Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207077
- eISBN:
- 9780191708909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential ...
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This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential account). It argues that modularity is a property of biological systems quite generally, and of animal minds in particular. It also defends the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific research program. The chapter criticizes Fodor’s argument that encapsulated forms of modularity are a requirement of computational tractability, arguing that the latter can be assured through the use of various kinds of cognitive heuristic.Less
This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential account). It argues that modularity is a property of biological systems quite generally, and of animal minds in particular. It also defends the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific research program. The chapter criticizes Fodor’s argument that encapsulated forms of modularity are a requirement of computational tractability, arguing that the latter can be assured through the use of various kinds of cognitive heuristic.
