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This chapter concentrates on black propaganda in order to assess its contribution to the overall propaganda effort for France. It also describes the machinery for the production of black propaganda, the methods of distribution, the messages it carried and reactions to it. It was reported that the production of ‘black’ leaflets diminished considerably in April 1944. Black propaganda could not be distributed in the same way as white propaganda. Aerial leaflets were definitely distributed using black techniques, both unchanged and miniaturised, specifically ‘for infiltration purposes’. As with the other elements of Political Warfare Executive (PWE)'s black propaganda work, the material available concerning rumours is patchy. Black leaflets, including the distribution of white leaflets using black techniques, had a potentially disruptive effect on the Germans or Vichy authorities. The contribution made by PWE's black radio stations broadcasting to France is more easily assessed.

This chapter describes machinery in order to show the creation and development of the British propaganda system, first presenting the background provided by the First World War and inter-war treatment of propaganda and its consequences on planning prior to 1939. It then discusses the development of the propaganda organisation after the outbreak of the Second World War. The legacy of First World War activities affected attitudes towards propaganda and influenced inter-war British planning. The establishment of Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was ‘the logical outcome of the initial lack of proper planning for enemy propaganda before World War Two broke out’. PWE's black propaganda to France was less offensive, but secrecy remained important. Different elements of 1930s planning were carried out in isolation from each other, so that only after the outbreak of the Second World War could the conflicts created be revealed and resolved.

This chapter discusses several instances when black-and-white propaganda were employed. Despite the Cabinet committee's sudden reluctance to suspend the BBC Charter, Duff Cooper's control of white propaganda was taking shape. He told Dalton he would ‘tie up the Ministry and the BBC into what is really one team’. This chapter explores some danger that the propaganda debate might get into the newspapers. When the invasion of Russia began on June 22, it was already likely that whatever concessions the MOI obtained from the Services would not be important. In any case, the invasion prevented the political crisis in Britain which Monckton had expected in the event of a closer Nazi-Soviet alliance. It notes that propaganda was not so strictly tied to British military credibility, that is, to ‘news control’.

The Morale Operations section of the OSS recruited Asian Americans with the requisite skills in media communications. They hired individuals to help with propaganda materials aimed at two targets. One was to the Chinese public, to help stiffen their resolve to resist the Imperial Japanese forces. The other was aimed at the Japanese public and Imperial Japanese military personnel, to weaken their morale and willingness to continue with the war. The means of communication was in print or over the radio. For the former, some were graphic artists and employed to design cartoons and other pictorial representations for those not sufficiently literate in the Chinese language. Others were experienced typesetters and printers. Still others were writers who produced propaganda leaflets that Morale Operations distributed throughout the countryside in China.