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This final chapter develops an account of blameworthiness that dovetails with the previous chapter’s account of blame. Because the core constituents of blame consist of a desire and a belief, the norms that determine when blame is called for are the ones that correspond to these elements. On the resulting account, blame is called for when (a) the blamer’s belief that the blamee has acted badly is true, and (b) the blamer’s desire that the blamee not have violated a moral principle to which the blamer is committed is justified by the very considerations that justify his commitment itself. By thus making explicit the link between the justification of blame and the justification of the moral principle that the blamee has flouted, we come to see that a commitment to blame is inseparable from a commitment to morality itself.

Drawing upon work in experimental philosophy and evolutionary game theory, the chapter argues that one of the roles the concept of knowledge plays in our social cognitive ecology is that of enabling us to make adaptively important distinctions between different kinds of blameworthy and blameless behaviors. In particular, the chapter defends the view that knowledge enables us to distinguish which agents are most worthy of blame for inflicting harms, violating social norms, or cheating in situations of social exchange.

There are different kinds of responsibility, and even different kinds of moral responsibility. This chapter offers a conceptual map of moral responsibility in the accountability sense. In this sense, those who are morally responsible are candidates for being held to account for what they do. Moral responsibility, so understood, can be explained by three related concepts: morally responsible agency, being morally responsible for something, and holding morally responsible. Morally responsible agents are distinguished from mere moral agents in that they are able to understand and respond to expectations and demands of those holding morally responsible. Being morally responsible for an action in the sense of being blameworthy for it is explained by focusing on morally wrong acts knowingly and freely preformed. A requirement on blameworthiness is that an agent act from a morally objectionable quality of will. Holding morally responsible for a blameworthy act by blaming is distinguished from merely judging that a person is blameworthy insofar as holding blaming involves an attitude of disapproval.

An examination of Williams account of agent-regret leads to its supplementation, and to an explanation of why we are attached to, and responsible for, some of our actions even when we do not control them, by relating our attachments to the emerging sense of who we are. These reflections lead to showing (a) that the control principle of responsibility reaches further than is often assumes, e.g. to establish responsibility for some beliefs and emotions, and (b) that we are responsible for actions regarding which the control principle does not apply. The chapter defends a rational functioning principle of responsibility. It concludes with some observations about how these conclusion bear on the question of blameworthiness which follow in Williams's footsteps.

This chapter considers Aristotle's own explanation of why he includes a discussion of voluntariness in his discussion of moral character. The connection he sees between voluntariness and the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of states of character gives us reason to suppose that the account of voluntariness is intended to capture conditions of moral responsibility for action. He thinks we are morally responsible for those actions and feelings produced by our states of moral character. The account of praiseworthiness on which he relies, however, fails to endorse a common modern assumption about moral responsibility — the view that one's praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for action requires responsibility for the states of character from which one acts.

This chapter examines an alternative revisionist approach to criminal justice thinking by focusing on the work of Antony Duff. The Kantian problematic encourages both defensive rationalisation of a morality of form and critical revision, which, seeking to move beyond the ‘mother position’, still remains tied to it. This is what characterises the three main moves in Duff's work, in his theory of punishment, his account of responsibility, and his analysis of legal culpability. The chapter begins with a discussion on the nature of revisionism in criminal justice thinking, then moves to a critique of Duff's views on blameworthiness, responsibility, and culpability. Duff's revisionist attempts to graft ‘contextual’ additions onto the Kantian framework, to make good its separations, are analysed. Duff develops a communitarian view of the blameworthy subject, a character view of the responsible subject, and a morally substantive view of the culpable subject. All three moves are invoked by the Kantian problematic of false separation.

The chapter argues, on the basis of a conceptual connection between wrongdoing and blameworthiness, that we should accept moral rationalism: the view that an agent can be morally required to perform a given act only if she has decisive reason, all things considered, to perform that act. And it argues that although we should reject all traditional versions of act-consequentialism given moral rationalism and certain plausible assumptions about what agents have decisive reason to do, we should accept some version of act-consequentialism, for act-consequentialism is entailed by the conjunction of moral rationalism and a certain plausible conception of practical reasons—namely, the teleological conception of practical reasons. Lastly, it is argued that act-consequentialism is best construed as a theory that ranks outcomes, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the agent has to desire that each outcome obtains.

This paper provides a presumptive argument in favor of moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. The argument is based on the assumption that there is a conceptual connection between wrongdoing and blameworthiness. The paper argues that if we accept moral rationalism, we should reject all traditional versions of act-consequentialism (e.g., act-utilitarianism). It furthermore argues that the demandingness objection against traditional versions of act-consequentialism is best construed as a more general objection stemming from moral rationalism.

This chapter argues that the first primary conclusion of this book—that our range of obligations is narrow—in conjunction with principles that associate obligation and being to blame, ratifies the second primary conclusion—that we are blameworthy for perhaps far less than what many may plausibly believe. The chapter also proposes additional arguments having to do with the changeability of obligations over time to support this second conclusion. Finally, it is proposed that the reach of nonmoral blameworthiness—prudential blameworthiness, for instance—is reduced as well, and for the same sorts of reason for which moral blameworthiness is constrained.

This chapter argues that agents can be justified in holding one another responsible, irrespective of whether anyone is a libertarian agent. The chapter begins by exploring and rejecting several familiar approaches for justifying responsibility-characteristic practices, such as P. F. Strawson’s account and the consequentialist approach in the work of Schlick and others. It then goes on to argue for a teleological account—the agency cultivation model—that makes use of some of the ideas in these rejected approaches, while also making use of the idea of a Reasons account of the sort gestured at in chapter 5. It concludes by showing how responsibility practices and norms can be justified, independent of appeal to libertarian forms of agency, without running afoul of the traditional objections to moral influence approaches.

This chapter fills in the details of how the account handles blame and desert. The first part of the chapter focuses on exculpation, and the question of how the norms of responsibility (roughly, norms characterizable in terms of quality of will) interact with the dynamic nature of moral considerations-responsive agency. A key idea that emerges is that moral ecology—or the way in which circumstances affect our dispositions to morally good and bad behavior—is important. The second part of the chapter concerns desert, and the basis on which it makes sense to regard people as deserving moralized praise and blame. The chapter argues that Pereboom’s notion of basic desert is to be rejected, but that a plausible account of desert is given by something called the social self-governance model of desert. This is a picture of desert on which responsible agents deserve reactions to their blameworthy actions because such reactions help aid agents in their self-governance in light of moral considerations.

In addition to an individual's personal blameworthiness, other reasons, such as force majeure and unavoidability of circumstances, may also play a role in the occurrence of damages to another individual's property and violations of their basic rights. Furthermore, these external factors will also influence the defendant's accountability for the aggravation of the said damages and the occurrence of acts of misdemeanour. This chapter discusses several scenarios that would determine an individual's level of culpability relating to legal violations that have been committed against another individual. The defendant's innocence and liability can be weighed based on liability for fault and strict liability. Moreover, the person's motive for performing a certain action or for opting for inaction will be accordingly classified as liability for intention or as liability for negligence. This chapter also covers liabilities and personal misconducts relating to motor vehicles, products, and activities that would impair the environment.