Edward Larrissy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748632817
- eISBN:
- 9780748651696
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748632817.003.0009
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism
This chapter reviews the idea of blindness, which is central to some of the important texts of British Romanticism, and observes that the blind and the developed figures of blindness provide various ...
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This chapter reviews the idea of blindness, which is central to some of the important texts of British Romanticism, and observes that the blind and the developed figures of blindness provide various ways of exploring an individual consciousness which imagines itself as lost in history. It concludes that the relevant collection of ideas on blindness is a result of a meditation on the status of the blind which preoccupied the thinkers of the eighteenth century.Less
This chapter reviews the idea of blindness, which is central to some of the important texts of British Romanticism, and observes that the blind and the developed figures of blindness provide various ways of exploring an individual consciousness which imagines itself as lost in history. It concludes that the relevant collection of ideas on blindness is a result of a meditation on the status of the blind which preoccupied the thinkers of the eighteenth century.
DAVID SCHUM
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264843
- eISBN:
- 9780191754050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264843.003.0002
- Subject:
- Sociology, Methodology and Statistics
This chapter shows how necessary it is for any science, including a science of evidence, to be able to classify phenomena of interest. It presents an evidence classification scheme that is ‘substance ...
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This chapter shows how necessary it is for any science, including a science of evidence, to be able to classify phenomena of interest. It presents an evidence classification scheme that is ‘substance blind’, meaning that the classes of individual items of evidence identified are recurrent and apply regardless of the substance or content of the evidence. There are also substance-blind combinations of evidence that are also recurrent. The chapter shows how substance-blindness occurs as a matter of course involving concepts encountered throughout science, logic, and mathematics.Less
This chapter shows how necessary it is for any science, including a science of evidence, to be able to classify phenomena of interest. It presents an evidence classification scheme that is ‘substance blind’, meaning that the classes of individual items of evidence identified are recurrent and apply regardless of the substance or content of the evidence. There are also substance-blind combinations of evidence that are also recurrent. The chapter shows how substance-blindness occurs as a matter of course involving concepts encountered throughout science, logic, and mathematics.
Fred Dretske
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199289769
- eISBN:
- 9780191711046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If psychologists can, as they say, really identify perception (of an object) without awareness (of that object), they must have a reasonably clear operational grasp of what perception and awareness ...
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If psychologists can, as they say, really identify perception (of an object) without awareness (of that object), they must have a reasonably clear operational grasp of what perception and awareness are. If so, philosophers can learn something from them. After settling on a test (at least a sufficient condition) for perception of x, the subjective test for awareness (you are not aware of x if you cannot detect it) is examined and found wanting by looking at such phenomena as split brains, change blindness, and unilateral neglect. An epistemic test is proposed in its place: S is consciously aware of x only if information about x is available to S as a reason for doing or believing something, as opposed to a reason why S does or believes something.Less
If psychologists can, as they say, really identify perception (of an object) without awareness (of that object), they must have a reasonably clear operational grasp of what perception and awareness are. If so, philosophers can learn something from them. After settling on a test (at least a sufficient condition) for perception of x, the subjective test for awareness (you are not aware of x if you cannot detect it) is examined and found wanting by looking at such phenomena as split brains, change blindness, and unilateral neglect. An epistemic test is proposed in its place: S is consciously aware of x only if information about x is available to S as a reason for doing or believing something, as opposed to a reason why S does or believes something.
Yulia Ustinova
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548569
- eISBN:
- 9780191720840
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548569.003.0004
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter envisages the mental frame of freelance ‘impresarios of gods’, their behaviour, method of attaining illumination, and especially the role of cave experiences in their lives. The cave ...
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This chapter envisages the mental frame of freelance ‘impresarios of gods’, their behaviour, method of attaining illumination, and especially the role of cave experiences in their lives. The cave environment required for the Sibyls reflects the traditional Greek views on the conditions necessary for the quintessential seers. The blindness of sightless prophets and poets emphasizes their constant state of visual deprivation. The insistence of myths and quasi-historical narratives on sensory deprivation experienced by seers and bards is rooted in age-long observation, which gave rise to their conventional image in the popular tradition. The recurring immersion in the outer darkness of a grotto or in the inner darkness of blindness indicates that inspired visions and revelations came to Greek seers and poets from within their minds.Less
This chapter envisages the mental frame of freelance ‘impresarios of gods’, their behaviour, method of attaining illumination, and especially the role of cave experiences in their lives. The cave environment required for the Sibyls reflects the traditional Greek views on the conditions necessary for the quintessential seers. The blindness of sightless prophets and poets emphasizes their constant state of visual deprivation. The insistence of myths and quasi-historical narratives on sensory deprivation experienced by seers and bards is rooted in age-long observation, which gave rise to their conventional image in the popular tradition. The recurring immersion in the outer darkness of a grotto or in the inner darkness of blindness indicates that inspired visions and revelations came to Greek seers and poets from within their minds.
Dean Keith Simonton
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753628
- eISBN:
- 9780199950027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
Donald Campbell proposed that scientific creativity and discovery could be best understood as entailing blind variation and selective retention (BVSR). This proposal is developed by defining ...
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Donald Campbell proposed that scientific creativity and discovery could be best understood as entailing blind variation and selective retention (BVSR). This proposal is developed by defining blindness in terms of the magnitude of decoupling between variant probabilities and their corresponding utilities. The selection part of BVSR is then defined according to whether variant selection is simultaneous or sequential and external or internal. These definitions provide the basis for identification criteria that can be applied to determine where ideational variation falls on the blind-sighted continuum. Explicit blindness can be obtained by systematic or stochastic combinatorial procedures, whereas implicit blindness becomes apparent when variations have certain properties of blindness or are generated by processes that should yield blindness. The chapter discusses the most common criticisms of BVSR, some that arise from misunderstandings and others that are rooted in misconceptions. The chapter concludes by discussing BVSR in terms of a three-criteria definition of creative ideas.Less
Donald Campbell proposed that scientific creativity and discovery could be best understood as entailing blind variation and selective retention (BVSR). This proposal is developed by defining blindness in terms of the magnitude of decoupling between variant probabilities and their corresponding utilities. The selection part of BVSR is then defined according to whether variant selection is simultaneous or sequential and external or internal. These definitions provide the basis for identification criteria that can be applied to determine where ideational variation falls on the blind-sighted continuum. Explicit blindness can be obtained by systematic or stochastic combinatorial procedures, whereas implicit blindness becomes apparent when variations have certain properties of blindness or are generated by processes that should yield blindness. The chapter discusses the most common criticisms of BVSR, some that arise from misunderstandings and others that are rooted in misconceptions. The chapter concludes by discussing BVSR in terms of a three-criteria definition of creative ideas.
Gordon Campbell, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale, and Fiona J. Tweedie
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199296491
- eISBN:
- 9780191711923
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296491.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies
This chapter considers codicological aspects of the manuscript and postulates the likely stages in its composition. It compares the practices thus identified with those evident in the manuscript to ...
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This chapter considers codicological aspects of the manuscript and postulates the likely stages in its composition. It compares the practices thus identified with those evident in the manuscript to Book One of Paradise Lost, and examines the evidence of the early biographies of Milton for his mode of composition after the onset of his blindness.Less
This chapter considers codicological aspects of the manuscript and postulates the likely stages in its composition. It compares the practices thus identified with those evident in the manuscript to Book One of Paradise Lost, and examines the evidence of the early biographies of Milton for his mode of composition after the onset of his blindness.
Gordon Campbell, Thomas N. Corns, John K. Hale, and Fiona J. Tweedie
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199296491
- eISBN:
- 9780191711923
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296491.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies
The history of the manuscript firmly ties it to a Miltonic provenance. Its physical condition shows clear evidence of how the blind Milton worked on so challenging a project. The manuscript is that ...
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The history of the manuscript firmly ties it to a Miltonic provenance. Its physical condition shows clear evidence of how the blind Milton worked on so challenging a project. The manuscript is that of a work-in-progress. There is no evidence that Milton worked on the manuscript after 1660. It shows an expert command of Latin, typical of Milton's other Latin works. The stylometric analysis indicates Miltonic authorship. Its theology is characteristic of the theology of other treatises in the same genre. The manuscript rightly belongs in the Milton canon.Less
The history of the manuscript firmly ties it to a Miltonic provenance. Its physical condition shows clear evidence of how the blind Milton worked on so challenging a project. The manuscript is that of a work-in-progress. There is no evidence that Milton worked on the manuscript after 1660. It shows an expert command of Latin, typical of Milton's other Latin works. The stylometric analysis indicates Miltonic authorship. Its theology is characteristic of the theology of other treatises in the same genre. The manuscript rightly belongs in the Milton canon.
Edward Larrissy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748632817
- eISBN:
- 9780748651696
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748632817.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism
This book examines the philosophical and literary background to representations of blindness and the blind in the Romantic period. In detailed studies of literary works the author shows how the topic ...
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This book examines the philosophical and literary background to representations of blindness and the blind in the Romantic period. In detailed studies of literary works the author shows how the topic is central to an understanding of British and Irish Romantic literature. While he considers the influence of Milton and the ‘Ossian’ poems, as well as of philosophers including Locke, Diderot, Berkeley and Thomas Reid, much of the book is taken up with new readings of writers of the period. These include canonical authors such as Blake, Wordsworth, Scott, Byron, Keats and Percy and Mary Shelley, as well as less-well-known writers such as Charlotte Brooke and Ann Batten Cristall. There is also a chapter on the popular genre of improving tales for children by writers such as Barbara Hofland and Mary Sherwood. The author finds that, despite the nostalgia for a bardic age of inward vision, the chief emphasis in the period is on the compensations of enhanced sensitivity to music and words. This compensation becomes associated with the loss and gain involved in the modernity of a post-bardic age. Representations of blindness and the blind are found to elucidate a tension at the heart of the Romantic period, between the desire for immediacy of vision on the one hand and, on the other, the historical self-consciousness that always attends it.Less
This book examines the philosophical and literary background to representations of blindness and the blind in the Romantic period. In detailed studies of literary works the author shows how the topic is central to an understanding of British and Irish Romantic literature. While he considers the influence of Milton and the ‘Ossian’ poems, as well as of philosophers including Locke, Diderot, Berkeley and Thomas Reid, much of the book is taken up with new readings of writers of the period. These include canonical authors such as Blake, Wordsworth, Scott, Byron, Keats and Percy and Mary Shelley, as well as less-well-known writers such as Charlotte Brooke and Ann Batten Cristall. There is also a chapter on the popular genre of improving tales for children by writers such as Barbara Hofland and Mary Sherwood. The author finds that, despite the nostalgia for a bardic age of inward vision, the chief emphasis in the period is on the compensations of enhanced sensitivity to music and words. This compensation becomes associated with the loss and gain involved in the modernity of a post-bardic age. Representations of blindness and the blind are found to elucidate a tension at the heart of the Romantic period, between the desire for immediacy of vision on the one hand and, on the other, the historical self-consciousness that always attends it.
William Fish
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195381344
- eISBN:
- 9780199869183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter develops a naive realist theory of veridical perception. It begins from the thought that the phenomenal character of our visual experiences is simply a matter of the scene before us but ...
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This chapter develops a naive realist theory of veridical perception. It begins from the thought that the phenomenal character of our visual experiences is simply a matter of the scene before us but finds this to be open to criticism. In light of these criticisms, together with the empirical findings of change/inattentional blindness experiments and considerations concerning the conceptual sophistication of perceivers, a detailed naive realist theory of perception is then presented. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that such a theory of phenomenal character offers hope for a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness that can answer the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ and bridge the explanatory gap.Less
This chapter develops a naive realist theory of veridical perception. It begins from the thought that the phenomenal character of our visual experiences is simply a matter of the scene before us but finds this to be open to criticism. In light of these criticisms, together with the empirical findings of change/inattentional blindness experiments and considerations concerning the conceptual sophistication of perceivers, a detailed naive realist theory of perception is then presented. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that such a theory of phenomenal character offers hope for a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness that can answer the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ and bridge the explanatory gap.
Richard Crouter
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379679
- eISBN:
- 9780199869169
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379679.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Chapter 3 shows how St. Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard inform Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology by insisting on our human ambiguity and sinful nature, the ways that self-interest constantly works ...
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Chapter 3 shows how St. Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard inform Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology by insisting on our human ambiguity and sinful nature, the ways that self-interest constantly works among individuals. This tendency toward self-preoccupied moral blindness is greater in our social relationships and in relations among nations than in our individual lives. Power has consequences in all aspects of our lives: religious as well as political. Love remains the norm of the moral life, even if its selfless aims conflict with the struggle toward approximations of justice in the larger political and economic world. Classical Christian teaching on “sin” has been in retreat among secular and religious minds since the 18th-century Enlightenment. Yet Niebuhr never deviates from thinking that the doctrine of sin yields great insight into human affairs. As a result, his hopes for future human achievements are marked by a sober realism that places our hopes within the reach of limited and fallible human beings.Less
Chapter 3 shows how St. Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard inform Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology by insisting on our human ambiguity and sinful nature, the ways that self-interest constantly works among individuals. This tendency toward self-preoccupied moral blindness is greater in our social relationships and in relations among nations than in our individual lives. Power has consequences in all aspects of our lives: religious as well as political. Love remains the norm of the moral life, even if its selfless aims conflict with the struggle toward approximations of justice in the larger political and economic world. Classical Christian teaching on “sin” has been in retreat among secular and religious minds since the 18th-century Enlightenment. Yet Niebuhr never deviates from thinking that the doctrine of sin yields great insight into human affairs. As a result, his hopes for future human achievements are marked by a sober realism that places our hopes within the reach of limited and fallible human beings.
Michael Spivey
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195170788
- eISBN:
- 9780199786831
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170788.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter argues that the “divide and conquer” approach for understanding how the mind works (advocated by the traditional modular information-processing framework) has already provided about as ...
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This chapter argues that the “divide and conquer” approach for understanding how the mind works (advocated by the traditional modular information-processing framework) has already provided about as much scientific advancement as it can. Further progress in the cognitive sciences is likely to require a more integrative dynamical and ecological approach to cognition that acknowledges not only the continuous and recurrent flow of information between different neural subsystems, but also the continuous and recurrent flow of information between the organism and the environment. Findings in change blindness, external memory use, and eye movements during imagery and memory are marshaled to support a visualization of mental content as something that spreads out beyond the body, sometimes overlapping with the mental content of other minds. The mind and its inextricable causes naturally extend to environmental forces (e.g., sensory, social, cultural, evolutionary) that operate at multiple interdependent time scales.Less
This chapter argues that the “divide and conquer” approach for understanding how the mind works (advocated by the traditional modular information-processing framework) has already provided about as much scientific advancement as it can. Further progress in the cognitive sciences is likely to require a more integrative dynamical and ecological approach to cognition that acknowledges not only the continuous and recurrent flow of information between different neural subsystems, but also the continuous and recurrent flow of information between the organism and the environment. Findings in change blindness, external memory use, and eye movements during imagery and memory are marshaled to support a visualization of mental content as something that spreads out beyond the body, sometimes overlapping with the mental content of other minds. The mind and its inextricable causes naturally extend to environmental forces (e.g., sensory, social, cultural, evolutionary) that operate at multiple interdependent time scales.
Morton A. Heller (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198503873
- eISBN:
- 9780191686559
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198503873.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Psychological studies of touch and blindness have been fraught with controversy. Within this field there remains an important theoretical divide. Many researchers have taken a cognitive approach to ...
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Psychological studies of touch and blindness have been fraught with controversy. Within this field there remains an important theoretical divide. Many researchers have taken a cognitive approach to the study of touch and blindness, relating these to higher order processes, such as memory and concept formation. Others adopt a theoretical perspective, arguing that it is not necessary to consider the ‘internal representation’ of the stimuli when investigating touch—thus people make use of information from the physical biomechanical properties of their limbs as they assess the physical properties of objects. In addition, psychologists differ in the relative importance they place on the modality of sensory stimulation for subsequent perceptual experiences. Some psychologists argue that touch can do many of the things that are accomplished by vision, and claim that the mode of sensory stimulation is not critically important for perception, arguing that much information can be obtained through non-visual modalities. Others suggest that there are important consequences of a lack of visual experience, arguing for the importance of multiple forms of sensory input for conceptual development. This book brings together the leading investigators in these areas, each presenting the evidence for their side of the debate. An introductory chapter sets the theoretical and historical stage for the debate, and a concluding chapter draws together the different views and ideas set forth by the contributors, summarizing and resolving the discussion.Less
Psychological studies of touch and blindness have been fraught with controversy. Within this field there remains an important theoretical divide. Many researchers have taken a cognitive approach to the study of touch and blindness, relating these to higher order processes, such as memory and concept formation. Others adopt a theoretical perspective, arguing that it is not necessary to consider the ‘internal representation’ of the stimuli when investigating touch—thus people make use of information from the physical biomechanical properties of their limbs as they assess the physical properties of objects. In addition, psychologists differ in the relative importance they place on the modality of sensory stimulation for subsequent perceptual experiences. Some psychologists argue that touch can do many of the things that are accomplished by vision, and claim that the mode of sensory stimulation is not critically important for perception, arguing that much information can be obtained through non-visual modalities. Others suggest that there are important consequences of a lack of visual experience, arguing for the importance of multiple forms of sensory input for conceptual development. This book brings together the leading investigators in these areas, each presenting the evidence for their side of the debate. An introductory chapter sets the theoretical and historical stage for the debate, and a concluding chapter draws together the different views and ideas set forth by the contributors, summarizing and resolving the discussion.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics ...
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This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics of Millikan, Dretske, and Papineau is false, and that other etiological accounts proposed by Prinz and Dretske are false. Facts about the color blindness play a key role in these arguments.Less
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics of Millikan, Dretske, and Papineau is false, and that other etiological accounts proposed by Prinz and Dretske are false. Facts about the color blindness play a key role in these arguments.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language and in which history is not crucial. It argues that the asymmetric dependence ...
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This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language and in which history is not crucial. It argues that the asymmetric dependence semantics of Fodor is false, and it critically considers other mind-based accounts of proper semantic causes, including the normality account of Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, and Tye, partly by appeal to facts about color blindness.Less
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language and in which history is not crucial. It argues that the asymmetric dependence semantics of Fodor is false, and it critically considers other mind-based accounts of proper semantic causes, including the normality account of Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, and Tye, partly by appeal to facts about color blindness.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The sharp distinction between preferential love (erotic love and friendship) and love of one's neighbor (agape) is mitigated by the claim that neighbor‐love should be preserved in erotic love and ...
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The sharp distinction between preferential love (erotic love and friendship) and love of one's neighbor (agape) is mitigated by the claim that neighbor‐love should be preserved in erotic love and friendship. Neighbor‐love is a commitment to equality, which involves a kind of moral blindness, and is best understood, in comparison with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, as responsibility to others.Less
The sharp distinction between preferential love (erotic love and friendship) and love of one's neighbor (agape) is mitigated by the claim that neighbor‐love should be preserved in erotic love and friendship. Neighbor‐love is a commitment to equality, which involves a kind of moral blindness, and is best understood, in comparison with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, as responsibility to others.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Moral blindness (or “closed eyes”) is not a call to otherworldliness, but rather indifference to temporal distinctions (e.g, class, financial status). Such moral blindness is the obverse of moral ...
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Moral blindness (or “closed eyes”) is not a call to otherworldliness, but rather indifference to temporal distinctions (e.g, class, financial status). Such moral blindness is the obverse of moral vision of our common kinship as creatures. Both advantaged and disadvantaged are equally obligated and equally able to fulfill the obligation.Less
Moral blindness (or “closed eyes”) is not a call to otherworldliness, but rather indifference to temporal distinctions (e.g, class, financial status). Such moral blindness is the obverse of moral vision of our common kinship as creatures. Both advantaged and disadvantaged are equally obligated and equally able to fulfill the obligation.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0018
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The concluding essay compares the imperative mode of the commandment with the notion of “intimacy” with the commandment experienced by those who so value love's need to express itself that they do ...
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The concluding essay compares the imperative mode of the commandment with the notion of “intimacy” with the commandment experienced by those who so value love's need to express itself that they do not need to be commanded. Kierkegaard's relation to his Lutheran heritage is ambivalent – he sees himself as a corrective to Luther who was himself a corrective to other errors. The Lutheran dimension of simul justus et peccator is found in the paradoxical dual goals of leniency and rigor, inwardness and outwardness, vision and blindness.Less
The concluding essay compares the imperative mode of the commandment with the notion of “intimacy” with the commandment experienced by those who so value love's need to express itself that they do not need to be commanded. Kierkegaard's relation to his Lutheran heritage is ambivalent – he sees himself as a corrective to Luther who was himself a corrective to other errors. The Lutheran dimension of simul justus et peccator is found in the paradoxical dual goals of leniency and rigor, inwardness and outwardness, vision and blindness.
Carey K. Morewedge, Kurt Gray, and Daniel M. Wegner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0014
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
People are normally encouraged to engage in premeditation—to think about the potential consequences of their behavior before acting. Indeed, planning, considering, and studying can be important ...
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People are normally encouraged to engage in premeditation—to think about the potential consequences of their behavior before acting. Indeed, planning, considering, and studying can be important precursors to decision-making, and often seem essential for effective action. This view of premeditation is shared by most humans, a kind of universal ideal, and it carries an additional interesting implication: Even the hint that premeditation occurred can serve as a potent cue indicating voluntary action, both to actors and observers. In legal and moral contexts, for example, actors are seen as especially culpable for the consequences of their actions if those consequences were premeditated, whether or not the premeditation influenced the decision. In this chapter, we review evidence indicating that even irrelevant premeditation can lead people to believe that an action's consequences were under personal control. We present research exploring how various forms of premeditation—including foresight, effortful forethought, wishful thinking, and the consideration of multiple possible outcomes of action—may lead actors to prefer and to feel responsible for action outcomes even when this premeditation has no causal relation to the outcomes.Less
People are normally encouraged to engage in premeditation—to think about the potential consequences of their behavior before acting. Indeed, planning, considering, and studying can be important precursors to decision-making, and often seem essential for effective action. This view of premeditation is shared by most humans, a kind of universal ideal, and it carries an additional interesting implication: Even the hint that premeditation occurred can serve as a potent cue indicating voluntary action, both to actors and observers. In legal and moral contexts, for example, actors are seen as especially culpable for the consequences of their actions if those consequences were premeditated, whether or not the premeditation influenced the decision. In this chapter, we review evidence indicating that even irrelevant premeditation can lead people to believe that an action's consequences were under personal control. We present research exploring how various forms of premeditation—including foresight, effortful forethought, wishful thinking, and the consideration of multiple possible outcomes of action—may lead actors to prefer and to feel responsible for action outcomes even when this premeditation has no causal relation to the outcomes.
Lea Shaver
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780300226003
- eISBN:
- 9780300249316
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300226003.003.0009
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility
This chapter discusses the non-profit organization Benetech, which operates many programs turning technology to social benefit. The biggest part of this work is Bookshare, an adaptive-format digital ...
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This chapter discusses the non-profit organization Benetech, which operates many programs turning technology to social benefit. The biggest part of this work is Bookshare, an adaptive-format digital library for people with blindness and other print disabilities. It also mentions CEO Jim Fruchterman, who spent more than a year fighting for international adoption of the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate cross-border sharing between libraries for people with disabilities. He is keenly aware of how copyright law can limit the possibilities for addressing book hunger through innovative non-profit efforts. The chapter concludes with the Marrakesh Treaty and how it provided important support for the global spread of copyright exceptions for the blind.Less
This chapter discusses the non-profit organization Benetech, which operates many programs turning technology to social benefit. The biggest part of this work is Bookshare, an adaptive-format digital library for people with blindness and other print disabilities. It also mentions CEO Jim Fruchterman, who spent more than a year fighting for international adoption of the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate cross-border sharing between libraries for people with disabilities. He is keenly aware of how copyright law can limit the possibilities for addressing book hunger through innovative non-profit efforts. The chapter concludes with the Marrakesh Treaty and how it provided important support for the global spread of copyright exceptions for the blind.
Sydney Shoemaker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something ...
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The chapter defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are ‘available’ in the sense that their subjects are poised to assent to their contents, to use them as premises in reasoning, and to be guided by them in their behavior. The account is compatible with the possibility of negative self-deception – mistakenly believing that one doesn’t believe something – but the closest thing to positive self-deception it allows is believing falsely that a belief with a certain content is one’s dominant belief on a certain matter through failure to realize that one has a stronger belief that contradicts it. The view has implications about Moore’s paradox that contradict widely held views. On this view self-ascriptions of beliefs can be warranted and grounded on reasons – but the reasons are not phenomenally conscious mental states (as held by Christopher Peacocke) but rather available beliefs.Less
The chapter defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are ‘available’ in the sense that their subjects are poised to assent to their contents, to use them as premises in reasoning, and to be guided by them in their behavior. The account is compatible with the possibility of negative self-deception – mistakenly believing that one doesn’t believe something – but the closest thing to positive self-deception it allows is believing falsely that a belief with a certain content is one’s dominant belief on a certain matter through failure to realize that one has a stronger belief that contradicts it. The view has implications about Moore’s paradox that contradict widely held views. On this view self-ascriptions of beliefs can be warranted and grounded on reasons – but the reasons are not phenomenally conscious mental states (as held by Christopher Peacocke) but rather available beliefs.
