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Greece: ‘Rationalizing’ Constitutional Powers in a Post-dictatorial Country

Georgios Trantas, Paraskevi Zagoriti, Torbjörn Bergman, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Kaare Strøm

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0011
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

The Greek process of delegation is highly institutionalized and exhaustively regulated by the Constitution. The Constitution gives the cabinet strong stability and leverage over the parliament, ... More


Luxembourg: A Case of More ‘Direct’ Delegation and Accountabilit y

Patrick Dumont and Lieven De Winter

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0015
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Featuring an indirect chain of delegation and a reasonable correspondence to the singularity principle, the Grand Dutchy of Luxembourg presents a number of characteristics that approximate the ideal ... More


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