Frank L. III Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for ...
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Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001, the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S. military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks? This book addresses this puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and national security. The book argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have caused both military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. In the armed services, influential ideas about kinetic warfare have undermined defense against biological warfare. The influence of these ideas on science and technology challenges the conventional wisdom that national security policy is driven by threats or bureaucratic interests. Given the ideas at work inside the U.S. military, the book explains how the lessons learned from biodefense can help solve other important problems that range from radiation weapons to cyber attacks.Less
Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001, the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S. military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks? This book addresses this puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and national security. The book argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have caused both military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. In the armed services, influential ideas about kinetic warfare have undermined defense against biological warfare. The influence of these ideas on science and technology challenges the conventional wisdom that national security policy is driven by threats or bureaucratic interests. Given the ideas at work inside the U.S. military, the book explains how the lessons learned from biodefense can help solve other important problems that range from radiation weapons to cyber attacks.
Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195311181
- eISBN:
- 9780199865086
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311181.003.0009
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter describes the use of biological weapons over time and current efforts to identify and control biological weapons. It discusses in depth anthrax, plague, tularemia, botulism, smallpox, ...
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This chapter describes the use of biological weapons over time and current efforts to identify and control biological weapons. It discusses in depth anthrax, plague, tularemia, botulism, smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers. It describes the case against plans for a biodefense research laboratory.Less
This chapter describes the use of biological weapons over time and current efforts to identify and control biological weapons. It discusses in depth anthrax, plague, tularemia, botulism, smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers. It describes the case against plans for a biodefense research laboratory.
Robert I. Field
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195159684
- eISBN:
- 9780199864423
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159684.003.0006
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter considers regulatory programs that protect public health. As the earliest form of health care regulation, it has evolved in several significant regards. Nineteenth century programs based ...
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This chapter considers regulatory programs that protect public health. As the earliest form of health care regulation, it has evolved in several significant regards. Nineteenth century programs based at the state and local levels focused on infectious threats through such efforts as improved sanitation, safe drinking water, quarantine, and vaccination. The federal role grew in the early and mid-20th century through programs such as public health service hospitals, food safety enforcement, and epidemiological monitoring by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Late 20th century programs shifted the regulatory focus to chronic conditions with programs that addressed environmental protection, occupational safety and health, and mental health. A host of major policy issues remain, including how to achieve the best balance between federal and state authority, between population and individual health, between acute and chronic diseases, and between reliance on the public and private sectors.Less
This chapter considers regulatory programs that protect public health. As the earliest form of health care regulation, it has evolved in several significant regards. Nineteenth century programs based at the state and local levels focused on infectious threats through such efforts as improved sanitation, safe drinking water, quarantine, and vaccination. The federal role grew in the early and mid-20th century through programs such as public health service hospitals, food safety enforcement, and epidemiological monitoring by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Late 20th century programs shifted the regulatory focus to chronic conditions with programs that addressed environmental protection, occupational safety and health, and mental health. A host of major policy issues remain, including how to achieve the best balance between federal and state authority, between population and individual health, between acute and chronic diseases, and between reliance on the public and private sectors.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804782753
- eISBN:
- 9780804786157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804782753.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other ...
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This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.Less
This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.
Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226444055
- eISBN:
- 9780226444079
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226444079.003.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Biotechnology
This chapter provides an overview of the dangerous future posed by the threats in the name of biosecurity, which is very complex because there are no simple solutions for it, but there are only ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the dangerous future posed by the threats in the name of biosecurity, which is very complex because there are no simple solutions for it, but there are only realistic strategies that can reduce the threats. In the years following 9/11, the United States has poured out billions of dollars for massive expansion of high-biosecurity labs. Perhaps a quarter of the nearly $50 billion in the U.S. biodefense program goes to research and developing bioweapons countermeasures such as antibiotics, antivirals, antidotes, and vaccines, in a rush to protect the nation from bioterrorism. These federal biodefense activities in the name of security in fact are putting everyone at ever-greater risk. Thus, informed citizens must distinguish between policy proposals that build protection against genuine public health threats and those that use fear and alarmist tactics to lead away from biosecurity while claiming to protect.Less
This chapter provides an overview of the dangerous future posed by the threats in the name of biosecurity, which is very complex because there are no simple solutions for it, but there are only realistic strategies that can reduce the threats. In the years following 9/11, the United States has poured out billions of dollars for massive expansion of high-biosecurity labs. Perhaps a quarter of the nearly $50 billion in the U.S. biodefense program goes to research and developing bioweapons countermeasures such as antibiotics, antivirals, antidotes, and vaccines, in a rush to protect the nation from bioterrorism. These federal biodefense activities in the name of security in fact are putting everyone at ever-greater risk. Thus, informed citizens must distinguish between policy proposals that build protection against genuine public health threats and those that use fear and alarmist tactics to lead away from biosecurity while claiming to protect.
Thomas D. Beamish
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780804784429
- eISBN:
- 9780804794657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804784429.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies
The Introduction develops the context within which the federal government’s biodefense plans emerged and on which they were justified, including 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and the successive menace ...
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The Introduction develops the context within which the federal government’s biodefense plans emerged and on which they were justified, including 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and the successive menace presented by West Nile virus, SARS, and avian influenza and most recently Ebola. After discussing the context and moral panic that ensued over terrorism, which were used to justify the new federal biodefense agenda, the Introduction then turns to local manifestations of those plans and responses to them–the community cases whose civic responses are comparatively explored in Community at Risk. The Introduction then develops key terms and concepts that are relied on to investigate and understand the community cases as well as the research strategy deployed to gather relevant data, analyze it, and draw conclusions. The Introduction ends with a brief summary of how the book is organized by chapter.Less
The Introduction develops the context within which the federal government’s biodefense plans emerged and on which they were justified, including 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and the successive menace presented by West Nile virus, SARS, and avian influenza and most recently Ebola. After discussing the context and moral panic that ensued over terrorism, which were used to justify the new federal biodefense agenda, the Introduction then turns to local manifestations of those plans and responses to them–the community cases whose civic responses are comparatively explored in Community at Risk. The Introduction then develops key terms and concepts that are relied on to investigate and understand the community cases as well as the research strategy deployed to gather relevant data, analyze it, and draw conclusions. The Introduction ends with a brief summary of how the book is organized by chapter.
Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This introductory chapter provides a background of biodefense and biological weapons. Biological weapons harm only living organisms because they incapacitate or kill through disease instead of ...
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This introductory chapter provides a background of biodefense and biological weapons. Biological weapons harm only living organisms because they incapacitate or kill through disease instead of causing blunt or penetrating trauma. The damage that these weapons cause can be limited through a combination of medical countermeasures, detection and identification, and physical protection—the key components of biodefense. Physical protection limits exposure to infection through face masks and filters that reduce the risk of inhaling aerosolized biological weapon agents. Detection and identification involves sensors and surveillance to help determine when a biological attack has occurred and what pathogens might be present. Lastly, medical countermeasures can prevent or treat infection through prophylactic vaccines and therapeutic drugs such as antibiotics.Less
This introductory chapter provides a background of biodefense and biological weapons. Biological weapons harm only living organisms because they incapacitate or kill through disease instead of causing blunt or penetrating trauma. The damage that these weapons cause can be limited through a combination of medical countermeasures, detection and identification, and physical protection—the key components of biodefense. Physical protection limits exposure to infection through face masks and filters that reduce the risk of inhaling aerosolized biological weapon agents. Detection and identification involves sensors and surveillance to help determine when a biological attack has occurred and what pathogens might be present. Lastly, medical countermeasures can prevent or treat infection through prophylactic vaccines and therapeutic drugs such as antibiotics.
Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter describes the three explanations for biodefense—realism, bureaucratic interests, and organizational frames—that this book will test. First, realist theory predicts that the United States ...
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This chapter describes the three explanations for biodefense—realism, bureaucratic interests, and organizational frames—that this book will test. First, realist theory predicts that the United States will fear biological weapons and help protect itself through biodefense because the threat is credible. Bureaucratic interests predict that both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will compete for funding and autonomy. Drawing on the organizational frame theory, the chapter then identifies organizational frames and stereotypes regarding biodefense, illustrate the military's kinetic frame of reference, and explain why military biodefense is expected to be neglected as a result.Less
This chapter describes the three explanations for biodefense—realism, bureaucratic interests, and organizational frames—that this book will test. First, realist theory predicts that the United States will fear biological weapons and help protect itself through biodefense because the threat is credible. Bureaucratic interests predict that both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will compete for funding and autonomy. Drawing on the organizational frame theory, the chapter then identifies organizational frames and stereotypes regarding biodefense, illustrate the military's kinetic frame of reference, and explain why military biodefense is expected to be neglected as a result.
Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the ...
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This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the period between World War II and the Iraq War. The U.S. military initially resisted the idea of biological warfare and assigned it to the Chemical Warfare Service despite all of the differences between chemical weapons and biological weapons. Moreover, inaccuracies inherent to the stereotype of “chemical and biological weapons” caused problems for offense as well as defense, and these ideas even influenced President Richard Nixon's decision to end the offensive biological weapons program in 1969. U.S. investment in biodefense soon hit record lows, which helps explain why General Schwarzkopf was unprepared for biological weapons during the Gulf War.Less
This chapter examines the history of military research, development, and acquisition for biodefense, from pre-World War II through the 2003 Iraq War. Neglect in each area is evident throughout the period between World War II and the Iraq War. The U.S. military initially resisted the idea of biological warfare and assigned it to the Chemical Warfare Service despite all of the differences between chemical weapons and biological weapons. Moreover, inaccuracies inherent to the stereotype of “chemical and biological weapons” caused problems for offense as well as defense, and these ideas even influenced President Richard Nixon's decision to end the offensive biological weapons program in 1969. U.S. investment in biodefense soon hit record lows, which helps explain why General Schwarzkopf was unprepared for biological weapons during the Gulf War.
Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter reveals how military doctrine has assumed that biological attacks are like chemical attacks and thus detectable in advance. The resulting stereotypes caused the military to likewise ...
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This chapter reveals how military doctrine has assumed that biological attacks are like chemical attacks and thus detectable in advance. The resulting stereotypes caused the military to likewise assume that biodefense could be achieved using the plans and procedures for contamination avoidance, physical protection, and decontamination that were previously prepared for chemical defense. This resulted to fatal gaps and errors in military planning and training. The military struggled to deploy biological weapon detection systems and use medical countermeasures. Doctrine dating back to the 1950s implied that vaccines were readily available, but the military did not consider how to actually use them until the Gulf War, when it failed to employ vaccines fast enough or in sufficient quantities.Less
This chapter reveals how military doctrine has assumed that biological attacks are like chemical attacks and thus detectable in advance. The resulting stereotypes caused the military to likewise assume that biodefense could be achieved using the plans and procedures for contamination avoidance, physical protection, and decontamination that were previously prepared for chemical defense. This resulted to fatal gaps and errors in military planning and training. The military struggled to deploy biological weapon detection systems and use medical countermeasures. Doctrine dating back to the 1950s implied that vaccines were readily available, but the military did not consider how to actually use them until the Gulf War, when it failed to employ vaccines fast enough or in sufficient quantities.
Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter studies civilian biodefense as a “natural experiment” to compare with research, development, acquisition, and doctrine in the military. Foreshadowed during the Korean War, the rise of ...
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This chapter studies civilian biodefense as a “natural experiment” to compare with research, development, acquisition, and doctrine in the military. Foreshadowed during the Korean War, the rise of civilian biodefense began in earnest during the 1990s when prominent scientists constructed a new relationship between bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases. These ideas helped situate biological weapons inside the biomedical frame at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enabling it to respond to increasing demands from the president and Congress. Unlike the military, the HHS lobbied hard to win funds money on the table for biodefense rather than let the funding go to the Department of Homeland Security after September 11 and the anthrax attacks of 2001. Moreover, the HHS did not rely on the military's inaccurate stereotypes.Less
This chapter studies civilian biodefense as a “natural experiment” to compare with research, development, acquisition, and doctrine in the military. Foreshadowed during the Korean War, the rise of civilian biodefense began in earnest during the 1990s when prominent scientists constructed a new relationship between bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases. These ideas helped situate biological weapons inside the biomedical frame at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enabling it to respond to increasing demands from the president and Congress. Unlike the military, the HHS lobbied hard to win funds money on the table for biodefense rather than let the funding go to the Department of Homeland Security after September 11 and the anthrax attacks of 2001. Moreover, the HHS did not rely on the military's inaccurate stereotypes.
Frank L. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452710
- eISBN:
- 9780801455162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452710.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This concluding chapter presents three major findings in the biodefense study. First, biological weapons do not conform to the military's assumptions and heuristics about projectile weapons and ...
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This concluding chapter presents three major findings in the biodefense study. First, biological weapons do not conform to the military's assumptions and heuristics about projectile weapons and explosives. Second, as a consequence of this discrepancy, the armed services have tended to rely on inaccurate stereotypes that conflate biological weapons with other nonkinetic weapons. These stereotypes let the military neglect biodefense while disregarding it as a matter of routine practice. Third, different ideas produce different results. The influence of different ideas on organizational decision making is one major reason why some civilian organizations are more willing and able to support biodefense than their military counterparts.Less
This concluding chapter presents three major findings in the biodefense study. First, biological weapons do not conform to the military's assumptions and heuristics about projectile weapons and explosives. Second, as a consequence of this discrepancy, the armed services have tended to rely on inaccurate stereotypes that conflate biological weapons with other nonkinetic weapons. These stereotypes let the military neglect biodefense while disregarding it as a matter of routine practice. Third, different ideas produce different results. The influence of different ideas on organizational decision making is one major reason why some civilian organizations are more willing and able to support biodefense than their military counterparts.
Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226444055
- eISBN:
- 9780226444079
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226444079.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Biotechnology
In the years since the 9/11 attacks—and the subsequent lethal anthrax letters—the United States has spent billions of dollars on measures to defend the population against the threat of biological ...
More
In the years since the 9/11 attacks—and the subsequent lethal anthrax letters—the United States has spent billions of dollars on measures to defend the population against the threat of biological weapons. But as this book argues, all that money and effort hasn't made us any safer—in fact, it has made us more vulnerable. The book reveals the mistakes made to this point and lays out the necessary steps to set us on the path toward true biosecurity. The fundamental problem with the current approach, according to the book, is the danger caused by the sheer size and secrecy of our biodefense effort. Thousands of scientists spread throughout hundreds of locations are now working with lethal bioweapons agents—but their inability to make their work public causes suspicion among our enemies and allies alike, even as the enormous number of laboratories greatly multiplies the inherent risk of deadly accidents or theft. Meanwhile, vital public health needs go unmet because of this new biodefense focus. True biosecurity, the chapters argue, will require a multipronged effort based in an understanding of the complexity of the issue, guided by scientific ethics, and watched over by a vigilant citizenry attentive to the difference between fear mongering and true analysis of risk.Less
In the years since the 9/11 attacks—and the subsequent lethal anthrax letters—the United States has spent billions of dollars on measures to defend the population against the threat of biological weapons. But as this book argues, all that money and effort hasn't made us any safer—in fact, it has made us more vulnerable. The book reveals the mistakes made to this point and lays out the necessary steps to set us on the path toward true biosecurity. The fundamental problem with the current approach, according to the book, is the danger caused by the sheer size and secrecy of our biodefense effort. Thousands of scientists spread throughout hundreds of locations are now working with lethal bioweapons agents—but their inability to make their work public causes suspicion among our enemies and allies alike, even as the enormous number of laboratories greatly multiplies the inherent risk of deadly accidents or theft. Meanwhile, vital public health needs go unmet because of this new biodefense focus. True biosecurity, the chapters argue, will require a multipronged effort based in an understanding of the complexity of the issue, guided by scientific ethics, and watched over by a vigilant citizenry attentive to the difference between fear mongering and true analysis of risk.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804782753
- eISBN:
- 9780804786157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804782753.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter addresses the offense-defense arms race in the biological arena, as this proves useful in focusing attention on those policy options that need to be conceptualized and should be ...
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This chapter addresses the offense-defense arms race in the biological arena, as this proves useful in focusing attention on those policy options that need to be conceptualized and should be implemented with a view to the 2011 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conferences. It is clear that there are no easy technical solutions to biodefense. Increasing transparency in biodefense is a problem that will not be quickly resolved. Moreover, the data does not mean that the CWC-BWC (mid-spectrum agent) gap cannot be closed to a significant degree by further development of the other chemical production facility (OCPF) verification regime, but States Parties and civil society need to give considerably more attention to how this can be accomplished than they have done to date. The most important long-term problem facing the States Parties to the BWC is how to enhance greatly the means of assuring compliance.Less
This chapter addresses the offense-defense arms race in the biological arena, as this proves useful in focusing attention on those policy options that need to be conceptualized and should be implemented with a view to the 2011 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conferences. It is clear that there are no easy technical solutions to biodefense. Increasing transparency in biodefense is a problem that will not be quickly resolved. Moreover, the data does not mean that the CWC-BWC (mid-spectrum agent) gap cannot be closed to a significant degree by further development of the other chemical production facility (OCPF) verification regime, but States Parties and civil society need to give considerably more attention to how this can be accomplished than they have done to date. The most important long-term problem facing the States Parties to the BWC is how to enhance greatly the means of assuring compliance.
Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226444055
- eISBN:
- 9780226444079
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226444079.003.0005
- Subject:
- Biology, Biotechnology
The U.S. biodefense program has been going along a dangerous path for two overarching reasons of paranoia and permissiveness that make strange relations. When each of them is taken alone, they can ...
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The U.S. biodefense program has been going along a dangerous path for two overarching reasons of paranoia and permissiveness that make strange relations. When each of them is taken alone, they can lead to dire consequences and when taken together they can lead to worse endings. Paranoia is the keystone in government's political policy of instilling fear to maintain a strong image in the war on terror. BioShield 2004 was the first act passed by Congress to provide billions in funding directed to countermeasures for bioweapons agents, but its rules and related federal agency strategy prevented the development of countermeasures. U.S. scientists are working in force on countermeasures for real and imagined bioweapons. As the number of researchers in biosafety laboratories increases, access to biological weapons agents and training in their skilled use increases. This markedly increases the risk of politically disaffected or mentally unstable lab workers exploiting these agents for hostile purposes.Less
The U.S. biodefense program has been going along a dangerous path for two overarching reasons of paranoia and permissiveness that make strange relations. When each of them is taken alone, they can lead to dire consequences and when taken together they can lead to worse endings. Paranoia is the keystone in government's political policy of instilling fear to maintain a strong image in the war on terror. BioShield 2004 was the first act passed by Congress to provide billions in funding directed to countermeasures for bioweapons agents, but its rules and related federal agency strategy prevented the development of countermeasures. U.S. scientists are working in force on countermeasures for real and imagined bioweapons. As the number of researchers in biosafety laboratories increases, access to biological weapons agents and training in their skilled use increases. This markedly increases the risk of politically disaffected or mentally unstable lab workers exploiting these agents for hostile purposes.
