Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding ...
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This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.Less
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces and discusses the standard static laws of belief, consistency and deductive closure, as well as the first steps towards a dynamics of belief. The latter amounts to an ...
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This chapter introduces and discusses the standard static laws of belief, consistency and deductive closure, as well as the first steps towards a dynamics of belief. The latter amounts to an introduction into AGM belief revision theory and some variant formulations. The chapter thus explains the three kinds of belief change commonly taken as basic: expansions, revisions, and contractions.Less
This chapter introduces and discusses the standard static laws of belief, consistency and deductive closure, as well as the first steps towards a dynamics of belief. The latter amounts to an introduction into AGM belief revision theory and some variant formulations. The chapter thus explains the three kinds of belief change commonly taken as basic: expansions, revisions, and contractions.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
There is a large spectrum of representations of belief states besides probabilities and ranks. The chapter cannot give a complete survey, but it presents comparisons with a number of important ...
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There is a large spectrum of representations of belief states besides probabilities and ranks. The chapter cannot give a complete survey, but it presents comparisons with a number of important accounts. It first discusses the predecessors of ranking theory: Shackle’s functions of potential surprise, Rescher’s hypothetical reasoning, and Cohen’s account of inductive support. It saves AGM belief revision theory from various critical examples. It carefully discusses Levi’s epistemology and finds discrepancies everywhere. It is critical of Lehrer’s account of knowledge and undefeated justification. Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning looks similar, but is quite different. This leads to a discussion of the nature of normative epistemology. The chapter closes with brief comparative remarks on formal learning theory, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, and non-monotonic reasoning.Less
There is a large spectrum of representations of belief states besides probabilities and ranks. The chapter cannot give a complete survey, but it presents comparisons with a number of important accounts. It first discusses the predecessors of ranking theory: Shackle’s functions of potential surprise, Rescher’s hypothetical reasoning, and Cohen’s account of inductive support. It saves AGM belief revision theory from various critical examples. It carefully discusses Levi’s epistemology and finds discrepancies everywhere. It is critical of Lehrer’s account of knowledge and undefeated justification. Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning looks similar, but is quite different. This leads to a discussion of the nature of normative epistemology. The chapter closes with brief comparative remarks on formal learning theory, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, and non-monotonic reasoning.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, ...
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The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, the different ways in which ongoing epistemological debates might be resolved, concerning such matters as the role of experience in founding justifications, and the permissible global patterns of justificatory support (foundationalist, coherentist, or foundherentist?). Secondly, the chapter wishes to show how compatible the new account of belief revision is with various important epistemological accounts that touch on the topic of belief revision, albeit not in any great logical or computational detail. To this end, the chapter examines the writings of Sosa, BonJour, Cornman, Haack, Levi, Quine and Ullian, Harman, Klein and Gupta. This discussion should serve to situate the work for the epistemological readerLess
The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, the different ways in which ongoing epistemological debates might be resolved, concerning such matters as the role of experience in founding justifications, and the permissible global patterns of justificatory support (foundationalist, coherentist, or foundherentist?). Secondly, the chapter wishes to show how compatible the new account of belief revision is with various important epistemological accounts that touch on the topic of belief revision, albeit not in any great logical or computational detail. To this end, the chapter examines the writings of Sosa, BonJour, Cornman, Haack, Levi, Quine and Ullian, Harman, Klein and Gupta. This discussion should serve to situate the work for the epistemological reader
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of ...
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This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of rational creatures is concerned. Some basic concepts in mathematical logic are defined, to lay the groundwork for the metatheorem, due to Harvey Friedman, that is proved in the next chapter.Less
This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of rational creatures is concerned. Some basic concepts in mathematical logic are defined, to lay the groundwork for the metatheorem, due to Harvey Friedman, that is proved in the next chapter.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199228003
- eISBN:
- 9780191711060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.003.0008
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and ...
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Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and merging and Pigozzi's application of this theory to judgement aggregation. Section. 8.3 argues that judgements should not be merged directly; rather, one should merge the evidence on which the judgements are based. Given this merged evidence, objective Bayesianism and decision theory can be used to derive an appropriate set of judgements—the resulting judgements should be viewed as the aggregate of the judgements of the original individuals (§8.4).Less
Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and merging and Pigozzi's application of this theory to judgement aggregation. Section. 8.3 argues that judgements should not be merged directly; rather, one should merge the evidence on which the judgements are based. Given this merged evidence, objective Bayesianism and decision theory can be used to derive an appropriate set of judgements—the resulting judgements should be viewed as the aggregate of the judgements of the original individuals (§8.4).
Hannes Leitgeb and Hannes Leitgeb
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198732631
- eISBN:
- 9780191796852
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732631.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter turns to the notion of conditional belief: rationally believing a proposition given another proposition. Among other things, conditional belief plays a role for belief revision by ...
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This chapter turns to the notion of conditional belief: rationally believing a proposition given another proposition. Among other things, conditional belief plays a role for belief revision by entailing a disposition for how to revise one’s belief given new evidence. The numerical version of conditional belief is subjective conditional probability, and first the chapter calls to mind how the concept of conditional probability figures in the standard diachronic norm on degree-of-belief change. Afterwards the same is done for conditional all-or-nothing belief and the standard diachronic norm on all-or-nothing belief change, which rely on the so-called AGM postulates for belief revision. Finally, a stability account of rational conditional belief is developed according to which subjective conditional probability and rational conditional all-or-nothing belief cohere with each other just as their unconditional versions did in Chapters 2 and 3. From this, together with the standard diachronic norms on belief change, it follows that also rational degree-of-belief change and categorical belief change must cohere with each other once the stability theory is in place. Other than extending the stability account to conditional belief, the chapter also serves the purpose of supplying some of the mathematical machinery on which the theory in this book is based.Less
This chapter turns to the notion of conditional belief: rationally believing a proposition given another proposition. Among other things, conditional belief plays a role for belief revision by entailing a disposition for how to revise one’s belief given new evidence. The numerical version of conditional belief is subjective conditional probability, and first the chapter calls to mind how the concept of conditional probability figures in the standard diachronic norm on degree-of-belief change. Afterwards the same is done for conditional all-or-nothing belief and the standard diachronic norm on all-or-nothing belief change, which rely on the so-called AGM postulates for belief revision. Finally, a stability account of rational conditional belief is developed according to which subjective conditional probability and rational conditional all-or-nothing belief cohere with each other just as their unconditional versions did in Chapters 2 and 3. From this, together with the standard diachronic norms on belief change, it follows that also rational degree-of-belief change and categorical belief change must cohere with each other once the stability theory is in place. Other than extending the stability account to conditional belief, the chapter also serves the purpose of supplying some of the mathematical machinery on which the theory in this book is based.
Franz Huber
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780199976119
- eISBN:
- 9780197585740
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter first introduces the AGM theory of belief revision. Then it focuses on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
This chapter first introduces the AGM theory of belief revision. Then it focuses on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596218
- eISBN:
- 9780191595783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical ...
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What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical relations relate thoughts, or propositions, to one another. Quine thus correctly notes that one could, on no pain of contradiction, respond to any experience with any constellation of beliefs. He incorrectly takes this to mean that any constellation of beliefs could be consistent with one's having experienced what he did. Revision can come anywhere; if it does not, this merely reflects the ways of our people. This is a mistake, and in fact destroys the very possibility of judgement. Quine has given us no reason (even if, in fact, there is one) to think that any proposition may (not incorrectly) be held to have been falsified by experience. So goes the present argument.Less
What we experience of the world—for example, that pig on the lawn—does not bear logical relations to thoughts, or propositions. That pig on the lawn is not of the form of a proposition. Logical relations relate thoughts, or propositions, to one another. Quine thus correctly notes that one could, on no pain of contradiction, respond to any experience with any constellation of beliefs. He incorrectly takes this to mean that any constellation of beliefs could be consistent with one's having experienced what he did. Revision can come anywhere; if it does not, this merely reflects the ways of our people. This is a mistake, and in fact destroys the very possibility of judgement. Quine has given us no reason (even if, in fact, there is one) to think that any proposition may (not incorrectly) be held to have been falsified by experience. So goes the present argument.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198810346
- eISBN:
- 9780191847332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to ...
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A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new evidence, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new evidence. The emphasis in the chapter is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The chapter emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.Less
A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new evidence, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new evidence. The emphasis in the chapter is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The chapter emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199254057
- eISBN:
- 9780191698194
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254057.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides replies to criticisms on the concept of dialetheism or the existence of true contradictions. It clarifies that dialetheism is not incompatible with predication because the ...
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This chapter provides replies to criticisms on the concept of dialetheism or the existence of true contradictions. It clarifies that dialetheism is not incompatible with predication because the former is concerned with the simultaneous truth of statements while the latter is an independent issue. In reply to a criticism on account of negation, it explains that dialetheism only rejects paraconsistent logic, and that there is no logical bar to dialetheism. On the issue of belief-revision, the chapter clarifies that dialetheism does not require abandonment of theories, only the relocation of beliefs to either low or high probabilities.Less
This chapter provides replies to criticisms on the concept of dialetheism or the existence of true contradictions. It clarifies that dialetheism is not incompatible with predication because the former is concerned with the simultaneous truth of statements while the latter is an independent issue. In reply to a criticism on account of negation, it explains that dialetheism only rejects paraconsistent logic, and that there is no logical bar to dialetheism. On the issue of belief-revision, the chapter clarifies that dialetheism does not require abandonment of theories, only the relocation of beliefs to either low or high probabilities.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238201
- eISBN:
- 9780191597527
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238207.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Whether a simple reporting practice produces positive changes in knowledge, or V‐value, depends on what reports a message sender sends, who actually receives them, what the receivers’ antecedent ...
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Whether a simple reporting practice produces positive changes in knowledge, or V‐value, depends on what reports a message sender sends, who actually receives them, what the receivers’ antecedent degrees of belief are, and how they revise their degrees of belief as a function of the reports. Does any belief‐revision practice have a general propensity to improve a hearer's degrees of knowledge? Assuming objective conditional probabilities, revising degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalization yields (objectively) expected increases in degrees of knowledge (V‐value), as long as subjective likelihoods match objective likelihoods. This general theorem applies to the special case of reasoning from social communications. As a separate subtopic, theories of justification for testimonial belief are briefly reviewed.Less
Whether a simple reporting practice produces positive changes in knowledge, or V‐value, depends on what reports a message sender sends, who actually receives them, what the receivers’ antecedent degrees of belief are, and how they revise their degrees of belief as a function of the reports. Does any belief‐revision practice have a general propensity to improve a hearer's degrees of knowledge? Assuming objective conditional probabilities, revising degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalization yields (objectively) expected increases in degrees of knowledge (V‐value), as long as subjective likelihoods match objective likelihoods. This general theorem applies to the special case of reasoning from social communications. As a separate subtopic, theories of justification for testimonial belief are briefly reviewed.
Soteriou Matthew
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199678457
- eISBN:
- 9780191757952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678457.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's ...
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This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's knowledge of what one believes. The chapter also explores some of the ways in which the ethics of belief, and accounts of the suspension of judgement and belief revision, may be affected by the fact that we are, as self-conscious subjects, capable of engaging in agential epistemic conscious mental activity, including self-critical reflection.Less
This chapter considers how the proposed account of the epistemology of mental action, and the proposed account of the self-knowledge involved in conscious thinking, bear on an account of one's knowledge of what one believes. The chapter also explores some of the ways in which the ethics of belief, and accounts of the suspension of judgement and belief revision, may be affected by the fact that we are, as self-conscious subjects, capable of engaging in agential epistemic conscious mental activity, including self-critical reflection.
Franz Huber
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780199976119
- eISBN:
- 9780197585740
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter first presents the static and dynamic rules of ranking theory. Then it shows how ranking theory solves the problem of iterated belief revisions.
This chapter first presents the static and dynamic rules of ranking theory. Then it shows how ranking theory solves the problem of iterated belief revisions.
Emar Maier and Merel Semeijn
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198846376
- eISBN:
- 9780191881534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198846376.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the author providing the propositions we are to ...
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A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the author providing the propositions we are to imagine and/or accept as true within the fiction. However, we can’t always take the text at face value. What narratologists call ‘unreliable narrators’ may present a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world. Meanwhile, there has been a debate in philosophy about ‘imaginative resistance’ in which we resist imagining (or even accepting as true in the fiction) what’s explicitly stated in the text. But if we can’t take the text’s word for it, how do we determine what’s true in a fiction? The chapter proposes an account of fiction interpretation in a dynamic setting (a version of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) with a mechanism for opening, updating, and closing temporary ‘workspaces’) and combines this framework with belief revision logic.Less
A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the author providing the propositions we are to imagine and/or accept as true within the fiction. However, we can’t always take the text at face value. What narratologists call ‘unreliable narrators’ may present a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world. Meanwhile, there has been a debate in philosophy about ‘imaginative resistance’ in which we resist imagining (or even accepting as true in the fiction) what’s explicitly stated in the text. But if we can’t take the text’s word for it, how do we determine what’s true in a fiction? The chapter proposes an account of fiction interpretation in a dynamic setting (a version of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) with a mechanism for opening, updating, and closing temporary ‘workspaces’) and combines this framework with belief revision logic.
Boudewijn de Bruin
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- March 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780198839675
- eISBN:
- 9780191875502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198839675.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter develops the normative ideal of known freedom. You possess known freedom to the extent that you possess knowledge about your opportunity set—that is, about available actions, their ...
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This chapter develops the normative ideal of known freedom. You possess known freedom to the extent that you possess knowledge about your opportunity set—that is, about available actions, their consequences, and the likelihood with which they arise. I first discuss an objection to such an ideal based on Isaiah Berlin’s notion of the ‘retreat to the inner citadel’. I critically examine recent work on the value of knowledge (the ‘Meno problem’) undertaken by Timothy Williamson and John Hawthorne, as well Duncan Pritchard’s case of the ‘ravine jumper’ purportedly illustrating the value of false beliefs. Using insights on belief revision, I argue that this body of research does not affect the value of known freedom. On the basis of theoretical and empirical work on skills, I then argue for a view of skills as known freedom and show how stereotype threats as studied by psychologists negatively affect the ideal of known freedom.Less
This chapter develops the normative ideal of known freedom. You possess known freedom to the extent that you possess knowledge about your opportunity set—that is, about available actions, their consequences, and the likelihood with which they arise. I first discuss an objection to such an ideal based on Isaiah Berlin’s notion of the ‘retreat to the inner citadel’. I critically examine recent work on the value of knowledge (the ‘Meno problem’) undertaken by Timothy Williamson and John Hawthorne, as well Duncan Pritchard’s case of the ‘ravine jumper’ purportedly illustrating the value of false beliefs. Using insights on belief revision, I argue that this body of research does not affect the value of known freedom. On the basis of theoretical and empirical work on skills, I then argue for a view of skills as known freedom and show how stereotype threats as studied by psychologists negatively affect the ideal of known freedom.
Emilio J. C. Lobato and Corinne Zimmerman
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant ...
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We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical findings to support the proposal that pseudoscientific beliefs arise in much the same way as other scientific and non-scientific beliefs do. In particular, we focus on (a) cognitive and metacognitive factors at the individual level; (b) trust in testimony and judgments of expertise at the social level; and (c) personal identity and the public’s relationship with the scientific community at a cultural level.Less
We review findings from the psychology of science that are relevant to understanding or explaining peoples’ tendencies to believe both scientific and pseudoscientific claims. We discuss relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical findings to support the proposal that pseudoscientific beliefs arise in much the same way as other scientific and non-scientific beliefs do. In particular, we focus on (a) cognitive and metacognitive factors at the individual level; (b) trust in testimony and judgments of expertise at the social level; and (c) personal identity and the public’s relationship with the scientific community at a cultural level.
Angelika Kratzer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199234684
- eISBN:
- 9780191738432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234684.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for ...
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The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for conflict resolution. There are many areas in human cognition where inconsistencies arise. Inconsistent beliefs are the topic of theories of belief revision; conflicting grammatical constraints are investigated in Optimality Theory; and clashes between presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and at issue meanings have been explored in formal pragmatics since the late 1970s. With potentially inconsistent premise sets, the presentation of premises matters. Deductively equivalent premise sets like {p&q} and {p, q} can show different behavior when a conflicting premise is added. The chapter takes this fact as an invitation for a promising research program that seeks evidence for the way the premises from which we reason are split up and lumped together. The semantics of counterfactuals is a rich source for such evidence, as shown in subsequent chapters.Less
The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for conflict resolution. There are many areas in human cognition where inconsistencies arise. Inconsistent beliefs are the topic of theories of belief revision; conflicting grammatical constraints are investigated in Optimality Theory; and clashes between presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and at issue meanings have been explored in formal pragmatics since the late 1970s. With potentially inconsistent premise sets, the presentation of premises matters. Deductively equivalent premise sets like {p&q} and {p, q} can show different behavior when a conflicting premise is added. The chapter takes this fact as an invitation for a promising research program that seeks evidence for the way the premises from which we reason are split up and lumped together. The semantics of counterfactuals is a rich source for such evidence, as shown in subsequent chapters.
Franz Huber
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780199976119
- eISBN:
- 9780197585740
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199976119.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is ...
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This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is expository in parts. Among other theories, it provides an accessible introduction to belief revision and ranking theory. Ranking theory specifies how conditional beliefs should behave. It does not tell us why they should do so nor what they are. This book fills these two gaps. The consistency argument tells us why conditional beliefs should obey the laws of ranking theory by showing them to be the means to attaining the end of holding true and informative beliefs. The conditional theory of conditional belief tells us what conditional beliefs are by specifying their nature in terms of non-conditional belief and counterfactuals. In addition, the book contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications. These include an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives; an account of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, according to which one ought to take the means to one’s ends; as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. A distinctive feature of the book is its unifying methodological approach: means-end philosophy. Means-end philosophy takes serious that philosophy is a normative discipline, and that philosophical problems are entangled with each other. It also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without being a technical theory itself.Less
This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is expository in parts. Among other theories, it provides an accessible introduction to belief revision and ranking theory. Ranking theory specifies how conditional beliefs should behave. It does not tell us why they should do so nor what they are. This book fills these two gaps. The consistency argument tells us why conditional beliefs should obey the laws of ranking theory by showing them to be the means to attaining the end of holding true and informative beliefs. The conditional theory of conditional belief tells us what conditional beliefs are by specifying their nature in terms of non-conditional belief and counterfactuals. In addition, the book contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications. These include an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives; an account of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, according to which one ought to take the means to one’s ends; as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. A distinctive feature of the book is its unifying methodological approach: means-end philosophy. Means-end philosophy takes serious that philosophy is a normative discipline, and that philosophical problems are entangled with each other. It also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without being a technical theory itself.
Allison B. Kaufman and James C. Kaufman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262037426
- eISBN:
- 9780262344814
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037426.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed ...
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In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed experts get their expertise from Google, how can the average person distinguish real science from fake? This book examines pseudoscience from a variety of perspectives, through case studies, analysis, and personal accounts that show how to recognize pseudoscience, why it is so widely accepted, and how to advocate for real science. Contributors examine the basics of pseudoscience, including issues of cognitive bias; the costs of pseudoscience, with accounts of naturopathy and logical fallacies in the anti-vaccination movement; perceptions of scientific soundness; the mainstream presence of “integrative medicine,” hypnosis, and parapsychology; and the use of case studies and new media in science advocacy.Less
In a post-truth, fake news world, we are particularly susceptible to the claims of pseudoscience. When emotions and opinions are more widely disseminated than scientific findings, and self-proclaimed experts get their expertise from Google, how can the average person distinguish real science from fake? This book examines pseudoscience from a variety of perspectives, through case studies, analysis, and personal accounts that show how to recognize pseudoscience, why it is so widely accepted, and how to advocate for real science. Contributors examine the basics of pseudoscience, including issues of cognitive bias; the costs of pseudoscience, with accounts of naturopathy and logical fallacies in the anti-vaccination movement; perceptions of scientific soundness; the mainstream presence of “integrative medicine,” hypnosis, and parapsychology; and the use of case studies and new media in science advocacy.