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Considers the theory and practices of ‘accountability’ that are associated with liberal constitutionalism, democracy, and especially contemporary democratization. Once again, it adopts a broad temporal and spatial perspective with the result that a plurality of alternative approaches and possibilities is highlighted, and processes of accountability‐building are presented as open‐ended. The chapter argues that it is possible to have both ‘too much’ accountability and also the ‘wrong sort’. Bicameralism and impeachment are selected for particular attention.

Jacques Necker progressively advocated political values for the French monarchy that were broadly in line with those operative within a British constitutional nexus. He came to see the value of a bicameral constitutional settlement that would allow ‘aristocracy’ in one chamber to act as a counterweight to ‘democracy’ in another. However, he was slow to acknowledge the core difference between the tightly defined British nobility — synonymous with the peerage — and the tensions that existed within the formal, juridical unity of the French Second Estate. Necker's view of what a publicly responsible nobility might undertake within a state had its origins in his (and his wife, Suzanne's) many conversations with David, Seventh Viscount Stormont, British Ambassador to France, 1772–78, whom they saw as the embodiment of aristocratic state service. With the failure of the proposal for a two-chamber National Assembly in the autumn of 1789, Necker was forced to admit that the majority of his countrymen had turned against British models just as he had decided to embrace them wholeheartedly.

Reform of the House of Lords provides critical insights not just into the nature of New Labour's statecraft but also into the challenges of constitutional political analysis. This examines empirical and analytical debates and concludes that change on the Index of Bicameralism has been marginal.

This chapter assesses the extent to which political institutions may mediate the impact of leaders' traits. There is variation in political context across the elections included in this study, providing a basis for examining the role of political institutions. The chapter looks at the impact of the degree of proportionality in elections, the effective number of parties competing in a campaign, as well as the role of electoral systems and legislative organization, including federalism and bicameralism. The analysis of data points to the need for more research, but suggests that proportionality and the number of parties competing may have the largest influence on the impact of leaders' traits in elections.

Chapter 5 analyses the development of new laws and their passage through parliament. It first discusses bicameralism, bill procedure, in turn addressing the drafting of proposals, the introducing of measures into one house, the adopting of measures by the other house, the making of amendments, the adding of provisos, and the giving of the royal assent. Next it explores lobbying, and the means by which petitioners persuaded royal councillors and others sitting in parliament to support proposals. Then the types of laws that were enacted are discussed. The distinction between public legislation and private legislation is analysed. The identities of individuals and interest groups putting forward legislation and their reasons for so doing are examined.

This chapter examines the meanings of moderation during the initial phase of the French Revolution by focusing on the ideas of Jean-Joseph Mounier, Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre, Trophimé-Gérard Lally-Tollendal, and Pierre Victor Malouet—the French monarchiens, also known as the “radical moderates” of 1789. It first provides a background on the monarchiens before discussing their attitude toward Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It then considers the debates in the new Constitutional Assembly over the task of “fixing” the French constitution, Mounier's influence on the document Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the controversy surrounding bicameralism and the royal veto. It also looks at the dialogue between the monarchiens and Edmund Burke regarding the former's political agenda that mixed moderation and radicalism. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the monarchiens' experience demonstrates the limits of moderation in revolutionary times.

The Framers designed a bicameral Congress to prevent legislative overreach and ensure compromise. More than two hundred years later, strong parties and intransigent policy problems have led to some criticism of a system in which two equal and distinct chambers share responsibility for lawmaking. Is the design of Congress antiquated, or does it continue to produce the outcomes desired by the Framers? In this chapter, I introduce these questions and begin to outline a basic framework around which to answer them. The chapter includes a discussion of the theoretical limitations that currently explain congressional outcomes in the two-chambered context and the difficulty in measuring how House-Senate bargaining change bills.

Though many of the world's legislatures are bicameral in nature, the ways in which they change legislation is not well understood. This chapter begins with a review of the expected effects of bicameralism, and discusses the state of the literature on how the House and Senate resolve their differences. The chapter also introduces data on conference committees and the use of amendment trading to resolve differences, with a special focus on important legislation and appropriations legislation. There is no doubt that the use of bicameral bargaining in Congress has declined, though the current literature has little explanation for the reasons behind this reduction.

Two chamber — or ‘bicameral’ — parliaments are relatively common around the world. They are particularly widespread among the larger Western democracies, and particularly among federal states. However, second chambers are far from uniform in their behaviour, composition, and powers. This is partly a legacy of their history, and partly the result of local circumstances. This chapter provides a broad overview of second chambers around the world, considering the historical development of bicameralism and the extent of bicameral parliaments today. The chapter looks at some of the common features of second chambers, and provides summary information about these in twenty selected countries.

This book examines the emergence of Russia's parliament between 1989 and 1999, a period that can be divided into three phases. The first phase began in 1989, when a new legislative structure designed by Mikhail Gorbachev replaced the old Supreme Soviet, and ended in August 1991 following the coup and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union. The second phase spanned 1990–1993, characterized by an interim legislature under the Russian Republic (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, or RSFSR) that ended in 1993. The third phase began in December 1993, when a new Federal Assembly was created following Boris Yeltsin's forcible dissolution of parliament in September of that year, and remains in force today. The book focuses on the emergence of parliamentary parties and bicameralism between 1989 and 1999 and explores how they contributed to the stabilization of political conflict in Russia.

This chapter summarises what has been learned in the book, returning to the six key questions that were posed in chapter 1. It suggests that today’s House of Lords is very different to its predecessors, and also differs in important ways from the House of Commons. It argues that the chamber now has an important role in British politics, which has strengthened parliament as a whole, and weakened executive dominance. British politics is therefore considerably more plural and consensual than the traditional 'Westminster model’ suggests. The chapter also proposes that the post-1999 Lords holds important lessons for bicameralism, and the role of unelected institutions. It ends by looking ahead at prospects for the House of Lords in the future.

This chapter provides a broad survey of bicameralism (i.e. two-chamber legislatures) in constitutions around the world. It briefly discusses the history and justification of bicameralism, then presents data about all contemporary bicameral legislatures at the national level. It describes the many different means by which second chamber members are chosen, and the varying powers that these institutions have. This shows the House of Lords to be less exceptional than it might seem, since many second chambers include members who are not directly elected by the people, and the powers of the Lords are moderate in international terms. The chapter asks what is special about second chambers, and which factors are associated with their strength. It points out that these bodies are often controversial, thanks both to their membership and their role in challenging elected first chambers.

This chapter examines the relationship between parliamentarism and the legislative branch. It explores the evolution of the legislative branch, leading to disillusionment with the rationalized law-making factory, a venture run by political parties beyond the reach of constitutional rules. The rise of democratically bred party rule is positioned between the forces favouring free debate versus effective decision-making in the legislature. The chapter analyses the institutional make-up and internal operations of the legislature, the role of the opposition in the legislative assembly, and explores the benefits of bicameralism for boosting the powers of the legislative branch. Finally, it looks at the law-making process and its outsourcing via delegating legislative powers to the executive.

This chapter shows that while all ten post-communist democracies adopted parliamentary systems of government, the degree to which political power is concentrated in their parliaments, more precisely in a majority that controls the legislature, varies considerably. The relative level of power dispersion is determined by four sets of institutions (electoral rules; the structure of the legislature; rules of government formation and termination; and the powers of the presidency), which constrain and influence political parties’ coalitional choices. Based on a detailed comparative review of their institutional arrangements, the chapter identifies three groups of post-communist democracies with regard to how favorable they are for the parliamentary concentration of power: i) states with the most favorable conditions for power concentration (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia); ii) states with mixed conditions (Latvia and Slovakia); and states with the least favorable conditions (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Romania).

Why is it the case that some post-communist democracies never witness the formation of a minority government after a general election (e.g. Estonia or Hungary) while in other cases such an outcome is almost the norm rather than an exception (e.g. Czech Republic or Romania)? Indeed, minority governments in general are concentrated in four states: the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Latvia. This chapter argues that institutional features that hinder the concentration of power in, and as such weaken the relative authority of, the first chamber of parliament over the executive, also reduce the incentives for political parties to form majority coalitions. As discussed in previous chapters, institutional features that promote the dispersion of political power include a large assembly size, bicameralism, negative parliamentary government formation rules, and a strong presidency. In turn, these institutional features promote the formation of minority governments.

The ten post-communist democracies vary considerably in terms of the stability and duration of their governments. In some states, such as Hungary, the government that is formed and invested in office after the election tends to last for the entire or nearly the entire term of the legislature. Elsewhere, such as Latvia, post-elections governments never last for a long time. This chapter examines how the set of political institutions that disperse or concentrate political power in the electoral, legislative and executive arenas of party competition affect government duration. The central finding of this chapter is the several institutions that disperse political power also reduce cabinet duration: specifically, bicameralism, a more powerful presidency, and negative government formation rules. In addition, government stability inversely varies with the fragmentation of the legislative party system, and both majority and post-election governments are more stable than minority and later mid-term cabinets.