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 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0014
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games. The chapter provides examples based on the prisoners’ dilemma and develops the notion of self-generation for private ... More


 Private Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0012
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter introduces and illustrates the basic issues that arise in games with private monitoring. It discusses and presents the two basic approaches to equilibrium analysis in games with private ... More


 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter provides examples in which private strategies, where a player’s behavior can depend nontrivially on his or her own privately observed past action, open up new payoff possibilities that ... More


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