Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This is the central chapter of this book. It criticizes belief revision theory for providing only a non-iterable account of belief change and thus only an incomplete dynamics of belief. An analysis ...
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This is the central chapter of this book. It criticizes belief revision theory for providing only a non-iterable account of belief change and thus only an incomplete dynamics of belief. An analysis of the incompleteness motivates the basic notion of this book: ranking functions. The chapter introduces some variants of this notion and develops its basic theory. It explains how ranks represent belief, and by defining conditional ranks, it is able to adequately explicate conditional belief. The latter notion finally allows stating a complete dynamics of belief by specifying various rules of conditionalization. Expansion, revision, and contraction turn out to be special cases of those rules. An appendix discusses the existing insufficient attempts at iterated belief change, and a further appendix explicates so-called multiple contraction in ranking-theoretic terms.Less
This is the central chapter of this book. It criticizes belief revision theory for providing only a non-iterable account of belief change and thus only an incomplete dynamics of belief. An analysis of the incompleteness motivates the basic notion of this book: ranking functions. The chapter introduces some variants of this notion and develops its basic theory. It explains how ranks represent belief, and by defining conditional ranks, it is able to adequately explicate conditional belief. The latter notion finally allows stating a complete dynamics of belief by specifying various rules of conditionalization. Expansion, revision, and contraction turn out to be special cases of those rules. An appendix discusses the existing insufficient attempts at iterated belief change, and a further appendix explicates so-called multiple contraction in ranking-theoretic terms.
Isaac Levi
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199270705
- eISBN:
- 9780191601774
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270708.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a continuation of Isaac Levi’s work on formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of contraction. It argues that the problem of how to contract is essential both to an account of ...
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This book is a continuation of Isaac Levi’s work on formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of contraction. It argues that the problem of how to contract is essential both to an account of justified or legitimate belief change, and to modal judgment conditional on a supposition. It presents a formal characterization of mild contraction, which is similar to what Pagnucco and Rott called “severe withdrawal”. This difference in terminology reflects a difference in philosophical perspective that is explained by the author.Less
This book is a continuation of Isaac Levi’s work on formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of contraction. It argues that the problem of how to contract is essential both to an account of justified or legitimate belief change, and to modal judgment conditional on a supposition. It presents a formal characterization of mild contraction, which is similar to what Pagnucco and Rott called “severe withdrawal”. This difference in terminology reflects a difference in philosophical perspective that is explained by the author.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental ...
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Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Therefore this book motivates and introduces the basic notion of a ranking function, which provides a new kind of degrees ob belief that at same time accounts for belief simpliciter. It develops ranking theory in ample detail, up to algorithms of inductive reasoning. It provides a measurement theory for ranking functions. It accounts for auto-epistemology in ranking-theoretic terms. It explicates the basic notion of a (deductive or non-deductive) reason, which is the entry to its rich philosophical applications. Among these are: a new account of lawlikeness, an account of ceteris paribus laws, a new perspective on dispositions, a rich and detailed theory of deterministic causation, an understanding of natural modalities as an objectification of epistemic modalities, an account of the experiential basis of belief, and thus a restructuring of the debate on foundationalism and coherentism (and externalism and contextualism), and finally a revival of fundamental a priori principles of reason fathoming the basics of empiricism and the relation between reason and truth and concluding in a proof of a weak principle of causality. All this is accompanied by thorough-going comparative discussions, on a general level as well as within each topic, and in particular with respect to probability theory that proves to be the major guideline of this book.Less
Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Therefore this book motivates and introduces the basic notion of a ranking function, which provides a new kind of degrees ob belief that at same time accounts for belief simpliciter. It develops ranking theory in ample detail, up to algorithms of inductive reasoning. It provides a measurement theory for ranking functions. It accounts for auto-epistemology in ranking-theoretic terms. It explicates the basic notion of a (deductive or non-deductive) reason, which is the entry to its rich philosophical applications. Among these are: a new account of lawlikeness, an account of ceteris paribus laws, a new perspective on dispositions, a rich and detailed theory of deterministic causation, an understanding of natural modalities as an objectification of epistemic modalities, an account of the experiential basis of belief, and thus a restructuring of the debate on foundationalism and coherentism (and externalism and contextualism), and finally a revival of fundamental a priori principles of reason fathoming the basics of empiricism and the relation between reason and truth and concluding in a proof of a weak principle of causality. All this is accompanied by thorough-going comparative discussions, on a general level as well as within each topic, and in particular with respect to probability theory that proves to be the major guideline of this book.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Conditional ranks also allow explicating a subjective notion of (deductive or non-deductive) reason, i.e., positive relevance, which is at the base of all current notions of (theoretical) reasons. ...
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Conditional ranks also allow explicating a subjective notion of (deductive or non-deductive) reason, i.e., positive relevance, which is at the base of all current notions of (theoretical) reasons. The chapter introduces and defends this explication; it distinguishes sufficient, necessary, insufficient, and supererogatory reasons (in an unconditional and a conditional version); it states the formal behavior of reasons thus explicated; it explains how such reasons can be weighed; and it shows that it is reasons precisely in this sense that drive the dynamics of belief. Moreover, it explains what maximal certainty and unrevisability mean in ranking-theoretic terms and thus provides a dynamic approach to two notions of apriority: (traditional) unrevisable apriority and so-called defeasible apriority.Less
Conditional ranks also allow explicating a subjective notion of (deductive or non-deductive) reason, i.e., positive relevance, which is at the base of all current notions of (theoretical) reasons. The chapter introduces and defends this explication; it distinguishes sufficient, necessary, insufficient, and supererogatory reasons (in an unconditional and a conditional version); it states the formal behavior of reasons thus explicated; it explains how such reasons can be weighed; and it shows that it is reasons precisely in this sense that drive the dynamics of belief. Moreover, it explains what maximal certainty and unrevisability mean in ranking-theoretic terms and thus provides a dynamic approach to two notions of apriority: (traditional) unrevisable apriority and so-called defeasible apriority.
David Christensen
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199263257
- eISBN:
- 9780191602603
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263256.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Sets up parameters for the book's approach — focuses on epistemic (rather than pragmatic) rationality; looks at conditions on simultaneous rational beliefs (rather than on rational changes of ...
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Sets up parameters for the book's approach — focuses on epistemic (rather than pragmatic) rationality; looks at conditions on simultaneous rational beliefs (rather than on rational changes of belief); and concentrates on global rationality—conditions for an agent's whole system of beliefs (rather than on local conditions for the rationality of particular beliefs). These choices are designed to focus the inquiry where formal logic is most likely to be useful in characterizing ideal rationality.Less
Sets up parameters for the book's approach — focuses on epistemic (rather than pragmatic) rationality; looks at conditions on simultaneous rational beliefs (rather than on rational changes of belief); and concentrates on global rationality—conditions for an agent's whole system of beliefs (rather than on local conditions for the rationality of particular beliefs). These choices are designed to focus the inquiry where formal logic is most likely to be useful in characterizing ideal rationality.
Newton C. A. da Costa and Steven French
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195156515
- eISBN:
- 9780199785896
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515651X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter considers the “vertical” relationship between theory and evidence. In particular, it considers the impact of the conception of “partial” truth on the dynamics of belief change. A new ...
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This chapter considers the “vertical” relationship between theory and evidence. In particular, it considers the impact of the conception of “partial” truth on the dynamics of belief change. A new basis for a logic of induction is developed which is faithful to the central principles of induction as set down by Russell, and which can handle various well-known problems that are taken to beset standard Bayesian approaches. It is shown that the standard, but implausible, assumption of “logical omniscience” can be appropriately weakened through a formal modification of the notion of “quasi truth”.Less
This chapter considers the “vertical” relationship between theory and evidence. In particular, it considers the impact of the conception of “partial” truth on the dynamics of belief change. A new basis for a logic of induction is developed which is faithful to the central principles of induction as set down by Russell, and which can handle various well-known problems that are taken to beset standard Bayesian approaches. It is shown that the standard, but implausible, assumption of “logical omniscience” can be appropriately weakened through a formal modification of the notion of “quasi truth”.
Suzanne Keen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195175769
- eISBN:
- 9780199851232
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195175769.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
This chapter examines several kinds of evidence about reactions to reading a novel based on a study conducted by Wayne Booth which surveyed readers of different ages and backgrounds about the novels ...
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This chapter examines several kinds of evidence about reactions to reading a novel based on a study conducted by Wayne Booth which surveyed readers of different ages and backgrounds about the novels that had led them to make a change in their behavior or beliefs. It discusses readers' experiences related to narrative empathy and explains a set of working hypotheses about the qualities of novels that evoke empathy in readers. It also analyzes the result of empirical studies concerning the effects of reading and discusses ideas about readers' empathy.Less
This chapter examines several kinds of evidence about reactions to reading a novel based on a study conducted by Wayne Booth which surveyed readers of different ages and backgrounds about the novels that had led them to make a change in their behavior or beliefs. It discusses readers' experiences related to narrative empathy and explains a set of working hypotheses about the qualities of novels that evoke empathy in readers. It also analyzes the result of empirical studies concerning the effects of reading and discusses ideas about readers' empathy.
Brian Skyrms
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652808
- eISBN:
- 9780191745829
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652808.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Does radical probabilism have enough structure to say anything interesting? Structure is provided by coherent belief change. Coherence imposes the Martingale property, which gives convergence ...
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Does radical probabilism have enough structure to say anything interesting? Structure is provided by coherent belief change. Coherence imposes the Martingale property, which gives convergence theorems and theorems about the value of knowledge.Less
Does radical probabilism have enough structure to say anything interesting? Structure is provided by coherent belief change. Coherence imposes the Martingale property, which gives convergence theorems and theorems about the value of knowledge.
Ralph Erber
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195133622
- eISBN:
- 9780199847952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133622.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter attempts to add to the literature on the psychological mechanisms underlying perpetrator behavior by looking at the possibility that a specific form of self-deception may play an ...
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This chapter attempts to add to the literature on the psychological mechanisms underlying perpetrator behavior by looking at the possibility that a specific form of self-deception may play an important role. Specifically, adopting lies and communicating them to others may enable perpetrators to carry out their evil tasks on a daily basis and may even enable them to live out the remainder of their lives with a clear conscience. The chapter examines what Hannah Arendt (1965) calls “lying self-deception”: the effects of telling lies repeatedly on subsequent belief change. The present analysis focuses heavily on how such processes may have operated on Adolf Eichmann, one of the main perpetrators of the Holocaust. In addition, the chapter offers speculations on how such an analysis may extend to other perpetrators, bystanders, and, to some extent, victims of genocide.Less
This chapter attempts to add to the literature on the psychological mechanisms underlying perpetrator behavior by looking at the possibility that a specific form of self-deception may play an important role. Specifically, adopting lies and communicating them to others may enable perpetrators to carry out their evil tasks on a daily basis and may even enable them to live out the remainder of their lives with a clear conscience. The chapter examines what Hannah Arendt (1965) calls “lying self-deception”: the effects of telling lies repeatedly on subsequent belief change. The present analysis focuses heavily on how such processes may have operated on Adolf Eichmann, one of the main perpetrators of the Holocaust. In addition, the chapter offers speculations on how such an analysis may extend to other perpetrators, bystanders, and, to some extent, victims of genocide.
Cristina Bicchieri
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190622046
- eISBN:
- 9780190622084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190622046.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The chapter studies how norms emerge or come to be abandoned. It argues how norm change always entails a change in social expectations. It also addresses which expectations must first change for a ...
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The chapter studies how norms emerge or come to be abandoned. It argues how norm change always entails a change in social expectations. It also addresses which expectations must first change for a norm to be abandoned, and which expectations have to be created for a norm to develop. It explains how social dilemmas can be solved by norms, as well as how cognitive biases affect the possibility of norm change. The chapter examines the role of scripts and schemata in norm change, and to illustrate these roles it takes examples from the field: sanitation and child marriage.Less
The chapter studies how norms emerge or come to be abandoned. It argues how norm change always entails a change in social expectations. It also addresses which expectations must first change for a norm to be abandoned, and which expectations have to be created for a norm to develop. It explains how social dilemmas can be solved by norms, as well as how cognitive biases affect the possibility of norm change. The chapter examines the role of scripts and schemata in norm change, and to illustrate these roles it takes examples from the field: sanitation and child marriage.
Ruth Barton
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226551616
- eISBN:
- 9780226551753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226551753.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter identifies the diverse cultural contexts that shaped the future members of the X Club: gentlemanly London science (Busk, Hooker and Lubbock), Balliol College, Oxford (Spottiswoode), ...
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This chapter identifies the diverse cultural contexts that shaped the future members of the X Club: gentlemanly London science (Busk, Hooker and Lubbock), Balliol College, Oxford (Spottiswoode), radical provincial Dissent (Spencer and Huxley), and the mechanics institutes and mutual improvement societies of the industrial north (Frankland, Tyndall and Hirst). The variety of their social backgrounds, scientific ambitions, and religious beliefs opens windows onto early Victorian science more generally. The future X-men included wealthy amateurs pursuing their scientific interests, medically trained men seeking to make reputations and careers in science, and social outsiders seeking to rise in the world through scientific employment. Most saw specialist expertise as the route to scientific recognition. They were all aware of the subtle distinctions of social status and religious belief that shaped Victorian life. Even scientific societies, it is shown, marked their status by the level of their fees. Religious skeptics were expected to constrain their conversation in polite society to avoid giving offence to orthodox believers. The changing religious beliefs of the nine are investigated: varieties of Anglicanism; reinterpretations of religion that rejected dogmatic formulations and associated “true” religion with deep feeling; the politics of Church reform and disestablishment.Less
This chapter identifies the diverse cultural contexts that shaped the future members of the X Club: gentlemanly London science (Busk, Hooker and Lubbock), Balliol College, Oxford (Spottiswoode), radical provincial Dissent (Spencer and Huxley), and the mechanics institutes and mutual improvement societies of the industrial north (Frankland, Tyndall and Hirst). The variety of their social backgrounds, scientific ambitions, and religious beliefs opens windows onto early Victorian science more generally. The future X-men included wealthy amateurs pursuing their scientific interests, medically trained men seeking to make reputations and careers in science, and social outsiders seeking to rise in the world through scientific employment. Most saw specialist expertise as the route to scientific recognition. They were all aware of the subtle distinctions of social status and religious belief that shaped Victorian life. Even scientific societies, it is shown, marked their status by the level of their fees. Religious skeptics were expected to constrain their conversation in polite society to avoid giving offence to orthodox believers. The changing religious beliefs of the nine are investigated: varieties of Anglicanism; reinterpretations of religion that rejected dogmatic formulations and associated “true” religion with deep feeling; the politics of Church reform and disestablishment.
Cristina Bicchieri
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190622046
- eISBN:
- 9780190622084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190622046.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The chapter discusses which tools can be employed to bring about norm change. It examines the limits of legislative interventions and economic incentives. It thereafter explores the role of the media ...
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The chapter discusses which tools can be employed to bring about norm change. It examines the limits of legislative interventions and economic incentives. It thereafter explores the role of the media and collective deliberation in initiating norm change. It identifies the marks of a successful intervention both within media and community deliberation. Along the way, it questions the purported utility of economic incentives for norm change, showing how incentives can backfire. Against the background of this critique, the chapter argues for the centrality of involving the target community in understanding the reasons for abandoning a traditional norm. However, it also raises cautionary flags about the use of deliberative practices in effecting norm change. An integrated approach, operating at the level of media, legal, and communal discussions, is recommended.Less
The chapter discusses which tools can be employed to bring about norm change. It examines the limits of legislative interventions and economic incentives. It thereafter explores the role of the media and collective deliberation in initiating norm change. It identifies the marks of a successful intervention both within media and community deliberation. Along the way, it questions the purported utility of economic incentives for norm change, showing how incentives can backfire. Against the background of this critique, the chapter argues for the centrality of involving the target community in understanding the reasons for abandoning a traditional norm. However, it also raises cautionary flags about the use of deliberative practices in effecting norm change. An integrated approach, operating at the level of media, legal, and communal discussions, is recommended.
Mark Richard
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198747765
- eISBN:
- 9780191811531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747765.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity and the objects of belief associated with sentences. Two views about propositions are temporalism, the view that some propositions can change truth ...
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Propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity and the objects of belief associated with sentences. Two views about propositions are temporalism, the view that some propositions can change truth value over time, and eternalism, the view that no proposition can do so. Eternalism is defended over temporalism. It is shown that temporalism is false, as it commits us to incorrect semantics for ascriptions of belief. A weakened version of temporalism is also considered and shown to be wanting.Less
Propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity and the objects of belief associated with sentences. Two views about propositions are temporalism, the view that some propositions can change truth value over time, and eternalism, the view that no proposition can do so. Eternalism is defended over temporalism. It is shown that temporalism is false, as it commits us to incorrect semantics for ascriptions of belief. A weakened version of temporalism is also considered and shown to be wanting.
