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This chapter, which discusses the wage setting and employment protection institutions in Norway, also reports the Norwegian data sets. A large number of stylized facts regarding wage structure and labor mobility within and between Norwegian firms are then dealt with. The chapter covers the period from 1980 to 1997. The firms in the blue-collar data set are a subsample of the firms in the white-collar data set. White-collar wages are more strongly affected by firm heterogeneity, and are also under a more flexible regime in terms of wage setting. For high-level jobs, there is significant positive correlation between wage dispersion and entry. Wage dispersion among blue-collar workers is much smaller than among white-collar workers. Entry and exit rates are much higher for workers in low-level jobs than for workers in high-level jobs.

This chapter presents a few more details on the Swedish labor market, and then conducts formal descriptive analyses to document these changes throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The matched employee–employer data is used. The analysis of wage levels and wage changes, as well as the trends in worker mobility are elaborated. The chapter shows that the decrease in wage variation during the 1970s and the increase in the 1980s were due to increased variation of wages within firms and increased variation across firms. In addition, people in the low part of the wage distribution have the least to lose by changing jobs, and this relationship gets stronger all the way to the bottom of the wage distribution within firms. The job turnover and wage compression trends are strong for both blue- and white-collar workers in Sweden.

During the early decades of the postwar era, public and private institutions constructed social roles for blue-collar men that forced the reemergence of gender practices that legitimized the subordination of women to men and the dominance of some men over others. The resultant hegemonic masculine ideal for the blue-collar “working man” was nevertheless ideologically flexible. By the mid-1960s, work had become a measure of citizenship, employment synonymous with manhood, and Japanese men had become the breadwinners of postwar society. By the 1970s, as wages increased, the blue-collar workers increasingly dreamed of living a middle-class lifestyle. This chapter examines the two aspects of this historical trajectory. First, it argues that higher wages had the unintended consequence of enabling working-class men of all ages to identify with middle-class notions of masculinity. Second, it shows how a generational schism also developed within the rank and file as younger men increasingly rejected the union’s hegemonic masculine “family man” norm while expressing bitterness that their wages did not allow them to access the familial and consumer trappings of middle-class life available to their older male co-workers. In addition, this chapter illustrates the generational contest to define the working-class masculine identity that emerged during the period of global youth culture and radical political movements of the 1960s and 1970s. By analyzing the ways in which middle-aged male leaders of Japan’s Old Left unions perceived politically active and young blue-collar men, the chapter shows how generational conflict influenced the ways in which blue-collar men of all ages identified with the middle-class cultural and economic forms.

This chapter, which explores the structure of wages within and between Belgian firms, also investigates how the productivity of these firms is affected by their internal wage dispersion. The bargaining regime in companies in the Belgian private sector does not derive directly from Canadian union membership. The data show that high-paying firms are characterized by a more dispersed wage structure. The bargaining regime has a crucial effect on the structure of wages even in a corporatist country such as Belgium. Following a 10 percent rise in wage inequality, productivity increases by approximately 2.1 percentage points more within firms that are essentially composed of blue-collar workers. The chapter also reveals that there is a lower pay spread within firms that are mainly composed of white-collar workers.

One of the main drivers of European integration was the idea that a more integrated European economy would promote economic efficiency, allowing countries to fully exploit their competitive advantages, fostering factor mobility and increasing allocational efficiency. The euro was a crucial milestone along this path. The productivity growth has been relatively stronger in those countries and sectors that relied more on competitive devaluations to regain price competitiveness before the euro was adopted. This finding is confirmed by an analysis of firm-level data from the Italian manufacturing sector. This study finds that low-tech businesses, which arguably benefited most from devaluations, have been restructuring more since the adoption of the euro. Restructuring has entailed a shift of business focus from production to upstream and downstream activities, such as product design, advertising, marketing, and distribution, and a corresponding reduction in the share of blue-collar workers.

This chapter summarizes the current understanding of the health risks associated with employment in various industries where exposure is alleged to occur. Topics discussed include textile mill workers, shipbuilders and navy/merchant marine personnel, insulators, plumbers and pipe fitters, construction workers, building interior workmen, floor tile and linoleum installers and removers, asbestos-cement manufacturers and end-product users, occupants of public and commercial buildings, electricians, automotive mechanics, railroad workers, and thermoelectric power and chemical plant workers.

Although there is vast diversity in apprenticeship concepts and practices in Europe, the United States, and other regions of the world, all apprenticeships are designed to support both the professional growth of workforce participants and business growth. Apprenticeships offer an efficient path to gaining valuable credentials and qualifications and thus are an important component of many career pathways. This chapter focuses on apprenticeships as a promising form of acquiring skills and credentials needed to fill the qualification gap of both white-collar and blue-collar workers. It provides a brief history of apprenticeship concepts, and it covers topics such as alignment of career pathways with apprenticeship concepts and trends. It illustrates the main ideas with examples of apprenticeship concepts and systems in several European countries and in the United States. It concludes with some considerations concerning future directions for research and practice.

This chapter examines the long-term socioeconomic changes in Japan since the 1980s through the eyes of one nuclear family of blue-collar workers from Kansai, the Fujii family. More specifically, it considers how the Fujii family experienced upward mobility in the early years, as well as instability in the later years, as they try to establish themselves in a downward-facing economy. It focuses on the marriage and work experiences of a Japanese woman in her fifties; in the strong economy she and her husband held regular jobs and achieved a secure lifestyle, but they did not obtain regular high-paying jobs in the downward economy despite having more education than their parents. This chapter discusses a number of themes revolving around the Fujiis, from economic change and family to parenting, parent-child relations, human and cultural capital, and reproduction of social class.

This chapter unpacks myths about the white working class and its support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election. Popular media wrongly suggest that millions of white, economically disadvantaged, uneducated blue-collar workers were responsible for Trump's victory. The chapter examines the evidence, showing that two-thirds of Trump voters made more than the median income but more than half of those without college degrees were in the top half of the income distribution. The chapter suggests that these voters were not motivated by enthusiasm about Trump's priorities but rather were protesting a system that had left them behind. The myth of the struggling white working-class voter, clamoring for Trump to make America great again, ignores the millions of working-class workers who are people of color and misunderstands racism. This chapter shows how important it is to listen to Trump voters, to understand why working-class people are angry, and to question the media's narrative of the white working class.

The scene is St. Louis, where William Greenleaf Eliot (1811–1887) has brought his bride, Abigail Adams Cranch (1817–1908), the namesake of her great aunt who lived in the White House. Raising a family and keeping them safe, the younger Abby's principal calling, becomes a rigorous test of her faith as she loses nine of her fourteen babies. When two of her sons are ordained and leave to shepherd their own flocks on opposite coasts, Abby's letters chase after them, throwing a wide net of motherly news from home and affection. She also keeps the family together by guarding the boundaries that set them apart from the unthinking people of faith and others less suited to share their social position. Her perceptions and fears of Catholics and foreigners, people of color, and blue‐collar workers betray a female complicity in liberal religion's hedging on its promised practice of parity and inclusion.

This chapter describes how West Drumoyne became Glasgow’s first scheme to house the “general needs” of ordinary manual workers as a result of John Wheatley’s imaginative 1924 Housing Act. But there was acute conflict over what kind of houses should be built in the scheme, with the ILP wanting cottage-style houses as in Mosspark, and the ruling Moderates insisting on only tenement-style housing. Because of their majority on the Corporation, the Moderates – a Tory-Liberal coalition - won the argument. This was an example of sheer class prejudice, but nevertheless, the scheme was a happy and popular working-class community.

A comparison is drawn between the typical far right voter living in the Balkans and his counterpart in Western Europe. The author concludes that their similarity seems to lie in the fact that most are male and young; the only difference is in Romania, where a portion of the PRM electorate is composed of those longing for the old regime. The author also looks at laws focusing on hate speech, activities which promote and incite racial discrimination and other legal issues concerning the parties. The legal framework controlling the banning of parties for reasons to do with hate speech, nationalist propaganda and revisionism is slowly being integrated into the legal systems of the countries analyzed. In practice, however, the law is not enforced. The situation is best (in terms of compatibility and use in practice) is in the EU countries – Romania and Bulgaria.

Since the 1970s, deregulation has increased the number of rules under which trucking operates. Instead of regulating freight, the Federal Motor Carriers Service Association (FMCSA) regulates individual truckers, micromanaging their working hours, their sleep, their speed, and their health. These regulations proceed under the guise of public safety but are actually motivated by corporate profit.