology. The argument of this chapter appeals to a relational or “ecological” humanism that will assist bioethics in developing a critique of the technologies and knowledges of molecular reductionism. In the perspective of relational humanism, human beings are empowered as subjects of value and agents of self-realization, and mutual relations of interdependence and solidarity are affirmed. Along these lines, a reframed debate concerning the governance of biopower and the promotion of just human flourishing in an age of biotechnology can take place.

While the notion of fundamental human rights attracts general respect, there is little agreement on how we identify rights or their substantive content and application. This chapter addresses several ways of addressing these foundational disagreements. One is to formulate a moral principle, from which human rights can be derived. The chapter critically assesses possible moral foundational principles, including autonomy, dignity, basic interests, and capability theory. A second approach rejects the possibility of formulating universal principles. The chapter evaluates theories of pluralism and moral relativism in relation to human rights as well as the liberal response to relativism. The chapter then canvasses various ways of resolving such disagreements. The conclusion sets out the approach in this book. Rather than aspiring to achieve absolute answers across time and place, the book draws on the insights of deliberative democracy, aiming to engage in constant reasoned attempts to develop the understanding of human rights.

Chapter 2 introduces and defends the normative framework used to ground arguments throughout the book. Nine’s theory grows from modern natural law, especially borrowed from Samuel Pufendorf. Chapter 2 defends the adoption of Pufendorf’s claim that the fundamental principle of natural law is to be sociable, to live in peaceful coexistence with others under conditions that respect the natural equality of persons. This chapter elaborates upon how this fundamental principle of natural law relates to specific rules of natural law. It applies a rule-utilitarian method and derives the natural right to secure access to the objects of our basic needs from the principle of sociability.

This chapter historicizes and theorizes the work of self-described “cop-watchers,” or police accountability activists based on interviews, participant observation, and textual analysis. This chapter describes the way police accountability organizations are proliferating, thanks to smartphone penetration and the ease of video sharing on social networks. The chapter describes the origins of such counternarrative “sousveillance” in the United States. Two women who founded the longest-running cop-watching group in the United States, Berkeley Copwatch, are among the subjects of the research, which spans multiple cities, organizations, and perspectives. The chapter explores the difference between sustained and organized cop-watching and the incidental or spontaneous filming of police, and argues that the true power of cop-watching lies not in its videos but its commitment to community surveillance and witnessing, and that participation in the visual public sphere can be theorized as an essential, democratic, human capability.

Robots seem to have great therapeutic value for patients with autism spectrum disorders. But their usefulness derives from a potentially problematic source: their appealingly friendly presence, which can lead patients to think of them as friends, or even to prefer their companionship to that of human beings. In this chapter, an analogy between false friends and counterfeit currency is leveraged to explore a potential moral hazard posed by these therapeutic robots. An objection from the subjective nature of the value of friendship is raised, and refuted by an appeal to the importance of cultivating social capabilities. I conclude that the moral hazard can be mitigated by careful design and responsible use, and that these therapies offer genuine promise. But I argue that we must tread with caution when using robots in therapeutic applications where the appearance of friendship is liable to arise.

This chapter looks at whether appellants succeed before the Supreme Court. Around half of appellants succeed, and these rates of success vary by area of law and by the type of appellant. The strongest predictors of success, however, have to do with the route the case took to the court. Appellants are more likely to succeed if the Supreme Court itself granted permission to appeal (rather than having leave granted by the lower court), and if appellants were able to convince at least some judges in lower courts. Success is not wholly determined by what happens in lower courts, however: litigants who employ one additional senior lawyer are more likely to succeed.