Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199532186
- eISBN:
- 9780191714580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532186.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter considers Calvin's view of the intermediate state of men and women between death and resurrection, and Christ's ‘intermediate state’ between his Ascension and Second Coming. Calvin is ...
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This chapter considers Calvin's view of the intermediate state of men and women between death and resurrection, and Christ's ‘intermediate state’ between his Ascension and Second Coming. Calvin is strongly dualist in his anthropology, often adopting Platonic terminology, routinely referring to the body as the ‘prison house’ of the soul. His strong denial of ‘soul sleep’ in his debates with the ‘Libertines’ raises the question of how he thinks of human awareness after death, and an attempt is made to reconstruct his views. His position is contrasted with the Aristotelianism of his fellow Reformer Peter Martyr Vermigli, but while there are distinct philosophical differences between the two these tend to be minimized because both are committed to the resurrection of the body. In the second half of the chapter Calvin's views of Christ's ‘intermediate state’ and their implications for his account of the real presence of Christ at the Lord's Supper are discussed, especially his attempt to articulate the real presence in terms of the totum?totus distinction. The chapter ends with a consideration of the attitude of two eighteenth‐century Calvinists, John Gill and Jonathan Edwards, to the Stoics.Less
This chapter considers Calvin's view of the intermediate state of men and women between death and resurrection, and Christ's ‘intermediate state’ between his Ascension and Second Coming. Calvin is strongly dualist in his anthropology, often adopting Platonic terminology, routinely referring to the body as the ‘prison house’ of the soul. His strong denial of ‘soul sleep’ in his debates with the ‘Libertines’ raises the question of how he thinks of human awareness after death, and an attempt is made to reconstruct his views. His position is contrasted with the Aristotelianism of his fellow Reformer Peter Martyr Vermigli, but while there are distinct philosophical differences between the two these tend to be minimized because both are committed to the resurrection of the body. In the second half of the chapter Calvin's views of Christ's ‘intermediate state’ and their implications for his account of the real presence of Christ at the Lord's Supper are discussed, especially his attempt to articulate the real presence in terms of the totum?totus distinction. The chapter ends with a consideration of the attitude of two eighteenth‐century Calvinists, John Gill and Jonathan Edwards, to the Stoics.
Lynne Rudder Baker
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195138092
- eISBN:
- 9780199835348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138090.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Monotheistic conceptions of an afterlife raise a philosophical question: In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same person who lived and died? Four standard answers are surveyed and ...
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Monotheistic conceptions of an afterlife raise a philosophical question: In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same person who lived and died? Four standard answers are surveyed and criticized: sameness of soul, sameness of body or brain, sameness of soul-body composite, sameness of memories. The discussion of these answers to the question of personal identity is followed by a development of my own view, the Constitution View. According to the Constitution View, you are a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a postmortem person is you if and only if that person has the same first-person perspective. The Christian doctrine of resurrection has three features: (i) a postmortem person is embodied; (ii) a postmortem person is identical to some premortem person; and (iii) the postmortem person owes existence to a miracle. I show how the Constitution View accommodates these three features.Less
Monotheistic conceptions of an afterlife raise a philosophical question: In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same person who lived and died? Four standard answers are surveyed and criticized: sameness of soul, sameness of body or brain, sameness of soul-body composite, sameness of memories. The discussion of these answers to the question of personal identity is followed by a development of my own view, the Constitution View. According to the Constitution View, you are a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a postmortem person is you if and only if that person has the same first-person perspective. The Christian doctrine of resurrection has three features: (i) a postmortem person is embodied; (ii) a postmortem person is identical to some premortem person; and (iii) the postmortem person owes existence to a miracle. I show how the Constitution View accommodates these three features.
Melchisedec TÖrÖnen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199296118
- eISBN:
- 9780191712258
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296118.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Introduces the various images and metaphors of Maximian theology. These are metaphors that describe the reality of simultaneous union and distinction, and of oneness and multiplicity. The following ...
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Introduces the various images and metaphors of Maximian theology. These are metaphors that describe the reality of simultaneous union and distinction, and of oneness and multiplicity. The following imagery is examined: fire and light; the deified human person; body and soul; circle, centre, and radii; multiple lights, single illumination; stone and colours.Less
Introduces the various images and metaphors of Maximian theology. These are metaphors that describe the reality of simultaneous union and distinction, and of oneness and multiplicity. The following imagery is examined: fire and light; the deified human person; body and soul; circle, centre, and radii; multiple lights, single illumination; stone and colours.
Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199732296
- eISBN:
- 9780199918492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732296.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
The doctrine of purgatory raises distinctive issues of personal identity since it assumes conscious survival between death and resurrection. This survival must be sufficient to make sense of the ...
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The doctrine of purgatory raises distinctive issues of personal identity since it assumes conscious survival between death and resurrection. This survival must be sufficient to make sense of the subject undergoing punishment, discipline, and/or moral and spiritual growth, depending on how one conceives of purgatory. This chapter examines materialist, Thomist, and substance dualist accounts of personal identity in light of the doctrine of purgatory. It also explores arguments that significant moral change, including change between death and resurrection, requires time if the personal identity of the one undergoing that change is to maintain identity.Less
The doctrine of purgatory raises distinctive issues of personal identity since it assumes conscious survival between death and resurrection. This survival must be sufficient to make sense of the subject undergoing punishment, discipline, and/or moral and spiritual growth, depending on how one conceives of purgatory. This chapter examines materialist, Thomist, and substance dualist accounts of personal identity in light of the doctrine of purgatory. It also explores arguments that significant moral change, including change between death and resurrection, requires time if the personal identity of the one undergoing that change is to maintain identity.
Paul L. Gavrilyuk
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199269822
- eISBN:
- 9780191601569
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199269823.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Having briefly surveyed various inadequate approaches to the Nestorian controversy, the author shows that the protection of the unqualified divine impassibility from being compromised by any ...
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Having briefly surveyed various inadequate approaches to the Nestorian controversy, the author shows that the protection of the unqualified divine impassibility from being compromised by any involvement in suffering was at the heart of Theodore’s and Nestorius’ christology. Nestorians charged Cyril with being an advocate of theopatheia. In response, Cyril developed a doctrine of God’s appropriation of human suffering and insisted upon the divine self-emptying in the incarnation.Less
Having briefly surveyed various inadequate approaches to the Nestorian controversy, the author shows that the protection of the unqualified divine impassibility from being compromised by any involvement in suffering was at the heart of Theodore’s and Nestorius’ christology. Nestorians charged Cyril with being an advocate of theopatheia. In response, Cyril developed a doctrine of God’s appropriation of human suffering and insisted upon the divine self-emptying in the incarnation.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter compares and contrasts Cartesian and Scholastic conceptions of the person in the seventeenth century and discusses the role that consciousness plays in these accounts. For all their ...
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This chapter compares and contrasts Cartesian and Scholastic conceptions of the person in the seventeenth century and discusses the role that consciousness plays in these accounts. For all their differences, both Cartesian and Scholastic conceptions can be said to be “ontological” in the sense that they share a view of the self as thing or substance. Cartesians typically place a stronger emphasis on consciousness understood as relating to one's own thoughts and actions but they, like the scholastics, do not ascribe to consciousness a constitutive function for the self as a person. Also like the scholastics, Cartesians do not discuss the issue of diachronic personal identity in any detail. Moreover, there is no unitary account of individuality in Descartes and attempts to attribute first-order understanding of consciousness to Descartes fail, although such an understanding can be said to be present in later Cartesian thinkers such as La Forge, Arnauld, and Regis. Other related issues discussed include animal consciousness, and the Trinitarian context of late seventeenth-century debates on the individuality of persons, especially in the controversy between William Sherlock and Robert South. The chapter ends with a brief look at the self as an object of psychological observation in Pascal.Less
This chapter compares and contrasts Cartesian and Scholastic conceptions of the person in the seventeenth century and discusses the role that consciousness plays in these accounts. For all their differences, both Cartesian and Scholastic conceptions can be said to be “ontological” in the sense that they share a view of the self as thing or substance. Cartesians typically place a stronger emphasis on consciousness understood as relating to one's own thoughts and actions but they, like the scholastics, do not ascribe to consciousness a constitutive function for the self as a person. Also like the scholastics, Cartesians do not discuss the issue of diachronic personal identity in any detail. Moreover, there is no unitary account of individuality in Descartes and attempts to attribute first-order understanding of consciousness to Descartes fail, although such an understanding can be said to be present in later Cartesian thinkers such as La Forge, Arnauld, and Regis. Other related issues discussed include animal consciousness, and the Trinitarian context of late seventeenth-century debates on the individuality of persons, especially in the controversy between William Sherlock and Robert South. The chapter ends with a brief look at the self as an object of psychological observation in Pascal.
Christopher Shields
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253074
- eISBN:
- 9780191598401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253072.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Shields begins the investigation of the practical application of homonymy by considering the principle use of discrete, seductive homonymy; the body, for Aristotle, is a discreet homonym. Aristotle's ...
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Shields begins the investigation of the practical application of homonymy by considering the principle use of discrete, seductive homonymy; the body, for Aristotle, is a discreet homonym. Aristotle's appeals to homonymy in serious philosophical contexts are appeals to discrete homonymy, because these are patently non‐univocal. Shields argues that homonymy in this context is a defensible application of homonymy, and furthermore it arms Aristotle against serious objections of the hylomorphic analysis of soul–body relations. The homonymy principle is also compatible with a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind.Less
Shields begins the investigation of the practical application of homonymy by considering the principle use of discrete, seductive homonymy; the body, for Aristotle, is a discreet homonym. Aristotle's appeals to homonymy in serious philosophical contexts are appeals to discrete homonymy, because these are patently non‐univocal. Shields argues that homonymy in this context is a defensible application of homonymy, and furthermore it arms Aristotle against serious objections of the hylomorphic analysis of soul–body relations. The homonymy principle is also compatible with a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind.
Helen Fulton
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719089701
- eISBN:
- 9781526104243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719089701.003.0005
- Subject:
- Literature, Anglo-Saxon / Old English Literature
In debates of the body and soul, the binary opposition between the flesh and the spirit implies that sanctity is limited to very few selected people only. While the soul strives for sanctity, the ...
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In debates of the body and soul, the binary opposition between the flesh and the spirit implies that sanctity is limited to very few selected people only. While the soul strives for sanctity, the body is bound up with the limits of mortality. The essay traces the tradition of the debate from the Latin sources to their renderings, which show a growing sense of literariness and are indebted to other genres, in medieval Irish and Welsh literature.Less
In debates of the body and soul, the binary opposition between the flesh and the spirit implies that sanctity is limited to very few selected people only. While the soul strives for sanctity, the body is bound up with the limits of mortality. The essay traces the tradition of the debate from the Latin sources to their renderings, which show a growing sense of literariness and are indebted to other genres, in medieval Irish and Welsh literature.
Gerard O'Daly
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199263950
- eISBN:
- 9780191741364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263950.003.0011
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval, Poetry and Poets: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter discusses the themes of the poem: body and soul and their separation in death; Christian care for burial rites and tombs; belief in human bodily resurrection; the perfection of the ...
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This chapter discusses the themes of the poem: body and soul and their separation in death; Christian care for burial rites and tombs; belief in human bodily resurrection; the perfection of the resurrected body in heaven; Christians should not indulge in mourning; death is renewal of life; Lazarus and Dives; Tobit's piety in burying a stranger and his reward, the cure of his blindness; and life as exile and death as a return to the birthplace, paradise.Less
This chapter discusses the themes of the poem: body and soul and their separation in death; Christian care for burial rites and tombs; belief in human bodily resurrection; the perfection of the resurrected body in heaven; Christians should not indulge in mourning; death is renewal of life; Lazarus and Dives; Tobit's piety in burying a stranger and his reward, the cure of his blindness; and life as exile and death as a return to the birthplace, paradise.
D. L. D’ AVRAY
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203964
- eISBN:
- 9780191676055
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203964.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, European Medieval History, History of Religion
This chapter casts some light on attitudes to death and to the body-soul relationship. Death and the afterlife are treated in numerous places in medieval theological writings, but it tends to be ...
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This chapter casts some light on attitudes to death and to the body-soul relationship. Death and the afterlife are treated in numerous places in medieval theological writings, but it tends to be treated in separate segments rather than as a unity. Memorial sermons are a good place to find the medieval Church's idea of death. This chapter also discusses Beati morti, an extended reflection on death and the afterlife. To persuade people to pray for the souls of the dead was doubtless at least a subsidiary function of memorial sermons, but should not be expected to add a lot to the theological history of purgatory, or even of heaven. They bring together thoughts about political power and thoughts about last things. The death of a prince, or a ceremony to remember him, was a good moment to represent the relation between this world and the next.Less
This chapter casts some light on attitudes to death and to the body-soul relationship. Death and the afterlife are treated in numerous places in medieval theological writings, but it tends to be treated in separate segments rather than as a unity. Memorial sermons are a good place to find the medieval Church's idea of death. This chapter also discusses Beati morti, an extended reflection on death and the afterlife. To persuade people to pray for the souls of the dead was doubtless at least a subsidiary function of memorial sermons, but should not be expected to add a lot to the theological history of purgatory, or even of heaven. They bring together thoughts about political power and thoughts about last things. The death of a prince, or a ceremony to remember him, was a good moment to represent the relation between this world and the next.
David Charles
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199546541
- eISBN:
- 9780191728600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
When Aristotle's description of how the animal is moved in De Motu Animalium is considered in light of his discussion of passions ‘common to body and the soul’ in De Anima one is able to sketch in ...
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When Aristotle's description of how the animal is moved in De Motu Animalium is considered in light of his discussion of passions ‘common to body and the soul’ in De Anima one is able to sketch in outline Aristotle's distinctive characterisations of desire; of features ‘common to body and soul’; and of how these lead the agent to move his (or her) body. The view which results can appear unsatisfactory, because it is not one of the familiar options available in post-Cartesian philosophy (dualism, materialism, functionalism, and ‘spiritualism’). However, Aristotle's approach should be seen as a radical alternative to these modern accounts, challenging the basic assumptions that underlie them.Less
When Aristotle's description of how the animal is moved in De Motu Animalium is considered in light of his discussion of passions ‘common to body and the soul’ in De Anima one is able to sketch in outline Aristotle's distinctive characterisations of desire; of features ‘common to body and soul’; and of how these lead the agent to move his (or her) body. The view which results can appear unsatisfactory, because it is not one of the familiar options available in post-Cartesian philosophy (dualism, materialism, functionalism, and ‘spiritualism’). However, Aristotle's approach should be seen as a radical alternative to these modern accounts, challenging the basic assumptions that underlie them.
Outi Lehtipuu
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198724810
- eISBN:
- 9780191792274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198724810.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Understanding what “resurrection” means in different sources forms the keynote to the analysis of the early Christian resurrection debates. This chapter treats an array of early Jewish and Christian ...
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Understanding what “resurrection” means in different sources forms the keynote to the analysis of the early Christian resurrection debates. This chapter treats an array of early Jewish and Christian texts and shows the profound ambivalence of the use of resurrection terminology in them. It also discusses the relationship between the resurrection of Jesus and the general resurrection of believers. The resurrection of the dead is not always conceived in physical terms, nor is it always described as a postmortem event. Moreover, it may denote a preliminary phase before attaining the ultimate goal, a transformed reality. While pagan sources do not use resurrection terminology to describe becoming immortal, they do contain a much wider diversity of opinions related to postmortem life than simply the immortality of the soul. The chapter argues that this ambiguous legacy was one of the main reasons for the heated debates over resurrection in the subsequent centuries.Less
Understanding what “resurrection” means in different sources forms the keynote to the analysis of the early Christian resurrection debates. This chapter treats an array of early Jewish and Christian texts and shows the profound ambivalence of the use of resurrection terminology in them. It also discusses the relationship between the resurrection of Jesus and the general resurrection of believers. The resurrection of the dead is not always conceived in physical terms, nor is it always described as a postmortem event. Moreover, it may denote a preliminary phase before attaining the ultimate goal, a transformed reality. While pagan sources do not use resurrection terminology to describe becoming immortal, they do contain a much wider diversity of opinions related to postmortem life than simply the immortality of the soul. The chapter argues that this ambiguous legacy was one of the main reasons for the heated debates over resurrection in the subsequent centuries.
Lionel Laborie
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719089886
- eISBN:
- 9781526104007
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719089886.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History
Chapter 6 explores the medical debate on the nature and causes of religious enthusiasm that emerged with the scientific revolution. As Anglican ministers and divines increasingly resorted to a ...
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Chapter 6 explores the medical debate on the nature and causes of religious enthusiasm that emerged with the scientific revolution. As Anglican ministers and divines increasingly resorted to a medical terminology to describe the physical manifestations of enthusiasm over the seventeenth century, physicians only began to address this issue around 1700 with the emergence of a ‘trade in lunacy’. This chapter therefore analyses the medicalisation of enthusiasm into a religious madness in the first half of the eighteenth century. It argues that the French Prophets stood at the heart of this debate, not only because of their bodily agitations, but also because of the presence of physicians among their followers. It demonstrates overall that madness was understood as a disease of the body, rather than one of the mind.Less
Chapter 6 explores the medical debate on the nature and causes of religious enthusiasm that emerged with the scientific revolution. As Anglican ministers and divines increasingly resorted to a medical terminology to describe the physical manifestations of enthusiasm over the seventeenth century, physicians only began to address this issue around 1700 with the emergence of a ‘trade in lunacy’. This chapter therefore analyses the medicalisation of enthusiasm into a religious madness in the first half of the eighteenth century. It argues that the French Prophets stood at the heart of this debate, not only because of their bodily agitations, but also because of the presence of physicians among their followers. It demonstrates overall that madness was understood as a disease of the body, rather than one of the mind.
Jacqueline Broad
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198716815
- eISBN:
- 9780191785382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716815.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Mary Astell’s arguments concerning the true nature of the self ground her moral views about the cultivation of proper self-esteem, self-love, and self-satisfaction. This chapter examines her argument ...
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Mary Astell’s arguments concerning the true nature of the self ground her moral views about the cultivation of proper self-esteem, self-love, and self-satisfaction. This chapter examines her argument for the view that the self is the soul, an immaterial and immortal substance, capable of existing independently of the body. The first part of this chapter explains her argument for the real distinction between soul and body, an argument that borrows crucial precepts from Cartesian dualist arguments. The second part discusses the moral implications of Astell’s concept of the self—especially the idea that temporal, bodily creatures could never render an immortal, immaterial soul truly happy. The third part concludes by examining the question of whether or not Astell was an occasionalist with respect to body–soul causation (the causation of sensation).Less
Mary Astell’s arguments concerning the true nature of the self ground her moral views about the cultivation of proper self-esteem, self-love, and self-satisfaction. This chapter examines her argument for the view that the self is the soul, an immaterial and immortal substance, capable of existing independently of the body. The first part of this chapter explains her argument for the real distinction between soul and body, an argument that borrows crucial precepts from Cartesian dualist arguments. The second part discusses the moral implications of Astell’s concept of the self—especially the idea that temporal, bodily creatures could never render an immortal, immaterial soul truly happy. The third part concludes by examining the question of whether or not Astell was an occasionalist with respect to body–soul causation (the causation of sensation).
Juhana Toivanen
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198743798
- eISBN:
- 9780191821011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743798.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of ...
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This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’Less
This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’
Edward Slingerland
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190842307
- eISBN:
- 9780190922955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190842307.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
This chapter presents traditional archaeological and textual evidence against the strong soul-body holist position—that is, the claim that the early Chinese lacked any sense of a qualitative ...
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This chapter presents traditional archaeological and textual evidence against the strong soul-body holist position—that is, the claim that the early Chinese lacked any sense of a qualitative distinction between an immaterial soul and a physical body. This evidence includes afterlife beliefs as gleaned from mortuary practices and textual evidence drawn from both the received corpus and archaeologically recovered texts. The early Chinese appear to have distinguished between a relatively corporeal, physical body and a relatively incorporeal soul (or set of souls). The former was part of a material, visible world and was viewed ultimately as peripheral to the essence of one’s personal identity. The latter was the focus of ancestor cults, sacrifices, and oracles, and partook of an invisible, numinous world, qualitatively distinct from our own. The “specialness” of the next world and the beings that inhabited it lent to them, and to items and practices associated with them, a degree of numinosity that is not at all alien to conceptions of the holy or sacred in Judeo-Christian traditions. The chapter concludes with the argument that soul-body dualism is ultimately parasitic on basic mind-body dualism, which sees mental states or consciousness as somehow qualitatively distinct from the material world of things.Less
This chapter presents traditional archaeological and textual evidence against the strong soul-body holist position—that is, the claim that the early Chinese lacked any sense of a qualitative distinction between an immaterial soul and a physical body. This evidence includes afterlife beliefs as gleaned from mortuary practices and textual evidence drawn from both the received corpus and archaeologically recovered texts. The early Chinese appear to have distinguished between a relatively corporeal, physical body and a relatively incorporeal soul (or set of souls). The former was part of a material, visible world and was viewed ultimately as peripheral to the essence of one’s personal identity. The latter was the focus of ancestor cults, sacrifices, and oracles, and partook of an invisible, numinous world, qualitatively distinct from our own. The “specialness” of the next world and the beings that inhabited it lent to them, and to items and practices associated with them, a degree of numinosity that is not at all alien to conceptions of the holy or sacred in Judeo-Christian traditions. The chapter concludes with the argument that soul-body dualism is ultimately parasitic on basic mind-body dualism, which sees mental states or consciousness as somehow qualitatively distinct from the material world of things.
Jacqueline Broad (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190673321
- eISBN:
- 9780190673369
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190673321.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter contains selected letters from the correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, and the Cambridge Platonist and philosopher-theologian Henry More. The letters span the period from 1650 to ...
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This chapter contains selected letters from the correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, and the Cambridge Platonist and philosopher-theologian Henry More. The letters span the period from 1650 to 1653 and are mainly focused on ideas in René Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy and More’s Philosophicall Poems. Their exchange covers such topics as the ontological argument for the existence of God, the Cartesian method of doubt, Cartesian cosmology, and the nature of soul and body. The letters show Conway engaging in critical appraisals of both More and Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions. The chapter begins with an introductory essay by the editor, situating the correspondence in the context of More’s and Conway’s mature philosophical views. It is argued that these letters foreshadow Conway’s later interest in issues to do with the nature of substance and God. The correspondence includes editorial annotations, to assist the reader’s understanding of early modern terms and ideas.Less
This chapter contains selected letters from the correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, and the Cambridge Platonist and philosopher-theologian Henry More. The letters span the period from 1650 to 1653 and are mainly focused on ideas in René Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy and More’s Philosophicall Poems. Their exchange covers such topics as the ontological argument for the existence of God, the Cartesian method of doubt, Cartesian cosmology, and the nature of soul and body. The letters show Conway engaging in critical appraisals of both More and Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions. The chapter begins with an introductory essay by the editor, situating the correspondence in the context of More’s and Conway’s mature philosophical views. It is argued that these letters foreshadow Conway’s later interest in issues to do with the nature of substance and God. The correspondence includes editorial annotations, to assist the reader’s understanding of early modern terms and ideas.
Paul Buhle
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520223837
- eISBN:
- 9780520936928
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520223837.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
When he was summoned before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1951, Abraham Lincoln Polonsky (1911–1999) was labeled “a very dangerous citizen” by Harold Velde, a congressman from ...
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When he was summoned before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1951, Abraham Lincoln Polonsky (1911–1999) was labeled “a very dangerous citizen” by Harold Velde, a congressman from Illinois. Lawyer, educator, novelist, labor organizer, radio and television scriptwriter, film director and screenwriter, wartime intelligence operative, and full-time radical romantic, Polonsky was blacklisted in Hollywood for refusing to be an informer. The New York Times called his blacklisting the single greatest loss to American film during the McCarthy era, and his expressed admirers include Steven Spielberg, Martin Scorsese, Sidney Lumet, Warren Beatty, and Harry Belafonte. The Bronx-born son of immigrant parents, Polonsky—in the few years after the end of World War II and just before the blacklist—had one of the most distinguished careers in Hollywood. He wrote two films that established John Garfield's postwar persona, Body and Soul (1947), still the standard for boxing films and the model for such movies as Raging Bull and Pulp Fiction; and Force of Evil (1948), the great noir drama that he also directed. Once blacklisted, Polonsky quit working under his own name, yet he proved to be one of television's most talented writers. Later in life he became the most acerbic critic of the Hollywood blacklist's legacy while writing and directing films such as Tell Them Willie Boy Is Here (1970).Less
When he was summoned before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1951, Abraham Lincoln Polonsky (1911–1999) was labeled “a very dangerous citizen” by Harold Velde, a congressman from Illinois. Lawyer, educator, novelist, labor organizer, radio and television scriptwriter, film director and screenwriter, wartime intelligence operative, and full-time radical romantic, Polonsky was blacklisted in Hollywood for refusing to be an informer. The New York Times called his blacklisting the single greatest loss to American film during the McCarthy era, and his expressed admirers include Steven Spielberg, Martin Scorsese, Sidney Lumet, Warren Beatty, and Harry Belafonte. The Bronx-born son of immigrant parents, Polonsky—in the few years after the end of World War II and just before the blacklist—had one of the most distinguished careers in Hollywood. He wrote two films that established John Garfield's postwar persona, Body and Soul (1947), still the standard for boxing films and the model for such movies as Raging Bull and Pulp Fiction; and Force of Evil (1948), the great noir drama that he also directed. Once blacklisted, Polonsky quit working under his own name, yet he proved to be one of television's most talented writers. Later in life he became the most acerbic critic of the Hollywood blacklist's legacy while writing and directing films such as Tell Them Willie Boy Is Here (1970).
M. F. Burnyeat
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false. It fails as an interpretation of Aristotle since it fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception ...
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This essay argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false. It fails as an interpretation of Aristotle since it fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation is one which no modern functionalist could share. The Putnam-Nussbaum thesis is examined within the context of the theory of perception. This involves the need to understand one of the most mysterious Aristotelian doctrines – the doctrine that in perception, the sense-organ assumes the sensible form of the object perceived without its matter.Less
This essay argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false. It fails as an interpretation of Aristotle since it fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation is one which no modern functionalist could share. The Putnam-Nussbaum thesis is examined within the context of the theory of perception. This involves the need to understand one of the most mysterious Aristotelian doctrines – the doctrine that in perception, the sense-organ assumes the sensible form of the object perceived without its matter.
W. Norris Clarke, SJ
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823229284
- eISBN:
- 9780823236671
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823229284.003.0014
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This chapter engages in a philosophical exploration of the creative imagination in human beings, seeking to discern its basic structure and its significance for the understanding of what it means to ...
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This chapter engages in a philosophical exploration of the creative imagination in human beings, seeking to discern its basic structure and its significance for the understanding of what it means to be human. Humans enjoy a far wider scope of creative imagination partly because of human intelligence to abstract thought, and partly from the freedom in which human imagination participates because it is associated with the free will of the human spirit.Less
This chapter engages in a philosophical exploration of the creative imagination in human beings, seeking to discern its basic structure and its significance for the understanding of what it means to be human. Humans enjoy a far wider scope of creative imagination partly because of human intelligence to abstract thought, and partly from the freedom in which human imagination participates because it is associated with the free will of the human spirit.
