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This chapter reviews existing research about campaign finance and the funding of the campaigns of women candidates for public office. Burrell discusses the role of women's political action committees (PACs), reviews the findings regarding campaign contributions to women candidates, and proposes an agenda for future research on money and women's candidacies for office.

This chapter examines how antecedent political events created a window of opportunity for campaign finance reformers during the period 1956–1974, including a series of scandals such as Watergate. In the 1960s, campaign finance reform emerged from a reform coalition composed of legislators, experts, philanthropists, foundations, and public interest groups. The coalition succeeded in placing campaign finance reform on the national agenda even without widespread public interest or support. It left intact most of the underlying pressures on campaign finance. For example, they did not tackle the declining importance of political parties, leaving high-cost television as the principal medium of political communication. The chapter highlights the tensions that arose over campaign finance that reached a boiling point when President Richard Nixon began his second term in office.

Although the American constitutional regime pays emphatic lip service to the ideal of reasoned persuasion in elections, its actual institutional arrangements in fact presuppose just the opposite—election campaigns that are thin rather than thick, aggregative rather than persuasive. In social science terminology, American constitutional law rests on the presupposition that public opinion is exogenous to political campaigns rather than endogenous to them. As a result, the legal structure of American politics is weighted heavily toward the premise that the central purpose of an election campaign is not to provide a forum in which citizens can reflect upon and arrive at sound political opinions, but rather is simply to tabulate as accurately as possible the opinions that citizens already hold at the inception of the campaign. This proposition is developed through examination of the constitutional rules governing ballot access, campaign finance, and party association.

This chapter discusses the influence of campaign finance over politics. Topics covered include impact of campaign finance on government ethics, the insufficiency and excessiveness of disclosure requirements, overcoming obstacles to effective campaign finance reform, and public funding of election campaigns.

This chapter contrasts his consequentialist account of democratic rights with prominent nonconsequentialist accounts, including those of Rawls, Habermas, Barry, and Waldron. He explains why majority rule itself requires a consequentialist rationale. To illustrate that the rationale for democratic rights is consequentialist, the chapter proposes an alternative to democratic rights, election by deliberative poll, that would be an improvement under the main principle, were it not for the potential for abuse. Democratic rights are a solution to a CAP. To be endorsed by the main principle, democratic rights must equitably promote the life prospects of all compliers and nonresponsible noncompliers. The chapter argues that group rights or cultural rights are not fundamental rights, but rather rights that are instrumental to protecting the individual rights of members of minorities against majorities. The chapter shows that the main principle can explain why human rights, including democratic rights, should be inalienable. This is a puzzle on many nonconsequentialist views. The chapter describes one kind of problem that no form of government, not even democracy, is very good at solving, the time lag problem. Finally, the chapter discusses the inappropriateness of the U.S. Supreme Court’s overturning campaign finance reform laws on free speech grounds.

This empirical chapter draws on a series of congressional investigations into election campaigns and lobbying conducted between 1912 and 1957 (plus additional data on the early 1960s) to identify interest groups and related organizations—including early PACs—that participated in elections during this period. The major groups so identified—primarily business organizations, labor unions, and ideological groups—form the spine of the narrative throughout the book. This chapter highlights changes in their major organizational features and electoral practices over time. Furthermore, it explores the controversies surrounding both political parties and “special interests” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly concerning the influx of money into election campaigns, which prompted these congressional investigations in the first place. It also offers an overview of campaign finance legislation and reforms that Congress passed in response.

Chapter 5 provides additional tests of the effects of election reform by assessing the consequences of campaign finance rules. Money in politics attracts a series of complaints—and raises a series of concerns about untoward and unwarranted influence of money in politics. The UK and US have seen the adoption of a series of finance reforms over the past ten to twenty years aimed at alleviating these concerns, and introducing transparency into the system in an attempt to restore public confidence in electoral politics. But the evidence from both the UK and the US shows that these reforms have simply not had the effect of reducing these concerns among voters. Voters seem to be just as cynical about the role of money politics after these reforms as before.

This chapter conducts a mixed-method case study of financial deregulation, showing that rising economic inequality made it easier to achieve a bipartisan majority in favor of inequality-inducing deregulatory policy change (culminating in repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act). A combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis shows that rising inequality contributed to financial deregulation in a variety of ways. First, electoral losses for Democrats become more common. Republicans were ideologically committed to deregulation, and their increased power set the stage for policy change. Second, rising inequality created strategic incentives for Democrats to join Republicans in supporting deregulation. With middle class income stagnation, households increasingly were forced to rely on credit to maintain living standards, and deregulation was framed as a way to reduce credit constraint. As well, Democrats became increasingly reliant on corporate sources of campaign finance, which may have softened their opposition to deregulation. Finally, politicians representing districts increasingly exposed to foreign competition due to globalization were easier to convince that financial deregulation would increase U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. In sum, rising inequality made it more likely for an inegalitarian policy change to occur, which provides yet another example of how politics can serve to reinforce inequality.

The size of the Commons varies according to population growth modified by the aim of equalizing the size of constituencies. Adjustments are proposed by the impartial Boundaries Commissions. Even after the departure of most hereditaries, the Lords remains a large House. Parliaments last roughly four years. The Electoral Commission registers and monitors donations to political parties and election expenses. Members' salaries are no longer under Commons control but allowances remain a difficulty. Decennial and a recent mid‐decade reapportionment of a fixed number of House seats based on State laws drawing partisan boundaries, coupled with non‐inclusive primary voter participation and the increased costs of election and constant fund‐raising by incumbents impacts on the quality of Members, their willingness to work collegially, and on their legislative productivity.

Those who affect the outcomes of elections—via financial or means—often have greater access to elected officials. Yet, we frequently have little information about the dynamics of elections, let alone the relationship between campaigns and subsequent sway over officials. I draw on surveys of politicians to illuminate three key aspects of campaign dynamics in India: differences in campaign costs across levels of government; variations in funding sources across levels; and the role of various actors in providing other forms of campaign assistance. I find, first, that financial support from political parties is relevant only at high levels of elected office, whereas personal resources dominate at lower levels. Second, a substantial portion of all respondents highlights the role of illicit funds in campaigns. Finally, sources of non-financial assistance—for example, for voter mobilization—differ across levels of government.

After the 2008 election Republicans were sunk in remorse and fear that their party had “lost its way” and might be relegated to minority status for years to come, while liberal commentators and politicians hailed a historic realignment ushering in a new center-left majority. In less than a year, however, much of the public had turned against the Democratic administration and Congress on major national issues, and polls found conservatives increasing their lead over liberals within the electorate to two-to-one. But only twenty percent of voters identified themselves as Republicans. Some Republican strategists argue that the party should be more consistently conservative to provide a clear alternative to Democratic liberalism. Others maintain that it should offer a more positive program and image to attract independent voters. The truth is that it probably needs to do both.

This chapter argues that the American electoral system is broken and in need of fixing even after the implementation of congressionally mandated reforms following the 2000 presidential election. In 2004, the problem arose from unsolved questions about touch-screen voting machines and provisional ballots. In addition, the McCain-Feingold legislation has failed to address the campaign for finance reform. The chapter first provides an overview of how American politics became highly polarized before turning to the problems of campaign finance. It then discusses the electoral college and the process of gerrymandering and how the political polarization of Congress has intensified due to the highly politicized redistricting efforts by both Democrats and Republicans. The chapter proposes a reform agenda designed to make the United States's electoral system truly work.

Chapter 1 describes the Supreme Court’s reasoning on campaign finance regulation, free speech, and political campaigns and then offers a chapter-by-chapter plan for testing the key assumptions underlying the Court’s reasoning. The behavioral model of the Buckley v. Valeo (1976) links individuals’ perceptions of corruption to their decisions to participate politically, hypothesizing that the greater an individual’s perception of corruption the less likely that person is to participate in the political process (e.g., vote) because of an erosion of trust in government. Based on these assumptions, the Court accepts the mitigation of corruption as the (lone) compelling state interest for limits on money in politics. Chapter 1 outlines how the authors will empirically explore the behavioral model posited by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision.

Chapter 3 aims to gauge both the reality of, as well as public opinion on, the central issue of corruption. It investigates public opinion on corruption among elected officials, source of corruption, effectiveness of laws and regulations in mitigating corruption, support for campaign finance reforms, etc. The data strongly suggest that people think corruption is rampant despite limited evidence that quid pro quo corruption is anything more than a minor problem. This fundamental attitude has not changed much in the wake of the Citizens United decision. Furthermore, they believe the problem is mostly intractable and that most of the commonly proposed reforms of the campaign finance system will not work. Nevertheless, they still support these reforms. Moving from simple descriptive data to more associational analyses, this chapter also explores the effect of campaign finance laws on campaign spending and then the effect of both on corruption attitudes. The results are not what the Court would have expected.

Chapter 6 exposes as inaccurate the perception popular among journalists and academics that financing for the United Center consisted mostly of private funds. In fact, Reinsdorf and his partners benefited from tens of millions of dollars in property and amusement tax breaks that offset the bulk of their initial investment in constructing the facility. The tax breaks were representative of a shift to more opaque forms of public funding for stadiums during the 1990s--forms that offered no concrete returns (e.g. profit share) to the public, which were relatively common in the immediate postwar period. The breaks were also emblematic of the broader expansion of corporate welfare in the U.S. since the 1970s in response to a dramatic expansion in corporate campaign contributions (Reinsdorf and his partners were very proactive campaign donors). In Chicago, specifically, the tax abatements also encapsulated efforts by local capitalists to undermine municipal politicians' attempts to cling to a relatively progressive property tax system in order to maintain funding for public goods like neighborhood schools. As these corporate efforts succeeded with more and more frequency during the 1980s and 1990s, municipal officials compensated by passing a wide array of new, regressive sales taxes and user fees.

Chapter 2 establishes a baseline by reviewing public opinion concerning money and politics, pre– and post–Citizens United, focusing on what Americans know about money in politics and campaign spending. On the one hand, given that citizens are typically not well informed about politics, it should come as no surprise that they do not know all that much about candidate spending or campaign finance. On the other hand, the public is not completely off base with respect to its sense of money in politics, and this basic intuition is perhaps even sharper in the post–Citizens United era. The data suggest that while Americans know a little bit about campaign finance, there is no systematic correlation between the regulatory environment of the state and how much people in that state know about campaign finance.

The United States is an example of how three branches of government can stall and derail reform initiatives. The judiciary in particular is central to the US experience with political finance reform, repeatedly striking down legislation on party finance, despite consensus from executive and legislative branches. The most recent Supreme Court ruling, in April 2014, struck down one of the last remaining federal regulations, on the overall campaign contribution limits for individuals. At a subnational level, the United States does, however, see significant variations in terms of regulations on the flow of money into politics at a state level. In the last few years at least, the United States provides an example of the deregulation of political finance—a phenomenon that not only bucks the trend globally, but has contentious implications for the costs of democracy and the equality of the political playing field.

This chapter takes a critical look at the internet fundraising techniques the Obama campaign perfected and argues that such techniques, combined with federal campaign contribution reporting requirements, pose an important challenge to political values that Americans have long embraced. Not only do the stunning amounts raised render obsolete the nation's four-decades-old system of public campaign financing; the fact that much of this money was raised from a large number of small donors, and that these donors can be readily identified in online campaign finance reports, challenges one of the most important innovations in the electoral process of the late nineteenth century, the secret ballot.