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Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe

Jean Blondel

in Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges

Blondel approaches the question of party decline by asking to what extent it is a product of semi‐legal or illegal practices adopted by parties. At first glance it seems that the answer should be ... More

Blondel approaches the question of party decline by asking to what extent it is a product of semi‐legal or illegal practices adopted by parties. At first glance it seems that the answer should be positive—the discovery of corruption or the distribution of favours by parties has made them the target of mass media attacks that have fed into increasing citizen dissatisfaction with or disaffection from parties; Blondel, however, adopts a more cautious and conditional stance, noting that negative electoral consequences of illegal or semi‐legal practices have been inconsistent among countries with significant levels of corruption. Develops a series of analytical distinctions and empirical generalizations focusing on the concepts of party government and patronage, which starts by noting that the most basic linkages between governments and their supporting parties involve policies and appointments, and that traditional parliamentary theory neglects patronage as one important aspect of these linkages. In order to speculate about the origins of cross‐national differences in the extent of patronage, Blondel develops a classification scheme based upon two dimensions: the first is derived from the various types of party–government relationships—adversarial, consensual, and conciliatory; the second involves the extent of parliamentary support for the government; in addition to these dimensions, a distinction is made between those parliamentary settings in which parties are, in general terms, dependent upon the government, those in which parties predominate over the government, and those in which the government and its supporting party/ies are linked in a situation of mutual interdependence. These typologies show that patronage is extensive and widely distributed in ‘partitocratic’ countries, is less common in Westminster‐type majoritarian polities, is greatly reduced in ‘conciliatory’ systems, and has grown notably since the 1980s, but only in the first two of these categories; suggests that this increase is because favours, bribes, and corruption are utilized as a partial substitute for the unfulfilment of over‐ambitious government programme commitments; argues that an assessment of the effects of patronage also requires a differentiation among types of party government.Less

Flower Visitors as Cheats and the Plants’ Responses

Pat Willmer

in Pollination and Floral Ecology

This chapter describes some of the kinds of cheating committed by flower visitors and what plants can do to avoid the costs of being cheated. While both plants and visitors have many ways of ... More

This chapter describes some of the kinds of cheating committed by flower visitors and what plants can do to avoid the costs of being cheated. While both plants and visitors have many ways of cheating, the diversity and deviousness of cheating by the plants seem to be substantially greater than the surreptitious stealing and ambushing that goes on in the animals. This is not surprising when considered in terms of the so-called life-dinner principle, and what each participant has at stake. The chapter begins with a discussion of how animals cheat by means of floral theft and thus get rewards without effecting pollination, including nectar theft, pollen theft, and florivory. It then examines three main options for defending plants against theft: physical barriers, chemical deterrents, and bribes. It also explains the overall effects of theft on flowers and concludes with an analysis of floral exploitation by hitchhikers and ambush predators.Less

Decline and Fall

Ian Worthington

in Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece

This chapter traces Demosthenes' return to the political limelight in 324 when Harpalus, Alexander's treasurer, fled to Athens to incite rebellion; Demosthenes' alleged receipt of bribes from him; ... More

This chapter traces Demosthenes' return to the political limelight in 324 when Harpalus, Alexander's treasurer, fled to Athens to incite rebellion; Demosthenes' alleged receipt of bribes from him; his ensuing trial at which he was found guilty; and his flight into self-imposed exile.Less

What’s Wrong With Bribery

Stuart P Green

in Defining Crimes: Essays on The Special Part of the Criminal Law

This chapter uses the facts of Singleton as a reference point for the broader analysis of bribery — what its limits are and why it's morally wrong. It defines bribery as an agreement in which a ... More

This chapter uses the facts of Singleton as a reference point for the broader analysis of bribery — what its limits are and why it's morally wrong. It defines bribery as an agreement in which a briber promises to act in furtherance of some interest of the briber. It focuses on questions such as who can be a bribe, who can be a briber, what the bribe must give, and what he must receive in return. It seeks to get at the underlying moral content of bribery, by distinguishing between taking a bribe and offering a bribe.Less

Legal Plots and Traps

Joseph Roisman

in The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens

This chapter focuses on legal plots and traps in the oratorical corpus in ancient Athens. It explains that plots aiming to defeat a legal action or to ensnare a rival in a legal trap were almost as ... More

This chapter focuses on legal plots and traps in the oratorical corpus in ancient Athens. It explains that plots aiming to defeat a legal action or to ensnare a rival in a legal trap were almost as popular as conspiracies to deprive a man of his property, and that one of the commonest charges of legal plotting involved the giving and taking of bribes. The chapter describes, and provides commentaries on, the relevant works of Apollodorus, Demosthenes, Antiphon, and Andocides.Less

A Guide to Corruption for Naive Idealists

Samuel Cohn

in All Societies Die: How to Keep Hope Alive

This chapter highlights corruption. Maintaining the integrity of government is integral to societal functioning. But what causes governments to become corrupt? It is not a matter of simple morality; ... More

This chapter highlights corruption. Maintaining the integrity of government is integral to societal functioning. But what causes governments to become corrupt? It is not a matter of simple morality; it is not the case that evil people take bribes and good people do not take bribes. Nor is it the case that ethical standards are high in the United States and Europe, and low in the rest of the world. Every country has its own rituals and its own style of handling informal payments. One method is to invoke chivalry and the need for the strong to protect the weak. These exchanges can represent a fundamental alliance and relationship of long-term mutual assistance. Often corruption occurs while maintaining all outward appearances of complete professionalism. The chapter then explains how bribery works, an activity which requires skill and sophistication.Less

Inhabitants' Daily Practices to Obtain Legal Status for Their Homes and Security of Tenure: Egypt

Marion Séjourné

in Popular Housing and Urban Land Tenure in the Middle East: Case Studies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

This chapter gives a thorough account of the different procedures for registering property built in violation of town planning and land laws in Cairo, depending on the various types of land and ... More

This chapter gives a thorough account of the different procedures for registering property built in violation of town planning and land laws in Cairo, depending on the various types of land and transactions involved. She uses the concept of “quiet encroachment” to describe the various methods used by Cairo residents to regularize their property without following all the numerous steps normally required of them by law, or by spending a fortune in bribes. It demonstrates that the Egyptian authorities themselves tolerate informal settlements for lack of any institutional solution to the chronic shortage of affordable housing.Less

A French Bailout?

Kim Oosterlinck

in Hope Springs Eternal: French Bondholders and the Repudiation of Russian Sovereign Debt

This chapter details the reasons which prompted French investors to believe that France might bail them out. During the 19th century the French government had bailed out its citizens who had invested ... More

This chapter details the reasons which prompted French investors to believe that France might bail them out. During the 19th century the French government had bailed out its citizens who had invested in the Mexican bonds the French government had promoted. In the Russian case the French government was even more involved. While legally the French government had never underwritten these bonds, it had vaunted their reliability and attractiveness. This was due to political reasons at a time when France felt it needed the diplomatic support of Russia but it was also the result of vast bribing campaigns undertaken by Russia. The fact that, during the First World War, France had paid the coupons on Russian bonds in the name of mutual assistance between allies put the French government in a delicate position. The chapter details the numerous parliamentary debates held to decide whether or not to bail out French holders of Russian bonds. The chapter concludes by describing the actions undertaken by foreign governments in terms of bailout.Less

An Absence of Alternatives: A New Framework for Understanding Corruption

Kelly M. McMann

in Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia

This chapter sets out the book's two main arguments about the causes of corruption. First, when essential goods and services are not available from alternative sources, individuals engage in corrupt ... More

This chapter sets out the book's two main arguments about the causes of corruption. First, when essential goods and services are not available from alternative sources, individuals engage in corrupt behaviors to try to acquire what they need from government officials. Second, market reform—policies to decrease state economic intervention—can limit these alternatives and thus encourage corruption. The first argument reveals the absence of alternative goods and services as a cause of corruption, and the second argument offers an explanation for why the absence exists. Together, the arguments constitute an “absence-of-alternatives framework” for studying corruption. This book focuses on petty corruption—ordinary citizens' use of bribes, personal connections, and promises of political support to try to secure small quantities of goods or services from low-level government officials.Less

Bribery, Favoritism, and Clientelism: Evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

Kelly M. McMann

in Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia

This chapter details the petty corruption that goes on in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The interviews conducted offer direct evidence that citizens use bribes, personal connections, and promises of ... More

This chapter details the petty corruption that goes on in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The interviews conducted offer direct evidence that citizens use bribes, personal connections, and promises of political support to try to obtain money, credit, and employment from government officials. Whereas the interview data reveal the illicit nature of citizens' efforts to secure resources from government officials, the survey data demonstrate how citizens are competing among themselves for state resources, and thus a bribe, connection, or promise of political support can provide an individual with an edge. The survey data also show how relatively common the practice of seeking help from government officials is. Citizens' most pressing needs are money, credit, and employment, and they try to obtain these resources from village leaders and raion (district) and oblast (provincial) bureaucrats and to a lesser extent oblast and national deputies.Less

Systemic Transition and Corruption

Andrew Wedeman

in Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China

This chapter examines qualitative changes in the form of corruption in China. It argues that, as reform deepened, the modal form of corruption in China shifted from predatory plunder or looting and ... More

This chapter examines qualitative changes in the form of corruption in China. It argues that, as reform deepened, the modal form of corruption in China shifted from predatory plunder or looting and primarily petty corruption to various forms of transactive corruption wherein corrupt officials “sold” favors to economic interests seeking profit-making opportunities. In broad terms, economic reforms in China have entailed the incremental transfer of control over property from the state to nonstate actors. In many instances, transferring control rights created windfall profits for those who obtained control rights. Most transfers did not ensure secure property rights, leading to a more sustained period of kickbacks and bribes rather than a tidal wave of one-time corruption. This chapter explains how the marketization of the Chinese economy led to the marketization of corruption as corrupt activity shifted outside the state apparatus and moved increasingly to the boundary between the market and the state.Less

The Shakur Proposal

Paul J. Magnarella

in Black Panther in Exile: The Pete O'Neal Story

Defense attorney Paul Magnarella describes American law enforcement’s attempt to bribe Pete O’Neal to arrange for the arrest of fugitive Assata Shakur, who enjoyed refuge from U.S. authorities in ... More

Defense attorney Paul Magnarella describes American law enforcement’s attempt to bribe Pete O’Neal to arrange for the arrest of fugitive Assata Shakur, who enjoyed refuge from U.S. authorities in Cuba. Magnarella informed O’Neal of the bribe offer, which included money and a possible reduction of O’Neal’s four-year sentence. O’Neal emphatically rejected the offer.Less

The Pure Food War: Outlaws in Missouri, 1899–1906

Linda Civitello

in Baking Powder Wars: The Cutthroat Food Fight that Revolutionized Cooking

In 1899, the Royal Baking Powder Trust bribed the Missouri state senate to pass a law that made alum baking powder poison. People were arrested for selling baking powder. Royal introduced this ... More

In 1899, the Royal Baking Powder Trust bribed the Missouri state senate to pass a law that made alum baking powder poison. People were arrested for selling baking powder. Royal introduced this legislation across the U.S. but the American Baking Powder Association fought successfully. Through repeated bribery, the law stood until 1905, after Lincoln Steffens exposed it in a seminal article against lobbying called “Business as Treason.” Missouri indicted Royal’s William Ziegler but the governor of New York refused to extradite. Finally, charges were dropped or the “boodlers” were acquitted. At the same time, the U.S. Congress conducted hearings on the Pure Food law, passed in 1906.Less

“Greetings from Sunny Georgia!”: Cultural Brokers and the Bribe Trail

James Heinzen

in The Art of the Bribe: Corruption Under Stalin, 1943-1953

The fourth chapter closely examines the case of a Georgian judge on the USSR Supreme Court, Levan K. Chichua, who was arrested for accepting bribes in 1949. Chichua’s story sheds light on contested ... More

The fourth chapter closely examines the case of a Georgian judge on the USSR Supreme Court, Levan K. Chichua, who was arrested for accepting bribes in 1949. Chichua’s story sheds light on contested notions of gift giving, bribery, and social reciprocity. The idea of the “cultural broker” as a key figure in the Soviet courts is also introduced here. Cultural brokers were individuals who had familiarity with both the Soviet legal system and local traditions and practices, and who prospered by moving back and forth between them, negotiating deals while bridging cultural gaps.Less

Stabilities within the Leeways

in The Theory of Rules

This chapter distinguishes between desirable legal change, which comes at the cost of some certainty, and erratic change, which has even greater cost and far fewer benefits. It also deals with the ... More

This chapter distinguishes between desirable legal change, which comes at the cost of some certainty, and erratic change, which has even greater cost and far fewer benefits. It also deals with the part played in stability and also in guidance by a most complex and baffling phenomenon. It then refers to the Office of the Judge. To the layman, stability meant that changes shall remain unnoticed or noted simply as rights because they keep moderate pace one with another. The most concern here was that the taking of bribe and favor as the crassest and most rule-explicit aspect of a tradition of the Office. The concept and ideal of Judge's Office lays its hand upon men—for healing, for making them more whole. What an Office and the ideal and practice of an Office may be deserves more study than is its common portion.Less

The State, Intermediaries and ‘Licit’ Corruption: Local Politics in Northern Afghanistan in the Sixties and Seventies

Micheline Centlivres-Demont and Pierre Centlivres

in Local Politics in Afghanistan: A Century of Intervention in the Social Order

This chapter examines the relationship between state authority and local communities at the subprovincial level or district (wuluswali) level, as well the interactions between the non-Pashtun local ... More

This chapter examines the relationship between state authority and local communities at the subprovincial level or district (wuluswali) level, as well the interactions between the non-Pashtun local population, the government officials (mainly Pashtuns), and the intermediaries, based on fieldwork in the 1960s and 1970s in northern Afghanistan. It first provides insights into the symbolical and practical means of the domination of the state officials by describing a typical gathering of state and local actors. The chapter then focuses on the role of officials and intermediaries, as well as the material exchange that regulated their interactions, namely bribes and corruption.Less

Bribes and Benefits

Felicity Heal

in The Power of Gifts: Gift Exchange in Early Modern England

There were many words that expressed criticism of illicit gift-giving. From the medieval period onwards the bribing of judges and justices was denounced as illegal, but gifts were given, especially ... More

There were many words that expressed criticism of illicit gift-giving. From the medieval period onwards the bribing of judges and justices was denounced as illegal, but gifts were given, especially those of food. Gifts to men of power were commonplace and the line between those deemed appropriate and corrupt dealings was subjective. Critics of corruption became more vociferous in the last years of the sixteenth century: it is less clear that the practice changed dramatically between the time of Thomas Cromwell and the eve of the Civil War. There was, however, a period under James I when both the manipulation of patronage, and the visible corruption of legal officers, appeared to threaten political stability. The chapter concludes with the specific example of attacks on clerical corruption, or simony.Less