Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding ...
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This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.Less
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
There is a large spectrum of representations of belief states besides probabilities and ranks. The chapter cannot give a complete survey, but it presents comparisons with a number of important ...
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There is a large spectrum of representations of belief states besides probabilities and ranks. The chapter cannot give a complete survey, but it presents comparisons with a number of important accounts. It first discusses the predecessors of ranking theory: Shackle’s functions of potential surprise, Rescher’s hypothetical reasoning, and Cohen’s account of inductive support. It saves AGM belief revision theory from various critical examples. It carefully discusses Levi’s epistemology and finds discrepancies everywhere. It is critical of Lehrer’s account of knowledge and undefeated justification. Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning looks similar, but is quite different. This leads to a discussion of the nature of normative epistemology. The chapter closes with brief comparative remarks on formal learning theory, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, and non-monotonic reasoning.Less
There is a large spectrum of representations of belief states besides probabilities and ranks. The chapter cannot give a complete survey, but it presents comparisons with a number of important accounts. It first discusses the predecessors of ranking theory: Shackle’s functions of potential surprise, Rescher’s hypothetical reasoning, and Cohen’s account of inductive support. It saves AGM belief revision theory from various critical examples. It carefully discusses Levi’s epistemology and finds discrepancies everywhere. It is critical of Lehrer’s account of knowledge and undefeated justification. Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning looks similar, but is quite different. This leads to a discussion of the nature of normative epistemology. The chapter closes with brief comparative remarks on formal learning theory, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, and non-monotonic reasoning.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces and discusses the standard static laws of belief, consistency and deductive closure, as well as the first steps towards a dynamics of belief. The latter amounts to an ...
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This chapter introduces and discusses the standard static laws of belief, consistency and deductive closure, as well as the first steps towards a dynamics of belief. The latter amounts to an introduction into AGM belief revision theory and some variant formulations. The chapter thus explains the three kinds of belief change commonly taken as basic: expansions, revisions, and contractions.Less
This chapter introduces and discusses the standard static laws of belief, consistency and deductive closure, as well as the first steps towards a dynamics of belief. The latter amounts to an introduction into AGM belief revision theory and some variant formulations. The chapter thus explains the three kinds of belief change commonly taken as basic: expansions, revisions, and contractions.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, ...
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The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, the different ways in which ongoing epistemological debates might be resolved, concerning such matters as the role of experience in founding justifications, and the permissible global patterns of justificatory support (foundationalist, coherentist, or foundherentist?). Secondly, the chapter wishes to show how compatible the new account of belief revision is with various important epistemological accounts that touch on the topic of belief revision, albeit not in any great logical or computational detail. To this end, the chapter examines the writings of Sosa, BonJour, Cornman, Haack, Levi, Quine and Ullian, Harman, Klein and Gupta. This discussion should serve to situate the work for the epistemological readerLess
The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, the different ways in which ongoing epistemological debates might be resolved, concerning such matters as the role of experience in founding justifications, and the permissible global patterns of justificatory support (foundationalist, coherentist, or foundherentist?). Secondly, the chapter wishes to show how compatible the new account of belief revision is with various important epistemological accounts that touch on the topic of belief revision, albeit not in any great logical or computational detail. To this end, the chapter examines the writings of Sosa, BonJour, Cornman, Haack, Levi, Quine and Ullian, Harman, Klein and Gupta. This discussion should serve to situate the work for the epistemological reader
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of ...
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This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of rational creatures is concerned. Some basic concepts in mathematical logic are defined, to lay the groundwork for the metatheorem, due to Harvey Friedman, that is proved in the next chapter.Less
This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of rational creatures is concerned. Some basic concepts in mathematical logic are defined, to lay the groundwork for the metatheorem, due to Harvey Friedman, that is proved in the next chapter.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199228003
- eISBN:
- 9780191711060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.003.0008
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and ...
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Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and merging and Pigozzi's application of this theory to judgement aggregation. Section. 8.3 argues that judgements should not be merged directly; rather, one should merge the evidence on which the judgements are based. Given this merged evidence, objective Bayesianism and decision theory can be used to derive an appropriate set of judgements—the resulting judgements should be viewed as the aggregate of the judgements of the original individuals (§8.4).Less
Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and merging and Pigozzi's application of this theory to judgement aggregation. Section. 8.3 argues that judgements should not be merged directly; rather, one should merge the evidence on which the judgements are based. Given this merged evidence, objective Bayesianism and decision theory can be used to derive an appropriate set of judgements—the resulting judgements should be viewed as the aggregate of the judgements of the original individuals (§8.4).
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198810346
- eISBN:
- 9780191847332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to ...
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A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new evidence, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new evidence. The emphasis in the chapter is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The chapter emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.Less
A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new evidence, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new evidence. The emphasis in the chapter is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The chapter emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.
Hannes Leitgeb and Hannes Leitgeb
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198732631
- eISBN:
- 9780191796852
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732631.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter turns to the notion of conditional belief: rationally believing a proposition given another proposition. Among other things, conditional belief plays a role for belief revision by ...
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This chapter turns to the notion of conditional belief: rationally believing a proposition given another proposition. Among other things, conditional belief plays a role for belief revision by entailing a disposition for how to revise one’s belief given new evidence. The numerical version of conditional belief is subjective conditional probability, and first the chapter calls to mind how the concept of conditional probability figures in the standard diachronic norm on degree-of-belief change. Afterwards the same is done for conditional all-or-nothing belief and the standard diachronic norm on all-or-nothing belief change, which rely on the so-called AGM postulates for belief revision. Finally, a stability account of rational conditional belief is developed according to which subjective conditional probability and rational conditional all-or-nothing belief cohere with each other just as their unconditional versions did in Chapters 2 and 3. From this, together with the standard diachronic norms on belief change, it follows that also rational degree-of-belief change and categorical belief change must cohere with each other once the stability theory is in place. Other than extending the stability account to conditional belief, the chapter also serves the purpose of supplying some of the mathematical machinery on which the theory in this book is based.Less
This chapter turns to the notion of conditional belief: rationally believing a proposition given another proposition. Among other things, conditional belief plays a role for belief revision by entailing a disposition for how to revise one’s belief given new evidence. The numerical version of conditional belief is subjective conditional probability, and first the chapter calls to mind how the concept of conditional probability figures in the standard diachronic norm on degree-of-belief change. Afterwards the same is done for conditional all-or-nothing belief and the standard diachronic norm on all-or-nothing belief change, which rely on the so-called AGM postulates for belief revision. Finally, a stability account of rational conditional belief is developed according to which subjective conditional probability and rational conditional all-or-nothing belief cohere with each other just as their unconditional versions did in Chapters 2 and 3. From this, together with the standard diachronic norms on belief change, it follows that also rational degree-of-belief change and categorical belief change must cohere with each other once the stability theory is in place. Other than extending the stability account to conditional belief, the chapter also serves the purpose of supplying some of the mathematical machinery on which the theory in this book is based.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596218
- eISBN:
- 9780191595783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical ...
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What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical relations relate thoughts, or propositions, to one another. Quine thus correctly notes that one could, on no pain of contradiction, respond to any experience with any constellation of beliefs. He incorrectly takes this to mean that any constellation of beliefs could be consistent with one's having experienced what he did. Revision can come anywhere; if it does not, this merely reflects the ways of our people. This is a mistake, and in fact destroys the very possibility of judgement. Quine has given us no reason (even if, in fact, there is one) to think that any proposition may (not incorrectly) be held to have been falsified by experience. So goes the present argument.Less
What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical relations relate thoughts, or propositions, to one another. Quine thus correctly notes that one could, on no pain of contradiction, respond to any experience with any constellation of beliefs. He incorrectly takes this to mean that any constellation of beliefs could be consistent with one's having experienced what he did. Revision can come anywhere; if it does not, this merely reflects the ways of our people. This is a mistake, and in fact destroys the very possibility of judgement. Quine has given us no reason (even if, in fact, there is one) to think that any proposition may (not incorrectly) be held to have been falsified by experience. So goes the present argument.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238201
- eISBN:
- 9780191597527
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238207.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Whether a simple reporting practice produces positive changes in knowledge, or V‐value, depends on what reports a message sender sends, who actually receives them, what the receivers’ antecedent ...
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Whether a simple reporting practice produces positive changes in knowledge, or V‐value, depends on what reports a message sender sends, who actually receives them, what the receivers’ antecedent degrees of belief are, and how they revise their degrees of belief as a function of the reports. Does any belief‐revision practice have a general propensity to improve a hearer's degrees of knowledge? Assuming objective conditional probabilities, revising degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalization yields (objectively) expected increases in degrees of knowledge (V‐value), as long as subjective likelihoods match objective likelihoods. This general theorem applies to the special case of reasoning from social communications. As a separate subtopic, theories of justification for testimonial belief are briefly reviewed.Less
Whether a simple reporting practice produces positive changes in knowledge, or V‐value, depends on what reports a message sender sends, who actually receives them, what the receivers’ antecedent degrees of belief are, and how they revise their degrees of belief as a function of the reports. Does any belief‐revision practice have a general propensity to improve a hearer's degrees of knowledge? Assuming objective conditional probabilities, revising degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalization yields (objectively) expected increases in degrees of knowledge (V‐value), as long as subjective likelihoods match objective likelihoods. This general theorem applies to the special case of reasoning from social communications. As a separate subtopic, theories of justification for testimonial belief are briefly reviewed.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199254057
- eISBN:
- 9780191698194
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254057.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides replies to criticisms on the concept of dialetheism or the existence of true contradictions. It clarifies that dialetheism is not incompatible with predication because the ...
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This chapter provides replies to criticisms on the concept of dialetheism or the existence of true contradictions. It clarifies that dialetheism is not incompatible with predication because the former is concerned with the simultaneous truth of statements while the latter is an independent issue. In reply to a criticism on account of negation, it explains that dialetheism only rejects paraconsistent logic, and that there is no logical bar to dialetheism. On the issue of belief-revision, the chapter clarifies that dialetheism does not require abandonment of theories, only the relocation of beliefs to either low or high probabilities.Less
This chapter provides replies to criticisms on the concept of dialetheism or the existence of true contradictions. It clarifies that dialetheism is not incompatible with predication because the former is concerned with the simultaneous truth of statements while the latter is an independent issue. In reply to a criticism on account of negation, it explains that dialetheism only rejects paraconsistent logic, and that there is no logical bar to dialetheism. On the issue of belief-revision, the chapter clarifies that dialetheism does not require abandonment of theories, only the relocation of beliefs to either low or high probabilities.
Soteriou Matthew
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199678457
- eISBN:
- 9780191757952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678457.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's ...
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This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's knowledge of what one believes. The chapter also explores some of the ways in which the ethics of belief, and accounts of the suspension of judgement and belief revision, may be affected by the fact that we are, as self-conscious subjects, capable of engaging in agential epistemic conscious mental activity, including self-critical reflection.Less
This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's knowledge of what one believes. The chapter also explores some of the ways in which the ethics of belief, and accounts of the suspension of judgement and belief revision, may be affected by the fact that we are, as self-conscious subjects, capable of engaging in agential epistemic conscious mental activity, including self-critical reflection.
Emilio J. C. Lobato and Corinne Zimmerman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant ...
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We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical findings to support the proposal that pseudoscientific beliefs arise in much the same way as other scientific and non-scientific beliefs do. In particular, we focus on (a) cognitive and metacognitive factors at the individual level; (b) trust in testimony and judgments of expertise at the social level; and (c) personal identity and the public’s relationship with the scientific community at a cultural level.Less
We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical findings to support the proposal that pseudoscientific beliefs arise in much the same way as other scientific and non-scientific beliefs do. In particular, we focus on (a) cognitive and metacognitive factors at the individual level; (b) trust in testimony and judgments of expertise at the social level; and (c) personal identity and the public’s relationship with the scientific community at a cultural level.
Angelika Kratzer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199234684
- eISBN:
- 9780191738432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234684.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for ...
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The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for conflict resolution. There are many areas in human cognition where inconsistencies arise. Inconsistent beliefs are the topic of theories of belief revision; conflicting grammatical constraints are investigated in Optimality Theory; and clashes between presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and at issue meanings have been explored in formal pragmatics since the late 1970s. With potentially inconsistent premise sets, the presentation of premises matters. Deductively equivalent premise sets like {p&q} and {p, q} can show different behavior when a conflicting premise is added. The chapter takes this fact as an invitation for a promising research program that seeks evidence for the way the premises from which we reason are split up and lumped together. The semantics of counterfactuals is a rich source for such evidence, as shown in subsequent chapters.Less
The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for conflict resolution. There are many areas in human cognition where inconsistencies arise. Inconsistent beliefs are the topic of theories of belief revision; conflicting grammatical constraints are investigated in Optimality Theory; and clashes between presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and at issue meanings have been explored in formal pragmatics since the late 1970s. With potentially inconsistent premise sets, the presentation of premises matters. Deductively equivalent premise sets like {p&q} and {p, q} can show different behavior when a conflicting premise is added. The chapter takes this fact as an invitation for a promising research program that seeks evidence for the way the premises from which we reason are split up and lumped together. The semantics of counterfactuals is a rich source for such evidence, as shown in subsequent chapters.
Allison B. Kaufman and James C. Kaufman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed ...
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In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed experts get their expertise from Google, how can the average person distinguish real science from fake? This book examines pseudoscience from a variety of perspectives, through case studies, analysis, and personal accounts that show how to recognize pseudoscience, why it is so widely accepted, and how to advocate for real science. Contributors examine the basics of pseudoscience, including issues of cognitive bias; the costs of pseudoscience, with accounts of naturopathy and logical fallacies in the anti-vaccination movement; perceptions of scientific soundness; the mainstream presence of “integrative medicine,” hypnosis, and parapsychology; and the use of case studies and new media in science advocacy.Less
In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed experts get their expertise from Google, how can the average person distinguish real science from fake? This book examines pseudoscience from a variety of perspectives, through case studies, analysis, and personal accounts that show how to recognize pseudoscience, why it is so widely accepted, and how to advocate for real science. Contributors examine the basics of pseudoscience, including issues of cognitive bias; the costs of pseudoscience, with accounts of naturopathy and logical fallacies in the anti-vaccination movement; perceptions of scientific soundness; the mainstream presence of “integrative medicine,” hypnosis, and parapsychology; and the use of case studies and new media in science advocacy.
Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for ...
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Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for atheism. Other philosophers say yes and claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. And still other philosophers say yes but demur on the task of explaining the role of evils in our world. Philosophers who believe in God and yet take this latter route are called “skeptical theists.” Such thinkers are skeptical about human abilities to determine whether the evils in our world could be justifiably allowed by a being such as God. Despite believing in God, these philosophers insist that humans are not cognitively equipped to discern many of the reasons that might be available to God. This collection of essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Part I investigates the epistemology of skepticism as it applies to evils and the nature of epistemic humility. Part II explores the tenability of a particular epistemic principle about the conditions of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA). The remaining sections of the book address objections to sceptical theism, namely the objection that skeptical theism undermines the theistic life (Part III) and the objection that skeptical theism undermines the moral life (Part IV).Less
Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for atheism. Other philosophers say yes and claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. And still other philosophers say yes but demur on the task of explaining the role of evils in our world. Philosophers who believe in God and yet take this latter route are called “skeptical theists.” Such thinkers are skeptical about human abilities to determine whether the evils in our world could be justifiably allowed by a being such as God. Despite believing in God, these philosophers insist that humans are not cognitively equipped to discern many of the reasons that might be available to God. This collection of essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Part I investigates the epistemology of skepticism as it applies to evils and the nature of epistemic humility. Part II explores the tenability of a particular epistemic principle about the conditions of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA). The remaining sections of the book address objections to sceptical theism, namely the objection that skeptical theism undermines the theistic life (Part III) and the objection that skeptical theism undermines the moral life (Part IV).
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198777892
- eISBN:
- 9780191823367
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198777892.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
We situate Core Logic and Classical Core Logic within a wider logical landscape. Core Logic lies at the intersection of two orthogonal lines of reform of Classical Logic—constructivization and ...
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We situate Core Logic and Classical Core Logic within a wider logical landscape. Core Logic lies at the intersection of two orthogonal lines of reform of Classical Logic—constructivization and relevantization. We explain the genesis of Core Logic and describe its carefully formulated rules of inference. We reveal how Core Logic arises as a smooth generalization of the proto-logic involved in working out the truth values of sentences under particular interpretations; and the case for the complete methodological adequacy of Core Logic for constructive deductive reasoning, and of Classical Core Logic for non-constructive deductive reasoning. Core Logic deserves the label ‘Core’, because it is both fully employed, and sufficient, as the metalogic involved in any process of rational belief revision. No rule of Core Logic can be surrendered. We end by speculating on two possible explanations—semantic and methodological—of how Core Logic might have been bloated to Classical Logic.Less
We situate Core Logic and Classical Core Logic within a wider logical landscape. Core Logic lies at the intersection of two orthogonal lines of reform of Classical Logic—constructivization and relevantization. We explain the genesis of Core Logic and describe its carefully formulated rules of inference. We reveal how Core Logic arises as a smooth generalization of the proto-logic involved in working out the truth values of sentences under particular interpretations; and the case for the complete methodological adequacy of Core Logic for constructive deductive reasoning, and of Classical Core Logic for non-constructive deductive reasoning. Core Logic deserves the label ‘Core’, because it is both fully employed, and sufficient, as the metalogic involved in any process of rational belief revision. No rule of Core Logic can be surrendered. We end by speculating on two possible explanations—semantic and methodological—of how Core Logic might have been bloated to Classical Logic.
