Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized ...
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The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized and implicit understandings? What are the key dimensions of such bargains? In what conditions do bargains rise and fall? And has there been a universal and uniform change in these bargains? This book offers a distinct perspective to answer these questions. It develops a unique analytical perspective to account for diverse bargains within systems of executive government. Drawing on comparative experiences from different state traditions, it examines ideas and contemporary developments along three key dimensions of any Public Service Bargain: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. The book points to diverse and differentiated developments across national systems of executive government, and suggests how different ‘bargains’ are prone to cheating by their constituent parties. It explores the context in which managerial bargains — widely seen to be at the heart of contemporary administrative reform movements — are likely to catch on and considers how cheating is likely to destabilize such bargains.Less
The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized and implicit understandings? What are the key dimensions of such bargains? In what conditions do bargains rise and fall? And has there been a universal and uniform change in these bargains? This book offers a distinct perspective to answer these questions. It develops a unique analytical perspective to account for diverse bargains within systems of executive government. Drawing on comparative experiences from different state traditions, it examines ideas and contemporary developments along three key dimensions of any Public Service Bargain: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. The book points to diverse and differentiated developments across national systems of executive government, and suggests how different ‘bargains’ are prone to cheating by their constituent parties. It explores the context in which managerial bargains — widely seen to be at the heart of contemporary administrative reform movements — are likely to catch on and considers how cheating is likely to destabilize such bargains.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility ...
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Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book’s most important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality itself — that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those who violate the principles. Because blame has not received much sustained attention, the book works its way toward its conclusions by first raising, and then seeking to resolve, a series of conceptual and normative questions. These questions include: How are blameworthy acts related to the characters of the agents who perform them? Can agents deserve blame for their bad traits as well as their bad acts? Is blame best understood as a kind of action, a kind of belief, a kind of feeling, a combination of these elements, or something entirely different? What sort of moral concept is blameworthiness? How do blame and blameworthiness — correlative concepts — fit together? Although the book draws both on Hume’s treatment of the relation between character and blame and Strawson’s landmark discussion of the “reactive attitudes”, the theory that emerges is neither Humean nor Strawsonian. It is a new theory that seeks to do more justice than its predecessors to the indispensable role that blame plays in our moral lives.Less
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book’s most important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality itself — that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those who violate the principles. Because blame has not received much sustained attention, the book works its way toward its conclusions by first raising, and then seeking to resolve, a series of conceptual and normative questions. These questions include: How are blameworthy acts related to the characters of the agents who perform them? Can agents deserve blame for their bad traits as well as their bad acts? Is blame best understood as a kind of action, a kind of belief, a kind of feeling, a combination of these elements, or something entirely different? What sort of moral concept is blameworthiness? How do blame and blameworthiness — correlative concepts — fit together? Although the book draws both on Hume’s treatment of the relation between character and blame and Strawson’s landmark discussion of the “reactive attitudes”, the theory that emerges is neither Humean nor Strawsonian. It is a new theory that seeks to do more justice than its predecessors to the indispensable role that blame plays in our moral lives.
Douglas Husak
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199585038
- eISBN:
- 9780191723476
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585038.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Husak reprints 15 of his earlier essays in the philosophy of criminal law (and add two previously unpublished pieces) collected from philosophy journals, law reviews, and book chapters. These ...
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Husak reprints 15 of his earlier essays in the philosophy of criminal law (and add two previously unpublished pieces) collected from philosophy journals, law reviews, and book chapters. These articles cover a broad range of topics about the nature of penal liability, criminal law culpability, defences, and the justification of punishment. Together, these essays present a desert-based analysis of issues in criminal theory that resist the consequentialist approach more familiar among legal scholars. The author's foremost concern is to ensure that the principles and doctrines of the criminal law preserve justice and do not sacrifice individuals for the common welfare. Although Husak draws equally from existing criminal law and contemporary moral and political philosophy, readers need neither a Ph.D. in philosophy nor a J.D. in law to understand and assess his essays.Less
Husak reprints 15 of his earlier essays in the philosophy of criminal law (and add two previously unpublished pieces) collected from philosophy journals, law reviews, and book chapters. These articles cover a broad range of topics about the nature of penal liability, criminal law culpability, defences, and the justification of punishment. Together, these essays present a desert-based analysis of issues in criminal theory that resist the consequentialist approach more familiar among legal scholars. The author's foremost concern is to ensure that the principles and doctrines of the criminal law preserve justice and do not sacrifice individuals for the common welfare. Although Husak draws equally from existing criminal law and contemporary moral and political philosophy, readers need neither a Ph.D. in philosophy nor a J.D. in law to understand and assess his essays.
Iris Marion Young
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195392388
- eISBN:
- 9780199866625
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195392388.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
When the noted political philosopher Iris Marion Young died in 2006, her death was mourned as the passing of “one of the most important political philosophers of the past quarter-century” (Cass ...
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When the noted political philosopher Iris Marion Young died in 2006, her death was mourned as the passing of “one of the most important political philosophers of the past quarter-century” (Cass Sunstein) and as an important and innovative thinker working at the conjunction of a number of important topics: global justice; democracy and difference; continental political theory; ethics and international affairs; and gender, race and public policy. This book discusses our responsibilities to address “structural” injustices in which we among many are implicated (but for which we are not to blame), often by virtue of participating in a market, such as buying goods produced in sweatshops, or participating in booming housing markets that leave many homeless. The book argues that addressing these structural injustices requires a new model of responsibility, which it calls the “social connection” model. The book develops this idea by clarifying the nature of structural injustice; developing the notion of political responsibility for injustice and how it differs from older ideas of blame and guilt; and finally how we can then use this model to describe our responsibilities to others no matter who we are and where we live.Less
When the noted political philosopher Iris Marion Young died in 2006, her death was mourned as the passing of “one of the most important political philosophers of the past quarter-century” (Cass Sunstein) and as an important and innovative thinker working at the conjunction of a number of important topics: global justice; democracy and difference; continental political theory; ethics and international affairs; and gender, race and public policy. This book discusses our responsibilities to address “structural” injustices in which we among many are implicated (but for which we are not to blame), often by virtue of participating in a market, such as buying goods produced in sweatshops, or participating in booming housing markets that leave many homeless. The book argues that addressing these structural injustices requires a new model of responsibility, which it calls the “social connection” model. The book develops this idea by clarifying the nature of structural injustice; developing the notion of political responsibility for injustice and how it differs from older ideas of blame and guilt; and finally how we can then use this model to describe our responsibilities to others no matter who we are and where we live.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic ...
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This chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic behaviour. Varieties of cheating behaviour across different trustee and agency bargains are considered, while highlighting the various forces and strategies that can keep cheating in check. It is argued that making any PSB cheat-proof requires particular and demanding social conditions.Less
This chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic behaviour. Varieties of cheating behaviour across different trustee and agency bargains are considered, while highlighting the various forces and strategies that can keep cheating in check. It is argued that making any PSB cheat-proof requires particular and demanding social conditions.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means ...
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This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means for public service bargains and points to the demanding conditions of such a bargain, given the incentives to cheat that affect the various parties to this type of bargain. Given its vulnerability to cheating, the managerialist type of bargain seems likely to emerge and ‘stick’ only in some traditions and cultures.Less
This chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means for public service bargains and points to the demanding conditions of such a bargain, given the incentives to cheat that affect the various parties to this type of bargain. Given its vulnerability to cheating, the managerialist type of bargain seems likely to emerge and ‘stick’ only in some traditions and cultures.
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243631
- eISBN:
- 9780191599507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243638.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Moves away from explaining the comparative statics of risk regulation regimes and explores what happens when regimes are under pressure to change, and, in particular, when they are under presure for ...
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Moves away from explaining the comparative statics of risk regulation regimes and explores what happens when regimes are under pressure to change, and, in particular, when they are under presure for greater openness and transparency. The chapter develops a style‐phase model of staged organizational responses to external pressure for change and compares its predictive value against two competing hypotheses. Examination of the nine case‐study risk regulation regimes reveals that, contrary to the common belief that such pressures are all pervasive, less than half were exposed to substantial pressures of this type. Responses of organizations in the ‘high‐pressure’ regimes were varied, but the overall pattern was consistent with a mixture of an autopoietic and staged‐response hypothesis stressing blame prevention. The chapter presents a hybrid ‘Catherine‐wheel’ model of the observed pattern and concludes by discussing the implications for policy outcomes.Less
Moves away from explaining the comparative statics of risk regulation regimes and explores what happens when regimes are under pressure to change, and, in particular, when they are under presure for greater openness and transparency. The chapter develops a style‐phase model of staged organizational responses to external pressure for change and compares its predictive value against two competing hypotheses. Examination of the nine case‐study risk regulation regimes reveals that, contrary to the common belief that such pressures are all pervasive, less than half were exposed to substantial pressures of this type. Responses of organizations in the ‘high‐pressure’ regimes were varied, but the overall pattern was consistent with a mixture of an autopoietic and staged‐response hypothesis stressing blame prevention. The chapter presents a hybrid ‘Catherine‐wheel’ model of the observed pattern and concludes by discussing the implications for policy outcomes.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the ...
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To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.Less
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.
Michael McKenna
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199740031
- eISBN:
- 9780199918706
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740031.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General
This chapter attends to questions of scope. The conversational theory explains blaming on analogy with a conversational response. Central to the explanation is the relation between blamer and blamed. ...
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This chapter attends to questions of scope. The conversational theory explains blaming on analogy with a conversational response. Central to the explanation is the relation between blamer and blamed. But we often blame in the absence of the blamed, for example, blaming the dead. The theory explains these cases as parasitic on the fundamental cases in which blame is able to take on its communicative role as a response to the one blamed. Yet a different question of scope has to do with the range of things a person can be responsible for. Some contend that an agent is only blameworthy for acts that involve violations of moral obligations or moral wrongdoing. Others claim that one can be blameworthy for bad or vicious acts as well. An even more inclusive view is that one can also be blameworthy for the nonvoluntary, such as character traits not freely acquired. The conversational theory makes room for the inclusive view while attempting to accommodate the intuitive support for the more restrictive thesis. Just as different kinds of conversations have different norms that are more or less restrictive, so too our moral responsibility practices have different norms, some more and some less restrictive.Less
This chapter attends to questions of scope. The conversational theory explains blaming on analogy with a conversational response. Central to the explanation is the relation between blamer and blamed. But we often blame in the absence of the blamed, for example, blaming the dead. The theory explains these cases as parasitic on the fundamental cases in which blame is able to take on its communicative role as a response to the one blamed. Yet a different question of scope has to do with the range of things a person can be responsible for. Some contend that an agent is only blameworthy for acts that involve violations of moral obligations or moral wrongdoing. Others claim that one can be blameworthy for bad or vicious acts as well. An even more inclusive view is that one can also be blameworthy for the nonvoluntary, such as character traits not freely acquired. The conversational theory makes room for the inclusive view while attempting to accommodate the intuitive support for the more restrictive thesis. Just as different kinds of conversations have different norms that are more or less restrictive, so too our moral responsibility practices have different norms, some more and some less restrictive.
David Owens
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199691500
- eISBN:
- 9780191744938
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative ...
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This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises, give our consent, etc. our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. This book describes how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship, and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of human agency and the nature of social convention.Less
This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises, give our consent, etc. our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. This book describes how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship, and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of human agency and the nature of social convention.
Nomy Arpaly
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195152043
- eISBN:
- 9780199785780
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195152042.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against ...
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This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).Less
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on whether deontologism — the view that justification is to be understood in terms of concepts such as duty, obligation, and blame — entails internalism. If it does, then ...
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This chapter focuses on whether deontologism — the view that justification is to be understood in terms of concepts such as duty, obligation, and blame — entails internalism. If it does, then internalists could still avail themselves of this deontological motivation for internalism despite the argument made in Chapter 1, that internalists endorsing the weak awareness requirement lose the main motivation for their view. It is argued that deontologism does not entail internalism. An explanation is offered for why philosophers are misled into thinking it does.Less
This chapter focuses on whether deontologism — the view that justification is to be understood in terms of concepts such as duty, obligation, and blame — entails internalism. If it does, then internalists could still avail themselves of this deontological motivation for internalism despite the argument made in Chapter 1, that internalists endorsing the weak awareness requirement lose the main motivation for their view. It is argued that deontologism does not entail internalism. An explanation is offered for why philosophers are misled into thinking it does.
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243631
- eISBN:
- 9780191599507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243638.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Rehearses what the regime perspective can do for enhancing our understanding of how risk regulation varies, works, and fails. Drawing on the preceeding analysis, the chapter identifies three key ...
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Rehearses what the regime perspective can do for enhancing our understanding of how risk regulation varies, works, and fails. Drawing on the preceeding analysis, the chapter identifies three key problems central to contemporary risk regulation. First, the chapter argues that many of the regimes studied in the book were afflicted by limited institutional coherence, with basic constituent components either missing, malfunctioning or poorly linked. Second, the chapter argues that contemporary trends to reform risk regulation regimes need to take greater account of blame‐avoidance imperatives in the institutional shaping of reform processes. Third, the chapter identifies some of the challenges and intractabilities of actually doing risk regulation, which are often overlooked by commonly cited but rarely followed principles of better regulation. The book concludes with an overall assessment of what future developments in regime analysis might promise for our further understanding of risk regulation.Less
Rehearses what the regime perspective can do for enhancing our understanding of how risk regulation varies, works, and fails. Drawing on the preceeding analysis, the chapter identifies three key problems central to contemporary risk regulation. First, the chapter argues that many of the regimes studied in the book were afflicted by limited institutional coherence, with basic constituent components either missing, malfunctioning or poorly linked. Second, the chapter argues that contemporary trends to reform risk regulation regimes need to take greater account of blame‐avoidance imperatives in the institutional shaping of reform processes. Third, the chapter identifies some of the challenges and intractabilities of actually doing risk regulation, which are often overlooked by commonly cited but rarely followed principles of better regulation. The book concludes with an overall assessment of what future developments in regime analysis might promise for our further understanding of risk regulation.
R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753673
- eISBN:
- 9780199918829
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
A collection of fifteen new papers on themes from the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. The contributions include discussions of issues in metaethics and the theory of value (reasons and reasoning, ...
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A collection of fifteen new papers on themes from the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. The contributions include discussions of issues in metaethics and the theory of value (reasons and reasoning, valuing, desire and action); normative ethics (contractualism, aggregation, promising, tolerance); political philosophy (conservatism, global justice, freedom of expression, distribution), and the theory of responsibility (psychopathy, blame, and opprobrium). Contributors: Christine M. Korsgaard, Samuel Scheffler, Niko Kolodny, Michael Smith, Pamela Hieronymi, Rahul Kumar, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Angela M. Smith, G. A. Cohen, Charles R. Beitz, Joshua Cohen, Aaron James, Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, and R. Jay Wallace. Together, the papers contribute to a deeper understanding of Scanlon’s views, while advancing the discussion of the important issues addressed in his ground-breaking work.Less
A collection of fifteen new papers on themes from the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. The contributions include discussions of issues in metaethics and the theory of value (reasons and reasoning, valuing, desire and action); normative ethics (contractualism, aggregation, promising, tolerance); political philosophy (conservatism, global justice, freedom of expression, distribution), and the theory of responsibility (psychopathy, blame, and opprobrium). Contributors: Christine M. Korsgaard, Samuel Scheffler, Niko Kolodny, Michael Smith, Pamela Hieronymi, Rahul Kumar, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Angela M. Smith, G. A. Cohen, Charles R. Beitz, Joshua Cohen, Aaron James, Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, and R. Jay Wallace. Together, the papers contribute to a deeper understanding of Scanlon’s views, while advancing the discussion of the important issues addressed in his ground-breaking work.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter sets the stage for a discussion of blame by asking how a world that did not contain it would differ from our world. The chapter poses the problems that the remainder of the book attempts ...
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This chapter sets the stage for a discussion of blame by asking how a world that did not contain it would differ from our world. The chapter poses the problems that the remainder of the book attempts to resolve and outlines the arguments of the chapters to come.Less
This chapter sets the stage for a discussion of blame by asking how a world that did not contain it would differ from our world. The chapter poses the problems that the remainder of the book attempts to resolve and outlines the arguments of the chapters to come.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines the Humean thesis that agents can only be blamed for their bad acts insofar as those acts are manifestations of defects in their characters. Several versions of this thesis are ...
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This chapter examines the Humean thesis that agents can only be blamed for their bad acts insofar as those acts are manifestations of defects in their characters. Several versions of this thesis are distinguished and criticized. The criticisms include both the familiar charge that the Humean can’t explain how someone can deserve blame for an act whose badness is “out of character” and the less familiar charge that on the Humean account, the badness of the act itself drops out as irrelevant. It is argued, however, that although Hume was wrong to say that every blameworthy act reflects a flaw in the agent’s character, it may be right to say that every blameworthy act is rooted in the agent’s character.Less
This chapter examines the Humean thesis that agents can only be blamed for their bad acts insofar as those acts are manifestations of defects in their characters. Several versions of this thesis are distinguished and criticized. The criticisms include both the familiar charge that the Humean can’t explain how someone can deserve blame for an act whose badness is “out of character” and the less familiar charge that on the Humean account, the badness of the act itself drops out as irrelevant. It is argued, however, that although Hume was wrong to say that every blameworthy act reflects a flaw in the agent’s character, it may be right to say that every blameworthy act is rooted in the agent’s character.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter exploits the insight that emerged in the previous chapter — that a bad act may be rooted in an agent’s character without manifesting a defect in that character — to explain how an act’s ...
More
This chapter exploits the insight that emerged in the previous chapter — that a bad act may be rooted in an agent’s character without manifesting a defect in that character — to explain how an act’s badness can render an agent blameworthy. According to this explanation, the crucial fact is that the act’s bad-making features can be traced to the interplay of the very same desires, beliefs, and dispositions that also make the agent the person he is. By assigning character this reduced but still substantial role, we can preserve what is important about Hume’s account while avoiding his errors.Less
This chapter exploits the insight that emerged in the previous chapter — that a bad act may be rooted in an agent’s character without manifesting a defect in that character — to explain how an act’s badness can render an agent blameworthy. According to this explanation, the crucial fact is that the act’s bad-making features can be traced to the interplay of the very same desires, beliefs, and dispositions that also make the agent the person he is. By assigning character this reduced but still substantial role, we can preserve what is important about Hume’s account while avoiding his errors.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The main thesis of this chapter is that agents can be blamed for their bad traits as well as for their bad acts. Because we often cannot help being the sorts of people we are, this thesis is ...
More
The main thesis of this chapter is that agents can be blamed for their bad traits as well as for their bad acts. Because we often cannot help being the sorts of people we are, this thesis is inconsistent with the view that agents can only be blamed for what is (or once was) within their control. However, although that view is widely held, its grounding is not well understood. The chapter’s main argument is that no version of it that applies to traits (as opposed to acts) is defensible.Less
The main thesis of this chapter is that agents can be blamed for their bad traits as well as for their bad acts. Because we often cannot help being the sorts of people we are, this thesis is inconsistent with the view that agents can only be blamed for what is (or once was) within their control. However, although that view is widely held, its grounding is not well understood. The chapter’s main argument is that no version of it that applies to traits (as opposed to acts) is defensible.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter asks what blaming someone adds to believing that he has acted badly. It examines three of the most popular accounts of the additional element: roughly, those which construe it as a ...
More
This chapter asks what blaming someone adds to believing that he has acted badly. It examines three of the most popular accounts of the additional element: roughly, those which construe it as a public expression of one’s disapproval, as a belief that the agent’s misdeeds have marred his moral record, and as a negative emotional reaction. Of these familiar accounts, each is shown to be inadequate.Less
This chapter asks what blaming someone adds to believing that he has acted badly. It examines three of the most popular accounts of the additional element: roughly, those which construe it as a public expression of one’s disapproval, as a belief that the agent’s misdeeds have marred his moral record, and as a negative emotional reaction. Of these familiar accounts, each is shown to be inadequate.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops a new account of what blame adds to the belief that someone has acted badly. According to the proposed account, the additional element consists of a set of dispositions (to ...
More
This chapter develops a new account of what blame adds to the belief that someone has acted badly. According to the proposed account, the additional element consists of a set of dispositions (to become angry, express one’s disapproval, and the like) which are explained by the combination of the belief that the agent has acted badly and a desire that he not have done so. Unlike most desires, this one is oriented to the past rather than the future. Nevertheless, it remains a source of motivation that is capable of accounting for the blame-constituting dispositions.Less
This chapter develops a new account of what blame adds to the belief that someone has acted badly. According to the proposed account, the additional element consists of a set of dispositions (to become angry, express one’s disapproval, and the like) which are explained by the combination of the belief that the agent has acted badly and a desire that he not have done so. Unlike most desires, this one is oriented to the past rather than the future. Nevertheless, it remains a source of motivation that is capable of accounting for the blame-constituting dispositions.
