Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-15 of 15 items

  • Keywords: belief reports x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions

Jennifer M. Saul

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199219155
eISBN:
9780191711848
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

It has traditionally been thought that the substitution of co-referential terms succeeds in all but a few special linguistic contexts, such as belief reports. Philosophers have devoted considerable ... More


Substitution and Simple Sentences

Jennifer Saul

in Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199219155
eISBN:
9780191711848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter provides a detailed look at the consequences of apparent substitution failures in simple sentences for standard debates on substitution. It begins with a look at traditional puzzle cases ... More


Default Semantics for Propositional Attitude Reports

K.M. Jaszczolt

in Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199261987
eISBN:
9780191718656
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261987.003.0005
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics

This chapter addresses the problem of substitutivity of coreferential expressions in belief reports, and offers an original solution to this problem in the form of degrees of mode of presentation ... More


Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions

Berit Brogaard

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199796908
eISBN:
9780199933235
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the ... More


Reporting Belief

Berit Brogaard

in Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199796908
eISBN:
9780199933235
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The claim that temporal contents may be the semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences is relatively uncontroversial. Eternalists such as Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, Mark Richard, Nathan Salmon, ... More


‘Bamboozled by our Own Words’: Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This chapter addresses several objections to contextualism, some of which have been prominent: objections from judgments of comparative content, and objections based on how ‘know(s)’ behaves within ... More


The Face-Value Theory

Stephen Schiffer

in The Things We Mean

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199257768
eISBN:
9780191602313
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199257760.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the ... More


Chapter The Easy Problem of Belief Reports

Stefano Predelli

in Contexts: Meaning, Truth, and the Use of Language

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199281732
eISBN:
9780191603204
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199281734.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter defends a simple-minded solution to the problems raised by occurrences of proper names within attitude reports, with particular attention to alleged failures of the substitutivity ... More


Objects of Thought

Ian Rumfitt

in Meanings and Other Things

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780199684939
eISBN:
9780191765230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

In The Things We Mean, Schiffer notes an asymmetry between ordinary singular terms and that-clauses: while we determine the truth of ‘Henri admires Braque’ by determining whether the referent of ... More


Propositional Platitudes

Gary Ostertag

in Meanings and Other Things

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780199684939
eISBN:
9780191765230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

On Schiffer’s face-value theory, “Lois believes that Kent is nerdy” asserts a binary relation between Lois and the proposition that Kent is nerdy. The theory of pleonastic propositions completes the ... More


De Re Belief Reports: Response to Gary Ostertag

Stephen Schiffer

in Meanings and Other Things

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780199684939
eISBN:
9780191765230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Ostertag’s contribution questions whether Schiffer’s current theory of belief reports—the face-value theory of belief reports combined with the pleonastic theory of propositions—fares better against ... More


Reference and Propositional Attitudes

Brian Loar

in Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780199673353
eISBN:
9780191758935
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

There are belief reports such as ‘Michael believes that that masked man is a diplomat’ in which a singular term (‘that masked man’) occurs referentially but substituting a co-referential singular ... More


Constraint with Restraint

Nathan Salmon

in Meanings and Other Things

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780199684939
eISBN:
9780191765230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Schiffer’s 2006 paper, “A Problem For Direct Reference Theories Of Belief Reports,” proposes a counterexample to the direct reference theorist’s analysis of belief reports. Schiffer’s argument turns ... More


Meanings and Other Things

Gary Ostertag (ed.)

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780199684939
eISBN:
9780191765230
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Fourteen major philosophers address Stephen Schiffer’s contributions to the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and ethics. The Introduction provides an overview of Schiffer’s work and relates the ... More


De Re Subtleties: Response to Nathan Salmon

Stephen Schiffer

in Meanings and Other Things

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780199684939
eISBN:
9780191765230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

An extended reply to Salmon’s contribution, itself a response to Schiffer’s 2006 paper, “A Problem For Direct Reference Theories Of Belief Reports”.


View: