Robert J. Matthews
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199211258
- eISBN:
- 9780191705724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter challenges the presumption that the relational nature of propositional attitudes can simply be read off the logical form of the sentences by which we report propositional attitudes. It ...
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This chapter challenges the presumption that the relational nature of propositional attitudes can simply be read off the logical form of the sentences by which we report propositional attitudes. It argues that while recent work in formal semantics provides good reason to think that the logical form of these sentences is indeed relational, that fact in itself is no reason to suppose that propositional attitudes are themselves relations. The relational logical form of belief sentences, problems with the relational conception of belief, semantic vs. psychological objects of belief, the problem for relationalists, and logical form are discussed.Less
This chapter challenges the presumption that the relational nature of propositional attitudes can simply be read off the logical form of the sentences by which we report propositional attitudes. It argues that while recent work in formal semantics provides good reason to think that the logical form of these sentences is indeed relational, that fact in itself is no reason to suppose that propositional attitudes are themselves relations. The relational logical form of belief sentences, problems with the relational conception of belief, semantic vs. psychological objects of belief, the problem for relationalists, and logical form are discussed.
Kent Bach
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240778
- eISBN:
- 9780191680267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240778.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
One of the themes of this book is that the notion of denotation is tangential to the semantics of singular terms. This thesis has been supported by defending Russell's theory of descriptions, by ...
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One of the themes of this book is that the notion of denotation is tangential to the semantics of singular terms. This thesis has been supported by defending Russell's theory of descriptions, by developing a version of the description theory of names, and by arguing that pronouns do not denote, not even relatively to contexts of utterance. This chapter suggests that occurrences of singular terms in belief (or other attitude) contexts do not pose the problems that arise for those views that rely on the notion of denotation. The account of the occurrence of singular terms in such contexts will be rather straightforward. That will not prevent it from being controversial, however, for the distinction between referentially transparent and opaque occurrences will be interpreted pragmatically. The theoretical benefit of drawing this distinction at the level of speaker intention rather than of sentence grammar is that, contrary to popular opinion, belief sentences are not systematically ambiguous. As for occurrences of singular terms in fictional contexts, in the final section a pragmatic account will be given of them as well.Less
One of the themes of this book is that the notion of denotation is tangential to the semantics of singular terms. This thesis has been supported by defending Russell's theory of descriptions, by developing a version of the description theory of names, and by arguing that pronouns do not denote, not even relatively to contexts of utterance. This chapter suggests that occurrences of singular terms in belief (or other attitude) contexts do not pose the problems that arise for those views that rely on the notion of denotation. The account of the occurrence of singular terms in such contexts will be rather straightforward. That will not prevent it from being controversial, however, for the distinction between referentially transparent and opaque occurrences will be interpreted pragmatically. The theoretical benefit of drawing this distinction at the level of speaker intention rather than of sentence grammar is that, contrary to popular opinion, belief sentences are not systematically ambiguous. As for occurrences of singular terms in fictional contexts, in the final section a pragmatic account will be given of them as well.
Takashi Yagisawa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576890
- eISBN:
- 9780191722301
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576890.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis's theory. ...
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Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis's theory. The notion of reality is left primitive and sharply distinguished from that of existence, which is proposed as a relation between a thing and a domain. Worlds are postulated as modal indices for truth on a par with times, which are temporal indices for truth. Ordinary individual objects are conceived as being spread in spatial, temporal, and modal dimensions, and their transworld identity is explicated by the closest-continuer theory. Impossible worlds and individuals are postulated and used to provide accounts of propositions, belief sentences, and fictional discourse.Less
Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis's theory. The notion of reality is left primitive and sharply distinguished from that of existence, which is proposed as a relation between a thing and a domain. Worlds are postulated as modal indices for truth on a par with times, which are temporal indices for truth. Ordinary individual objects are conceived as being spread in spatial, temporal, and modal dimensions, and their transworld identity is explicated by the closest-continuer theory. Impossible worlds and individuals are postulated and used to provide accounts of propositions, belief sentences, and fictional discourse.
Takashi Yagisawa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576890
- eISBN:
- 9780191722301
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576890.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis’s theory. ...
More
Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis’s theory. The notion of reality is left primitive and sharply distinguished from that of existence, which is proposed as a relation between a thing and a domain. Worlds are postulated as modal indices for truth on a par with times, which are temporal indices for truth. Ordinary individual objects are conceived as being spread in spatial, temporal, and modal dimensions, and their transworld identity is explicated by the closest-continuer theory. Impossible worlds and individuals are postulated and used to provide accounts of propositions, belief sentences, and fictional discourse.Less
Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. This book defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis’s theory. The notion of reality is left primitive and sharply distinguished from that of existence, which is proposed as a relation between a thing and a domain. Worlds are postulated as modal indices for truth on a par with times, which are temporal indices for truth. Ordinary individual objects are conceived as being spread in spatial, temporal, and modal dimensions, and their transworld identity is explicated by the closest-continuer theory. Impossible worlds and individuals are postulated and used to provide accounts of propositions, belief sentences, and fictional discourse.
Tim Henning
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198797036
- eISBN:
- 9780191860850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
This chapter introduces and motivates parentheticalism about sentences of the form “S believes that P.” It starts from the so-called phenomenon of transparency of first-person sentences of this form. ...
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This chapter introduces and motivates parentheticalism about sentences of the form “S believes that P.” It starts from the so-called phenomenon of transparency of first-person sentences of this form. It is argued that this phenomenon is not aptly explained in wholly pragmatic terms. Parentheticalism offers a superior explanation, and it shows that transparent first-person uses are really just special cases of a wider class, a class of parenthetical readings which are available in all persons and many embedding environments. Formal implementations of the semantic and pragmatic elements of the view are suggested, and the role of parenthetical “believe”-antecedents in indicative conditionals is explored.Less
This chapter introduces and motivates parentheticalism about sentences of the form “S believes that P.” It starts from the so-called phenomenon of transparency of first-person sentences of this form. It is argued that this phenomenon is not aptly explained in wholly pragmatic terms. Parentheticalism offers a superior explanation, and it shows that transparent first-person uses are really just special cases of a wider class, a class of parenthetical readings which are available in all persons and many embedding environments. Formal implementations of the semantic and pragmatic elements of the view are suggested, and the role of parenthetical “believe”-antecedents in indicative conditionals is explored.
