Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter defends a commitment to an ontology of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and ...
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This chapter defends a commitment to an ontology of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and restricted conception of parthood and composition outlined in the previous chapter. The special case of natural kinds is intended as an illustration of how a commitment to a certain class of kinds in general, or to specific kinds among them, may be generated on the basis of extra-mereological considerations. The belief in the existence of natural kinds, for example, may be supported by an appeal to their role in prediction and explanation; particularly noteworthy in this respect is the weight borne by scientific natural kinds (e.g., physical, chemical and biological kinds) in (i) inductive arguments, (ii) the laws of nature, and (iii) causal explanations.Less
This chapter defends a commitment to an ontology of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and restricted conception of parthood and composition outlined in the previous chapter. The special case of natural kinds is intended as an illustration of how a commitment to a certain class of kinds in general, or to specific kinds among them, may be generated on the basis of extra-mereological considerations. The belief in the existence of natural kinds, for example, may be supported by an appeal to their role in prediction and explanation; particularly noteworthy in this respect is the weight borne by scientific natural kinds (e.g., physical, chemical and biological kinds) in (i) inductive arguments, (ii) the laws of nature, and (iii) causal explanations.
David Charles
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256730
- eISBN:
- 9780191597183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925673X.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle's account of essences is distinct from that offered by Platonists (who do not give such a central role to causal explanation) and by scientific realists (for whom definitions are solely ...
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Aristotle's account of essences is distinct from that offered by Platonists (who do not give such a central role to causal explanation) and by scientific realists (for whom definitions are solely dependent on real‐world patterns of causal explanation). Further, while Aristotle's essences are part of the fabric of reality, they can be grasped only by those with certain definitional and explanatory practices. Thus, his account differs from (amongst others) that of the Platonist (for whom essences can be discovered by any mind, independently of its definitional practices). Standard criticisms of Aristotle's essentialism (such as those that are to be found in the writings of John Locke or W.V.O. Quine) are, I argue, misdirected against a Platonist Aristotle of legend and do not successfully engage with Aristotle's own account.Less
Aristotle's account of essences is distinct from that offered by Platonists (who do not give such a central role to causal explanation) and by scientific realists (for whom definitions are solely dependent on real‐world patterns of causal explanation). Further, while Aristotle's essences are part of the fabric of reality, they can be grasped only by those with certain definitional and explanatory practices. Thus, his account differs from (amongst others) that of the Platonist (for whom essences can be discovered by any mind, independently of its definitional practices). Standard criticisms of Aristotle's essentialism (such as those that are to be found in the writings of John Locke or W.V.O. Quine) are, I argue, misdirected against a Platonist Aristotle of legend and do not successfully engage with Aristotle's own account.
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015936
- eISBN:
- 9780262298780
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Contemporary discussions of the success of science often invoke an ancient metaphor from Plato’s Phaedrus: successful theories should “carve nature at its joints,” but is nature really “jointed?” Are ...
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Contemporary discussions of the success of science often invoke an ancient metaphor from Plato’s Phaedrus: successful theories should “carve nature at its joints,” but is nature really “jointed?” Are there natural kinds of things around which our theories cut? This book offers reflections by a group of philosophers on a series of intertwined issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of classification. The chapters consider such topics as the relevance of natural kinds in inductive inference; the role of natural kinds in natural laws; the nature of fundamental properties; the naturalness of boundaries; the metaphysics and epistemology of biological kinds; and the relevance of biological kinds to certain questions in ethics.Less
Contemporary discussions of the success of science often invoke an ancient metaphor from Plato’s Phaedrus: successful theories should “carve nature at its joints,” but is nature really “jointed?” Are there natural kinds of things around which our theories cut? This book offers reflections by a group of philosophers on a series of intertwined issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of classification. The chapters consider such topics as the relevance of natural kinds in inductive inference; the role of natural kinds in natural laws; the nature of fundamental properties; the naturalness of boundaries; the metaphysics and epistemology of biological kinds; and the relevance of biological kinds to certain questions in ethics.