Search Results

From Medical Research to Biological Warfare

Paul Julian Weindling

in Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945

Campaigns against insects in the east became entwined with preparations for biological warfare. The idea of unleashing disease pathogens to destroy Nazi Germany's enemies fascinated disinfection ... More

Campaigns against insects in the east became entwined with preparations for biological warfare. The idea of unleashing disease pathogens to destroy Nazi Germany's enemies fascinated disinfection experts, for it seemed to them that if a disease could be prevented, it should also be possible for epidemics to be deliberately spread. The fear that Germany's opponents were stockpiling arsenals of biological and chemical weapons spurred on offensive preparations. Consequently, disease control programmes became radicalized, shifting from containment and prevention to strategies for total eradication of pathogens and their carriers. Whereas the Germans clung to delousing by poison gas, the Allies adopted innovative DDT-based methods, and accelerated louse- and mosquito-control studies. Ironically, Germany's development of biological warfare remained stunted. Leading figures in biological warfare profoundly disagreed over theoretical approaches to epidemiology. As the German sanitary measures became more draconian, they accelerated genocide.Less

Stereotypical Neglect of Military Research, Development, and Acquisition for Biodefense

Frank L. Smith

in American Biodefense: How Dangerous Ideas about Biological Weapons Shape National Security

This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the ... More

This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the period between World War II and the Iraq War. The U.S. military initially resisted the idea of biological warfare and assigned it to the Chemical Warfare Service despite all of the differences between chemical weapons and biological weapons. Moreover, inaccuracies inherent to the stereotype of “chemical and biological weapons” caused problems for offense as well as defense, and these ideas even influenced President Richard Nixon's decision to end the offensive biological weapons program in 1969. U.S. investment in biodefense soon hit record lows, which helps explain why General Schwarzkopf was unprepared for biological weapons during the Gulf War.Less

A Brief History of Bioterrorism

William R. Clark

in Bracing for Armageddon?: The Science and Politics of Bioterrorism in America

Chapter 2 traces the history of bioterrorism in the US and eldewhere, beginning with the Rajneeshee episode in Oregon in 1985. The unsuccessful Aum Shinrikyo forays into bioterrorism in Japan in the ... More

Chapter 2 traces the history of bioterrorism in the US and eldewhere, beginning with the Rajneeshee episode in Oregon in 1985. The unsuccessful Aum Shinrikyo forays into bioterrorism in Japan in the 1980s-90s are also reviewed. The postal anthrax attacks of 2001 are discussed in detail, along with activities of organizations such as the Minnesota Patriots Council and individuals like Larry Wayne Harris. With the exception of the postal anthrax attacks, these incidents caused few deaths, and very few serious injuries. A discussion of bioterrorism vs. biocrime is presented.Less

Case Study: Biological Weapons Verification

Caroline Fehl

in Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism

The verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention is the subject of the last case study. In the negotiations over this agreement, European advocates of intrusive verification were ready ... More

The verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention is the subject of the last case study. In the negotiations over this agreement, European advocates of intrusive verification were ready to weaken key provisions to win US support. When the new Bush administration rejected even the watered-down draft, they abandoned the initiative altogether. The chapter argues that effectiveness concerns explain the concessions made in the original negotiations, since a loss of US support threatened to alienate key third countries suspected of BWC violations. After the US rejection, however, European decision-makers had to choose between two equally unattractive outcomes, a protocol with limited membership and an abandonment of the process. That they preferred the latter option was explained in part by their fear of competitive disadvantages for European biotechnical companies, and in part by the strong norm of transatlantic consensus that prevailed on this ‘hard security’ issue.Less

Pandemic Disease, Biological Weapons, and War

Lawrence Douglas, Austin Sarat, and Laura K. Donohue

in Law and War

Broadly historical in its perspective, Laura Donohue tells a story of the blurring of categories. From the founding of the Republic through the end of the twentieth century, the legal authority to ... More

Broadly historical in its perspective, Laura Donohue tells a story of the blurring of categories. From the founding of the Republic through the end of the twentieth century, the legal authority to respond to the threat of pandemic disease dramatically shifted from the police powers of the states to those of the federal government. The events of 9/11, however, triggered a shift in thinking, as the threat posed by disease has more recently come to be seen through a “national security framework” and “through the lens of war.” Donohue worries that as categories continue to blur, the consequences will be difficult to foresee and control. Were a pandemic to strike the United States, the initial chaos would make it all but impossible to determine whether the outbreak was caused by natural factors or by a purposive act of biowarfare/terrorism. In either case, the response would require the coordinated efforts of institutions of civilian governance and the military.Less

Microbes for War and Peace: On the Military Origins of Containment

Melanie Armstrong

in Germ Wars: The Politics of Microbes and America's Landscape of Fear

When the U.S. military created a bioweapons research program at Fort Detrick, Maryland, following World War II, it enlisted microbiology in the production of modern warfare. Biological weapons ... More

When the U.S. military created a bioweapons research program at Fort Detrick, Maryland, following World War II, it enlisted microbiology in the production of modern warfare. Biological weapons magnify the potential of germs to harm humans, remaking the terms of risk to account for natures that have been engineered to be more contagious, fatal, and far-reaching. This alliance between war and science also bracketed certain ways of knowing nature by creating spaces and mechanisms to control microbes according to human desires. Beyond the weapon itself, bioweapons research promulgated knowledge of containment, designing top-secret, high-security laboratory spaces for the safe study of deadly microbes, thereby materializing the belief that microbes must (and could) be contained.Less

War: from humanitarian relief to prevention

Douglas Holdstock

in International Co-operation in Health

This chapter examines the impact of war on health. It begins by considering the health impact and response to specific types of weapons, and the role of the arms trade. It then discusses the broader ... More

This chapter examines the impact of war on health. It begins by considering the health impact and response to specific types of weapons, and the role of the arms trade. It then discusses the broader political changes need for a war-free — that is, stable — global society.Less

Arms Dynamics, the Changing Threat Environment, and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Prohibition Regimes

in Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race

This chapter presents a description on the efficiency of an measure of arms control. The threat environment and the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes are then explored. The ... More

This chapter presents a description on the efficiency of an measure of arms control. The threat environment and the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes are then explored. The evolution of biological warfare agents are regarded in three phases: traditional biological weapons agents, genetically modified traditional agents, and advanced biological warfare (ABW) agents. It is noted that the nature of the revolution in the life sciences is favoring early adoption of advanced biological warfare agents by states and not by substate actors. The increased biodefense-related activities should also be considered as part of the biological weapons proliferation problem itself. Finally, an overview of the chapters included in this book is given.Less

On the Brink of Bacteriological War: Stalin’s BW Programme and the Second World War

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

During the 1930s, a series of reports generated by both German and Soviet intelligence fueled increasing alarm with regard to the perceived BW capabilities allegedly being developed by their ... More

During the 1930s, a series of reports generated by both German and Soviet intelligence fueled increasing alarm with regard to the perceived BW capabilities allegedly being developed by their potential opponents. After the onset of the Second World War, if either side was going to break the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of gas and bacteriological warfare, to which they had both agreed to abide, then 1942 was the most likely year. However, a number of prominent scholars have strongly disputed Alibek’s account of the deliberate aerosol dissemination of tularemia by the Red Army at Stalingrad in the late summer of 1942. The occasional use by Soviet-supported partisans of biological agents against the German occupation forces is better documented but there is no evidence that these attacks formed part of a wider, centrally coordinated, campaign of biological sabotage by the Soviet authorities.Less

Threats to the CBW Prohibition Regimes: Biodefense Pushed Too Far

in Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race

This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other ... More

This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.Less

Origins: The Launch of the Moscow Strand of the Red Army’s Offensive Biological Warfare Programme

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

Although unprecedented in scale and ambition, Stalin’s offensive biological warfare program was not an isolated phenomenon. It can instead be viewed as a response to, and extension of, the biological ... More

Although unprecedented in scale and ambition, Stalin’s offensive biological warfare program was not an isolated phenomenon. It can instead be viewed as a response to, and extension of, the biological sabotage programs pursued during the First World War by Germany. During the nearly three-decade period of Stalin’s leadership (1924-1953), two distinct, and highly compartmentalized, components of the Soviet Union’s offensive biological warfare program are in evidence. The main strand was launched by the Red Army in Moscow in 1926 and is very well-documented with numerous archival and secondary sources available. There is in addition a second, earlier and much more ephemeral strand, which is based in Leningrad, which was mainly concealed within the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Health (RSFSR Narkomzdrav) and the Red Army’s Military-Medical Academy.Less

The Soviet Union’s Enigma BW Programme: Military-Biological Research in Leningrad

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

The British Secret Intelligence Service identified the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Health (RSFSR Narkomzdrav) as being the main agency within which ostensibly civil facilities engaged in offensive ... More

The British Secret Intelligence Service identified the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Health (RSFSR Narkomzdrav) as being the main agency within which ostensibly civil facilities engaged in offensive biological warfare work were concealed. Significant funds for BW research were channeled from RSFSR Narkomzdrav to the Plague Fort at Kronstadt and to other laboratories in Leningrad. Semen Ivanovich Zlatogorov, who had participated in Russian efforts to combat the October 1910 to February 1911 outbreak of pneumonic plague in Manchuria, and had subsequently emerged as one of the world’s leading authorities on pneumonic plague, was the lead scientist heading up BW research in Leningrad. The key institution operating closely alongside the Narkomzdrav facilities appears to have been the Red Army’s Military-Medical Academy.Less

From Defence to Offence: The Development of the Red Army’s Biological Warfare Facilities at Vlasikha

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

In April 1934 Stalin called a key meeting of the Politburo to hear reports relating to Soviet biological weapons programs. At the end of the meeting he concluded that all facilities working in the ... More

In April 1934 Stalin called a key meeting of the Politburo to hear reports relating to Soviet biological weapons programs. At the end of the meeting he concluded that all facilities working in the area of biological warfare should be combined within “a single powerful institute”. The Soviet Union’s BW facilities were at this point transferred to the Red Army’s Military-Chemical Directorate where they were absorbed into the Biochemical Institute at Vlasikha. In March 1935 Stalin called a second meeting focused on the Soviet BW program. Here he clashed with Demikhovskii, one of the leading scientists, who, as a consequence, was to be excluded from further participation in military biological projects.Less

From Shikhany to Vozrozhdenie Island: The Selection of Open-Air Proving Grounds for the Soviet Offensive BW Programme

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

A key requirement with regard to the Soviet Union’s preparedness for biological warfare was the identification of a location—preferably an island—for use in field tests of bacteriological agents. ... More

A key requirement with regard to the Soviet Union’s preparedness for biological warfare was the identification of a location—preferably an island—for use in field tests of bacteriological agents. Initially, the Red Army made use of the Central Army Chemical Proving Ground at Shikhany and carried out a range of tests on BW simulants. The risks and difficulties associated with BW tests at Shikhany, especially the proximity of the town of Volsk to the proving ground, eventually led to the transfer of this work to the newly established biological proving ground on the highly remote Vozrozhdenie Island in the Aral Sea.Less

Stalin’s BW Archipelago: Mapping-Out a New Post-War BW Network

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

During the immediate post-war period, Lavrentiy Beria, the Soviet minister of internal affairs, continued to maintain control of the Soviet biological warfare program and to further develop its ... More

During the immediate post-war period, Lavrentiy Beria, the Soviet minister of internal affairs, continued to maintain control of the Soviet biological warfare program and to further develop its offensive capabilities. In his new role, Beria and his staff had access to biological weapons specialists captured as a result of the Soviet victory in the Second World War. In the post-war period, Beria maintained the NIIEG facility at remote Kirov as the key hub of the Soviet BW program. During the period 1947 to 1949, a new military BW facility was spun off from the Kirov institute. Based in Sverdlovsk it was known as the USSR Ministry of Defense’s Scientific-Research Institute of Hygiene. In 1953, a third military BW facility, the Scientific-Research Sanitary Institute, was created at Zagorsk. The Vozrozhdenie Island open-air BW proving ground was also expanded after the war.Less

The Rise and Fall of a Working-Class Hero: Ivan Mikhailovich Velikanov, Lead Scientist of the Soviet Union’s Offensive BW Programme

Anthony Rimmington

in Stalin's Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare

In July 1937, the lead scientist of the Soviet Union’s offensive BW program, Ivan Mikhailovich Velikanov, was one of a large number of prominent biological warfare specialists to be arrested by the ... More

In July 1937, the lead scientist of the Soviet Union’s offensive BW program, Ivan Mikhailovich Velikanov, was one of a large number of prominent biological warfare specialists to be arrested by the security organs during the mass repression (dubbed the Great Terror) instigated by Stalin. After his execution in April 1938, Velikanov was effectively airbrushed out of the history of Soviet microbiology. One of the most interesting aspects of developments in Russia’s current military biological network is an attempt by the authorities to create a new institutional memory of the early Soviet BW program, with Velikanov, one of the outstanding microbiologists of his generation, at the very heart of the new historical account.Less

Producing Immunity across the Hinterlands

Mary Augusta Brazelton

in Mass Vaccination: Citizens' Bodies and State Power in Modern China

This chapter surveys the history of vaccine research and development in China's wartime hinterlands during the early years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, considering first a major project launched ... More

This chapter surveys the history of vaccine research and development in China's wartime hinterlands during the early years of the Second Sino-Japanese War, considering first a major project launched by the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) and then, in turn, the major cities of Chongqing, Guiyang, and Lanzhou. Although urban areas were not the only places where medical researchers, students, and administrators worked, they were significant hubs for coordination and exchange. The development of vaccine production in cities coincided with the deployment of new and coercive strategies for immunization, reflecting the ongoing militarization of Chinese society. Yet many urban dwellers welcomed vaccination as a means of defending themselves against disease at a time when the Japanese offensive threatened to cause epidemic catastrophe both directly, through biological warfare, and indirectly, by causing large-scale migrations of refugees and soldiers across the country. Attempts to establish a certification system that connected immunization status to free passage on ships and roads suggested the increasing importance of biology to individual rights and freedoms in wartime China.Less